期刊名称:Advance Journal of Food Science and Technology
印刷版ISSN:2042-4868
电子版ISSN:2042-4876
出版年度:2016
卷号:10
期号:5
页码:378-383
DOI:10.19026/ajfst.10.2087
出版社:MAXWELL Science Publication
摘要:This study, based on the relationships and the evolutionary game theories among Food processing Enterprise, enterprises and the integrated social benefit, builds two system dynamics-based tripartite evolutionary game models for Food processing enterprise environmental regulation-static punishment model and dynamic punishment model. By imposing varied policy strategies on the two models, including adjusting "Budget of pollution inspection", adjusting "Reward for no pollution discharge", adjusting "Enterprise production gain", adjusting "Punishment coefficient" and combine the adjustment schemes, this study observes the changes in the action and the value in the two models. Finally, the author compares and analyzes the operation of the two models under the same policy strategy. The result shows that the loss of the integrated social benefit and the type of punishment mechanism will have a significant impact on the selection of the environmental regulation strategies. However, compared with the single strategy, the combination of policy strategies can make greater efforts in promoting the environmental regulatory model to achieve the "ideal state".