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  • 标题:Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge
  • 作者:Adams, Fred ; Clarke, Murray
  • 期刊名称:Logos & Episteme
  • 印刷版ISSN:2069-0533
  • 电子版ISSN:2069-3052
  • 出版年度:2016
  • 卷号:7
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:67-73
  • DOI:10.5840/logos-episteme2016715
  • 出版社:Institutul European
  • 摘要:In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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