文章基本信息

标题：Transparency Effect in the Emergence of Monopolies in Social Networks
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作者：Amir Hossein Shirazi ; Ali Namaki ; Amir Ahmad Roohi 等
期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
印刷版ISSN：1460-7425
出版年度：2013
卷号：16
期号：1
页码：1-10
DOI：10.18564/jasss.2054
出版社：University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
摘要：A power law degree distribution is displayed in many complex networks. However, in most real social and economic networks, deviation from power-law behavior is observed. Such networks also have giant hubs far from the tail of the power law distribution. We propose a model based on information 'transparency' (i.e. how much information is visible to others), which can explain the power structure in societies with non-transparency in information delivery. The emergence of very high degree nodes is explained as a direct result of censorship. Based on these assumptions, we define four distinct transparency regions: perfectly non-transparent, low transparent, perfectly transparent regions and regions where information is exaggerated. We observe the emergence of some very high degree nodes in low transparency networks. We show that the low transparency networks are more vulnerable to attack and the controllability of low transparent networks is more difficult than for the others. Also, the low transparency networks have a smaller mean path length and higher clustering coefficients than the other regions.
关键词：Social and Economical Networks; Information Transparency; Super-Nodes and Monopolies