文章基本信息

标题：An Agent Based Market Design Methodology for Combinatorial Auctions
本地全文：下载
作者：Jinho Choi ; Gyoo Gun Lim ; Kun Chang Lee 等
期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
印刷版ISSN：1460-7425
出版年度：2010
卷号：13
期号：2
页码：1-13
DOI：10.18564/jasss.1557
出版社：University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
摘要：Auction mechanisms have attracted a great deal of interest and have been used in diverse e-marketplaces. In particular, combinatorial auctions have the potential to play an important role in electronic transactions. Therefore, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed to satisfy market needs. These combinatorial auction types have diverse market characteristics, which require an effective market design approach. This study proposes a comprehensive and systematic market design methodology for combinatorial auctions based on three phases: market architecture design, auction rule design, and winner determination design. A market architecture design is for designing market architecture types by Backward Chain Reasoning. Auction rules design is to design transaction rules for auctions. The specific auction process type is identified by the Backward Chain Reasoning process. Winner determination design is about determining the decision model for selecting optimal bids and auctioneers. Optimization models are identified by Forward Chain Reasoning. Also, we propose an agent based combinatorial auction market design system using Backward and Forward Chain Reasoning. Then we illustrate a design process for the general n-bilateral combinatorial auction market. This study serves as a guideline for practical implementation of combinatorial auction markets design.
关键词：Combinatorial Auction; Market Design Methodology; Market Architecture Design; Auction Rule Design; Winner Determination Design; Agent-Based System