文章基本信息

标题：Punishment Deters Crime Because Humans Are Bounded in Their Strategic Decision-Making
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作者：Heiko Rauhut ; Marcel Junker
期刊名称：Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
印刷版ISSN：1460-7425
出版年度：2009
卷号：12
期号：3
页码：1-23
出版社：University of Surrey, Department of Sociology
摘要：Is it rational to reduce criminal activities if punishments are increased? While intuition might suggest so, game theory concludes differently. From the game theoretical perspective, inspectors anticipate the effect of increased punishments on criminal behavior and reduce their inspection activities accordingly. This implies that higher punishments reduce inspections and do not affect crime rates. We present two laboratory experiments, which challenge this perspective by demonstrating that both, criminals and inspectors, are affected by punishment levels. Thereupon, we investigate with agent-based simulations, whether models of bounded rationality can explain our empirical data. We differentiate between two kinds of bounded rationality; the first considers bounded learning from social interaction, the second bounded decision-making. Our results suggest that humans show both kinds of bounded rationality in the strategic situation of crime, control and punishment. We conclude that it is not the rationality but the bounded rationality in humans that makes punishment effective.
关键词：Crime; Punishment; Control; Bounded Rationality; Agent-Based Simulation; Experiment; Game Theory