文章基本信息

标题：Truthful Mechanisms for Delivery with Agents
本地全文：下载
作者：Andreas B{\"a}rtschi ; Daniel Graf ; Paolo Penna 等
期刊名称：OASIcs : OpenAccess Series in Informatics
电子版ISSN：2190-6807
出版年度：2017
卷号：59
页码：1-17
DOI：10.4230/OASIcs.ATMOS.2017.2
出版社：Schloss Dagstuhl -- Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik
摘要：We study the game-theoretic task of selecting mobile agents to deliver multiple items on a network. An instance is given by $m$ packages (physical objects) which have to be transported between specified source-target pairs in an undirected graph, and $k$ mobile heterogeneous agents, each being able to transport one package at a time. Following a recent model [Baertschi et al. 2017], each agent i has a different rate of energy consumption per unit distance traveled, i.e., its weight. We are interested in optimizing or approximating the total energy consumption over all selected agents. Unlike previous research, we assume the weights to be private values known only to the respective agents. We present three different mechanisms which select, route and pay the agents in a truthful way that guarantees voluntary participation of the agents, while approximating the optimum energy consumption by a constant factor. To this end, we analyze a previous structural result and an approximation algorithm given in [Baertschi et al. 2017]. Finally, we show that for some instances in the case of a single package, the sum of the payments can be bounded in terms of the optimum.
关键词：delivery; agent; energy optimization; approximation mechanism; frugality