文章基本信息

标题：Eavesdropping and animal conflict
本地全文：下载
作者：Rufus A. Johnstone
期刊名称：Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
印刷版ISSN：0027-8424
电子版ISSN：1091-6490
出版年度：2001
卷号：98
期号：16
页码：9177-9180
DOI：10.1073/pnas.161058798
语种：English
出版社：The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
摘要：Fights between pairs of animals frequently take place within a wider social context. The displays exchanged during conflict, and the outcome of an encounter, are often detectable by individuals who are not immediately involved. In at least some species, such bystanders are known to eavesdrop on contests between others, and to modify their behavior toward the contestants in response to the observed interaction. Here, I extend Maynard Smith's well known model of animal aggression, the Hawk-Dove game, to incorporate the possibility of eavesdroppers. I show that some eavesdropping is favored whenever the cost of losing an escalated fight exceeds the value of the contested resource, and that its equilibrium frequency is greatest when costs are relatively high. Eavesdropping reduces the risk of escalated conflict relative to that expected by chance, given the level of aggression in the population. However, it also promotes increased aggression, because it enhances the value of victory. The net result is that escalated conflicts are predicted to occur more frequently when eavesdropping is possible.