文章基本信息

标题：A Dynamic Stackelberg Game of Supply Chain for a Corporate Social Responsibility
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作者：Massimiliano Ferrara ; Mehrnoosh Khademi ; Mehdi Salimi 等
期刊名称：Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
印刷版ISSN：1026-0226
电子版ISSN：1607-887X
出版年度：2017
卷号：2017
DOI：10.1155/2017/8656174
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a supply chain in a decentralized state which includes a supplier and a manufacturer. For analyzing supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members of the supply chain, we formulate a model that crosses through multiperiods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game which is made under two different information structures. We obtain an equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by supply chains are maximized.