文章基本信息

标题：Relativism defended
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作者：Howard Darmstadter ; Peter Stanley Fosl ; Reviewing Editor 等
期刊名称：Cogent Arts and Humanities
电子版ISSN：2331-1983
出版年度：2016
卷号：3
期号：1
DOI：10.1080/23311983.2016.1166685
出版社：Taylor and Francis Ltd
摘要：Abstract I argue for a type of relativism that allows different people to have conflicting accurate representations of the world. This is contrary to the view of most Anglo-American philosophers, who would, with Paul Boghossian in Fear of Knowledge, deny that “there are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world.” My argument is not a metaphysical argument about the ultimate nature of the outside world, but a psychological argument about the mental processes of representation. The argument starts from a few principles of naïve (or folk) psychology, but is later extended to apply to mechanisms that do not have a “psychology.” Finally, I briefly discuss the anti-relativist impulse in philosophy, with particular reference to Boghossian’s example of non-scientific beliefs regarding Lakota origins. I argue that both we and the Lakotas have good reason to reject such beliefs while still remaining relativists. Being a relativist does not mean that you get to believe whatever you like.
关键词：relativism ; belief systems ; models ; representations ; Boghossian