文章基本信息

标题：A note on auctions with compulsory partnership
本地全文：下载
作者：Paulo K. Monteiro ; Aloisio Araujo ; Otávio Damé 等
期刊名称：Revista Brasileira de Economia
印刷版ISSN：0034-7140
出版年度：2016
卷号：70
期号：4
页码：481-486
语种：English
出版社：Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
摘要：We study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
其他摘要：We study a symmetric, profitt share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < r < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
关键词：pre-salt auction;equilibrium existence