Since systemic risk in recent financial crisis has received attention, a wide variety of studies on how financial regulations should be reformed to control such risk have been progressed. Among these, mathematical and computational studies have analyzed the way how the borrowing and lending banks and the borrowers go bankrupt in the chain via interbanking network. This study deals with a chain of bankruptcies of financial institutions endogenously caused by deterioration of their financial situations from the changes in prices of risky assets by focusing on the macro-level collapse caused by the shock stemming from the general market risk factors addressed in theoretical studies after the crisis in 2008. For this purpose, the authors develop an agent-based simulation platform and then examine how current systemic management regulations affect corresponding bankruptcies. The main findings are as follows: First, pertinent management regulations are dependent on the market environment. Second, some combination of management regulations may increase the possibilities of bankruptcies due to more sensitivity toward the market change.