摘要：This article focuses on the possible determinants of the concentration of the right to vote and the rights over cash-flow of the controlling shareholders of publicly-quoted Brazilian companies. The analysis investigates if endogenous variables of firms and sectors mean that some companies have a more concentrated corporate structure than others that undergo the same contractual environment. When empirical tests were applied to a panel of 161 companies between 1998 and 2002, the variables that were tested as possible determinants seem not to have an influence on the shareholder concentration of the owners of the companies that were analyzed. The results offer evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the influence of the exogeneity of the ownership structure on corporate performance, which has been used in recent work.
关键词：Ownership structure;corporate governance;investor protection;voting rights;rights over cash-flow;Estrutura de propriedade;governança corporativa;proteção ao investidor;direito de voto;direito sobre o fluxo de caixa
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