文章基本信息

标题：Monetary policy goals and central bank independence
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作者：M.A. AKHTAR
期刊名称：PSL Quarterly Review
印刷版ISSN：2037-3643
出版年度：2013
卷号：48
期号：195
语种：English
出版社：Economia civile
摘要：During recent years a strong body of academic literature has argued that central bank independence (CBI) is necessary in order to achieve and maintain low inflation. This appears to support the view of central bankers that they should have the autonomy to pursue policy objectives without being pressured by short-term political objectives. The treatment of policy goals and the issue of policymakers' inflationary bias within CBI models are reviewed. JEL Codes: E52, E58 Keywords: Decision-making, Models, Decision making, Evaluation, Monetary policy
关键词：Decision-making, Models, Decision making, Evaluation, Monetary policy