文章基本信息

标题：Managerial Incentives And Changes In Corporate Focus
本地全文：下载
作者：Ronald W. Best ; Charles W. Hodges ; Bing-Xuan Lin 等
期刊名称：Journal of Business & Economics Research
印刷版ISSN：1542-4448
电子版ISSN：2157-8893
出版年度：2011
卷号：2
期号：3
语种：English
出版社：The Clute Institute for Academic Research
摘要：We examine how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity ownership, CEO tenure, and the percentage of options in CEO annual compensation are related to decisions regarding changes in corporate focus. We document that the CEOs whose companies change their level of corporate focus have significant differences from CEOs whose firms do not change focus. However, we find no differences in the characteristics of CEOs who increase their firm’s level of diversification and the CEOs who decrease their firm’s level of diversification. Firm characteristics, such as size or whether the firm sells at a premium or discount to its peers, are better predictors of changes in corporate focus than CEO characteristics. Overall, we find no evidence that changes in diversification are related to self-serving managers attempting to maximize their own wealth.