文章基本信息

标题：CAPACITY CONSTRAINT, MERGER PARADOX AND WELFARE-IMPROVING PRO-MERGER POLICY
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作者：DONG, BAOMIN ; GUO, GUIXIA ; QIAN, XIAOLIN 等
期刊名称：Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
印刷版ISSN：0018-280X
出版年度：2016
卷号：57
期号：1
页码：1-26
DOI：10.15057/27944
出版社：Maruzen Company Ltd
摘要：In this paper, we show that the “Merger Paradox” (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983) ismitigated when capacity constraint is considered. This is because outside firms who do notparticipate in a merger cannot expand their output beyond their existing capacity, and therefore,Stigler type of free riding is alleviated. When overcapacity is socially costly, it is also shownthat a pro-merger fiscal policy may discourage ex ante capacity investment and hence alleviateovercapacity, if capacity building is not too costly. Furthermore, it can be shown that theoptimal pro-merger subsidy is always welfare improving when it discourages capacity building.
关键词：capacity constraint; merger paradox; overcapacity