期刊名称:Discussion Paper Series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
出版年度:2015
出版社:Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
摘要:Evidence from public good game experiments holds the promise of instructive and cost- e.ective insights to inform environmental policy-making, for example on climate change mitigation. To fulfill the promise, such evidence needs to demonstrate generalizability to the specific policy context. This paper examines whether and under which conditions such evidence generalizes to voluntary mitigation decisions. We observe each participant in two di.erent decision tasks: a real giving task in which contributions are used to directly reduce CO 2 emissions and a public good game. Through two treatment variations, we explore two potential shifters of generalizability in a within-subjects design: the structural resemblance of contribution incentives between the tasks and the role of the subject pool, students and non-students. Our findings suggest that cooperation in public good games is linked to voluntary mitigation behavior, albeit not in a uniform way. For a standard set of parameters, behavior in both tasks is uncorrelated. Greater structural resemblance of the public goods game leads to sizable correlations, especially for student subjects