The role of procurement as trusted adviser to management.
Young, Bill ; Green, Charles H.
Procurement's journey from transactional processing to
strategic business partnering is not complete. Many argue it has even
stalled. Some personal successes are evident, but they are individual
achievements, not an organizational model that can be copied. We argue
that this should surprise no one. Too many unresolved conflicts exist
between the role of procurement and its internal clients, and the
savings metrics used by procurement belong to a former age and aggravate
the problem. Where good relationships exist, they do so between
individuals who trust each other in spite of these conflicts. We argue
that trust is fundamental and essential in the type of relationship that
procurement is aiming for, but the metrics and governance used by
procurement are antithetical to its aims. Procurement has pushed hard to
attract brighter and better staff, but research shows that capability is
not enough. A genuine understanding of and concern for clients'
ambitions and goals is needed: Procurement needs to be benevolent as
well as capable in the way it works with clients. Six distinct areas of
conflict demonstrate how procurement's targets and metrics serve to
defeat its strategic aims and to undermine the work it invests in
building capabilities. These include incentives to engage late with
vendors, to over-specify requirements and even to shrink a business
rather than grow it. We conclude that there is a need for an alternative
to savings as the main reporting metric for procurement; the one we
recommend is Spend Control Index. This isn't a completely new
concept, but very few organizations set out to use it rigorously as
their primary indicator of procurement's performance. In our view,
doing so would catalyze a change in behavior and encourage real trust,
leading to the strategic business partnerships all parties desire.
Tensions in the Realm of Procurement
Procurement today is a complex management service, intended to
support the strategic aims of the organization. However, some of
procurement's intended customers are confused about its role and
intentions--and hence don't trust its motives. This is only
partially due to customers' misunderstandings; a good bit of it is
procurement's own fault. While presenting itself as a strategic
business partner, some purchasing practices are in fact tactical--and,
worse yet, self-serving.
This creates a trust issue with procurement's clientele--both
internally and externally. In a day and age where collaboration is a
strategic must, unnecessary tensions created between an
organization's own business and functional units are strategically
relevant and financially harmful.
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Kinnaird and Movius, arguing for a more sophisticated approach to
negotiations, observed that: "On the one hand, business leaders ...
want to be able to sit down and talk freely with their counterparts,
shaping deals and exploring potential options. On the other hand, we
have procurement attempting to constrain dialogue within a process that
it insists on controlling, seemingly fearful of the very relationships
that business leaders want to cultivate." (1)
The reasons for lack of trust show up mainly in procurement's
target metrics and the way in which procurement reports them. The
metrics are excessively focused on savings, even when those savings are
secondary or cannot be measured. While savings are a proper target for
certain cost--down programs, the aggregated total of savings is a
misleading performance indicator--its acceptance and use create perverse incentives.
Deeper down, these tensions are an outcome of two distinct views of
procurement: one rooted in transactions, another based on relationships.
Both views are necessary, but the inability to distinguish between the
two as the situation demands creates dysfunction.
We suggest that a solution lies in better defining
procurement's transactional versus relationship responsibilities.
We offer such a view, as well as a metric for control over external
spend. This is a performance indicator superior to cost savings.
Accepting this as an overriding objective would align procurement with
its customers, create trust and make it a truly strategic partner.
Context: the Changing Role of Procurement
Procurement has three broad functions:
* The first is managing internal transactions for ordering and
receiving goods and services and handling procurement data. The primary
goal here is to maximize the efficiency of transaction flow and
reporting.
* The second is support for vendor engagement and contracting
processes. Procurement's roots are in regular price negotiations
for raw materials, packaging, tools, consumables, components and other
regular purchases. It is largely a tactical and transaction-focused
process.
* The third area is "value-based strategic procurement that
can translate into bottom line improvements to the corporation ... to
ensure that the procurement strategy is aligned with, and that it
rolls-up to, the overall corporate strategy." (2)
The Internet has created massive opportunities for driving
efficiency in the first two functions--from automating order processes
to establishing online, blinded bid systems, for example. These have the
lion's share of attention in the general management press. However,
apart from that, the essence of the first two roles has not
substantively changed.
It is in the third role that procurement has attempted a
metamorphosis (3) in several ways:
* Procurement is increasingly responsible for buying nontraditional
services such as consultancy, audit, training and legal.
* Procurement now challenges specifications developed by its own
internal customers, and, in some cases, even the basic need for a
purchase.
* It may draft or even own the organization's strategy for
buying goods and services with high transaction volumes, such as travel,
office supplies and MRO (maintenance, repair and operation), in some
cases.
* It may support or lead outsourcing projects.
"This change, with half of [procurement departments] looking
after marketing spend and more than two-thirds in charge of professional
services, suggests an increase not only in their responsibility, but
also in influence at a strategic level. It also suggests a shift towards
an increasing responsibility for people-related buying." (4)
General managers and the public still tend to think of procurement
as being essentially about bargaining. But it now aims to create value
and even competitive advantage on behalf of its internal customers in
all activities relating to vendors, according to this received wisdom.
But has its outlook matured sufficiently to match these
responsibilities? And how do its customers see it?
Schiele & McCue (5) describe two main traits that determine the
level of meaningful involvement that a purchasing department can have
with client departments. They are:
(1.) Ability: the extent to which the purchasing department has the
requisite expertise and ability to benefit the client department
(2.) Benevolence: the extent to which the purchasing department is
concerned about the needs and interests of the client department
Chief procurement officers (CPOs) have invested heavily in staff
and training to build expertise and achieve the first trait. But both
traits must be present if client departments are to have trust in the
purchasing department; and there is evidence that benevolence has not
been addressed with the same rigor as ability.
The problems of tactics, conflict and trust arise when
procurement's traditional, tactical roles are confused with the
strategic position in which it wants to be. This typically happens in
the realm of performance measurement.
Six Areas of Conflict
There are six areas in which confusion between the traditional
tactical role and the new strategic role arises and which, in turn, lead
to conflict.
1. Price vs. Value Assessments: Procurement often helps internal
customers (budget owners) to understand a need better, identify the best
goods and services for that need, and undertake cost/benefit analyses
for different solutions. When there are more factors to consider than
price alone, procurement uses weighted criteria to evaluate the best
offer. Customers often appreciate this help.
However, procurement's target, as well as the annual
assessments of its managers, is based mainly on achieved savings, so
they have an incentive to push hardest on price rather than other
factors that contribute to value. The effect is that intentions are
unclear, incentives are mixed and customers are confused--even
resentful.
2. Market-Based Solutions: There is an instinct in procurement to
challenge price through competitive tendering. This is based on a faith
in the rational outcomes of markets dealing with common (i.e.,
commoditized) goods. The aim of procurement, then, is often to formalize
the requirements, remove subjectivity and bring the service as close to
a commodity as possible. (6) It's a great theory and hard to argue
against--if it did not conflict with the way people actually make
purchase decisions.
In practice, we as humans indeed use rational criteria in the
screening part of a down-selection process to create a short list of
suppliers, who are qualified to provide the required goods or services.
But then we tend to look the supplier candidates in the eye to decide
which one we would like to deal with; this final selection stage is less
cognitively defined and less tangible. Senior managers are paid to make
judgments, and they do so.
Procurement's aim is typically to commoditize all goods and
services so as to remove intangibles like trust from the vendor
selection process. This works well in the first phase of screening,
where those are unarguable virtues. In this phase, we want an empirical,
fact-based process in which the vendor is selected by weighted criteria
set against price.
But when it comes to the selection phase, client managers want to
explore a relationship with the final candidates and test their own
comfort level before moving forward. This is a decision model
that's entirely different from the rational screening process.
There's nothing wrong with this conflict, but it is one that many
procurement staff fail to deal with because of their focus on the
traditional, tactical transaction processes.
3. Explicit vs. Implicit Contracts (7): Explicit contracts are
written and formal. Implicit contracts are not: They are usually created
during a working relationship and are based on trust. Often the two go
together: The explicit contract is agreed between the organizations at
the start; and implicit deals, based on trust, develop between
individuals working together.
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Procurement, reflecting its transactional responsibilities, worries
about cozy relationships that circumvent the formal buying process, but
it may fail to recognize that implicit deals are essential and try to
overformalize.
It may even go further, toward the deliberate exploitation of a
vendor's trust and the breaking of implicit deals. For instance, a
vendor may invest in production capacity and stock to provide
reliability that justifies a price premium only to find that the
business is tendered to the lowest bidder. Such a case represents a
tragic triumph of the tactical--taking pride in counting transactional
battles won--at the expense of a war lost on relationships.
4. Strategic Discussions: Chief procurement officers say their
staff should become involved in projects earlier and more strategically,
so they can drive efficiencies and cost avoidance during the planning
and design stages of projects, not just during final vendor
negotiations. They recruit and develop purchasing managers with
higher-level skills who can work strategically with their clients'
functional leadership teams.
But these strategic discussions raise a tension when it comes to
measuring performance--a tension that is frequently ignored. Procurement
performance is typically measured by cost savings. This is what many
clients assume as obvious truth, and many CPOs don't offer an
alternative. Unfortunately, pursuing strategic objectives can lower the
possible range of savings targets. Here's how:
At first, everyone agrees on the value of early, strategic
engagement. It creates clarity of the business issue, sharper
specifications, more appropriate technical solutions and earlier
screening out of unsuitable suppliers. But this narrows the delta that
procurement is able to report as a saving. With a smaller number of
qualified suppliers, the gap between the highest and lowest bidder is
reduced, and it is even possible that the highest bidder offers the best
overall value. How, if they are rewarded mainly on savings, is the
procurement manager incentivized to invest time and effort in strategy?
Until 2009, procurement departments accepted (or conspired to
ignore?) this paradox. However, as the financial crisis hit, many CPOs
told their staff to focus on tactical savings and to forget the
strategy. The switch in approach confused many clients and reinforced
perceptions that procurement was, after all, a tactical service.
5. Contrived Calculations: Continued use of transaction-based
metrics to evaluate strategic objectives can lead to serious gaming of
the system. For example, procurement savings on raw materials can be
translated into P&L accounts only if there are ongoing purchases and
like-for-like unit-price comparisons. Often, however, this is not the
case, so procurement looks for reportable savings in:
* The difference between two quotes
* External benchmarks
* Internal changes (e.g., job cuts)
* Other benefits (e.g., production efficiencies, waste reduction,
reduced working capital)
These calculations have a subjective element, but they are,
nevertheless, aggregated with unit-price reductions to create the
headline number reported by the CPO.
Reported savings also address only the areas that procurement
chooses to report. A price rise (a negative saving?) is likely to go
unreported. And there is an incentive for procurement managers to
harvest savings the way farmers harvest hay, allowing the crop to grow
longer in order to get a better yield. Procurement managers may see
larger reportable savings from areas that previously they have
creatively neglected.
One head of group procurement reported hopefully to a seminar,
"The single reason for us being credible, for us gaining strategic
and professional status within the business is nailing the notion of
whether something is a genuine cost saving or a made-up number."
(8) To achieve this, procurement departments may report savings under
three headings: hard savings based on unit price reductions; cost
avoidance (e.g., from demand reduction); and value-add from additional
business benefits without increased spend. In the opinion of the
authors, these acknowledge the weakness of savings reporting without
offering a more useful alternative.
Realistically, most executives know that a CPO's reported
aggregate savings number is not real. But they accept that cost
reductions are generally desirable and should be encouraged. So they
offer praise to the CPO and pretend that the reported savings are
meaningful. After all, they may think to themselves that there is little
to be gained by skepticism.
This back-and-forth game is played with both parties insisting that
they believe in rational, quantitative, measurable results, but with
each vaguely knowing that the numbers are fudged. This lends a
hypocritical, even cynical, flavor to the relationship between
procurement and management--to the detriment of both.
6. Operating Budgets vs. Strategic Spending: Some organizations
translate savings into budget cuts, especially those where procurement
reports through finance.
Not surprisingly, managers may be disinclined to accept support
from procurement if their operating budget is reduced as a consequence.
Although these budget-owning managers did not previously voice their
doubts openly about the unreliability of procurement's reported
savings, it may be a different matter when their own budget is
threatened in order to deliver procurement's bonuses. To a client,
it seems that procurement's aim is to always to shrink the
business.
All six of these areas of conflict have one thing in common. They
arise because there is a single metric on which procurement expects to
be measured and which it emphasizes above everything else when
presenting its performance and promoting its value to the organization:
the aggregate total cost reductions across all of its
activities--savings.
But savings have no value to other business units (though we duly
note the value to financial stakeholders). Regarding the management of
the organization, the only practical use to which the reported savings
total can be put is the reward of procurement staff. It does not help or
guide decision making in any other function; it does not inform the
"what" or the "how" of management team decisions. It
stands alone, detached from everything else in the organization, related
only to the previously reported savings total.
When the CPO reports the aggregated savings total, she or he
compares it only to two things:
* the previously reported total and
* the volume of extra sales that would be required to deliver the
same value to the bottom line.
Neither is likely to engage the management team positively, still
less win their hearts and minds.
The Procurement Dilemma
The net of these six areas of conflict is that procurement faces a
dilemma. By history and tradition, it focuses on managing transactions
and increasing internal efficiencies of internal processes. The relevant
measure for such a role is a focus on hard savings.
At the same time, procurement's increasingly successful
self-elevation into strategic partnerships endangers its reliable
sources of hard savings. And no one--including CPOs--has effectively
argued for a new and discrete metric; thus, unresolved arguments and
confusion abound. The role has changed, but the measurement has stayed
the same--no one has stated the problem clearly enough to permit
resolution.
CPOs may deny this, but the evidence is clear. When interviewing
procurement managers about where they invest their time, they say they
have to focus on reporting short-term savings. Running a tender or
auction is a quick and efficient use of their time: It delivers easily
reportable savings and meets their targets.
On the other hand, identifying better business processes and
becoming involved in change management are time-consuming and high risk.
In a cost-reduction climate, "You don't need a weatherman to
know which way the wind blows," (9) so strategy loses out. This is
the message that procurement teams are getting: "Strategy is a
nice-to-have, but when the chips are down, we are measured on
savings."
A Better Way
The solution is two-sided. One part is a better understanding of
the emerging role of procurement and the dual function it must perform.
The other part is the metrics, a particularly powerful tool in
procurement.
Because the very nature of performance assessment for procurement
is so quantitative, it may be useful to put the "cart before the
horse" and focus on a revised metric as the most powerful lever for
change.
It would be naive to stop reporting aggregate savings if there were
nothing to put in its place. But there is a move toward a different key
performance indicator--one that has more credibility, can be supported
by internal audit and that aligns procurement with the interests of its
internal clients. It allows procurement organizations to build the trust
they need in order to become a strategic partner.
That indicator is Spend Control Index (SCI). It is not completely
new, and some organizations have something close called Spend Under
Management, with the nice acronym of SUM. Instead of focusing on a spend
area only when a purchase is imminent--and restricting reporting to
those areas they have actively worked in--the aim is to make procurement
accountable for all spend. Not just for the spend that can be easily
seen and measured, but for a top-down calculation of external spend
derived from turnover, adjusted for salaries, earnings, interest,
extraordinary activities, depreciation and working capital.
Using this base (100 percent of spend), procurement identifies the
proportion where spend is actively and fully managed by procurement
according to a strategy agreed with the business. This article does not
define the calculation of SCI, as it may vary from one organization to
another, but we can identify factors that could be used as the basis of
an audit. After assessing the monitoring and control systems, an auditor
would examine items of spend from different functional areas and supply
channels. By checking the level of control and compliance in each, they
can sign of on the SCI claimed by the procurement department. Key
indicators of control for each item of spend include:
* Is there an identified procurement strategy that is documented,
less than 12 months old, and formally agreed with the budget owner?
* Is there an internal communications document to inform users how
to acquire the goods or services? Are users instructed on how to find
this document, how to deal with the vendor and how to escalate issues?
* Is there an identified manager who is accountable for ensuring
that the item is delivered and used according to the agreement and in
line with business requirements? This person may be called a contract
manager, vendor manager or service manager, and they are usually
line-managed by the budget owner rather than being in the procurement
department.
* Are the correct procurement channels and transactions being used?
Reporting the proportion of total spend that is under control gets real
attention from the executive team and relegates tactical savings to
second place. Maximizing the SCI is more easily aligned with business
objectives, and internal audit can check its measurement. It is not even
necessary for procurement to manage everything hands-on. In the same way
that corporate counsel is accountable for an organization's legal
compliance but does not have to be present in every business meeting,
procurement's role no longer needs to be so interfering.
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Increasing Trust in the Procurement Function
If an organization wants procurement to manage its cost base
strategically, it must help it to escape from the rut of transactional
models and from the exclusive use of tactical savings as its main
performance indicator. Savings are a good metric for individual
projects, but as an aggregate overall measure of performance, they are
misleading and lead to perverse behaviors. A function trapped by such a
metric is unlikely to become a trustworthy partner to the rest of the
organization. A trustworthy partner should be evaluated in terms of the
benefits it can bring through being trusted more broadly. The alignment
of goals and metrics, through adoption of a Spend Control Index, will
itself contribute to greater trust of procurement staff, as well as in
the system.
(1) T. Kinnaird and H. Movius. "Avoiding the Three Deadly
Sins," CPO Agenda, Autumn 2008
(2) J. Mahoney and G. Stoller, "Strategic vs. Tactical
Procurement--Shifting Focus Towards Value Creation," July 2009,
http://www.slideshare.net/
jamie.mahoney/tactical-vs-strategic-procurement-shifting-focus-towardsvalue-creation.
(3) A Moorhouse, "Insight into the changing role of the
procurement professional," (Bradford University School of
Management) 2006.
(4) S. Bagshaw (Editor), "Direct vs. Indirect
Procurement--Market Intelligence Survey," Supply Management &
Buying Team, September 2009.
(5) J.J. Schiele and C.P. McCue, "Professional service
acquisition in public sector procurement: A conceptual model of
meaningful involvement," International Journal of Operation and
Production, Vol 26, 3 pp. 300-325. 2006
(6) J. Bloom, "Agencies and Media Brands Turning Into
Commodities," Advertising Age http://adage.com/columns/ 22 June
2009 M. D. Kresic 'Procurement Tactics, An Interview with Mladen
Kresic' http://negotiators.com/, April 2006
(7) J. Kay, "Foundations of Corporate Success," Oxford,
Chapter 4, Relationships & Contracts
(8) S. Santarelli "Cost Savings in the Spotlight,"
Procurement Intelligence Unit, 24 September 2009, www.procurement-iu.com
(9) S. Santarelli "Cost Savings in the Spotlight,"
Procurement Intelligence Unit, 24 September 2009, www.procurement-iu.com
This article was first published online and can be found at:
http:// trustedadvisor.com/public/files/pdf/articles/2011_The_Role_of_
Procurement_as_Trusted_Advisor_to_Management.pdf
Bill Young is the principal of Swiss-based Kestrel OPS GmbH. He can
be reached at
[email protected]. Charles H. Green is the
principal of New Jersey-based Trusted Advisor Associates. He can be
reached at
[email protected].