Wolfe, Alan. Political Evil: What It Is and How to Combat It.
Friedman, Barry D.
Wolfe, Alan. Political Evil: What It Is and How to Combat It. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011. vii + 339 pages. Cloth, $27.95.
Alan Wolfe, a professor of political science at Boston College and
contributing editor of The New Republic magazine, evaluates
"political evil"--i.e., genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
terrorism. He argues that many governments misinterpret forms of
"political evil"--e.g., incorrectly identifying cases of
ethnic cleansing as genocide which causes those governments to respond
ineptly to such situations. Wolfe asserts that the governments of Israel
and the United States misunderstand the practitioners of terrorism and,
thus, respond with unrestrained violence that contributes to the
terrorist leaders' effectiveness in recruiting adherents.
One of the catalysts for Western leaders who are Christians to
overreact to "political evil," Wolfe states, is a conception
of evil as an object that has its own identity. Wolfe traces this notion
to "a third-century Persian prophet named Mani, who viewed the
world as a constant struggle between the forces of good and those of
evil" (p. 50). The Christian theologian St. Augustine, a
fifth-century bishop of Hippo in Roman Africa, became intrigued by
Mani's idea, studied it exhaustively, and finally repudiated it as
heretical.
To Wolfe, President George W. Bush's characterization of
terrorism as a manifestation of evil that stands alongside and threatens
good is incongruous, given Bush's self-professed, born-again
Christian faith. "Bush drew so easily upon the language of evil
because he was one of the most religious of America's
presidents" (p. 83). However, in focusing on evil as a separate
force, Bush ultimately embraced Mani rather than Jesus. Wolfe contends
that "political evil" is not an independent force of nature;
rather, it is an impulse in human beings that may motivate them to
inflict harm on others to accomplish political objectives: "...
[T]errorism is a form of political evil rather than an embodiment of
evil per se" (p. 147). Therefore, leaders of democratic nations
should respond to "political evil" with political solutions,
rather than with calls for a crusade against evil.
Treating "political evil" as an entity in its own right
leads to rhetoric that equates Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, Saddam
Hussein, Yasser Arafat, and Osama bin Laden with each other. Logically,
as the rhetoric continues, any response to "political evil"
that is less than furious and bloodthirsty draws a contemptuous analogy
to the infamous Munich Agreement of September 1938. Inevitably, leaders
of democratic nations can be agitated to resort to extreme measures,
such as torturing suspected terrorists, that resemble the acts of the
evildoers themselves.
The objective of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda is to discredit and
disrupt the order and stability of liberal societies. Overreaction from
liberal societies, including the rise of imperial presidencies or the
suspension of civil liberties, undermines their legitimacy and
reinforces terrorists' claims about their flimsy moral foundation.
Wolfe asserts that the treatment of all forms of "political
evil" with standard responses cannot succeed. Each instance of
"political evil" involves political tactics selected
specifically for the occasion. When "political evil" arises,
government officials must carefully analyze the specific format,
understand the evildoers' political motivation, and design a
customized political response, which may include discussions and
negotiations with the evildoers.
Wolfe recognizes that acts of "political evil" enrage
societies that are targeted. Revenge is a natural response. But he
counsels against "shock and awe" reactions based on these
ideas. First, he argues that it will be more effective to respond to the
evildoers' reasons than to unleash furious violence against them,
writing, "We have to respond to their reasons if we are to deprive
them of their rationales and in that way bring their actions under
control" (p. 47). Second, he claims that responding to the deaths
of soldiers and law-enforcement officials and civilian bystanders with
"eye for an eye" ferocity is a misuse of a nation's
capacity to employ force. Says Wolfe, "Although it may seem obvious
that commanders want to protect those who fight under their command to
the greatest possible extent, the truth is that risk is always inherent
in war. To try to reduce that risk to zero is therefore to choose to
fight a war with unusually brutal means" (p. 263). Third, he
maintains that political evil will eventually lose its'
justification: "Political evil comes into being for specific
reasons and goes out of existence once the conditions that feed it
change" (p. 66). Therefore, a fight to the finish may be
unwarranted.
This book contains a rather exhaustive portrait of the work of
foreign-policy theorists and relevant political philosophers, which
Wolfe uses to construct the argument that, "[a] s passionate as our
reaction to terrorism may be, our response must be dispassionate"
(p. 171). Readers will have to decide for themselves whether they find
Wolfe's argument convincing. I, personally, am not convinced. That
a society like America's will ever, after being attacked, be able
to view a heartbreaking scene like the ruins of the World Trade Center
and invite the perpetrators to sit down for a chat about their political
objectives is a scenario I find difficult to envision. Nevertheless, I
am persuaded that more thought about how to manage "political
evil" and to minimize the extent of human misery is always
beneficial.
Barry D. Friedman, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science
University of North Georgia
Dahlonega, Georgia
