The Senate should give immediate advice and consent to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: why the critics are wrong.

Moore, John Norton ; Schachte, William L., Jr.

I. INTRODUCTION

As national security professionals who have spent much of our lives working on oceans and security issues, we believe that Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention is strongly in the national interest of the United States. Elsewhere we have each testified at length as to why advice and consent is urgently needed. (1) This short paper, which supplements our earlier testimony, is motivated by our mutual concern that the arguments being against the treaty are simplistic and erroneous.

Not only are the specific cases advanced against the treaty wrong, but more importantly, its critics ignore the powerful masons for U.S. compliance, including the fact that the 1982 convention supercedes the far less favorable 1958 convention that is currently in force. (2) This response will first briefly summarize a few of the broader issues ignored by the critics and will then address the erroneous arguments or "myths" that are advanced against the convention.

We respect the privilege of all Americans to disagree with their elected officials; it is only through a full exchange of views that truth emerges. Perhaps, as Churchill said, we should "not resent criticism, even when, for the sake of emphasis, it parts for the time with reality." (3) Nevertheless, the critics, some of whom are personal friends, are mistaken in their opposition to the convention and we cannot stand by idly while myths are advanced against a treaty of the utmost importance to U.S. national security.

II. THE BROADEST CONTEXT IGNORED BY THE CRITICS

As we have testified elsewhere, the most compelling reasons that support U.S. adherence to the Convention are rooted in restoring U.S. oceans leadership, protecting national interests and enhancing U.S. foreign policy. For example, if the convention is ratified, the United States will be in a stronger position to respond to illegal oceans claims such as the harassment of the USNS Bowditch survey vessel by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The United States will also be able to advance more rapidly with offshore oil and gas development beyond 200 nautical miles (approximately 15 percent of our continental shelf), require U.S. approval for the transfer of seabed revenues and reclaim the prime deep seabed mining sites it has abandoned. Further, adhering to the convention will finally give the United States an opportunity to officially declare its views as to the correct operation of convention provisions. This will end over a decade of self-imposed silence despite efforts by extremist opponents to roll back the gains achieved in the convention.

The critics show no understanding of the United States' continuing role as a global protector of navigational freedom. Yet a core issue at stake is the control of unilateral coastal state claims against U.S. shipping, both military and commercial. In this respect, the convention is the most important and historic achievement in the safeguarding of these interests. For example, the new provisions for the protection of straits transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as well as the improved provisions for innocent passage in territorial seas, are of utmost importance to U.S. naval mobility. The progressive advancements that the U.S. negotiating team achieved to this end are completely missed by the critics; by second guessing U.S. naval experts, it seems they would rather snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Paradoxically, by opposing the convention, the critics reinforce the views of Third World nations that the United States defeated in negotiations. We must also never forget that thousands of U.S. servicemen and servicewomen, who volunteer to go in harm's way, depend on the navigation and over-flight provisions guaranteed in the convention. As General Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated, "The Convention remains a top national security priority." (4)

The critics also show little understanding of the realities of asserting the rule of law in the world's oceans. They seemingly contend that the United States can protect its interests by shooting its way around the oceans rather than developing a stable and favorable legal regime, defensible with force if necessary, that provides a legal basis for naval and air operations. The United States simply cannot shoot its way to acceptable resolutions of oceans disputes with Canada, Chile, Brazil, India, Italy and other democracies. Nor is it realistic to ignore the effects of law and international agreements in our interactions with others. It is hubris to believe that the United States can disregard the law without consequences, as it creates scenarios where other nations follow suit, thus compromising interests on both sides. Ironically, at a time when the president of the United States is urging others toward the rule of law as a foreign policy interest, the critics voice only disdain for that principle.

The convention's opponents present a simplistic view of the convention as a Soviet, Third World conspiracy for the redistribution of wealth or as representing initial steps toward a world government. In reality, the United States and Soviet Union sought new provisions on safe navigation through straits to protect their own strategic interests in naval mobility long before any Third World is a interest in a deep seabed mining "common heritage of mankind." (5) Moreover, the Soviet Union, as a major maritime power, supported the United g States--and opposed the "Group of 77" Third World states--on almost every major issue in the negotiation. Deep seabed mining, which briefly encouraged Third World dreams of ocean riches, was only one among many critical issues in the negotiations, which also included navigational freedom, fisheries, oil and gas, telecommunications, ocean surveys, scientific research and environmental protection. Almost all of the issues were based on bottom line national interests, such as whether a nation was a distant water or coastal fishing nation, or whether it had a large continental shelf off its coast, rather than on Third World "New International Economic Order" principles. True, the original deep seabed mining negotiations in the 1970s reflected such views; however, the protectionist interests of land-based mineral producers were at least equally important in this negotiation. But when the Reagan administration refused to accept a deep seabed mining regime tainted with these ideals, it was renegotiated to reflect market principles. These concessions, which concluded in 1994, met each of Reagan's conditions and then some. There was no mystery in this process; the world simply adjusted to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the damage inflicted on developing countries by the double oil shock of the 1970s.

Even more laughable is the charge of a conspiracy to create a world government. In reality, the convention expanded national sovereign rights more than any international agreement in history. Its central thrust entails an extension of coastal resource and economic rights in a vastly enlarged exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf, while furthering sovereign rights and navigational freedom. On the contrary, the corridors of the law of the sea negotiations were predominantly filled with thoughts of nationalism rather than internationalism. And ironically, in their attack on the convention, the critics join extreme internationalists who have been key opponents of the treaty because it focuses on national sovereign rights.

Critics' complaints tend to center on provisions that require submarines to surface and show their flag in the territorial sea, as well as those provisions that limit rights to board foreign flag ships. But apparently out of ignorance they never disclose that such provisions are already binding on the United States pursuant to the 1958 convention that was ratified with the Senate's advice and consent almost a half-century ago and with which we have lived since. Nor do the critics note the reciprocal nature of the law. Provisions against overly broad boarding exist precisely to protect the sovereignty of U.S. flag ships on the high seas. Do the critics really want Chinese submarines submerged off the beaches of New York or Los Angeles? Most importantly, the 1982 convention has considerably improved on the 1958 convention to meet current U.S. resource and strategic needs. Arguments against the convention that ignore the 1958 obligations effectively support those now outdated concepts, foregoing the new strategic rights of transit passage through straits, archipelagic sea lanes passage, the improved regime of innocent passage and many other issues critical to U.S. national security and ocean interests.

Furthermore, critics fail to acknowledge that the convention deals with the peacetime law of the oceans. These laws do not concern the inherent right of self-defense or the laws of war that apply to terrorism. Quite apart from any provision of the convention, the right of self-defense under international law would, of course, always permit the United States to intercept a shipment of weapons of mass destruction en route to a terrorist group.

The critics also fail to understand that the negotiations that lead to the 1982 convention were an enormous success for the United States. The United States was by far the most influential player in these negotiations--not the Soviets or the Third World--and every strategic U.S. objective was met in the original 1982 convention except the regime governing deep seabed mining, which was met in the 1994 renegotiation. To reject the convention would be to set aside one of the most important U.S. negotiating successes of the twentieth century, achieved over the very Third World objections that critics say underlie the convention.

The critics evince little knowledge of international or oceans law, and consequently make arguments contrary to U.S. interests. For example, some have argued that the provision in Article 88 that limits use of the high seas for "peaceful purposes" would constrain U.S. warships or prevent military activities on the high seas. (6) But to make this argument is to unknowingly adopt the "old" Soviet line, no longer embraced even by Russia, which was never supported by the United States. During the negotiations, the U.S. representative accurately described the "peaceful purposes" language when he said:

 The term "peaceful purposes" did not, of course, preclude military
 activities generally. The United States had consistently held that
 the conduct of military activities for peaceful purposes was in full
 accord with the Charter of the United Nations and with the
 principles of international law. Any specific limitation on military
 activities would require the negotiation of a detailed arms control
 agreement. (7)

Indeed, in their zeal to complain about the convention, the critics promote an interpretation of this language that may be cited by opponents of future space-based missile defense programs. Thus, in a different context, the implication of this argument would be to ban the aforementioned defense systems because of our adherence to the Outer Space Treaty that contains the same "peaceful purposes" language. (8) Real world experience refutes this argument by showing warships of every major power freely navigating the world's oceans despite the convention being in force for 149 nations.

Moreover, the Senate Text of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee specifically provides:

 The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to
 the following ... understandings: (1) The United States understands
 that nothing in the Convention, including any provisions referring
 to 'peaceful uses' or 'peaceful purposes,' impairs the inherent
 right of individual or collective self-defense or rights during
 armed conflict. (9)

But never mind that the critics' argument is rooted in ignorance; if it sounds plausible in a smokescreen of charges against the convention, make it! Another critic asserted that the language in Article 30l, which says that parties "should refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state," would have prevented the United States from taking the actions against Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks, or from defending Korea or Taiwan in the future. (10) This argument not only fails to understand that Article 301 simply paraphrases an obligation under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter already binding on every nation in the world, but it erroneously agrees with the United States' most extreme critics that such perfectly lawful defensive actions are illegal.

The critics seem to suggest that if only the United States refuses to adhere, the convention will disappear. But it is already in force for 148 nations, is acknowledged by the United States as a reflection of customary law and is the core of modern ocean law. Continued non-adherence would not, for example, end the existence of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) (explained below), but would disenfranchise the United States and remove our veto over the potential distribution of seabed mining revenues. Parties to the treaty include every major developed nation, all NATO members except Turkey and the permanent members of the UN Security Council. As a major maritime nation, the United States' absence stands out.

The critics sometimes advance "conspiracy" or "personality" theories that suggest that the president has been hoodwinked by Vice President Dick Cheney, military holdovers from the Clinton administration or unnamed "special interests." But such charges ignore the reality of what is perhaps one of the most careful processes for determining national interests in any area of foreign policy: the negotiating instructions during the Nixon and Ford administrations that were developed by an 18-agency task force set up within the National Security Council by presidential order to ensure full vetting of national interests. This process included an almost 100-member private sector advisory committee, the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, which represented every oceans interest as well as representatives of the Senate. A similar methodology was employed by subsequent administrations. Indeed, there has probably never been a process as thoroughly dedicated to national interests on any complex issue of foreign policy Over the subsequent years, the Reagan administration conducted a full interagency review, which concluded that the provisions of the convention other than those on seabed mining were in the national interest. The Clinton administration then conducted a review before submitting the convention, with the renegotiated Part XI on deep seabed mining, to the Senate in 1994. Most recently, the Bush administration performed careful reviews before twice recommending the convention to the Senate's top priority list of treaties. This review included an exhaustive examination by the Defense Department on every objection raised, no matter how remote the risk, followed by another interagency review of all recommended U.S. statements for the proposed Senate resolution of advice and consent. For more than a quarter century, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Navy, fully understanding strategic needs for naval mobility, have been among the strongest supporters of the convention. We also note that recently, high-level administration officials have strongly supported the United States' accession to the convention. These officials include Condoleezza Rice, in her confirmation hearing as secretary of state, and John Bellinger, during his confirmation hearing as legal adviser of the Department of State. Even John Bolton, in his confirmation hearing as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, testified in support of the administration's decision to make accession to the convention a priority.

Critics also argue that the convention will turn the world's oceans over to the United Nations. The United Nations has no decisional authority over any oceans issue in the convention, nor does the treaty create another UN agency. Rather, the three strictly limited organizations that the convention does create report to the state parties to the treaty, not to the United Nations. As with many U.S. arms control agreements, the negotiations proceeded under UN auspices, but the United Nations had no hand in developing the convention. And the negotiations leading to the convention were supported by the United States precisely because of its strategic and resource-based interests at sea. The real threat to these interests has been unbridled coastal state "unilateralism," sometimes referred to as "creeping jurisdiction." (11) This is a threat for which multilateral negotiations provided the best forum for protecting core U.S. oceans interests.

The efforts of critics, if erroneous, to "tar" the treaty by equating it with the United Nations is also a simplistic argument. In many respects, the United Nations has served U.S. interests well, supporting U.S. actions in the Korean and Gulf Wars, establishing the post-war boundary between Iraq and Kuwait after the Gulf War and substituting Canadian for U.S. troops in Haiti.

Arguments against the convention are, in a way; a denigration of law; they seem to indicate that any international agreement is an unwelcome infringement of U.S. sovereignty, when the contrary is the case. President George Washington regarded the Jay Treaty with Great Britain as the most important achievement of his administration. No one would accept a loss of U.S. sovereignty. At the same time, one of the most important sovereign rights is the legal ability of states to enter into agreements, just as individual citizens in the United States have the right to agree to contracts with one another. In fact, it is only children and the mentally incompetent who have no right to contract. To deny the U.S. government the right to enter into agreements with other nations would deprive it of one of its most fundamental rights, leaving it with few options short of expending the lives of its armed forces to establish and enforce national rights. It should also be understood that under the U.S. Constitution, freedom of action cannot be lost through international agreements. One widely-accepted precept of U.S. foreign policy is that a subsequent act of Congress can override a prior international agreement. Further, critics fail to mention that because of its sovereignty, the United States is free to withdraw from the convention.

The critics argue that the convention has not been given adequate consideration by the Senate. But again, this ignores a process of Senate, and even House consideration, far beyond that of most treaties, including the SALT I Arms Control Treaty of 1972 and the four 1958 law of the sea treaties currently binding on the United States. Thus, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing in 1994 was conducted before the president submitted the convention to the Senate. And last year, one decade after the Convention was tabled before the Senate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the committee of principal jurisdiction, again held full committee hearings on the convention. All members of that committee then supported the convention unanimously, by a vote of 19-0. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and even the House International Relations Committee (which has no role in treaty advice and consent) also held full committee hearings. The argument for more hearings is in fact a transparent tactic urged by critics of the convention to kill it through delay. They correctly understand that whenever the convention is taken to a Senate vote it will be overwhelmingly approved.

Finally, the critics brush aside the consensus among affected ocean interests and knowledgeable oceans experts in the United States in favor of their own judgment as persons who clearly lack expertise in international law or operational U.S. maritime policy. Indeed, few conventions have been so unanimously supported by knowledgeable experts and affected interests. Supporters include every president, both Democrat and Republican, who has considered the convention subsequent to the successful 1994 renegotiation of Part XI on deep seabed mining, Joint Chiefs chairman, combatant commanders and secretaries of state from the Nixon administration to today; not to mention every affected U.S. oceans interest including the oil and gas industry, fisheries, shipping and oceanic cables industries; to marine scientists and environmentalists. Most recently, the congressional U.S. Oceans Commission and the new Bush administration Oceans Interagency Task Force boyh unanimously recommended Senate advice and consent on the convention. As deliberations continue, senators might want to ask who they trust more for national security advice: every chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders of our united geographic commands and the consistent view of the Navy since the Nixon administration, or those few who admittedly are not naval, oceans or international law experts. Further, how can the totality of U.S. agencies, military departments and private sector oceans industries representatives constitute a "special interest" as charged by the critics? By what criteria are the most vocal critics not special interests?

III. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: SPECIFIC MYTHS ADVANCED AGAINST THE CONVENTION

A. Myths Concerning National Sovereignty

Myth: The United States is giving up sovereignty to a new international authority that will control the oceans. Nothing could be further from the truth. The United States does not give up an ounce of sovereignty in this convention. Rather, as noted, the convention solidifies a massive increase in resource and economic jurisdiction for the United States, not only to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad continental margin in many areas even beyond that. The new International Seabed Authority (ISA) created by this convention, which, as noted, has existed for a decade and will continue to exist regardless of U.S. actions, deals solely with mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction--it has nothing to do with the water column above the seabed. The deep seabed is not only an area in which the United States has no sovereignty; but one on which the United States and the entire world have consistently opposed extension of national sovereignty claims.

Moreover, to mine deep seabed minerals requires security of tenure for the billion dollar plus costs of such an operation. Our industry has emphatically reminded us that they cannot mine under a fishing approach in which mining is a free-for-all concept, as the critics seem to suggest. Rather, they must have both the exclusive rights to mine sites and international recognition of titles to the minerals recovered. These requirements led to the formation of a limited international agency to provide security of tenure and title for mineral resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which was otherwise owned by no one. The ISA was a necessary specialized agency of strictly limited jurisdiction to deal with security of tenure and stable property rights so that investors can amortize their debt. Quite contrary to the recent testimony of one critic before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, the ISA would not have "the exclusive right to regulate what is done, by whom, when and under what circumstances in subsurface international waters and on the sea-floor." (12) Rather, the ISA is a small, narrowly mandated international agency that has emphatically no ability to control the water column and only functional authority over the mining of the minerals of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Again, this is a necessary requirement for seabed mining, an area beyond which any nation has sovereignty, to provide security of tenure to mine sites, without which mining will not occur. By not adhering to the treaty, the United States will simply lose its deep seabed mine sites--the best in the world--and our seabed mining industry will be permanently deep-sixed.

Myth: U.S. adherence will entail history's biggest voluntary transfer of wealth and surrender of sovereignty. To the contrary, the convention enhances not only sovereignty of U.S. military ships and aircraft, but also bolsters our resource jurisdiction over a vast area off of our coasts. In fact, the convention supports the sovereign rights of the United States over extensive maritime territory and the natural resources therein, including a broad continental shelf that in many areas extends well beyond the 200-nm limit. The area of resource jurisdiction confirmed under national control of the United States by this convention is approximately equal to that of the continental United States and exceeds the area of the Louisiana Purchase, the purchase of Alaska or any other addition to U.S. sovereignty in history. It is also the most extensive of any nation in the world. The mandatory technology transfer provisions of the deep seabed mining sections in the original convention, to which the United States objected, were eliminated in the 1994 agreement. Any transfer of funds to nations from deep seabed mining revenues, or oil and gas development beyond 200 miles, is subject to a U.S. veto. As such, we not only have a veto over where our seabed mining revenue would go, but also over that of all nations worldwide. This new power is simply lost if we fail to adhere.

B. Myths Concerning the United Nations

Myth: The convention would turn the oceans over to the United Nations. This is completely and utterly false; not a drop of ocean water nor an ounce of oceans resources would be turned over to the United Nations. To the contrary, the convention disappointed extreme internationalists who believed in "blue helmet" solutions to oceans issues. It placed all coastal resources of the water column and the continental shelf under coastal nation, rather than international, jurisdiction. And it maintained and strengthened freedom of navigation on the world's oceans. These critical issues in the negotiation, by far the most important, hugely strengthened national sovereign rights. Even the ISA that the convention created is an independent international authority, supported by the United States, and is necessary to provide stability of property rights to deep seabed minerals owned by no other nation. Without such an authority providing exclusive property rights to seabed mine sites of the deep ocean floor, seabed mining, including that by U.S. interests, would never be realized. And remember that this body is limited to the mineral resources of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction that have yet to be mined, in contrast with the billions of dollars in fisheries, oil and gas production on the continental margins, all of which are under national jurisdiction.

Myth: The convention "is designed to place fishing rights, deep-sea mining, global pollution and more under the control of a new global bureaucracy ..." (13) This is so erroneous that it would he humorous were it not so insistently advanced by critics. The executive branch, which led U.S. negotiations on the convention and supports the Senate's advice and consent, would never have supported such nonsense. The ISA deals solely with mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, not with fishing, global pollution or navigation, nor with activities in the water column. If U.S. mining firms are ever to mine the deep seabed, particularly sites under no nation's ownership, it is necessary to create enforceable rights to this end. The United States is already party to hundreds of specialized international organizations. The ISA would be an unremarkable addition, one that after 11 years of operation currently has a staff of 28.

Myth: The convention gives the United Nations its first opportunity to levy taxes. False--the convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals or corporations. It does include modest revenue sharing provisions for oil and gas activities on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles after the first five years of production and certain fees for deep seabed mining operations. The oil and gas fees are less than the royalties paid to foreign countries for drilling off their coasts and none of the revenues go to the United Nations. These de minimus revenues, which average between two and four percent over the projected life of a well, were a small price to pay for enlarging the U.S. continental shelf by 15 percent, an area larger than the state of California. This is one of the reasons the U.S. oil and gas industry so strongly supports the convention. With respect to deep seabed mining, U.S. companies that apply for deep seabed mining licenses would pay their fees directly to the ISA; no implementing legislation would be necessary. United States consent-that is, its veto would be applicable-would be required for any transfer of such revenues. Yet because the United States is a non-party, U.S. companies currently lack the ability to engage in deep seabed mining under domestic authority alone. By ratifying the treaty, our firms will have this ability which will open up new revenue opportunities when deep seabed mining becomes economically viable. The alternative is no deep seabed mining for U.S. firms, except through other nations that are convention parties. When the Interior Department charges royalties to U.S. oil companies for the development of oil and gas from our continental shelf, it is not exercising a "taxing power," rather it is selling access to an asset. Similarly, royalties paid for these rights are not a "tax" on U.S. taxpayers any more than such royalties paid by U.S. miners to Chile or Indonesia to mine resources there are such a "tax." Perhaps most importantly, until the United States accedes to the convention, it will not be able to exercise its veto over distribution of revenues from every other nation in the world generated by these provisions. And when we do accede, we not only have veto rights over distribution of revenues from U.S. mines, but from all other seabed mines as well. As such, these provisions greatly expand U.S. influence over financial aid decisions.

C. Myths Concerning National Security

Myth: The convention is harmful to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Again, this is false. The PSI has already been negotiated explicitly in conformance with the convention, and not surprisingly so, since the nations with which we coordinate in that initiative are parties to the convention. This charge apparently rests on the false belief that if the United States does not adhere to the convention, it will be free from any constraints in relation to oceans law. Again, this is a false assumption; we are today a party to the 1958 Geneva Convention that is much more restrictive than the 1982 convention now before the Senate. This charge is also misguided as it fails to understand the critically important interest we have in protecting navigational freedoms on, in and above the world's oceans. The convention allows our vessels to get on station, a capability that is essential before any issue even arises about boarding. Moreover, we emphatically do not want a legal regime that would permit any nation to seize U.S. commercial vessels in the world's seas. That would be a massive loss of U.S. sovereignty! The PSI was carefully constructed with parties to the 1982 convention, using the flag state, port state and other jurisdictional provisions of the 1982 convention precisely to avoid this problem. Nor is this charge at all realistic in failing to note that nothing in the Law of the Sea Convention could or does trump our inherent rights to individual and collective self-defense. Most recently, we note, Under-Secretary of State John Bolton, a principal architect of the PSI, testified to the Senate that adhering to the convention will not harm the PSI.

Myth: The convention would interfere with the operations of our intelligence community. Having either chaired or participated in the 18-agency National Security Council interagency process that drafted the United States' negotiating instructions for the convention, we found this charge so bizarre that we recently checked with the intelligence community to see if we had missed something. The answer that came back was that they, too, were puzzled by this charge, as there was absolutely no truth to it. We are confident that there is no provision in the convention which will, if approved by the Senate, constrain the operations of our intelligence community. In this regard, the United States is already bound by the 1958 convention, and since 1983, pursuant to President Reagan's order, we have operated under the provisions of the 1982 convention, with the exception of deep seabed mining issues associated with Part XI.

Myth: Freedom of navigation is only challenged from "[t]he Russian navy [that] is rusting in port [and] China has yet to develop a blue water capability...." (14) The implication here is that the principal challenge to navigational freedom emanates from a major power and that we do not have any particular national concerns about freedom of navigation. But the 1982 convention deals with the law of peace, not war or self-defense. Thus, this argument misses altogether the serious and insidious challenge, which, again, is what the convention is designed to deal with; these repeated efforts by coastal nations to control navigation, including those from U.S. allies and trading partners, have through time added up to death by a thousand pin-pricks. This is the so-called problem of "creeping jurisdiction" which remains the central struggle in preserving navigational freedom for a global maritime power. After years of effort, we have won in the convention a legal regime that supports our efforts to control this "creeping jurisdiction." To unilaterally disarm the United States from asserting what was won against illegal claimants is folly and undermines our national security.

Myth: U.S. adherence to the convention is not necessary because navigational freedoms are not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power of the U.S. Navy). Wrong--it is not true that our navigational freedoms are not threatened. There are more than 100 illegal, excessive claims around the globe that adversely affect vital navigational and over-flight rights and freedoms. The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist excessive maritime claims by other countries that interfere with U.S. navigational rights as reflected in the convention. On occasion, these operations have entailed a certain amount of risk (e.g., the Black Sea bumping incident with the former Soviet Union in 1988). Being a party to the convention would significantly enhance our efforts to roll back these claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a far stronger position to assert its rights, thus affording additional methods of resolving conflict and aligning expectations of behavior at sea.

Myth: Friendly relations with the few states that sit astride sea lanes are more likely to protect U.S. navigational rights than an abstract multilateral treaty to ensure passage. This myth simply does not understand oceans policy. There are not simply a "few" states that "sit astride" sea lanes; rather there are more than 100 straits used for navigation overlapped by a 12-mile territorial sea. Past difficulties with bordering straits states evince that we are far better off as a party to an international agreement that articulates these rights in a multilateral negotiation through which we can mobilize the world's maritime powers against extreme demands. The implication that bilaterally-negotiated agreements with straits states are a better way to protect U.S. ocean interests is fundamentally wrong; instead, it is the path to a rapid loss of our sovereign rights and navigational freedoms. This was our bitter experience in the Persian Gulf when we relied on the Shah of Dan to provide stability. Finally, there is nothing abstract about the convention, as it protects our navigational rights with greater clarity than ever before.

Myth: The convention was drafted before the inception of the war on terror and without regard to what the United States must do to wage it successfully. It is true that the convention was drafted before the war on terror began. However, the convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to successfully wage this campaign. The convention assures the maximum maritime naval and air mobility that is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. It also provides the necessary stability and framework for our forces, weapons and materiel to arrive at the fight without hindrance, and ensures that our forces will not be hindered in the future. Thus, the convention supports our war on terrorism by providing important stability for navigational and over-flight freedoms, and preserves the right of the U.S. military to use the world's oceans to meet national security requirements. It is essential that key sea and air lanes are not contingent upon approval from nations along these routes. A stable legal regime for the world's oceans will support global mobility for our armed forces.

Myth: Obligatory technology transfers will equip actual or potential adversaries with sensitive and militarily useful equipment and know-how (such as antisubmarine warfare technology). No technology transfers are required by the convention. Mandatory technology transfers were eliminated by Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement amending Part XI of the convention. Further, Article 302 of the convention explicitly provides that nothing in the convention requires a party to disclose information the disclosure of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security.

Myth: As a non-party, the United States is allowed to search any ship that enters our EEZ to determine whether it could harm the United States or pollute the marine environment. Under the convention, the U.S. Coast Guard or others would not be able to search any ship until the United Nations is notified and approves the right to search the ship. Under applicable treaty law, the 1958 convention on the law of the sea as well as customary international law, no nation has the right to arbitrarily search any ship that enters its EEZ to determine whether it could harm that nation or pollute its marine environment. Nor would we want countries to have such a blanket right, because it would fundamentally undermine the freedom of navigation that benefits the United States more than any other nation. Thus, the descriptions of both the status quo and the convention's provisions are incorrect and seriously misleading. Adhering to the convention will make no change in our existing authority to search ships entering our EEZ and also with regard to environmental protection. Also, under the convention, the United Nations plays no role at all, much less a role in deciding when and where a foreign ship may be boarded.

Myth: The convention would place restriction on anti-submarine sonars to protect whales. This is false. The convention's environmental provisions do not apply to warships, which enjoy complete immunity under the convention. The environmental measures the United States applies to its own warships remain a matter of national law.

Myth: The PRC asserts that the convention entitles it to exclusive economic control of the waters within a 200-nm radius of its artificial islands, including waters transited by the vast majority of Japanese and American oil tankers en route to and from the Persian Gulf. This is wrong on both facts and law. The U.S. government is not aware of any claims made by the PRC to a 200-mile economic zone around its artificial islands. Any claim that artificial islands generate a territorial sea or EEZ would be illegal under the convention. The convention specifically provides that artificial islands do not have the status of islands and have no territorial sea or EEZ of their own.

D. Myths Concerning Part XI on Seabed Mining

Myth: The convention would mandate technology transfer and it contains other fundamentally non-free-market provisions with respect to deep seabed mining in Part XI. This charge seems to stem from a failure to understand that a series of flawed seabed mining provisions in Part XI of the 1982 convention, including mandatory transfer of technology, were successfully renegotiated at the courageous insistence of President Reagan. Today, the convention, as so modified, provides first-come, first-serve rights to mine the deep seabed under a joint venture arrangement that provides guaranteed access to deep seabed minerals. The renegotiated Part XI even goes beyond the Reagan conditions in adopting the important pro-free-market GATT principle against subsidization of seabed miners. The mining regime adopted by the ISA can even be more flexible than what we have here at home. But whatever imperfections there may be in the deep seabed regime, it is a certainty that U.S. non-adherence has to date, and if continued, will permanently kill all hopes of a U.S. seabed mining industry. Bankers simply will not lend the billion dollars plus required for a deep sea mining operation without an unchallengeable legal title to the resource.

Myth: The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by the 1994 agreement relating to deep seabed mining. Wrong--each objection was addressed and remedied. Among other things, the 1994 agreement provides for access by U.S. industry to deep seabed minerals on the basis of non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions; overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the United States' critical influence, including veto power over the most important future decisions that would affect U.S. interests; and restructures the regime to comport with free-market principles, including the elimination of the earlier mandatory technology transfer provisions and all production controls. The unique and singular veto awarded to the United States in this renegotiation is of enormous precedence. This is worth repeating: the United States has been singled out in the renegotiation as the only nation in the world with a permanent veto over the critical decisions of the ISA. By non-adherence, we turn our back on this highly favorable development.

Myth: The ISA has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the earth's surface, impose international taxes, etc. Nothing could be further from the truth. The convention does address seven-tenths of the earth's surface, but does so primarily to affirm the sovereign rights of coastal nations over resources and freedoms of all nations. However, the ISA does not have jurisdiction over seven-tenths of the earth's surface. The authority of the ISA is strictly limited to administering mineral mining in seafloor areas of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which is generally over 200 miles from the shore of any country. At present, and in the foreseeable future, such deep seabed mining is economically unfeasible. The ISA has no other role and has no general regulatory authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and over-flight. The ISA also has no authority or ability to levy. taxes.

Myth: The United States might end up without a vote in the ISA. This is not possible unless we follow the critics' advice and refuse to participate. The council is the main decision-making body of the ISA. The United States would have a permanent seat on this council, by virtue of its being the state with the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date of entry into force of the convention, 16 November 1994 (1994 Agreement, Annex Section 3.15). This would give us a uniquely influential role on the body that matters most. This is a unique international precedent which provides the United States, and only the United States, with a permanent seat in the ISA. It would be folly to reject it.

E. Myths Concerning Dispute Settlement

Myth: U.S. military activities will be subject to a world court. There was consensus in the convention negotiations that military activities should be exempted from dispute settlement. Accordingly, Article 298 of the convention permits nations to opt out of the dispute settlement provisions for military activities, and under the president's submission, as embodied in the Senate draft resolution of advice and consent, this option is unmistakably exercised for the United States. Further, the scope of dispute settlement is in general severely limited. For example, none of the United States' decisions relating to foreign fishermen's access to our fish stocks are subject to dispute settlement. In addition, as embodied in the president's submission and the Senate draft resolution, the United States will be accepting "arbitration" as our preferred modality of dispute settlement rather than the International Court of Justice (ICI) or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The United States is already a party to literally hundreds of international agreements, including more than 85 submitting disputes to the ICI, that provide for compulsory dispute resolution. Recently, the Senate approved the 1995 agreement implementing certain fisheries provisions of the convention, an agreement strongly supported by U.S. fishing interests, which incorporates by reference the dispute resolution procedures of the convention. As a result of these agreements, remedies are often available when the rights of the United States or its citizens are violated by other countries. In this connection, compulsory dispute settlement is particularly useful in controlling illegal interference with commercial navigation. Because of its importance in constraining these illegal claims, even the former Soviet Union was persuaded of the convention's importance despite its longstanding general opposition to compulsory dispute settlement. The severely cabined dispute settlement procedures in the convention are far more restrictive than those in most other resolution provisions already binding on the United States. Moreover, as noted above, the convention allows us to opt for special arbitration over the ICJ or the ITLOS.

Myth: The convention mandates a tribunal to adjudicate the ocean disputes of the United States. The convention does establish the ITLOS. However, parties are free to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The United States has stated that it will choose two forms of arbitration rather than the tribunal. While the limited area of U.S. deep seabed mining is subject to the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber, the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent makes clear that the Seabed Disputes Chamber's decisions "shall be enforceable in the territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures established by implementing legislation and that such procedures shall be subject to such legal and factual review as is constitutionally required and without precedential effect in any court of the United States." (15) Importantly, the chamber's authority extends only to disputes involving the mining of minerals from the deep seabed; no other activities, including operations in the water column or on the surface of the oceans, are subject to it.

Myth: The International Law of the Sea Tribunal has already asserted, in the MOX case involving a UK nuclear plant, that it will determine its own competence, or scope and jurisdiction, even in the face of other extant treaties designed to address the issue at hand. The MOX case was brought by Ireland against the United Kingdom. The tribunal, in a setting in which the United Kingdom had failed to assert its right to invoke exceptions under Article 297 of the convention and in dealing solely with provisional measures, focused its analysis on the highly technical question regarding the relationship among a series of different treaties the United Kingdom had accepted, all of which provided for compulsory jurisdiction but in different fora. Upon the completion of its analysis, the tribunal denied Ireland's request for intrusive provisional restraints on the United Kingdom's activities. The tribunal then simply recommended that the parties cooperate and dropped out of the case. An arbitral panel had been selected by Ireland and the United Kingdom, and that panel also suspended proceedings (which have not yet resumed) pending litigation in the European Court of Justice pursuant to European law. Implying that these facts should be portrayed as an example of the tribunal grabbing jurisdiction from other courts is not just wrong, it is upside down.

F. Myths Concerning the Negotiating Process

Myth: "IT]he Law of the Sea Convention was a grand scheme to create 'an oceanic Great Society' ..." (16) It is true that one motivation of developing countries in the convention negotiations more than three decades ago, played out in the negotiation for Part XI, was an exaggerated hope of riches from deep seabed mining. It is also true that the concept of the "New International Economic Order" played a harmful role in the negotiation of Part XI on deep seabed mining. The purpose of the United States and other major powers in signing on to the convention, however, was to protect navigational freedom, stem the unbridled coastal state grab for ocean space, extend our jurisdiction to encompass fish stocks and much of the oil and gas off our coasts and achieve international consensus on a mechanism providing security of tenure for deep seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It was the other non-Part XI issues that were the real core of the convention negotiations, as attested by the fact that delegation heads did not focus on Committee I where Part XI was being negotiated, and spent their efforts in Committees II and III, where more critical national security issues were at stake. The United States and other developed nations coordinated closely on crucial navigational and resource issues in the "Group of Five." Moreover, the interest of certain land-based producers of nickel and copper, including from developed nations, in preventing competition from deep seabed minerals was probably a more important factor in the negotiating difficulties in Part XI than the "New International Economic Order." The renegotiation of Part XI pursuant to the Reagan conditions solved this latter problem by abolishing the "production limitations" that the land-based producers had written into the original agreement.

Myth: The convention is an effort by the radical left to move toward world government. The reality is the opposite! The convention includes a massive extension of national sovereign rights over the most important oceans resources, including fish stocks and oil and gas, while protecting national sovereign rights in freedom of navigation for all nations. As such, it is a direct repudiation of radical claims, urged by some, for an international agency to control the oceans. Only seabed mineral resources beyond a broadly extended area of coastal state jurisdiction are placed under the limited control of an international authority, and this was necessary to establish the exclusive property rights needed by mining firms for minerals otherwise owned by no nation. Further, the ISA, as renegotiated, adopts free-market principles as its core and is itself a rejection of the "New International Economic Order." Also, the negotiations resisted any effort to stray into arms control as urged by some. In reality, the convention is a triumph for both national sovereign rights and free market principles.

G. Myths Concerning the National Decision Process and the Views of President Reagan

Myth: President Reagan would oppose moving forward with this convention. Again, the actions of the Reagan administration show this to be false. At the urging of one of the authors, a former U.S. ambassador to the negotiations, among others, President Reagan wisely declined the provisions on deep seabed mining then set out in Part XI of the convention, and he approved instructions for the U.S. delegation to re-engage in the negotiations to achieve a series of critical access and institutional changes in Part XI. After a full and careful interagency review of the then draft convention, President Reagan suggested no changes to the remainder of the convention, including the most important security provisions sought by the United States. The reason for this is simple: the United States had superbly achieved its security objectives in the negotiations under Presidents Nixon and Ford. Further, in 1983, President Reagan issued orders to the executive branch to act in accordance with the substantive provisions of the convention, other than Part XI, as though the United States were a party to the convention. Although the Reagan conditions for changes in Part XI were not achieved during his tenure, they were later taken up by President Clinton as the basis for U.S. adherence. By 1994, the Clinton administration negotiators successfully achieved all of the Reagan conditions and then some. They also attained all of the conditions related to a deep seabed mining regime that had earlier been set out by Congress. Only then did the United States indicate total acceptance and submit the convention to the Senate for advice and consent.

Myth: If the convention is a treaty about the Navy's conflict mobility and national security, why is the ratification effort being led by State Department environmentalists? This disingenuous statement simply ignores the reality that the U.S. Navy and the Joint Chiefs have been the principal proponents of the convention since negotiations began in the 1970s. When the convention sat before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a decade because of opposition from the then-chairman of the committee, it was the chiefs and the Navy who worked tirelessly to move it forward. This statement further ignores the strong support of every U.S. oceans agency and private industry (e.g., oil and gas, fishing), as well as the unanimous support of the congressionally-established U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy. Further, as mentioned above, the U.S. position on law of the sea as reflected in this convention was developed by a broad interagency task force under the White House National Security Council mechanisms.

Myth: There has been inadequate consideration of the Law of the Sea Treaty and we need more time to study it. Those who espouse this view fail to note that this is the second round of Senate hearings on the convention. The first round was held in 1994 just before the convention was initially submitted to the Senate. The Senate and the nation have had a decade to study the convention, and since 1983, we have lived under the legal regime of everything but Part XI. We have an especially hard time finding sympathy for this position when it comes from spokesmen who did not call for more consideration while the convention languished for a decade before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rarely has any convention that has come before the Senate been more fully studied and debated and, in effect, lived under.

Myth: President Bush is urging Senate advice and consent to the convention for little better than "go-along, get-along multilateralism." In terms of presidents who are prepared to take international heat for their actions, as events in Afghanistan and Iraq surely demonstrate, this president is near the top. Is it too much to understand that after lengthy and careful review this president has urged Senate advice and consent because it is in the national interest of the United States? Further, does anyone really believe Ronald Reagan was a "go-along, get-along" president?

H. Myths Concerning Legal Effects

Myth: Other parties will reject the U.S. "military activities" declaration as a reservation. The U.S. declaration is consistent with the convention and is not a reservation. It is an option explicitly provided by Article 298 of the convention. Other parties to the convention that have already made such declarations exercising this option include the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Portugal, Denmark, Ukraine and Norway.

Myth: The 1994 agreement does not even pretend to amend the convention; it merely establishes controlling interpretive provisions. The convention could only have been formally amended if it had already entered into force. The 1994 Agreement was negotiated as a separate agreement in order to ensure that the convention did not enter into force with Part XI in its flawed state. The 1994 agreement made explicit, legally binding changes and has the same legal effect as if it were an amendment to the convention itself. Indeed, the ISA has been operating under the changes for a decade and has incorporated them article-by-article into the treaty in its compilation of basic documents. (17) A letter personally endorsed by all living former legal advisers of the U.S. Department of State, representing both Republican and Democratic administrations, confirms the legally binding nature of the changes to the convention affected by the 1994 agreement. Their letter states that "[T]he Reagan Administration's objection to the LOS Convention, as expressed in 1982 and 1983, was limited to the deep seabed mining regime. The 1994 Implementing Agreement that revised this regime, in our opinion, satisfactorily resolved that objection and has binding legal effect in its modification of the LOS Convention." (18) Moreover, the proposed resolution of advice and consent does not simply accept the 1982 convention but rather the convention with the 1994 agreement implementing Part XI (Section 1 of the Text of Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification).

Myth: Most of the benefits are available without the treaty. A major error in this assertion is that it altogether misses the ongoing struggle for navigational freedom in the world's oceans, a struggle requiring active U.S. engagement and leadership. Such a role is simply impossible if we are the only permanent Security Council member not to adhere to the convention. It also fails to address the cost to the United States of being excluded from the principal institutions created by the convention, including the loss of a U.S. veto over major decisions concerning deep seabed mining. It is also wrong to ignore the permanent loss of a U.S. deep seabed mining industry that would result from non-adherence. It further ignores the cost of the United States' international negotiating credibility in holding out requests for renegotiation of a major international agreement, and then turning our backs on the renegotiated agreement that met all of our requirements.

Myth: We do not need to adhere to the convention because it already represents customary international law binding on the United States. This argument implies that our navigational interests are already protected. Curiously, those who advance this stance fail to note its corollary: the United States is already bound to the convention as customary international law and to the provisions they may object to in the convention. The critics cannot have it both ways. More importantly, the argument misses the reality that the United States is legally disenfranchised as a non-adherent and will not receive the full benefits of the convention without acceding to it. Further, customary international law is subject to change which can be abrupt, such as when the law of outer space was changed overnight when Sputnik was launched.

I. Miscellaneous Myths

Myth: Adhering to the convention will come with substantial financial obligations. U.S. financial obligations under the convention will be modest. Had we been a full party throughout 2001, our contribution to the ISA would have been approximately $1.3 million computed at the 25 percent rate, and this reduced to a 22 percent rate in 2002. Our contribution to the International Tribunal is estimated to be approximately $2 million per year. This total level of contribution is less than the United States pays each year for membership in the U.S./Canada Great Lakes Fish Commission.

Myth: The convention purports to govern claims of rising sea levels and melting ice caps. These issues are neither dealt with in the convention nor were they featured in the negotiations.

IV. ARE THERE ACCURATE REASONS TO OPPOSE THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION?

While we strongly support immediate Senate advice and consent and seek to rebut false arguments that oppose it, we present below a list of oppositional arguments we do not support, but which are at least accurate in stating the effects of non-adherence. Thus, you should oppose Senate advice and consent:

* If you favor a gradual loss of U.S. sovereign rights over naval and commercial navigation on the world's oceans;

* If you believe the United States should substitute the lives of servicemen and servicewomen for the stability of the rule of law;

* If, at this time of high oil prices, you want to greatly delay development of the oil and gas industry on the United States continental margin beyond 200 nm, and the associated job creation;

* If you want to kill the U.S. seabed mining industry, permanently lose U.S. mine sites regarded as the best in the world and prevent the development of seabed mining jobs in the United States;

* If you do not want U.S. fishermen and merchant mariners to have legal protection against corporal punishment and imprisonment in jails around the world;

* If you do not want the United States to participate in assessing continental margin claims, such as that of Russia in the Arctic Ocean;

* If you believe it wrong for the convention to confirm for the United States the most extensive EEZ in the world;

* If you oppose stable expectations and the rule of law in the world's oceans;

* If you believe that the United States should have a diminished voice in protecting its maritime interests worldwide;

* If you believe that providing a guaranteed permanent seat and veto right for the United States on the governing council of the ISA, the only guaranteed seat for any nation, is a bad precedent;

* If you oppose protection of fish stocks and the ocean environment; If you believe the United States should no longer lead in the development of oceans law and policy; and

* If you believe that advice from non-Law of the Sea experts on oceans security issues is more reliable than that from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, presidents of both parties, all U.S. oceans industries and the unanimous opinion of the congressionally-established U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy.

NOTES

(1) See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: Urgent Unfinished Business," testimony by Ambassador John Norton Moore, 108th Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003; U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: United States Security Interests," testimony by Amb. Moore, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 April 2004; U.S. House Committee on International Relations, "United States Adherence to the Law of the Sea Convention: A Compelling National Interest," testimony by Amb. Moore, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 May 2004; U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea," testimony by Admiral William L. Schachte Jr., 108th Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003; U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention," testimony by Adm. Schachte, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 April 2004; U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Senate Advice and Consent to the Law of the Sea Convention: U.S. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention," testimony by Adm. Schachte, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 June 2004.

(2) Formally known as the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States is already a party to four 1958 convention regarding various aspects of the law of the sea, at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2004/30723.htm (October 29, 2005).

(3) Testimony by Moore, 8 April 2004.

(4) Richard B. Myers, Personal Correspondence with John W. Warner, Chairman of the Committee of Armed Services, United States Senate, Washington, DC, 7 April 2004.

(5) See www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/ convention_historical_perspective.htm.

(6) For more on both sides of the debate, see the proceedings of the Brookings Institution conference, "Should the United States Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty?" (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 4 May 2004), at www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20040564.pdf (30 October 2005).

(7) At http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/nvfz/submission%20on%20NWF2.htm (30 October 2005).

(8) U.S. Bureau of Arms Control, "Treaty on Principles of Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," 10 October 1967, at www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm (30 October 2005).

(9) U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," report to accompany Treaty Doc. 103-39 by Senator Richard Lugar, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 March 2004, at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/seareport.pdf (31 October 2005): 8.

(10) Article 301, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part16.htm (30 October 2005).

(11) See "White House Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger," Foreign Relations, 1969-1976 E-1 (8 May 1970), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/el/53191.htm (30 October 2005).

(12) U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, "Oversight Hearing to Examine the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," testimony of Frank Gaffney Jr., 108th Cong., 2nd sess., at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/ds/s1082.html (30 October 2005).

(13) "Bottom-of-the-Sea Treaty," Wall Street Journal, 29 March 2004, A18.

(14) Doug Bandow, "Sink the Law of the Sea Treaty," Weekly Standard, 15 March 2004, 17.

(15) U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, "Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention," testimony by John F. Turner, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 23 March 2004, at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/2004/30723.htm (30 October 2005).

(16) "Bottom-of-the-Sea Treaty."

(17) See International Sea Authority, The Law of the Sea: Compendium of Basic Documents (Ian Randle Publishers, September 2001).

(18) Herbert J. Hansell et al. Letter to Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, 7 April 2004.