8. Forestry and fishery conflict in Danau sentarum: application of an impairment approach.

Yasmi, Yurdi ; Colfer, Carol J. Pierce

Rigorous conflict analysis is needed to develop sound conflict management strategies. The recently proposed "impairment approach" is based on conceptual considerations, but empirical application in natural resources management has been lacking. The approach defines conflict as a situation in which one actor feels "impaired" by the action of another. We explore the applicability of this approach in analyzing inter- and intraethnic conflicts in a wetland conservation area of Danau Sentarum National Park, Indonesia. The park is home to two ethnic groups, Iban and Malay, which depend on forest and fish resources, respectively. Interethnic conflicts reflect local residence patterns and include the Iban communities' use offish "poisons," perceived by the Malay communities as impairment because poisons kill their caged fish and all other fish along the watercourse. In contrast to Malay customary law, the use of poisons is allowed by Iban customary law. Intra-ethnic conflict, between hamlets within a particular group, commonly relates to logging and timber sales and is often triggered by unclear forest boundaries between Iban hamlets and unclear boundaries of fishing zones in Malay areas. This study demonstrates how the use of an impairment approach helps identify the sources of conflict over natural resources.

The unprecedented destruction of tropical forests is receiving worldwide attention (Myers 1985; Laurence 1999; Pimm et al. 2001). Indonesia has responded to its high rate of deforestation by taking important measures to conserve its remaining tropical forests. The Government of Indonesia enacted the Biodiversity Conservation Law in 1990 and ratified the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in 1995. By the end of 2005, the government had established 50 national parks with a total area of approximately 15 million ha (Ministry of Forestry 2006). Managers of the parks, however, are confronted with conflicts involving different stakeholder groups (Daniels and Walker 2001; Moeliono and Fisher 2003). The Indonesian experience reflects the common problems of park management, such as uncertain tenure, unclear boundaries, conflicts among stakeholders, difficulties with law enforcement and unjust laws (Jamal and Eyre 2003; Castro and Nielson 2003). Rigorous methods of conflict analysis can contribute to providing a sound basis for addressing these problems (FAO 2000; Adams et al. 2003).

Numerous methods and models for conflict analysis exist. Classically, conflict is defined as differences in such things as perceptions, goals or interests (Coser 1956; Fisher and Ury 1981; Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Bartos and Wehr 2002). According to this definition, differences need to be reduced or eliminated to address conflict. However, scholars also argue that the classic model fails to distinguish between conflict and its antecedent conditions (e.g., Fink 1968; Dadrian 1971). Additionally, this broad definition fails to distinguish conflict from non-conflict situations that also involve differences, which are inevitable and inherent in every social interaction and do not necessarily represent conflict. Alternative models for conflict analysis in natural resources management have also been proposed (e.g., Pinz6n and Midgley 2000; Hjorsto et al. 2005), although most do not explicitly distinguish conflict from non-conflict situations.

More recently, an impairment approach (Glasl 1997, 1999; Marfo 2006; Yasmi 2007) defines conflict as a situation in which one actor feels impaired by the behavior of another actor because of different perceptions, emotions and interests. Conflict consists of three distinctive features. First, conflict is always attributed to two-actor, opponent-proponent settings: Actor A acts to impair Actor B, and each actor may be one or more individuals or organizations (Marfo 2006). Second, the experience of an actor's behavior as impairment becomes a central part of the definition of conflict. Unless impairment is felt, there is no conflict. Third, factors or conditions that induce such behavior, like the presence of differences, should not be confused with the actual conflict situation; they are the sources of impairment--also often referred to as sources of conflict--that trigger or induce impairing behavior.

Yasmi (2007) inductively derives impairments based on an extensive review of the literature, which argues that impairment plays a pivotal role in conflict over natural resources and that the sources of impairment dictate how a particular impairment manifests itself. The present study explores to what extent the impairment model can be used empirically and, based on that, seeks to generate lessons that may be applicable to wider contexts. We focus on two types of resource conflict (forestry and fisheries) that involve the two main ethnic groups (Iban and Malay) in Danau Sentarum National Park (DSNP). We investigate conflicts that occur between the two groups as well as internal conflicts within a particular group.

Methodology

The identification of impairments and their sources is primarily based on the perceptions of stakeholders who are directly and indirectly involved in conflict (Bernard 2002). Our main strategy to obtain such perspectives is through a case study (Yin 1994). We use an exploratory case study method to go beyond mere description of a case; we require a hermeneutic process (continued interpretation and reinterpretation of social phenomena) (Kyburz-Graber 2004). Our case study site is DSNP. It comprises various types of forest and aquatic ecosystems (Giesen and Aglionby 2000) and has several large

seasonal lakes connected by a dense network of rivers and channels, surrounded by swamps and low hills. Rich in biodiversity, it faces tremendous threats to its ecological integrity from illegal logging, palm oil plantation development and unsustainable fishing practices (e.g., Heri et al., this volume). Its multiple resources are continually contested by stakeholders, and the persistence of various conflicts offers an opportunity for in-depth exploration and learning.

Yasmi conducted semi-structured interviews to elicit stakeholders' perspectives (Gubrium and Holstein 2001; Holstein and Gubrium 2003), including in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 31 key informants, consisting of six Iban, 11 Malays and 14 outsiders (researchers, park rangers, and NGO and district forest service personnel of varying ethnicity). The number of informants represents the saturation point of the data, the point at which interviewing more informants would not provide additional substantive information (Guest et al. 2006) and is also proportional to the size of each stakeholder group. (2) In addition to interviews, we carried out two focus group discussions, one in an Iban and another in a Malay settlement. We also convened a multi-stakeholder workshop attended by representatives of all stakeholder groups. We double-checked our findings with experts with long-term experience working in the area. Finally, we analyzed our data primarily through qualitative content analysis of the interview texts following iterative steps (e.g., data reduction, categorization, adjustment of categories) described by Mayring (2000).

Conflict in Sociopolitical Context Site and Stakeholders

DSNP covers an area of 132,000 ha in the floodplain of the Upper Kapuas River basin, Indonesian Borneo, near the border with Malaysia (Figure 1). It consists of a series of interconnected lakes (danau) interspersed with swamp forest, peat swamp forest, and dry lowland forest on isolated hills in the northern and eastern part of the park area (Colfer and Wadley 1999; Dennis et al. 2000a; Anshari et al. 2001). Ninety-five percent of the area is inundated during the flood season (October-April), creating a network of rivers and lakes. During the dry season (May-September) there is an average 12 m drop in water level (Adger and Luttrell 2000). A Ramsar site (a Wetland of International Importance), the park is home to 500 tree species, 250 fish species, 250 bird species, and three crocodile species, as well as orangutans and proboscis monkeys (Giesen and Aglionby 2000; Dennis et al. 2000a).

Local communities depend on fish, timber and nontimber forest products, including rattan, honey and medicinal plants (Harwell 1997). The two major ethnic groups found in DSNP, Iban and Malay, have different livelihood strategies (Colfer et al. 2000). The Iban, who are Christian, are primarily shifting cultivators and hunters. They live in traditional longhouses and occupy the more upland, drier areas surrounding the lakes (Wadley 1997). Although they fish routinely for subsistence along the rivers and around the lakes, fishing is not their primary source of livelihood. The Malay, who are Muslim, are fishers. They reside downstream, around the lakes and along the large rivers, and depend almost exclusively on commercial fishing for their livelihoods (Dudley 2000).

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The population in DSNP grew by almost 40 percent between 1985 and 1995 because of a large influx from surrounding areas who came for fishing (Aglionby 1995). These newcomers were, by and large, tied by kinship to the earlier residents and simply increased the population rather than forming additional stakeholder groups. There were 39 permanent and 10 seasonal hamlets recorded within the park in the late 1990s (Giesen and Aglionby 2000). (3) In addition, 14 other hamlets located outside the park had utilization zones (e.g., fallows, customary forests) that overlapped with the park boundaries. Of the total settlements, there were only 12 Iban hamlets, 10 of which were outside the park. Erman and Heri (2005) reported that the population of DSNP was about 8,000, of whom 80 percent were Malay "fisherfolk." With the growing population, increased pressure on aquatic and forest resources, and new involvement of powerful external actors (especially the timber and oil palm industries), conflict among community groups has become more frequent.

Forestry Conflicts

Local forestry conflicts can be best understood by looking at the historical division and utilization of forest resources. The division is primarily based on the location of the hamlet. Every hamlet has its own wilayah kerja (utilization zone) (Dennis & Erman 1999). The zone of a particular hamlet is usually distinguished by natural features, such as rivers or hills. (4) The use of resources in any particular zone is regulated by hukum adat (customary law), which stipulates, for instance, how many of which kinds of trees can be harvested, which locations are off-limits to harvesting and for what purposes the trees can be used (Anshari et al. 2005). In Malay settlements, timber is usually used for house and canoe construction, walkways, simple furniture, floating gardens and fish cages. In Iban settlements, there tends to be somewhat less use of timber for floating gardens, fish cages and walkways; other uses remain similar.

Giesen and Aglionby (2000) stated that until the 1980s, extraction of products from forests was quite sustainable. This observation was reinforced by Dennis et al. (1998), who used time-series remote sensing data (1973, 1990 and 1994) to conclude that local forest management appeared to have minimal impact on forest cover. However, in late 1999, Wadley et al. (2000) found signs of illegal logging activity. This finding was confirmed by Anshari et al. (2005), who reported that after the demise of the Suharto regime in 1998, illegal logging activities increased. A common explanation for this phenomenon has been the political instability in the country following the end of Suharto's authoritarian regime. During the transition period of weak state control (1998-2004), many communities took advantage of the situation to make some quick cash, often encouraged by wealthy entrepreneurs from across the border. This period was the peak of illegal logging, and preliminary analysis of time-series satellite imagery corroborates these findings (Dennis, pers. commnnication).

Illegal logging in DSNP seemed to follow a common pattern. Usually, a hamlet made an agreement with a timber company to log within its utilization zone. In almost all cases, Malaysian timber companies were the major players. These companies used local entrepreneurs as "brokers" to persuade communities to enter into logging deals. The communities received fees from the companies (from $2 to $5 per cubic meter) and local infrastructure development assistance (e.g., renovation of longhouses or mosques). During the expansion of illegal logging, conflict increased, particularly between hamlets over unclear boundaries of utilization zones.

Fishery Conflicts

Fishing zones are defined by natural features, such as rivers and lakes. The divisions between the Malay and Iban zones are more pronounced than the divisions among the Malay hamlets. The Iban fishing zones normally exist in the upstream areas, which include rivers and some lakes. The Malays, who live mostly downstream along major rivers and lakes, divide fishing zones among themselves. Sometimes two hamlets share the same river or lake, in which case the boundaries may be rather vague.

Fishers in DSNP use lift nets, funnel nets, cast nets, gill nets, traps, hooks-and-lines, and other practices (Dudley 2000). The intensity of fishing activities is highly influenced by the water level, reaching its peak during the dry season. Each hamlet has its own adat (customary regulations) that control fishing activities, such as regulation on gears (allowed or prohibited, allocated by lottery, seasonal), locations for fishing, and sanctions and fines. The ketua nelayan (head of the fishers) in each hamlet ensures compliance with the area's practices. Conflict often emerges when someone breaches the adat by, for instance, using prohibited gear or entering another fishing zone without permission.

Actors, Impairments, and Interethnic Conflicts

Interethnic conflicts in Danau Sentarum have predominantly been between the Iban and the Malays in recent decades. Following the impairment approach, we distinguish between Actor A, who impairs another actor, and Actor B, who feels impaired. We specify A's actions that are experienced by B as impairment. We seek B's perspectives on why such actions are felt as impairment. Furthermore, we seek explanation on the factors or conditions that induce A's actions (sources of impairment). Table 1 summarizes the most significant interethnic conflicts in DSNP.

The use of chemical poisons by the Iban was the major concern among Malays. They perceived this practice to be very destructive because it killed all fish along the watercourse, including caged fish in downstream settlements. A respondent reported three times (1990, 1994 and 1997) during the past two decades when poisoning caused major problems; another, more recent incident was mentioned by Malay respondents during interviews and focus group sessions. Poisoning indeed has a long history in Iban tradition, though the traditional poison, tuba, is far less harmful than the commercial poisons frequently used today. Whereas the Malays considered poisoning very dangerous, the Iban commonly saw it as an acceptable method rooted in their tradition and customary laws. An Iban respondent argued, "The use of poison is not dangerous at all for fish stocks because we only use it during a certain period of the year and not on a continuous basis. Poisoning is our tradition that we inherited from our ancestors."

A second interethnic conflict relates to fishing by some Malay, particularly those who live in the upper river basin close to Iban settlements. An Iban respondent said, "We often encounter the Malay fishing in our area without prior permission from our customary leader. They do not respect our territory and also they endanger our fish stocks. We often confiscate their fishing equipment and enforce fines according to our customary laws." Fishing by Malays in Iban utilization zones was perceived as impairment by the Iban. The Malays said they had to fish far from their own hamlets because of the difficulty of catching fish and the decreasing amount offish in recent times. This condition had led them to fish farther and very often to enter the Iban utilization zones.

Figure 2 summarizes the perceptions of each stakeholder group, including the perception of outsider groups, and reveals the very large discrepancy in perceptions between the Iban and the Malays. For example, all Malay respondents said that using poisons jeopardized the fish stocks, and 64 percent believed that it destroyed their caged fish (Figure 2a). The Iban respondents did not share this view. The perceptions of outsiders were similar to those of the Malays: 71 percent considered poisoning dangerous for fish stocks and 57 percent said that it damaged the Malays' caged fish.

Furthermore, the perceptions of stakeholders on the second conflict case, where Malays entered Iban territories, also varied considerably (Figure 2b). For instance, 83 percent of the Iban perceived such entry as a disrespectful act and 50 percent as a threat to the fish stocks in their territories. However, some Malay respondents considered it acceptable: they said they had to fish there because of the lack offish in Malay territories. Some Malay respondents acknowledged that their fishing in Iban territories was indeed a disrespectful act (27 percent) and could jeopardize fish stocks (18 percent). However, they felt that they had no other choice and therefore they continued to fish there. Outsiders perceived this conflict as mainly the result of disrespectful acts by the Malays, who were jeopardizing the Iban fish stocks.

Actors, Impairments, and Intra-Ethnic Conflicts

Table 2 summarizes four types of intra-ethnic conflict. In the Malay settlements, certain types of fishing gear, particularly jermal (small mesh funnel nets), pukat (gillnets) and rabai (multiple hooks),were considered harmful for fish stocks because they caught fish of all sizes (including small species and juveniles) and were forbidden. A few hamlets, however, did not have such customary laws. Conflict often emerged when two hamlets shared the same river or lake but had different laws.

Another intra-ethnic conflict in the Malay area was fishing in another hamlet's utilization zone without permission. This type of incident was frequently reported, as illustrated by a respondent in Leabo: (5) "People from Laje often come to our area without permission. They fish here as if this lake and river belongs to them. We often warn them not to come again but they just ignore us. In the past, we had to confiscate their fishing gear and canoes. We even burned them." The fishing practices of Laje people were perceived as impairment because they did not respect Leabo's fishing zone. More importantly, the Leabo people were concerned about their fish stocks if Laje people continued to fish there. The incidents derived primarily from unclear fishing boundaries. Another stated reason was the low fish catches, which led many people to fish outside their utilization zone. Numerous respondents complained that fish stocks had decreased dramatically. This scarcity issue was also discussed during a multi-stakeholder workshop, and many attributed it to the increased human population, overfishing and use of destructive fishing gears. Evidently, because of the scarcity perceived by many fishers and the increasing number of households (see Indriatomoko, this volume), the issue of fishing zone boundaries has become more important and often the source of prolonged disputes.

The third type of conflict relates to forestry. In 2003, two Malay hamlets, Pangemo and Gantuno, became embroiled in an intense conflict. Gantuno, which was committed to conserving its forest, observed that the timber company working with Pangemo had cut trees in the Gantuno forest area. Pangemo said that the company only operated within its own utilization zone. The two hamlets established a joint team of representatives to survey the area under dispute. After weeks of debate, the boundaries were finally clarified; the result being that the timber company was found to have logged in Gantuno's forest. A fine of 20 million Rupiah (approximately US$2,000 (6)) was subsequently imposed on Pangemo.

A community leader from Gantuno explained why logging was perceived to be an impairment to the conservation initiative that he promoted:

 We in Gantuno are committed to not selling our forest to any
 company. We do not want to follow others who auction their forests.
 We will conserve it for our future generations, children and
 grandchildren. It is our last resort and we do not want to destroy
 it. If we log our forest today, in the future we will have
 difficulties in finding timber for housing, canoes, fish cages and
 furniture. We felt threatened when the company working with Pangemo
 entered our forest without permission and cut our trees. We could
 not accept that and we decided to stop them by force.

Respondents stated that unclear forest zone boundaries were the main source of this conflict.

Figure 3 illustrates how stakeholders perceived the three cases of intra-ethnic conflicts in the Malay settlement described above. For example, the perception of fishing gear differed significantly (Figure 3a). The opponents (the impaired actors) of such gear considered it a "threat" (100 percent); proponents obviously did not share this view. Outsiders (researchers, park rangers, and NGO and district forest service personnel) also considered the use of such gear unacceptable on the grounds that it jeopardized fish stocks. For the second intra-ethnic conflict case (Figure 3b), the opponents perceived fishing in another's zone as impairment because it was disrespectful (80 percent) and it jeopardized fish stocks (60 percent). Most outsiders also perceived this practice as unacceptable. Finally, in the case of forestry conflicts (Figure 3c), all opponents perceived logging as a threat to conservation. Similar to the perceptions of opponents, most outsiders perceived logging as a threat to conservation.

The fourth case of intraethnic conflict was between two neighboring Iban hamlets, Peleju and Malele, which had entered into agreements with various timber companies. The problem emerged when Malele accused Peleju of felling trees in its utilization zone; Peleju denied the charge of trespass. Meanwhile, community members from Malele confiscated all logging equipment and requested Peleju to cease activity immediately. Several attempts to resolve the conflict failed, and logging was halted for several months. The forest boundaries could not be resolved even after months of negotiation. Our interviews revealed that the people of Peleju thought Malele residents were jealous because they had not received assistance from the company to renovate their longhouse. Malele said that Peleju had breached the boundaries and that compensation must be paid for all trees taken from its forest. For both sides, claiming forest area and maintaining their claims were important to securing future access to the forest resources. A respondent in Malele said,

 The logging company that got the permit from Peleju entered our
 forest without permission. We fear that they will continue to log
 our forest if we do not stop them immediately. The result will be
 devastating as we will lose our forest for nothing and our future
 generations will also lose their access to the forest. For this
 reason, we will have to stop them.

The concerns about logging were based on Malele residents' belief that their utilization zone was not respected. Their inability to stop the logging would strengthen Peluju's claim to the area, given the significance of land clearing in claims to land, in Iban tradition. Similar conflicts have occurred in many other hamlets throughout DSNP. One of the respondents explained

 In the past these two hamlets never fought each other. We
 originated from one family. Now, because the possibility to cut
 trees from the forests is open, we start to dispute the boundaries.
 Every hamlet wants to claim a bigger area to get more money from
 selling the trees. In the past we never thought seriously about
 boundaries because it was difficult to log the forests and people
 were afraid of being caught by the military.

Discussion

This study shows that the impairment model, previously applied in natural resources management only theoretically (see Yasmi 2007; Marfo 2006), can be used for analyzing conflict cases and identifying impairments, sources of impairment and actors in a field study. We can draw several lessons from our work. First, the impairment model seems to allow us to identify conflict explicitly. For example, in the interethnic conflicts between the Malays and Iban, we could identify the specific actions that were considered impairments (e.g., using poison that destroys fish stock) and led to conflict. The impairment approach bases the analysis on an actual behavioral situation, whereas conventional approaches pay more attention to underlying differences. The interethnic conflict can be partially explained by the differences in customary law between the Iban and the Malays (see Coser 1956; Fisher and Ury 1981; Pruitt & Rubin 1986; Bartos and Wehr 2002), but such differences are normal and do not lead to conflict unless they result in impairing actions. The impairment model helps clarify when a particular conflict actually emerges--that is, only after the impairment is felt. Thus the impairment model--while not necessarily replacing conventional approaches--adds value to our analysis by making the distinction between conflict and nonconflict situations more explicit. It should not be considered superior to other approaches but rather complementary to the recent rapid stakeholder and conflict assessment and system model approaches introduced by Hjorsto et al. (2005) and Pinzon and Midgley (2000), respectively.

Second, this study shows that differences per se are not conflict but, rather, a reflection of the underlying sources of conflict or the antecedent conditions, as described by Fink (1968) and Dadrian (1971). Differences trigger certain actions, and only after such actions are experienced as impairment does conflict emerge. From this study, it becomes clear that natural resource conflicts are triggered when differences like customary laws and interpretation of boundaries clash. The dimensions of conflict are broad and not limited to interests per se (Daniels and Walker 2001). Given the complex institutional arrangements and the diversity of values (both material and cultural) attached to natural resources management, the sources of impairment and the range of underlying sources and actors associated with conflict are diverse. This study and others (Daniels and Walker 2001; Marfo 2006) show that a particular actor can engage in conflict with various other actors at the same time, as when ethnic groups clash over resources at the same time as hamlets within each group come into conflict. Hence, our finding is consistent with the majority of other studies that natural resource conflict usually involves multiple actors (Doornbos et al. 2000; Adams et al. 2003; Jamal and Eyre 2003).

Finally, while there is no panacea, what is needed to resolve conflicts is elimination of the impairments, which means paying attention to the underlying sources and conditions that trigger impairing behavior. In the case of DSNP, this may mean, for example, political efforts to ensure that customary laws and boundary interpretations are complementary and support each other. To achieve this objective, stakeholders must be willing to work in partnership, engage in mutually agreeable joint processes and jointly define their roles and responsibilities. Government officials, park managers or local NGOs could play facilitative roles to reconcile conflicts, and traditional leaders may represent particular hamlets' views in negotiations to reconcile many conflicting rules and regulations. Apart from policy-level actions, there are implications for practical resource management as well. The biggest question that needs critical reflection is how can we enable or stimulate stakeholders to use their capacities to cope with impairment and its sources creatively and effectively. Given the various impairments and their sources, to what extent can stakeholders maximize internal resources to cope better with conflict? And finally, when and how should they seek outside help from mediators or facilitators? Perhaps the co-management arrangement currently being proposed can be productive in DSNP (see Yuliani et al. 2008), and lessons can be drawn from other co-management experiences in Indonesia (e.g., Kusumanto et al. 2005; Tomich and Lewis 2001; Yasmi 2003; Yuliani et al. 2008) and elsewhere (Diaw et al. 2009, Fisher et al. 2007; Hartanto et al. 2003; McDougall et al. 2008). More research is clearly needed.

Conclusions

The "impairment model" seems to offer significant potential for analyzing natural resource conflicts from both theoretical and empirical points of view. This study indicates that conflict can be distinctly identified based on the empirical assessment of impairments, rather than differences. Instead of analyzing conflict in terms of differences in interests, perceptions or goals, the impairment model helps to distinguish conflict clearly from its antecedent conditions through three empirically distinct features: actors, impairments and sources of impairment. As shown throughout the paper, resource use conflicts involve different constellations of actors and may revolve around a number of impairments, such as using poison in fishing, logging in another's zone, and using destructive fishing gear. The common sources of such impairments in DSNP are conflicting customary laws, resource scarcity, and unclear territorial boundaries (with the insertion of powerful outside actors being an additional catalyst in some cases). Cultural and religious differences and historical animosities add another layer of meaning to the impairments that emerge. The impairment model adds value to existing conflict models by providing clearer distinctions between conflict and nonconflict situations. However, more application of the impairment model in natural resources management contexts is needed to explore its full potential.

The presence of conflict over resource use with different kinds of impairments, actors and sources suggests the need to develop mechanisms for effective conflict management that can respond to such dynamics. Conflict among different groups over unsustainable resource extraction is one of the critical challenges in managing national parks for biodiversity conservation. One implication that can be drawn is that establishing a national park should take into account the needs and aspirations of local communities. Any initiative for biodiversity conservation is likely to fail if local people's needs are not adequately addressed. In this context, the impairment approach offers an advantage: it allows us to anticipate conflict. If one knows what people consider impairment and the sources of such impairment, we should then be better able to address natural resource conflict in a timely manner, before it escalates.

Acknowledgments

This study was carried out when the first author was working for Wageningen University and CIFOR at the time, and now works for RECOFTC in Bangkok, Thailand; the second author works for CIFOR, in Bogor, Indonesia. Financial and logistical support was provided by both organizations for which we are very thankful. We are indebted to Heiner Schanz, Bas Arts, Doris Capistrano, Linda Yuliani, Rahayu Koesnadi and Yayan Indriatmoko. Jefri of Park Management of TNDS (BKSDA), Valentinus Heri of the NGO, Riak Bumi, and Gusti Anshari and Zuikifli of another NGO, Konservasi Borneo, helped in many ways. We also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive critiques. Finally, this study would not have been possible without the help of many communities in Danau Sentarum National Park; what we present here draws heavily on their knowledge.

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Yurdi Yasmi

RECOFTC--The Center for People and Forests

Bangkok, Thailand

Carol J. Pierce Colfer

Center for International Forestry Research

JL. CIFOR, Sindang Barang

Bogor, West Java, Indonesia

[email protected]

(1) More material on conflict in this area, with more thorough methodological discussion is available in Yasmi et al. (2007).

(2) In line with anthropological disclosure of sources of possible bias, Yasmi is a Muslim of Minangkabau ethnicity (from Sumatra) and was associated both with CIFOR and Riak Bumi (an NGO created and run mainly by people for this area). Part of Colfer's contribution (as an American foreigner of culturally Christian background) has been her longer-term experience with and understanding of DSNP lifeways. Unfortunately, given the cultural context and sociopolitical structure of the community in the study area, it proved difficult for Yasmi to interview female informants. Hence, the results may not adequately address women's perspectives.

(3) In Danau Sentarum a hamlet is typically a group of households composed of people from the same ethnic group who share the same geographical area.

(4) Although each hamlet has a utilization zone, people from other hamlets normally may collect timber and NTFPs if they have permission from the customary leader.

(5) All hamlet names used to illustrate conflict cases are pseudonyms.

(6) Based on the exchange rate in June 2009.

Table 1. Infra-ethnic conflicts in DSNP

Conflict Actor A Impairing Actor Explanation of why B
case behavior of B perceives A's behavior
 Actor A as impairment

1 Than Using poison Malay Destroying/causing death
 in fishing to caged fish,
 jeo ardizin, fish stocks

2 Malay Fishing in Than Disrespectful to one's
 Than territory utilization zone,
 ieonardizina fish stocks

Conflict Source of
case impairment

1 Differences in
 customary laws

2 Decreasing fish
 resources

Table 2. Intra-ethnic conflicts in DSNP

Conflict Actor A Impairing Actor
case behavior of B
 Actor A

1 Malay Using Malay
 "destructive"
 fishinFN gear

2 Malay Fishing in Malay
 another's
 zone

3 Malay Logging in Malay
 another's
 zone

4 Than Logging in Iban
 another's
 zone

Conflict Explanation of why B Source of
case perceives A's behavior impairment
 as impairment

1 Jeopardizing fish stocks Differences in
 customary laws

2 Disrespectful of one's Unclear
 utilization zone, boundaries of
 jeopardizing fish stocks fishing zones,
 decreasing fish
 stocks
 (scarcity)

3 Threat to conservation Unclear
 initiative boundaries of
 forest zones

4 Disrespectful to one's Unclear
 utilization zone, threat to boundaries of
 future access forest zones

Figure 2. Perceptions of actors on interethnic conflicts between
Malays and Iban

(a) Using poison in rising

 destroying jeopardizing
 caged fish fish stocks

Ibans 0 0
Malays 64 100
Outsiders 57 71

(b) Fishing in Iban's territory

 jeopardizing disrespectful
 fish stocks

Ibans 50 83
Malays 18 27
Outsiders 43 79

Note: Table made from bar graph.

Figure 3. Perceptions of actors on intra-ethnic conflict among Malays

(a) Using "destructive" gear

 jeopardizing
 fish stocks

Malays-proponents 0
Malays-opponents 100
Outsiders 100

(b) Fishing in other's zone

 disrespectful jeopardizing
 fish stocks

Malays-proponents 0 0
Malays-opponents 80 60
Outsiders 43 57

(c) Logging in other's zone

 threat to conservation

Malays-proponents 0
Malays-opponents 100
Outsiders 86

Note: Table made from bar graph.