Abortion and crime: unwanted children and out-of-wedlock births.
Lott, John R., Jr. ; Whitley, John
I. INTRODUCTION
With violent crime rates dropping by 31% from their peak in 1991 to
1999 and murder rates declining by 42%, many explanations have been
offered. This drop is all the more interesting because it occurred while
some academics had predicted the rise of super predators and an
explosion of crime. (1) In the debate, many plausible explanations for
this decline have been advanced, such as increased arrest and conviction
rates, longer prison sentences, "broken windows" or
"problem-oriented" police policies, the ending of the crack
epidemic, a strong economy, right to carry concealed handgun laws, and
legalizing abortion during the early 1970s. (2) Generally, all these
explanations could be simultaneously true. Most scholars agree that the
crime reduction must be due to a range of factors, though they disagree
on which ones are important.
Recently Donohue and Levitt (2001) suggested that "legalized
abortion may account for as much as one-half of the overall crime
reduction" during the 1990s, legalization accounted for even more
of the drop in murder rates. One of their estimates implies legalizing
abortion accounts for 25 percentage points of the 31-percentage-point
drop in murder between 1991 and 1997 (2001, table IV, column 6). Two
possible hypotheses were advanced. Abortion may have prevented
"unwanted" children from being born. These unwanted children
might, if born, have had smaller investments in human capital by their
parents and thus been more prone to end up in trouble when they grew
older (e.g., Bouza (1990) or Morgentaler (1998)). (3) Second, there is
the less savory issue of whether abortion simply heavily culls out
certain groups disproportionately involved in crime (e.g., poor black
males).
Given the possible racial implications, it is important to separate
these two hypotheses. This concern has been particularly raised by those
pointing out that blacks account for over 30% of the abortions since the
early 1970s. (4) One simple test would have been to measure whether the
drop in crime still occurred after directly accounting for the changing
racial composition of the population. (5)
Although it is indeed quite plausible that abortion would result in
fewer unwanted children who have smaller investments in human capital
and higher probabilities of engaging in crime, the legalization of
abortion may have increased the number of out-of-wedlock first births.
(6) If true, the prediction for crime is the opposite of the
Bouza-Morgentaler-Donohue-Levitt hypothesis. Others note that the
legalizing of abortion might contribute to a coarsening of society and
thus lead to more crime. (7)
This article directly links the number of abortions when a cohort was born to the crimes that cohort later commits using the Supplemental
Homicide Report to more directly link murders to the age of the murderer
and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) estimates on the number of
abortions. We find that legalizing abortion was associated with a
statistically significant increase in murder rates.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGALIZING ABORTION AND CRIME
The central question is really how abortions alter human capital
investments in marginal children. To Donohue and Levitt, the marginal
children are "unwanted" ones whose parents would not have
taken good care of them. (8)
But the legalization of abortion might also cause women to have
children out of wedlock. Akerlof et al. (1996) focus on the fate of the
children who were born (not on what fate would have awaited each child
had they not been aborted). From the 1960s through to the late 1980s
(the last years in which births could have any effect on crime rates
during the 1990s), there has been a tremendous increase in the rate of
out-of-wedlock births. On average during 1965-69, only 4.8% of whites
were born out of wedlock, rising to 16.1% 20 years later (1985 to 1989).
For blacks, the numbers rose from 34.9% to 61.8%. As Akerlof et al.
(1996) point out, unmarried women used to be much more likely to put up
their children for adoption. In 1969 only about 28% of children born out
of wedlock were being raised by mothers who were still unmarried within
three years. By 1984, that same fraction doubled to 56%. Hence, before
legalized abortion most of the children born out of wedlock ended up in
families with a father.
To Akerlof et al., the legalization of abortion reduced
women's ability to withhold premarital sexual favors from men.
Women who are willing to obtain an abortion are more likely to engage in
premarital sexual activity without a promise of marriage should
pregnancy occur. However, other women who are unwilling to obtain an
abortion face competition from women who are willing to obtain an
abortion as men "seek satisfaction elsewhere" (Akerlof et al.
1996, pp. 296-97). Furthermore, as premarital sex and out-of-wedlock
births became more common, the stigma declined and social pressure for
couples to marry also declined, hence reducing investment in the child.
(9)
Both effects are likely to be going on at the same time.
"Unwanted" children may indeed become less common after
abortion, with those potential children avoiding the problems of an
adverse family environment and a higher likelihood of crime. At the same
time, other women who want children and are unwilling to have abortions
find that they are raising children on their own, which also entails a
smaller investment in human capital compared to the situation that
existed before abortion was legalized. It is unclear which effect will
dominate, and thus whether the investment in children's human
capital will increase or decline.
Both effects are also consistent with an observed reduction in
fertility rates. Women who do not want children obviously can terminate
pregnancies. Women who do not want to avail themselves of abortions are
now more willing to engage in risky premarital sex and more likely to
end up with more out-of-wedlock births, but this is still a less
attractive option than they faced before abortion was legal when they
would have been able to wait until marriage for sex and have had
children within a marriage. Women with children may also find marriage
at a later date more difficult.
Finally, whereas Akerlof et al. don't extend their discussion
to crime, both theories relate abortion to crime rates through the level
of investment in a child's human capital. The percentage of
children born out of wedlock and the rate at which those children are
raised by their unwed birth mother are easily observable, yet it is more
problematic to link such time-series evidence to the legalization of
abortion. In contrast, the types of homes in which children had they not
been aborted would have grown up in is even more hypothetical. By 1980,
665,747 children were born out of wedlock and almost 1.3 million were
aborted; both numbers are large, but more information is needed to
answer what happens to investment in human capital and thus crime.
III. CHANGES IN MURDER RATES BY AGE RANGE
Five states are classified by Donohue and Levitt as legalizing
abortion prior to the Roe v. Wade decision in January 1973.
California's Supreme Court legalized abortion in late 1969 and
Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington legalized abortions through
legislation the following year. The data used in their regressions
assume that no abortions occur in any state other than these five prior
to 1973. (10) However, there are doubts whether this simple
classification accurately reflects the ease of obtaining abortions:
abortion data from the CDC indicate that other states that allowed
abortions only when the life or health of the mother was in danger
actually had higher abortion rates than some states where it was legal
(see Table 1). (11) For example, in 1972, Maryland, Oregon, New Mexico,
Kansas, and the District of Columbia had abortion rates that were as
high or higher than the states where abortion was legal. Still other
states such as Wisconsin, Colorado, and Delaware were not very far
behind.
Overall, 23 states in 1972, 20 in 1971, and 5 in 1970 are
incorrectly listed in their data as not having abortions. (12) Other
publications also use Donohue and Levitt's abortion data (e.g.,
Joyce 2004; Garmaise and Moskowitz 2004; though Joyce 2006 now makes
similar points to the ones raised here).
The assumption of zero legal abortions in the late adopting states
prior to Roe v. Wade is not a random error and systematically lowers
their abortion rates relative to the early adopting states during the
years between when the early adopting states started allowing abortions
and the Roe v. Wade decision.
Donohue and Levitt have argued since the publication of their
article that excluding abortions in the "nonlegal" states is
justified because only relatively well-to-do mothers were able to
"game the system" and obtain abortions and that the offspring of these mothers were not the type who would likely have engaged in
criminal activity. (13) Although there is no direct data on the wealth
of the women who have abortions, we can proxy their wealth by using
information on a woman's race. Two different racial categories are
available from the CDC: blacks and others or whites. The evidence
indicates that if anything relatively poorer women made up a larger
share of abortions in the nonlegal states. Blacks and other women make
24% of the female population between 10 and 49 years of age and the same
percentage of live births, but they account for 30% of the abortions in
nonlegal states prior to 1973. By contrast, they make up 32% of the
female population and 33% of live births in the five legal states, but
only 21% of the abortions.
Although we will rely on Donohue and Levitt's classification
in this section, including other states as early adopters, with abortion
rates at least as high as those where it was legal, produces results
that were more inconsistent with their hypothesis. (14) We will
graphically examine the changes in crime rates, first comparing murder
rates across different age groups in United States over time and second
by comparing crime rates in the states that first legalized abortion to
other states.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Also important, we will use the Supplemental Homicide Reports
instead of the arrest reports in the Uniform Crime Reports because they
allow us to much more accurately disaggregate the number of murders
committed by each age for each state. (15) Suppose the legalization of
abortion can explain up to 80% of the drop in murder during the 1990s,
as suggested by Donohue and Levitt. Such a huge drop in crime should be
readily observed first in the youngest age categories and then gradually
appear in progressively older age groups as they were born after
abortion was legalized. To examine this, we broke down the number of
murderers into five age categories: 10- to 15-year-olds, 16- to
20-year-olds, 21- to 25-year-olds, 26- to 30-year-olds, and over age 30.
By far the highest murder rates (the number of murderers in an age
category divided by the number of people of that age) are concentrated
in two age categories 16-20 and 21-25, with the murder rate for
26-30-year-olds ranking third.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Figure 1 shows how the murder rates varied by age for the period
from 1976 to 1998. The murder rate changes appear to be more consistent
with the theory that legalizing abortion increased (rather than reduced)
murder rates. The murder rates for the two oldest age groups (26-30 and
over 30 years of age) fall almost over the entire time period. The next
two oldest age groups (16-20 and 21-25 years of age) both peak in 1993.
Finally, the youngest age group peaks last in 1994. (16)
The next set of figures contrasts the changes in crime over time
for five early legalizing states with all the other late legalizing
states. Figures 2A-2D make this comparison for 10-15-year-olds,
16-20-year-olds, 21-25-year-olds, and 26-30-year-olds. We also
investigated murderers where the age of the murderer is not known were
also examined, but not shown. Murders by those over age 30 are excluded
because no one in that category was born after the legalization of
abortion. Besides the murder rates for the early and late legalizers,
the dotted vertical lines indicate the years when legalization begins to
apply to people in the age range. (17) For example, the first people
born after the legalization of abortion in the early legalizing states
were born in 1970 and didn't start to enter the 10-15 age category
until 1980. Because legalization is not assumed by Donohue and Levitt to
have occurred for the late adopters until 1973, there should be no
affect on crime by 10-15-year-olds in those states until 1983.
Figures 2A, 2B, and 2C show several striking similarities. The
patterns are remarkably similar over time when one compares the
"early" legalization patterns across age groups to each other.
The 10 to 15 year olds in the early adopters in Figure A can not be
affected by abortions until 1980 and the early adopters in the older age
groups in Figures B and C can not affected until 1986 and 1991,
respectively. Thus, if abortion is driving the murder rates for the
early adopters in the first three figures, the patterns should be lagged
by about six years for 16 to 20 year olds and then another five years
for 21 to 25 year olds. Instead the three early adopter patterns are
remarkably similar to each other. All three rise from 1976 to 1980, then
fall from 1980 to 1984, then rise into the 1990s, and finally fall
together again over the last five years. The same similarity also holds
true for the three late adopting patterns. All three decline from 1980
to 1984, then rise, and then fall together again.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Figures 2A to 2D further show a remarkably similar pattern across
early and late adopting states despite abortion legalization affecting
the late legalizers with a three-year lag. It is also clear that despite
legalization beginning to affect people in the different age groups at
different times there is little obvious relation to any changes in
murder rates. Although murder rates declined when abortions were
legalized for early adopters for 10-15-year-olds and early and late
adopters for 21-25-year-olds, murder rates rose after legalization for
late adopters in the 10-15--year-old age range and early and late
adopters for 16-20-year-olds. Examining both early and late adopters for
the 26-30-year old age group, the legalization of abortion does not seem
to speed up what had been a fairly continuous drop in murder rates over
the whole period. If legalizing abortion is having any effect on murder
rates, it is not obvious from this raw data. (18)
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
The murder rates for murderers of unknown age also show a similar
pattern in murder rates for both sets of states. The murder rates peak
in 1993 for the early adopters and 1994 for the late adopters. Again,
the timing of these peaks do nor seem consistent with legalized
abortion: There is no difference in when the peaks in murder rates
occurred and there is too long of a lag after legalization.
It is also possible to compare the murder rates by people born
immediately before and after abortion legalization. The top panel in
Figure 3 is for people born immediately two years before or two years
after the legalization of abortion in the five early adopting states.
The second panel does the same thing for those living in the 45 states
and the District of Columbia that were affected by Roe v. Wade. The
graphs tack these cohorts crime rates from their teens through their
twenties. There is some difference in murder rates as these cohorts age,
particularly during the late teenage years. For example, in B, while the
murder rate among those born after legalization rises faster up until
age 18, this group also has a slightly faster decline in murder rates
after that point. In A, those born prior to legalization have higher
murder rates for nine ages, and the reverse is true for five ages. It is
possible to include additional years before and after legalization, and
this does show a somewhat higher murder rates during middle age years
for those born after legalization (e.g., see Figure 4 for a period of
four years before and after legalization), but allowing more years to
elapse between cohorts makes comparisons more difficult because other
factors may be changing. (19)
Finally, a breakdown according to the sex of the murderer is also
possible. Some abortions are done to selectively choose the sex of
infants, and this has become progressively easier over time. The
presumption is usually that female offspring are less desired than males
and thus aborted at relatively higher rates, possibly implying greater
drops in violent crime by women. (20) Yet murders by women fell
continually during the 1980s and 1990s. The entire difference between
overall murder rates increasing in the last half of the 1980s and the
dropping during the 1990s is driven by males. Breaking down murders for
women and men by the age of the killer (not shown here) again confirms
what was reported in Figure 1: The drop in murder rates is first
observed for the oldest age categories. The abortion argument does not
seem to apply to abortions of females.
IV. HOW TO TEST THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABORTION AND CRIME
As just noted, the major benefit of the Supplemental Homicide
Report is to move beyond these aggregate crime and abortion numbers and
directly link the age of the murderer with the year in which the crime
occurs. (21) To use this data in a regression analysis, we set up panel
data to examine the number of murders committed by each year of age by
state by year. We break down the individual ages by year from 10 to 30
years of age and then aggregate together all the murders committed by
those over age 30. The age groupings are disaggregated by year born for
those born when abortion may have been allowed. This panel allows us to
track each cohort as they age and account for the number of legal
abortions in their state in their year of birth. If abortion eliminates
those in the population who are most likely to commit murder, we should
observe a significantly lower murder rate among those who were born
immediately after legalization. Furthermore, that difference should be
traceable over time as each cohort ages.
In their estimates explaining arrests for violent crime (table
VII), Donohue and Levitt drop observations where there are zero arrests
for a given age. Yet excluding observations based on on the realization
of the dependent variable creates potential selection bias. This problem
is particularly acute for murder, which is less frequently committed
than either overall violent or property crime, and it is the reason they
cite for not reporting these estimates for murder. The distribution is
clearly not normal. In our sample, almost a third of the observations by
age by state by year have zero murders (see Appendix Figure A2 at
http:/ssrn.com/abstract=270126 for the entire distribution). Though the
mean and variance of murders is consistent with a Poisson distribution,
we deal with the count nature of the data by estimating both Poisson and
negative binomial regressions (Plassman and Tideman 2001).
Obviously many factors affect the rate at which people commit
murder. The most basic regressions include age, state, and year fixed
effects. We also include the population in the state that are the same
age as the murderers. Law enforcement efforts against murder are
measured by arrest rates for murder, the execution rate in the year that
the crime occurred, and the percent of the population in prison. (22)
Both the last two variables are problematic because crime and
enforcement rates in the past as opposed to current efforts are much
more important in determining their current values. This is probably
less of a difficulty for execution rates because changes in who is
governor or changes in the composition of the state supreme court can
have a big impact on the number of executions that take place. Using the
general prison population as a percent of the total population also has
the problem that only about 1% or 2% of prisoners are incarcerated for
murder and any changes in enforcement against murder are likely to have
small changes in even this tiny fraction because prison sentences for
murder are so long. (23)
The bottom line is that the variable we would like to
measure--prison sentences as deterrence against murder would likely be
swamped by the changes in enforcement for other crimes. However, the
results reported here are not much affected by the inclusion of any of
these variables, and we include the percent of the population in prison
simply to make our results consistent with those of Donohue and Levitt.
Other factors that we account for are the unemployment rate; the
poverty rate; real per capita personal income; real per capita
government payments for income maintenance; unemployment insurance and
retirement payments; state population density in miles; a set of
demographic variables that subdivide a state's population into 36
different race, sex, and age groups (see Appendix Table 1); (24) and the
trends before and after the passage of right-to-carry laws. With the
exceptions of demographics and broader measures of income, the variables
are similar to those used by Donohue and Levitt. We have included these
other variables because they have been used in our past work (e.g., Lott
2000) and because of the importance of demographics in accounting for
whether changes in crime are simply due to groups that commit crime at
high rates being culled out of the population. Still, as we will show
shortly, the results we report are not dependent on any particular set
of control variables. (25)
V. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ABORTION ON CRIME
The panel data set covers murders committed by murderers in 22 age
categories (by year of age from 10 to 30 and over 30), 50 states and the
District of Columbia, and years from 1976 to 1998. In addition, 23% of
the murders are in a twenty-third category covering murders committed by
criminals of unknown age. Potentially there are 26,979 observations,
though missing observations reduce it to 21,480, particularly the
population by year of age, which is only available starting in 1980.
The first issue is what to do with the unknown age category. There
are several possible approaches: (1) exclude murders where the age of
the criminal is unknown, (2) include all murders but use additional
dummy and trend variables to proxy for the impact of abortion for those
observations because abortions numbers are not available for murderers
of unknown age, or (3) use estimates included in the Supplemental
Homicide Reports that distribute the unknown murderers based on the
known distribution by age/race/sex of offenders by state and year. The
first two approaches create problems by either censoring the endogenous
variable or not being able to link the unknown murderer category to the
abortion variable. The third approach is problematic because unknown
murderers may be different from murderers who have been identified if
only because they are more difficult cases. (26) The chief advantage of
the second approach is that it does not discard any information. We
primarily report the results using the second approach, but we tried all
three, and the abortion variable estimate differed little across
specifications.
For the second approach, we estimated the following regression:
(1) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
"Murders" are the number of murders committed by a
murderer of age i in state j and year k. "Abortions/1,000 Females
age 15-44" are the abortions that took place in that state when
that cohort was born divided by the number of women age 15-44 in that
state and year (multiplied by 1,000), (27) and
"'population" is the number of residents of age i in
state j and year k. For murders where the age of the murderer is
unknown, the abortion variable equals zero, but the vector of state
specific time trends for just that category is nonzero (to account for
the otherwise unmeasured impact of abortion for unknown age murderers).
We also have vectors of control variables and state, age, and year fixed
effects.
Table 2 examines the simplest specifications that include all the
variables and observations and examines whether the results are affected
by how the law enforcement variables are accounted for. The columns show
different specifications with various sets of control variables, though
all include state, year, and age fixed effects. Yet to account for
clustering at the state level, STATA requires that a population-averaged
estimator is included. Clustering is used at the state level, and we use
robust standard errors. (28)
The first column in Table 2 shows the relationship between the
number of murders and abortions, and the second specification includes
all the other control variables. One concern with this simple
specification is that the total arrest rate for all ages for murder
affects the number of murders, and the reverse is also true.
Simultaneity also exists for the overall prison population, but it is
much less of a problem because murderers make up only 1% or so of the
total prison population. The next two columns deal with this problem.
The third specification uses lagged values for the arrest rate and
prison population, (29) whereas the fourth specification replaces the
arrest rate for murder with the arrest rate for overall violent crimes.
The arrest rate for violent crimes will still proxy for the
effectiveness of police but avoids being very closely tied to current
changes in the number of murders.
The final two specifications use a dummy variable for the
legalization of abortion as well as the natural log of all the abortion
and population variables. (30) An advantage of using the simple dummy
variable is that it is more clearly exogenous, especially because other
social factors might be changing over time that influence both the
abortion rate and how children are raised. On the other hand, although
the dummy variable will give us a measure of the average impact of the
law, the number of abortions allows us to measure the differential
impact of legalization across different states. The log specification
not only allows the interaction of the abortion and population
variables, but it allows us to use nonlinear values for those variables
and puts a smaller weight on the impact of abortion in the larger
states.
The top row of Table 2 reports the percent change in murders by
people of a certain age from 1,000 abortions for people of that age.
These incident rate ratios are reported throughout the paper and
indicate that murders are increasing when the coefficient is greater
than one and declining when the values are less than one. Interestingly,
all the estimates imply that more abortions produce significantly more
murderers when children get older, and the coefficients for the first
four specifications are remarkably consistent.
To interpret the coefficients, note that the average state had
25,443 abortions in 1980 and 1,039,797 females age 15-44. The average
abortion rate (abortions per 1,000 females age 15-44) was thus 24.5 (the
simple average across states was 23). One more abortion per 1,000
females age 15-44 (i.e., about 4% of the average) is associated with
about a 0.9% increase in murders in any given year. (31)
The last two columns imply somewhat different impacts from
abortion. The dummy variable reported in column 5 indicates that
legalizing abortion was associated with, on average, a 7.2% increase in
murder. Whether this increase is due to the legalization of abortion for
the two sets of states in 1970 and 1973 and not other general cultural
factors that are also changing at about this same time is hard to say
simply because there is so little difference in the adoption dates. When
evaluated at the mean, the sixth column, which examines the log of the
number of abortions per 1,000 females age 15-44, implies that one more
abortion per female age 15-44 is associated with an increase in murders
of 0.12%, about one-seventh the magnitude estimated by the linear
specification. (32)
The specifications corresponding to those in Table 2 when we use
the Supplemental Homicide Reports' method of distributing unknown
murderers or exclude murders where the age of the criminal is unknown
are reported in Appendix 2 (available from the authors). In all but one
of these specifications the impact of abortion is statistically
significant at well above the 0.01 level for a two-tailed t-test, and
the effect ranges from between 33% smaller than what was reported in
Table 2 to 48% larger. (33)
Most of the law enforcement variables have the expected effects,
with more executions and more people in prison associated with
reductions in murder, though the effect is not significant for the
execution rate (the arrest rate effect appears positive, but
statistically insignificant). Consistent with past research, murder
rates fall at least 1% per year faster after the adoption of
right-to-carry laws. (34) The population density coefficient estimates
show a negative relationship but are not statistically significant.
Surprising results include the negative relationship estimated for the
unemployment rate and the positive relationship for income levels, but
these results are generally not statistically significant. Estimates
using weighted least squares instead of the Poisson and negative
binomial regression examined here are reported in Appendix 3 found that
five of the six results are similar in size to those shown in Table 2
(available from the authors).
The second section of Table 2 shows the impact of changes in
abortions per 1,000 live births on the murder rate. The results continue
to show a strong consistent positive relationship between abortions and
murder. The average abortion ratio (abortions per 1,000 live births) was
thus 359 (the simple average across states was 294). The estimate for
the specifications where abortions enter linearly (columns 1-4) imply
that an increase of one abortion per live birth (about 0.3% of the
total) is associated with a 0.06% increase in murders, about the same
magnitude of the results using abortions per 1,000 females age 15-44.
The log specification with abortions per 1,000 live births is similar to
the log specification with abortions per 1,000 females age 15-44.
To put these results differently, if legalizing abortion meant that
the abortions per female and per birth went from zero to those observed
from 1973 to 1988, Table 2's estimates (specifications 2, 6, 8, and
11) imply that there will be between 854 and 1,916 more murders in 1998.
The simply dummy estimate implies about 1,543 more murders. (35)
The results in Table 3 correspond with the sensitivity test
provided in Donohue and Levitt's Table V, with two exceptions: an
additional row limiting the sample to just those of known ages affected
by the legalization of abortion and replacing all the nonage specific
state-year level variables with state specific year fixed effects. For
the linear and log specifications, a column with results using abortions
per 1,000 females age 15-44 and a column with results using abortions
per 1,000 live births are presented. The full set of control variables
and sample is reported in the first row as the baseline. Each row
represents a separate specification. Donohue and Levitt tested whether
the results were sensitive to "large states," states with
"very high or low abortion rates" as well as different types
of trends and fixed effects. The large states excluded are California and New York, and the jurisdiction with the high abortion rate that is
excluded is Washington, DC. Each is excluded separately, and then all
three are excluded as a group. Individual state-specific trends and
separate regional fixed effects by year are also tried. Because of our
statistical package's (STATA) limit on the number of control
variables using state-specific year fixed effects may more effectively
control for year-to-year variations in factors that affect the overall
level of crime, but it comes at a cost of having to restrict the number
of years that can be examined. The last row in each of the three
sections in Table 3 reports regressions that account for the number of
abortions, the age specific population, a state-specific trend variable
for unknown age murders, as well as state-specific year effects for the
period from 1989 to 1998.
The results remain consistent across the various sensitivity tests.
Excluding the California, the District of Columbia, and New York
individually or together generally increases the effect of abortion.
Controlling for fertility reduces the abortion coefficient and makes it
statistically insignificant in the log specification.
Other sensitivity tests are available. We categorized the control
variables used in Table 2 into 10 groups: the execution rate, prison
population, arrest rate, the four measures of income, population
density, unemployment rate, poverty rate, right-to-carry laws,
population of the age group committing murder, and the 36 demographic
variables. Running all combinations of these groups results in 1,024
regressions. The estimates all account for state, age, and year fixed
effects. Doing this for all the linear, dummy variable, and the natural
log specifications with abortions/1,000 females age 15-44 triples the
number of regressions. Adding the linear and natural log specifications
with abortions/1,000 live births adds an additional 2,048 regressions.
Altogether, we ran 5,200 regressions.
The results from this specification search show a very consistent
set of results. The range of coefficient estimates for the linear
specification for the number of abortions by in-state residents (/1,000)
ranges from a low of 1.3449 to a high of 1.4564, with a median of
1.4002. For the dummy variable the estimates range from 1.069 to 1.087
and for the natural logs from 1.022 to 1.0275. (36)
We finally examined whether abortion had a different effect on
crime as people aged. It is not obvious that the percentage increase in
crime should be the same for all ages. To do this, the five measures
that we have been using (abortions per 1,000 females age 15-44,
abortions per 1,000 live births, the natural log of these two measures,
and the dummy variable for legalization) were interacted with the age
dummy variables. The results (available from the authors) imply a more
complicated story than we have seen thus far. Although abortions imply
more murders, the impact is not the same for all ages nor consistent
across all the specifications. The different specifications only
consistently imply higher crime rates for criminals between the ages of
13 and 17. (Comparing the rate regressions there are consistently higher
murder rates from for abortions for ages 13-22 and ages 27-29.) Only the
coefficients for one year of age--29-year-olds--show a consistent
decline in murder rates from abortions. The four regressions on the
number of abortions as well as the natural logs of those values show
much more consistency both in terms of the ages associated with
increases or decreases in crime.
There is a possible explanation for why the legalization dummy
produces different results from the abortion rate measures. As noted
earlier, abortion data from the CDC indicate that many states where
abortions were illegal actually had higher abortion rates than some
states where it was legal. The dummy variable for the law wrongly
assumes that legalization always produces more abortions than when
abortions were illegal (only allowed when the life or health of mother
are endangered), and that is obviously not true. These results raise
concerns with assuming that no abortions took place in states prior to
legalization.
VI. DISAGGREGATING CRIME AND ABORTION RATES BY RACE AND SEX
Legalized abortion need not affect all population groups equally.
Whites, blacks, and other groups obtain abortions and have
out-of-wedlock births at different rates. The net effect of legalization
is unclear because the groups that have a high levels of abortions also
tend to have out-of-wedlock births more frequently. For example, whereas
blacks account for 29% of abortions during our sample, they account for
40% of the out-of-wedlock births from 1980 to 1995. Fortunately, the
Supplemental Homicide Report disaggregates murders by race and sex, as
well as age. The CDC abortion data does list the number of abortions in
each state by whether the mother is white or nonwhite, though this
information is missing for 1969 and 1982-86. With the exception of
replacing the earlier endogenous variable for the total number of
murders with the number of murder broken down by race and sex, replacing
the total number of abortions with the number of abortions by the birth
mother's race, and examining only those murders for which the race
and sex of the murder is available, the regressions correspond to those
reported earlier in Table 2. Unfortunately, the abortion data does not
disaggregate nonwhite abortions further by race.
The regressions imply that more abortions by white or nonwhite
mothers are associated with more murders by people in their respective
groups. White males consistently and statistically significantly are
more adversely affected by higher abortion rates than white females, and
the difference are always statistically significant at least at the 5%
level for a two-tailed test. For nonwhites the difference between males
and females is more mixed: In one case males face the significantly
greater loss, in two cases, females did.
The different specifications do not imply that any one group is
harmed consistently more than another. The linear and natural log
estimates imply that on average additional abortions harm nonwhites the
most, whereas the dummy variable indicates that this is true for whites.
The bottom line is that increasing the abortion rate consistently
results in more murderers when the remaining offspring of that race come
of age, and the effect is larger for white males than for white females.
Generally the coefficients are similar in size to what was reported
earlier, though some are as large as two or three times as much as the
average effects reported earlier. Why white males exhibit a larger
percentage increase than white females in becoming murderers from
additional abortions is not clear, but the effect is consistent and
large. (37)
VII. MEASURING THE IMPACT OF ABORTION ON ARREST RATES
Donohue and Levitt's publications directly link abortions to
the arrests by year for 1524-year-olds using data from 1985 to 1996,
though as Foote and Goetz (2006) discovered, they did not run the
regressions that they thought they had and correcting the estimates
showed a positive and significant increase in violent crime. (38) Also
as noted earlier, there are problems with using arrest rates as opposed
to the Supplemental Homicide Report because arrest data do not directly
link the criminal to the crime and arrests frequently do not occur in
the year the crime was committed. Unfortunately, an equivalent of the
Supplemental Homicide Report does not exist for violent and property
crimes.
Although some control variables differ between our studies (e.g.,
the lack of any demographic variables in their regressions), the last
two regressions reported at the end of the sections for violent and
property crime and murder correspond to the odd numbered regressions in
their table 4. (39) The big difference between their results and ours
stems from them assuming that no abortions took place in the late
adopting states from 1970 to 1973 and particularly that no observations
were included for births that took place prior to 1970. Expanding the
data set so that it covers arrests over the period 1980-96 also produces
stronger evidence that abortion increases arrests for violent crime and
murder. The other estimates are based on the Poisson and negative
binomial regressions that we reported earlier. However, with few of the
age groups examined experiencing zero violent crime arrests in any given
state during a year and none of the age groups experiencing this for
property crime, the benefit from using the Poisson regressions is
limited to analyzing murder.
The results generally show either a positive relationship or no
relationship between abortion and arrests for violent crime and murder
while suggesting a weak negative relationship between abortion and
property crime (available upon request). For the weighted ordinary least
squares regressions that most closely correspond with their original
estimates, only the regressions for property crimes imply that higher
abortion rates reduce that type of crime. Overall only the arrest for
murder regressions always imply the same relationship between abortion
and crime, and indeed the effect is similar to what we found using the
Supplemental Homicide Report, though this is really a result of the
narrower age group being examined. It is unfortunate that Donohue and
Levitt do not provide results for this crime category so that we can
make a comparison. Although there are estimates for both violent and
property crime that imply both increases and decreases from abortion,
one conclusion is clear: The effects are always small and imply that
going from zero abortions to the mean number in 1980 had only around a
percentage point or so effect on crime.
There are difficulties with using arrests and not data such as that
provided by the Supplemental Homicide Report, but neither the different
data source nor the limited sample alone is sufficient to explain the
different results. Part of the difference between our results and theirs
goes away when we assume that abortions only occurred in the five states
they define as early legalizers, but that still does not qualitatively
change our results.
Combining our earlier results from Table 2 with these general
estimates for violent and property crime allow some rough estimates of
the victimization costs of crime. Donohue and Levitt suggest that
abortion reduces annual victimization costs by $30 billion, with most of
this coming from reductions in murder (Miller et al. 1993). Using their
same calculations for our results from Table 2 for 1998 imply that
abortion raises victimization costs from these higher murder rates alone
by between $3.3 and $7.4 billion per year in 2003 dollars. Even if we
take our estimates on the most optimistic reductions in property crime,
the net effect of abortion is to increase victimization costs by $3.2 to
$7.3 billion per year.
VIII. DOES ABORTION LEAD TO MORE OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS?
Akerlof et al. raise the issue of whether abortions and
contraceptives lead to more out-of-wedlock births. Yet their empirical
work is based on purely time-series evidence. (40) ARMA regressions are
used to examine whether there was a change in abortions, use of the Pill during first intercourse, and the percent of women before and after 1970
or 1971 who had sex by 16 years of age. They also examine whether there
was a change in so-called first-birth shotgun marriages, where couples
were pressured to marry, before and after 1968. All the variables change
in the expected way. Abortions, use of the Pill, and early intercourse
are all higher after the early 1970s, and shotgun marriages are lower,
but only for whites.
Compared to panel data, it is rather difficult to disentangle
different factors when using time-series data. Fortunately, state-level
data are available by year on the rate of out-of-wedlock births, and as
we have discussed there is a clear difference over time and across
states in abortion rates. Alternatively, state-level measures of the
availability and use of contraceptives are less obvious, though year
fixed effects combined with demographics and income data should serve as
a proxy.
With a few exceptions, we estimated Poisson regressions that
account for the same factors that we used in the earlier regressions.
(41) The three differences are: excluding the deterrence variables,
including a variable for the number of births, and excluding the age
fixed effects. Deterrence variables and age fixed effects are no longer
relevant to explaining out-of-wedlock births.
The results in Table 4 provide support for the Akerlof et al.
hypothesis, though the effect represents just a fraction of a percentage
point. In column 1, each 1,000 more abortions is associated with a 0.6%
increase in out-of-wedlock births. With about 1.6 million abortions
taking place a year from around 1980 on that implies about 9,600 more
out-of-wedlock births annually. The linear estimates for abortion
implied that legalization resulted in around 700 more murders annually
in 1998, about 4% of a year's worth of out-of-wedlock births.
Obviously the effective rate of murderers is much lower as these people
may commit multiple murders over many different years. If the higher
estimates of around 1,000 more murders per year arising from abortion
are true, this figure represents around 11% of the annual number of
out-of-wedlock births, and this number only appears plausible if a small
number of these people are responsible for a large number of murders
over multiple years.
The other estimates in the second and third columns indicate
similarly small effects. They imply that it is not the legalization of
abortion per se that is associated with more out-of-wedlock births but
that those states that had the biggest increase in abortion are somehow
different than other states. Higher unemployment, poverty, and income
are associated with more out-of-wedlock births, though surprisingly more
densely populated states have slightly fewer out-of-wedlock births.
Other possible explanations for why abortions increase crime (e.g.,
the legalization of abortion leading to a coarsening of society) are
beyond the scope of this article, though this section raises questions
about exactly how abortion increases crime.
IX. CONCLUSION
There are many factors that reduce murder rates, but the
legalization of abortion is not one of them. Of the over 6,000
regressions that we estimated here, only one implied even a small
reduction in murder rate. All the other estimates implied significant
increases in murder rates: allowing abortions after 1973 implies at
least 850 more murders in 1998. Donohue and Levitt suggest that abortion
reduces annual victimization costs by $30 billion, with most of this
coming from reductions in murder. Our results indicate that total annual
victimization costs rose by at least $3.2 billion as a result of
abortion.
Many times academics cannot avoid using aggregate crime data. Yet
the linking of abortion and crime is not such a situation: Examining
total crime rates and not directly linking abortions and the crimes
committed by individual cohorts missed catching obvious patterns and
incorrectly attributes the initial drop in murder rates to older
cohorts. Even if Donohue and Levitt believe that the correct approach
links crimes committed by all ages with their aggregate effective
abortion rate, sensible minor adjustments such as allowing the share of
crime committed by different ages to vary across states and years rather
than assuming that the weights are constant reverses their estimates.
This is not to suggest that the hypothesis provided by
Bouza-Morgentaler-Donohue-Levitt is not plausible, but at least that it
is not the most important part of the story. (42) Abortion can eliminate
unwanted children and can benefit many women, but it can also make other
women who are unable to bring themselves to have an abortion worse off
and more likely to have out-of-wedlock births. Like many laws there
appear to be both winners and losers, but here the net effect appears to
be a net reduction in human capital and an increase in crime.
doi:10.1093/ei/cb1003
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(1.) Lynette Clemetson, "The Gospel According to John,"
Newsweek, February 12, 2001, p. 25.
(2.) For evidence on all these explanations except for abortion see
Lott (2000, chap. 9).
(3.) Henry Morgantaler, one of the leading proponents of abortion
in Canada for several decades, notes (1998) that "it is well
documented that unwanted children are more likely to be abandoned,
neglected and abused. Such children inevitably develop an inner rage
that in later years may result in violent behaviour against people and
society.... I predicted a decline in crime and mental illness 30 years
ago when I started my campaign to make abortion in Canada legal and
safe. it took a long time for this prediction to come true. I expect
that things will get better as more and more children are born into
families that want and desire them, and receive them with joy and
anticipation" (Morgentaler 1998). Similarly, Bouza, the Minneapolis
police chief, wrote (1990) that abortion is "arguably the only
effective crime-prevention device adopted in this nation since the late
1960s."
(4.) Abortion Surveillance: Preliminary Analysis--United States.
1996, CDC, December 4. 1998, 47(47): 1025-1028, 1035.
(5.) In a response to this article when it was presented at the
American Law and Economic Association meetings in 2001, Donohue argued,
"If abortion is changing a state's demographics, then
controlling for demographics is inappropriate when trying to measure the
impact of legalized abortion." We argue that is precisely what you
want to account for if you want to see whether the impact of crime is
due to the changing quality of people within groups as opposed to
eugenics-type claim that the drop in crime results from culling out
those portions of the population who are likely to engage in crime.
However this article goes further and examines the results both with and
without demographics.
(6.) Recent work by Klick and Stratmann (2003) indicates that
sexual activity increased dramatically after legalized abortion.
Grossman and Joyce (1990, pp. 1000-1) provide interesting results that
the number of abortion providers in New York City is negatively related
to birth weight.
(7.) George F. Will, "More Abortions, Fewer Crimes?"
Newsweek, April 30, 2001, p. 84.
(8.) They cite evidence that aborted pregnancies would have
resulted in children who "would have been 60 percent more likely to
live in a single-parent household, 50 percent more likely to live in
poverty, 45 percent more likely to be in a household collecting welfare,
and 40 percent more likely to die during the first year of life"
(Gruber et al. 1999, p. 265). They point to evidence that unwanted
children and those raised in "an adverse family environment"
are "strongly linked to future criminality" (p. 11). However,
the discussion relating human investments in crime is more complicated
than this because assumptions must be made about how the reduction
reduces the return to legitimate relative to illegitimate activities
(Lott 1987).
(9.) Contraceptives make abortion less of an issue, and it seems
likely that the knowledge and correct use of contraceptives is much
higher among intelligent women. For them the cost of premarital sex is
lower, and they will lace relatively few unwanted pregnancies.
(10.) The correlation between the CDC's measure of abortions
and those used by Donohue and Levitt is 0.91 for abortions from 1973 to
1985, but it falls to 0.84 from 1970 to 1985 because of the assumption
that there are no abortions in the nonlegalizing states prior to 1973.
Using data we provided them, Donohue and Levitt (2004, p. 34) do report
three regressions with the CDC data up until 1981 (not 1985), but these
are only for the regressions that create their aggregate measure of
abortion and not the arrest rate data that they also use that roughly
tries to link the criminal's year of birth with the year of the
murder. The estimates employed here will be more equivalent to their
more disaggregated regressions that use the arrest rate data, not their
estimates using the aggregate effective abortion rate. As will be
discussed later, the Supplemental Homicide Report is the standard data
set used for linking the characteristics of the murderer with the victim
(not the Uniform Crime Report used by Donohue and Levitt), and that is
the data set that we will use in this article. One comment should also
be made: We were the ones who supplied Donohue and Levitt with the CDC
data on abortion rates.
(11.) We originally discovered the abortion data from the CDC when
the data that Donohue and Levitt used from the Alan Guttmacher Institute
was not made available to us when we put this article together.
(12.) Donohue and Levitt do not include data on the number of
abortions prior to 1970.
(13.) Based on comments made at the 2001 American Law and Economics
Association meetings.
(14.) Joyce (2004) and Foote and Goetz (2006) argue that the
District of Columbia should also be included as an early adopter, and
making this change would strengthen our findings that legalization
increases crime. Simply to be consistent with Donohue and Levitt, we
primarily use the number of abortions reported in a state, though we
also provide results that adjust for whether people are coming from
other states to have their abortion. We measure the total number of
abortions by state, though the results are extremely similar if we
simply used the number of abortions for a state's residents. This
is shown in Table 3, and doing so makes the affect of abortion more
positive and statistically significant.
(15.) Arrests are a poor measure of crimes because arrests can
frequently occur in different years from when the crime took place. The
Supplemental Homicide Reports also do a much better and much more
complete linking of the characteristics of the murderer with those of
the victim. The simple arrest rate data from the Uniform Crime Report
contains many missing observations for the age of the murder that are
not found in the Supplemental Homicide Reports.
(16.) Foote and Goetz (2006) provide similar figures for violent
and property crime rates. Although we are focusing on who is committing
the crimes, it is also possible to produce a figure for the
victimization rate, and it produces a similar pattern where the
victimization rate for the oldest people begins to decline first.
Another way of summarizing this information is to examine the average
age of murderers. If murder rates first declined among the youngest, the
average age of murderers should be rising. Yet, as Figure 1 implies, the
average age of murderers fell almost continually from the mid-1970s to
the 1994, declining from 30.9 years of age in 1977 to 27 in 1994. Only
after 1994 has there been a slight rebound in the average age as the
younger age groups began to reverse their increase in rates of
committing murder which began in the mid-1980s. By 1998, the average age
of murderers had risen back up to 28 years of age. This diagram also
provides a caution for Donohue and Levitt's use of an aggregate
abortion rate that creates an index that assumes the share of murders
committed by different ages remains constant over time. Using a constant
weighting over time causes the early drop in murder rates to be driven
by the oldest cohort of criminals even though their theory depends on
the drop occurring because of a change in the behavior of younger
people.
(17.) The numbers in Figure 2A prior to 1980 are calculated
slightly differently than the other numbers because of the inability to
precisely link the ages of population with crimes by this age group. To
make this link we assumed that the population group for 5-13-year-olds
was uniformily distributed.
(18.) The gap between early and late adopters also does not vary in
ways that can be explained by the legalization of abortion. For example,
in Figures 2A and 2B the gap between early and late adopters falls from
1980 to 1985 in both graphs even though legalization cannot possibly
begin to impact the 16-20-year-olds in Figure 2B until 1986.
(19.) Graphs showing one and also three years before and after the
legalization are also available.
(20.) The explicit systematic use of abortion to select male
offspring appears most widespread in Asian countries and India, but
discussions also arise in the U.S. press. See Michael Breen,
"Daugthers Unwanted: Asian's Preference for Sons Makes
Abortion Rate Soar," Washington Times, February 13, 1993, p. A1:
Sharon Rutenberg, "'Custom-Made' Families by Sex
Selection," United Press International, May 31, 1983, Owen D.
Jones, "Made-to-Orders Babies," Connecticut Law Tribune,
September 6, 1993, p. 19.
(21.) Donohue and Levitt create an "effective abortion
rate" that weights the number of abortions in different past years
by the percent of total arrests for a particular crime that occur for
people who were born in that year. It is a creative approach, but as
with most aggregation problems, there are risks. One of the dangers in
using the aggregate crime rate across all ages is that they may
incorrectly link changes in total crime rates to the wrong age groups.
Donohue and Levitt also made other compromises in creating the effective
abortion rate. They assume that the relative rates at which different
age groups commit crime is not only the same across all states but is
also constant over time. This assumption causes these results to miss
that it is the drop in murders by older people that is responsible for
the drop in murder rates to occur during the early 1990s (Figure 1). For
example, while murders by 16-20-year-olds made up 12% of total
identified murders in 1984, they made up 21% in 1994. Similarly, the
assumption that crime is committed at the same rate by different age
groups across states and over time is another oversimplification (see
figure 5 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=270126). We redid the results
reported in Donohue and Levitt's table IV: (1) assuming that no
abortions occurred when not defined as legal by Donohue and Levitt or
using CDC abortion data for all years in calculating the effective
abortion rate, (2) using national average weights for 1985 or slate- and
year-specific weights in calculating the effective abortion rate, and
(3) using either the Uniform Crime Report murder rate or the murder
offender rate from the Supplemental Homicide Report (more details are
available in table 2 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=270126). Donohue and
Levitt's (2001) results in their table IV column 6 implied a 0.43%
drop in murder for each 1% increase in abortions. This accounts for 25%
of the 30% drop in murder between 1991 and 1997. By contrast, when we
used all the abortion data available and used state and year weights in
determining the share of crimes committed by each age group instead of
assuming constant shares across states and years, the same specification
implies that each 1% increase in abortion raises the murder rate by
0.08%. Everything else equal, abortion slightly increased murder rates
by 1.3% between 1991 and 1997. Results are available that examine how
the results found by Donohue and Levitt change even when the FBI's
Uniform Crime rate data are used. See the discussion in section IV here:
http://ssrn.com/abstracat-270126.
(22.) For discussions of these variables, see Lott (2000).
(23.) There are other theoretical problems with using the prison
population. For example, prison population is a stock while the crime
rate is a flow. The difficulty that this creates is that the prison
population is determined by enforcement over many years, but it is the
current level of enforcement that is important for determining the crime
rate.
(24.) Available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 270126.
(25.) Although it is difficult to directly measure the violence
caused by cocaine/crack, limited cocaine price data is available for a
portion of the sample from 1980 to 1992 (with the exceptions of 1988 and
1989) to proxy for the relative accessibility of cocaine in different
markets. Using yearly state-level pricing data (as opposed to more
short-run changes in prices) also has the advantage of picking up cost
and not demand differences between counties, thus measuring the
differences in availability across counties. The data was obtained from
Grossman et al. (1996). The county level data is aggregated to the state
level by weighting the prices by the population in the counties. The
reduced number of observations provides an important reason that we do
not include this variable in the regressions shown in the text.
Including it leaves the coefficient on abortions virtually unchanged.
Whereas simply using the price does not allow one to perfectly
disentangle local differences in demand and supply, arbitrage basically
ensures that except for short periods of time the differences in prices
between these local markets will equal differences in selling costs. If
the total cost of selling cocaine was the same in two different cities,
any price differentials resulting from sudden shifts in demand would
result in distributors sending cocaine to the city with the higher price
until the price had fallen enough so that the prices between the two
cities were equal. Distributors could even remove cocaine from the
low-price city and move it to were it could obtain a higher price.
Sellers could also hold inventories and not sell their cocaine during
periods with unusually low demand. To the extent that it is costly to
instantly move drugs between different cities or to store drugs, any
price differentials in the short run can be due to demand shifts, but
because we are dealing with a period of a year, it seems difficult to
believe that any noncost based price differentials will not be
arbitraged away.
(26.) Joyce (2004) uses the imputation method provided by the
Supplemental Homicide Report and he is aware of the problems that this
creates, though he appears to be unaware that the data are available
without this lumping of known and unknown data together.
(27.) If the number of murders is regressed on the number of
abortions, there is a scaling problem. Estimates that do those types of
regressions produce similar results to those reported here (see
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 270126).
(28.) The results without clustering are available on request,
though the difference is that the estimates are much more statistically
significant.
(29.) Lagged values are problematic because in theory the current
arrest and punishment levels should matter most in deterring criminals.
The benefit from lagging the prison population also seems extremely
small because murderers make up such a small portion of prisoners.
(30.) For observations where the abortion variable equals zero we
added. I before taking the natural log.
(31.) One concern is whether the results are consistent across
states or are being driven by a few unusual outliers. To test this, we
interacted the abortion variable with a set of state dummy variables.
With Alabama serving as the left out state, 41 states have higher crime
rates as abortion increases, 39 of them statistically significant at
least at the 10% level for a two-tailed t-test. For six states the
effect was negative, but more abortions significantly reduced murder
rates in only two states (Nebraska and Vermont).
(32.) Though not reported, we also ran the simple dummy variable
and natural log specifications that correspond to specifications 1, 3,
and 4 and the abortion results changed little from those reported in
columns 5 and 6.
(33.) However. as we were concerned that would happen, excluding
those cases for which the age of the of. fender was never known did
alter other coefficients, such as the arrest and execution rates.
(34.) A data set with information on other gun control laws for a
portion of the time period studied here from 1980 to 1997 was also used
to estimate these regressions, but their inclusion had little impact on
the size or significance of the abortion variable. The data are
discussed in Lott (2000) and include information on waiting periods,
background checks, penalties for using guns in the commission of crime,
and so-called safe storage laws, which impose penalties on adults who do
not lock up there guns if the guns are used improperly by a juvenile.
(35.) If legalizing abortion meant that one went from zero
abortions to the mean abortions per female and per birth seen in 1980,
specifications 2, 6, 8, and 11. respectively, imply 22%, 27.5%, 20%, and
52% increases in murder rates. If instead of going from zero murders to
those that were actually allowed prior to legalization, specifications
2, 6, 8, and 11, respectively, imply 16%, 16%, 6%, and 9.3% increases in
murder rates.
(36.) In an earlier version of the article, we ran these 6,144
specifications without the category of unknown murderers. The ranges of
estimates were similar to those reported here.
(37.) There is also the question of who the victims are of this
increased crime. We disaggregated murders by the race of the victim and
criminal. Abortions seem to produce similar increases in murders by
whites of both whites and nonwhites. The data are more mixed for
nonwhites and others with the linear and natural log specifications
implying much bigger percentage increases in murders of nonwhites and
others than for whites, but the reverse is true for the dummy variable
specification.
(38.) We limited our sample to that reported by Donohue and Levitt
for consistency, but using a sample that for the ages and years reported
earler produces results, which are generally less consistent with their
estimates.
(39.) Our inability to replicate their "state x age
interactions" turns out to be because they did not estimate the
regressions they said that they had run (Foote and Goetz 2006). We were
unable to determine this at the time we wrote this article because we
were not provided with the regressions that Donohue and Levitt
estimated.
(40.) Recent work by Alesina and Giuliano (2006). done after our
paper was accepted, also finds that the legalization of abortion
increases out-of-wedlock births and reduces births in marriages, thus
confirming our results here. Gruber et al. (1999) question Akerlofet
al.'s findings.
(41.) Klick and Stratmann (2003) use weighted least squares to find
that sexual activity greatly increased after legalized abortion.
(42.) Kahane et al. (2006) provide strong evidence using British
data that abortion legalization did not reduce crime rates when abortion
is treated as endogenous. They also note (p. 26) the surprising point
that "total recorded crime in the U.K. began to decrease at about
the same time as in the U.S., despite the fact that abortion
legalization occurred about five years earlier." Though the
international evidence that does exist has not allowed the panel
analysis by age offered here, it still does not really suggest a
relationship between abortion and crime (Foote and Goetz 2006). The
Romanian data do not differentiate the increase in crime that occurred
alter the fall in communism from the increase recorded all across
Eastern Europe and Russia (an increase at least partly related to more
accurately reported statistics). Foote and Goetz's graphs of the
Australian data make it very difficult to see any pattern. The Canadian data are mixed but are estimated differently than the Donohue and Levitt
regressions.
JOHN R. LOTT JR. and JOHN WHITLEY *
* We thank Mike McKee and an anonymous referee from Economic
Inquiry, Alan Sykes, Richard Epstein, Ed Glaeser, Ted Joyce, Teb
Marvell, David Murray, Sam Peltzman, Florenz Plassmann, Mark Ramseyer,
and Bob Reed as well as participants at the American Law and Economics
Association meetings, George Mason University, New York University, SUNY Binghamton, Virginia Polytechnic and State University, and a conference
on abortion and crime at the American Enterprise Institute for helpful
comments. The Yale Law School's Center for Law, Economics, and
Public Policy provided funding for this research. Unfortunately, at the
time that this article was originally written, Donohue and Levitt were
unable to provide us with either all their data or their regressions.
Lott: Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington,
DC 20036. Phone 1-202-862-4884, E-mail
[email protected]
Whitley: Received his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, Taylor
Run, Alexandria VA, 22314.
TABLE I
Comparing Abortion Rates for States Where Abortions were Legal
(in bold) versus Those where Abortions Could be Done When the Life or
Health of the Mother is in Danger
1969# 1970#
No. Abortions No. Abortions
per 1,000 per 1,000
State# Live Births# State# Live Births#
California# 35 Alaska# 120#
Colorado 25 California# 172#
Georgia 2 Colorado 53
Maryland 31 D.C. 268
Delaware 55
Georgia 7
Hawaii# 204#
Maryland 101
New Mexico 73
New York# 534#
North Carolina 13
Oregon 199
South Carolina 8
Virginia 14
Washington# 83#
1971# 1972#
No. Abortions No. Abortions
per 1,000 per 1,000
State# Live Births# State# Live Births#
Alabama 7 Alabama 19
Alaska# 160# Alaska# 169#
Arizona 20 Arizona 7
Arkansas 18 Arkansas 24
California# 344# California# 420#
Colorado 101 Colorado 136
Connecticut 16 Connecticut 66
DC 703 DC 1801
Delaware 114 Delaware 151
Georgia 17 Florida 42
Hawaii# 261# Georgia 29
Kansas 277 Hawaii# 295#
Maryland 145 Kansas 369
Massachusetts 33 Maryland 178
Mississippi 2 Massachusetts 41
New Mexico 219 Mississippi 1
New York# 927# Nebraska 34
North Carolina 46 New Mexico 291
Oregon 206 New York# 1183#
Pennsylvania 36 North Carolina 94
South Carolina 14 Oregon 228
Vermont 1 Pennsylvania 52
Virginia 46 South Carolina 17
Washington# 265# Tennessee 0
Wisconsin 65 Vermont 32
Virginia 60
Washington# 377#
Wisconsin 116
Note: Comparing Abortion Rates for States Where Abortions were Legal
indicated with #.
TABLE 2
Do Abortions Affect Murders?: Using Poisson or Negative Binomials
Regressions
Poisson Estimates No. of Murderers by Age by
State by Year
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Number of abortions during 1.405 1.3874 1.38753
the year in which people of (2.24) (2.32) (2.31)
that age were born/the
number of births
Dummy variable for whether
abortions are legal in a
state
ln(Number of abortions rate
during the year in which
people of that age were
born/the number of births)
Population in state that is 1 1
the age of the murders (-8.76) (-8.78)
ln(Population in state that
is the age of the murders)
Population density per 1.00054 1.011062
square mile in state (.95) (1.11)
ln(Population density in
state)
Number of people in prison 0.999995
(-6.18)
Number of people in prison 0.999995
lagged one year (-6.26)
ln(Number of people in
prison)
Execution rate 0.4925 0.3438
(-0.47) (-0.7)
Arrest rate for murder 0.99977
(-0.85)
Arrest rate for murder 0.9996363
lagged one year (-1.39)
Arrest rate for violent
crime
Unemployment rate 0.98944 0.98995
(-0.86) (-0.85)
Poverty rate 0.99968 1.00
(-0.06) (-0.03)
Per capita income 1.00006 1.00005
(-1.8) (-1.57)
Per capita income 0.99908 0.999047
maintenance (-0.94) (-1.02)
Per capita unemployment 1.00058 1.00043
insurance payments (1.81) (0.64)
Per capita retirement 0.999763 0.99968
payments for those over (-2.09) (-2.98)
age 65
Percent annual rate of -1.87 -2.5
change in murders after (1.71) (2.77)
right-to-carry law--annual
rate of change in murders
before right-to-carry law
(F-statistic in parentheses)
Chi-square 196144 2563166 1649367
No. of observations 21756 21480 21411
Same as Above but Using (7) (8) (9)
Negative Binomials
Three different measures of 1.29 1.317 1.3189
abortion are used in (4.18) (3.18) (3.15)
correspondence to the
columns used above
Same as First Regressions (13) (14) (15)
but Using Number of
Abortions
Number of abortions during 1.00217 1.00179 1.00
the year in which people of (1.90) (2.13) (2.03)
that age were born/1000
ln(Number of abortions
during the year in which
people of that age were
born/1000)
Poisson Estimates No. of Murderers by Age by
State by Year
Variable (4) (5) (6)
Number of abortions during 1.3928
the year in which people of (2.33)
that age were born/the
number of births
Dummy variable for whether 1.0718
abortions are legal in a (2.82)
state
ln(Number of abortions rate 1.105
during the year in which (3.43)
people of that age were
born/the number of births)
Population in state that is 1 1
the age of the murders (-9.14) (-9.48)
ln(Population in state that 0.71834
is the age of the murders) (-3.17)
Population density per 1.000596 1.00047
square mile in state (1.08) (0.85)
ln(Population density in 1.33101
state) (-7.06)
Number of people in prison 0.999995 0.999995
(-6.56) (-5.87)
Number of people in prison
lagged one year
ln(Number of people in 0.763888
prison) (-3.34)
Execution rate 0.44016 0.4154 0.4907
(-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.43)
Arrest rate for murder 0.9998 0.999665
(-0.85) (-1.12)
Arrest rate for murder 0.999665
lagged one year (-1.12)
Arrest rate for violent 0.9994108
crime (-0.7)
Unemployment rate .0989052 0.9904 0.996341
(-0.83) (-0.78) (-0.28)
Poverty rate 1.00004 0.99975 0.99786
(-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.38)
Per capita income 1.000069 1.00006 1.00008
(-2.26) (-1.90) (-2.5)
Per capita income 0.99936 0.9991 0.998223
maintenance (-0.71) (-0.90) (-1.79)
Per capita unemployment 1.00068 1.0006 1.00044
insurance payments (0.86) (0.84) (0.69)
Per capita retirement 0.9997545 0.9998 0.99988
payments for those over (-2.4) (-2.01) (-0.96)
age 65
Percent annual rate of -2.4 -1.85 -1.0
change in murders after (3.41) (1.69) (1.47)
right-to-carry law--annual
rate of change in murders
before right-to-carry law
(F-statistic in parentheses)
Chi-square 1641310 2911502 237549
No. of observations 21319 21480 21480
Same as Above but Using (10) (11) (12)
Negative Binomials
Three different measures of 1.3165 1.127 1.097
abortion are used in (3.21) (8.21) (4.64)
correspondence to the
columns used above
Same as First Regressions (16) (17) (18)
but Using Number of
Abortions
Number of abortions during 1.00182
the year in which people of (2.04)
that age were born/1000
ln(Number of abortions 1.033
during the year in which (7.11)
people of that age were
born/1000)
Notes: The coefficients are incident rate ratios. with absolute
z-statistics reported in parentheses. Values of the coefficients
greater than 1 show the percent increase in crime, and values
less than 1 indicate the percent decline. The demographics and
fixed age. state. and year effects are not reported. Robust SEs
with clustering are reported and a population-averaged estimator
is used. The last set of estimates using the number of abortions
have a scaling problem, but are provided for comparison purposes.
TABLE 3
Sensitivity of Abortion Coefficients for the Poisson Estimates Using
the Alternative Specifications Used by Donohue and Levitt (Only
Incident Rate Ratios for Abortion Effects Shown)
Coefficient for the No.
Abortions by In-State
Residents (divided by 1000)
Except Where Noted
Incident Rate
Ratio Absolute
Specification Coefficient z-Statistic
(1) Linear value of abortion rate
(corresponding to specification 2 in
Table 2)
Baseline 1.3874 2.32
Exclude New York 1.5155 1.56
Exclude California 1.3391 2.55
Exclude District of Columbia 1.89695 1.76
Exclude New York, California, District 1.64996 8.25
of Columbia
Adjust abortion rate for nonresidents 1.99059 3.57
Include control for flow of immigrants 1.3868 2.33
Include state-specific trends 1.2575 1.96
Include region-year interactions 1.3878 2.33
Include control for overall fertility 1.1736 3.02
Limiting sample to only those ages 1.4707 2.62
affected by abortion (eliminating
observations for those over 29 and of
unknown age)
Allowing for state-specific year fixed 1.388 2.33
effects in addition to the number of
abortions and the age specific
population
(2) Dummy variable for legalizing
abortion (corresponding to
specification 5 in Table 2)
Baseline 1.0718 2.82
Exclude New York 1.0701 2.70
Exclude California 1.0621 2.45
Exclude District of Columbia 1.0711 2.78
Exclude New York, California, District 1.0594 2.35
of Columbia
Adjust abortion rate for nonresidents 1.1011 3.43
Include control for flow of immigrants 1.0717 2.81
Include state-specific trends 1.0997 3.90
Include region-year interactions 1.0706 2.82
Include control for overall fertility 1.0452 1.84
Limiting sample to only those ages 1.0541 2.21
affected by abortion (eliminating
observations for those over 29 and of
unknown age)
Allowing for state-specific year fixed 1.0690 2.77
effects in addition to the number of
abortions and the age specific
population
(3) Natural logs of abortion rate and
population variables (corresponding to
specification 6 in Table 2)
Baseline 1.105 3.43
Exclude New York 1.125 3.82
Exclude California 1.081 3.35
Exclude District of Columbia 1.104 3.33
Exclude New York, California, 1.094 3.27
District of Columbia
Adjust abortion rate for nonresidents 1.0958 3.30
Include control for flow of immigrants 1.1053 3.43
Include state-specific trends 1.1105 3.61
include region-year interactions 1.1044 3.45
Include control for overall fertility 1.0105 1.00
Limiting sample to only those ages 1.1066 4.81
affected by abortion (eliminating
observations for those over 29 and of
unknown age)
Allowing for state-specific year fixed 1.1044 3.45
effects in addition to the ln(number of
abortions) and the age specific
population
TABLE 4
The Impact of Abortions on Out-of-Wedlock Births: Explaining
the Number of Out-of-Wedlock Births by State by Year
Coefficients and Absolute
Z-Statistics
Variable 1 2
Number of in-state abortions 1.00619800 ...
during the year in which people 3.27
of that age were born/ 1000
Dummy variable for whether abortions ... 1.45
are legal in a state -8.82
In (Number of abortions during the ... ...
year in which people of that age
were born/ 1000)
Number of births 0.9999989 1.000003
(0.35) (1.85)
Population density in state 0.9999487 0.9998297
(0.38) (1.28)
Unemployment rate 1.015146 1.005642
(2.66) (1.17)
Poverty rate 1.000791 1.002454
(0.0011821) (1.97)
Per capita income 1.000017 1.000008
(1.83) (0.62)
Per capita income maintanence 1.000245 0.999894
(1.83) (0.30)
Per capita unemployment 0.999859 0.9994682
insurance payments (9.59) (1.72)
Per capita retirement payments 1.000004 0.9999284
for those over age 65 (9.19) (2.60)
Chi-square 2453649 149e+07
No. of observations 7640 7640
Coefficients and Absolute
Z-Statistics
Variable 3
Number of in-state abortions ...
during the year in which people
of that age were born/ 1000
Dummy variable for whether abortions ...
are legal in a state
In (Number of abortions during the 1.04
year in which people of that age -7.45
were born/ 1000)
Number of births 1.000004
(3.93)
Population density in state 0.8965998
(2.16)
Unemployment rate 1.013540
(2.91)
Poverty rate 0.9999112
(0.07)
Per capita income 1.000027
(1.92)
Per capita income maintanence 1.00
(0.80)
Per capita unemployment 0.9997257
insurance payments (1.20)
Per capita retirement payments 1.00002
for those over age 65 (9.57)
Chi-square 6.90e+07
No. of observations 7640
Notes: Again the coefficients are incident rate ratios. Demographics
and fixed state and year effects are not reported. Robust SEs with
clustering are reported and a population-averaged estimator is used.