Strategic reforms for accelerated agricultural growth in Pakistan.
Faruqee, Rashid
Agricultural growth rates in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s show
that strong growth during the 1960s was driven by several factors,
including greater certainty in the use of irrigation water (as a result
of an agreement with India), the introduction of productivity-enhancing
fertiliser-seed packages, the introduction of tubewells and the
electrification of rural areas, and policy changes that improved the
profitability of farming. Growth during the 1970s dropped to 2.3
[percent as a result of the uncertainty created by land reforms in 1972
and 1977, severe climatic shocks, a cotton virus that depressed
production for most of the decade, and political instability. The
recovery in the 1980s and early 1990s can be attributed to the
introduction of new cotton varieties and improved management techniques,
as well as to a gradual improvement in economic incentives.
Closer inspection of the nature and sources of this growth raises
concerns about its sustainability and casts doubt on the ability of the
sector to grow by more than 3-4 percent a year in the future. Many of
the past sources of agricultural growth in Pakistan appear to have been
fully exploited. Strategy for the future must effectively address the
followings.
Allowing the market to Operate, policy reforms that support the
ongoing structural adjustment should be given top priority. To address
the crisis in irrigation management market-determined incentives must be
allowed to determine resource allocation within the irrigation system.
Reform in extension should include establishing closer links with
research institutions and reducing the number of front-line extension
workers and replacing them with fewer, better-trained workers who are
more responsive to the needs of farming systems. Full-fledged land
reform is difficult to enact and can be considered only after a
comprehensive study of costs and benefits. Some important measures can
be implemented immediately, however. Foremost is providing security of
tenure to many farmers, especially tenants-at-will, thereby improving
responsiveness to incentives and creating better incentives for
long-term investments.
INTRODUCTION
How has the agricultural sector in Pakistan performed in the past?
How is it likely to perform in the future? What are the major issues and
constraints facing the sector? What strategic reforms are needed to
boost the performance of the sector in the future?
This paper addresses these questions and suggests a strategy for
accelerated agricultural growth in Pakistan.
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Agricultural growth rates in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and early
1990s are shown in Table 1. Strong growth during the 1960s was driven by
several factors, including greater certainty in the use of irrigation
water (as a result of an agreement with India), the introduction of
productivity-enhancing fertiliser-seed packages, the introduction of
tubewells and the electrification of rural areas, and policy changes
that improved the profitability of farming. Growth during the 1970s
dropped to 2.3 percent as a result of the uncertainty created by land
reforms (and their selective implementation) in 1972 and 1977, severe
climatic shocks, a cotton virus that depressed production for most of
the decade, and political instability. The recovery in the 1980s and
early 1990s can be attributed to the introduction of new cotton
varieties and improved management techniques, as well as to a gradual
improvement in economic incentives.
A breakdown of agricultural growth by subsector is shown in Table
2. Between 1970-71 and 1994-95 agricultural gross domestic product (GDP)
more than doubled, increasing from Rs 51 billion in 1970-71 to more than
Rs 128 billion in 1994-95--steady growth of about 3 percent a year.
Because of even faster growth in the non-agricultural sectors the share
of agriculture in total GDP declined from about 40 percent to 24 percent
over the same period.
Important structural changes have taken place in the agricultural
sector since 1970-71. Although crop production remains the largest
contributor to agricultural GDP (62 percent in 1994-95), noncrop
agriculture has grown significantly since the 1970s, with livestock
contributing 33 percent and fisheries and forestry contributing 15
percent of agricultural GDP in 1994-95.
Structural changes have also taken place within the crop sector. By
1994-95 cotton had become almost as important as wheat in terms of value
added, accounting for 28 percent of total crop earnings. Expansion of
cotton caused a corresponding decline in the relative importance of
rice, which fell to 13 percent of total crop earnings, and sugar, which
fell to 16 percent of total crop earnings, both down from 20 percent in
the early 1970s. The lesson from the early 1990s is that depending on
cotton for strong export performance and economic stability may be
unwise given its susceptibility to yield and price fluctuations.
Productivity growth in other major crops is also levelling off and there
have been few increases in productivity in crops other than cotton.
Wheat is the most important food grain in Pakistan and is estimated
to contribute more than half of per capita caloric intake and 85 percent
of total protein intake. Some wheat is also fed to livestock. The area
under wheat increased from 7.4 million hectares in 1982-83 to about 8.2
million hectares in 1994-95. Yields also rose, from just under 1,700
kilograms per hectare in 1982-83 to more than 2,000 kilograms per
hectare in 1994-95. The area under maize grew only slightly, from about
790,000 hectares in 1982-83 to 830,000 hectares in 1994-95. Maize yields
increased modestly, from 1,250 kilograms per hectare to nearly 1,500
kilograms per hectare over the same period.
Rice production was flat between the early 1980s and 1992-93, with
the area under rice fluctuating moderately around 2 million hectares
since 1980. Yield growth fell from almost 1,750 kilograms per hectare in
1982-83 to just under 1,550 kilograms per hectare in 1992-93. Basmati yields declined by 15 percent and coarse and irri yields declined by 4
percent. More recently (1993-94 and 1995-96) high yields have led to
record rice production levels of close to 4 million tons.
Like many other countries Pakistan has pushed for self-sufficiency
in sugar, and production has increased slowly since the mide-1980s.
About 0.85 million hectares have been under sugar since the early 1980s
and yields have increased moderately, from 35,700 kilograms per hectare
in 1982-83 to 46,747 kilograms per hectare in 1994-95.
The livestock subsector is less important than the crop subsector
and remains largely uncommercialised. Many questions about performance
and potential face the subsector (such as a possible tradeoff between
the growth of crops and livestock) and further analysis is needed before
sound policy recommendations can be made regarding its
commercialisation. Livestock production contributed about 33 percent of
agricultural GDP in 1994-95. Between 1981-82 and 1994-95 the volume of
red meat and milk production grew by 5-6 percent a year. The poultry
industry was even more dynamic, growing by 12-13 percent a year during
the early 1990s. In 1994-95 poultry accounted for almost 15 percent of
total meat production, compared with 9 percent in 1984-85 and 6 percent
in 1980-81. The most important animal product is milk, 70 percent of
which comes from buffalo.
A favourable climate gives Pakistan a strong comparative advantage
in horticulture, as indicated by the rapid growth of the subsector in
the absence of policy interventions. The country's climatic zones
give it an edge in several valuable niches in the horticulture market,
notably off-season (relative to the European market) midwinter harvests,
year-round tropical fruits, low-chilling temperate fruits (such as
berries and some types of stone fruit), and high-chilling temperate
fruits (stone fruit). But the perishability of horticultural products
requires an efficient processing and marketing infrastructure, which is
largely lacking in Pakistan.
ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE
Between 1990 and 1995 the agricultural sector grew at about 3.0
percent annually--a rate that compares favourably with Egypt and India,
but unfavourably with China, Thailand, and Indonesia (Table 3). Closer
inspection of the nature and sources of this growth raises concerns
about its sustainability and casts doubt on the ability of the sector to
grow by more than 3-4 percent a year in the future [Faruqee (1995)].
Concern is based on several factors. First, rapid population growth
means that per capita growth has been weaker in Pakistan than in other
Asian countries, where strong agricultural growth has been maintained
with much lower population growth. In China, for example, aggregate
agricultural growth has been only about one percentage point higher than
in Pakistan, but per capita growth has been much higher (3.6 percent
compared with only 0.2 percent) because of lower population growth. In
India aggregate agricultural growth was lower than in Pakistan, but per
capita growth was higher than in Pakistan. Moreover, because Pakistan is
comparatively well endowed with natural resources (arable land, water,
and sunshine) and other favourable factors (a sizeable domestic market
and a favourable location) a faster rate of growth could have been
expected.
Another characteristic of past growth it that is has come largely
through more extensive rather than more intensive agriculture. The
continued reliance on area expansion for growth indicates that
technological progress in agriculture has been slow in recent years.
Area expansion has encountered increasing constraints in Pakistan, as
indicated by the country's low cropping intensity of 130 percent.
Egypt, a country with strikingly similar resource endowments, has a
cropping intensity of 180 percent. This partly explain why Pakistan,
with an agricultural land base six times that of Egypt, has agricultural
production that is less than twice as high.
The past performance of the agricultural sector should not be
judged on production trends alone. Output growth relative to
inputs--that is, productivity and productivity growth--also must be
considered. Productivity growth in Pakistan has been measured by several
different methods, all of which lead to the conclusion that production
has been poor relative to input use for several years. One
straightforward productivity measure is output per hectare (Figure 1).
For cotton and wheat output per hectare has risen in recent years; for
maize and rice it has remained stagnant. Partial productivity measures
(output per unit of a single factor) also suggest that productivity is
much lower than in comparable countries, such as India and Egypt.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Another indicator of average productivity is yield gaps (the
difference between average and best farmers' yields). Recent
studies indicate that yield gaps in Pakistan are excessive. The yield
gap for wheat is as high as 30 percent; for rice the figure is 50
percent [Byerlee and Akmal (1994) and Saleemi (1994)]. Such gaps are
generally caused by the lack of timely inputs, insufficient water, and
seed impurities.
The most reliable measure of productivity is total factor
productivity, which compares an index of all outputs with an index of
all inputs. Two recent studies [cited in Byerlee and Akmal (1994)] found
that total factor productivity has either stagnated or declined in
Pakistan since the mid-1970s. These studies suggest that the true
contribution of agriculture to economic growth may have been
considerably smaller than is suggested by the 4.4 percent increase in
agricultural output that Pakistan experienced between 1980 and 1993. Ali
and Velasco (1993) calculated total factor productivity by region and
cropping system and found poor results for all major systems (Table 4).
What factors lie behind the low levels of growth in agricultural
productivity? Although no comprehensive studies analysing the causes of
low productivity and slow productivity growth have been undertaken, a
few studies have examined the subject. Several studies [including
Byerlee, Harrington and Sharif (1990); Hussain et al. (1994) and Heissy
(1990)] identified seed supply and distribution systems as major
obstacles to yield increases for some crops, including wheat. Mahmood et
al. (1992) examined sources of productivity growth during different
periods on a crop-by-crop basis and found that input and output price
signals (which have been influenced by government policies) and levels
of human capital affected productivity (Table 5). They concluded that
wheat yields stagnated in the pre-green revolution period of the early
1960s and increased during the green revolution (1960s to mid-1970s),
even though the area under irrigation remained unchanged. During the
1980s yield growth dropped considerably, as a result of inefficient
irrigation, distorted prices, and misguided macroeconomic policy,
according to the study. Other variables found to have had an impact on
the level and growth of productivity were deregulation of input markets
(especially agrochemical) and technological change (and the research
that generates it).
Ali and Velasco (1993) attributed declining total factor
productivity to resource degradation and found a clear correlation
between intensification of input use across districts and resource
quality. Intensification leads to resource degradation in several ways.
Double-cropping affects the timing of crops in the rotation (such as the
delayed planting of wheat in wheat-cotton systems) and may encourage the
development of insect and pest diseases specific to each system. Such
problems have been found with rice-wheat and cotton-wheat systems
throughout South Asia. The use of modern inputs--such as tubewell water,
which is unsuitable for crops because of its high salinity--may also
contribute to degradation of the land, and increased machinery use may
have increased soil compaction.
Byerlee and Siddiq (1994) studied wheat yields between 1966 and
1986 and found that growth was less than expected from the application
of green revolution inputs. They attributed the worse than expected
performance to a decline in the quality of the resource base. Indicative
of resource degradation is the fact that yields of high-yielding wheat
varieties have not risen since 1970 despite the intensification of
fertiliser use. Yields of high-yielding rice varieties rose only 0.2
percent a year between 1969 and 1981 and were stagnant between 1981 and
1990 [Mahmood et al. (1992)].
Many of the past sources of agricultural growth in Pakistan appear
to have been fully exploited. There is no possibility of a significant
increase in total cultivable land or irrigation. At best a 10 percent
expansion in water resources can be expected, and only at a prohibitive cost. With past sources of growth weakening, future growth will have to
come predominantly from productivity growth, which will be achieved by
allocating resources to crops in which Pakistan has a comparative
advantage, improving the technical efficiency of inputs of each major
crop, and increasing cropping intensity.
Prospects and Challenges for the Future Supply Potential
A country's comparative advantage in a commodity or product
can be measured using the domestic resource cost (DRC), the ratio of
domestic (nontraded) inputs to the value of foreign exchange per unit of
the crop, all evaluated at opportunity cost. The DRCs for
Pakistan's principal crops are shown in Table 6.
Cotton, wheat, basmati rice, and livestock production all have DRCs
of less than 1, indicating that Pakistan has a comparative advantage in
their production. Coarse rice and sunflowers are marginally inefficient
(DRCs near 1): sugarcane and yellow maize are highly inefficient (at
least for the indicated regions).
Although Pakistan has a strong comparative advantage in wheat,
wheat imports are large and growing. Pakistani sugarcane appears to be
extremely uncompetitive and the gain in productivity from switching
water use to more efficient crops would be considerable. Overall, the
supply potential depends on moving production toward competitive crops
and closing the large yield gaps described earlier.
Demand Prospects
Pakistan's strong comparative advantage in wheat, basmati
rice, and cotton suggests that these commodities will likely have the
greatest production growth potential once market controls are removed.
Prospects are also good for expansion of livestock and horticultural
products. But production growth will be profitable for farmers only if
there is strong market demand for these commodities; weak demand
(domestically or internationally) could constrain production expansion.
Once production increases and prices become competitive, exports will
rise. How large are the markets for these products and how strong is the
future demand likely to be?
Food consumption patterns change as incomes rise and move away from
traditional staples, such as wheat and rice, toward higher-valued
products, especially milk, meat, fruits, and vegetables. This is already
being observed. In 1969-70 cereals accounted for 18 percent of average
consumer expenditure in Pakistan and milk accounted for 4 percent. Based
on the most recent household expenditure survey (1990-91), cereals
represent 19 percent and milk accounts for 18 percent of average
consumer spending.
Population growth will also increase the demand for food
commodities. Projections of future meat and animal product consumption
for the 1993-94 to 2004-05 period show rapid growth in consumption of
poultry and eggs (more than 5 percent a year in both cases), mutton (nearly 4.5 percent), fresh milk (4 percent), and beef (3 percent)
[Akmal (1993)].
The estimated growth rates for selected crops indicate that markets
will exist in the future for those crops that Pakistan can produce
efficiently (Table 7). Demand for meat is projected to grow by 10-15
percent a year, demand for fruits and vegetables by about 10 percent a
year, and demand for basmati rice by 8-12 percent a year. Crops with low
projected rates of demand growth (less than 5 percent growth) include
other rice and maize, which cannot be produced efficiently.
The demand for wheat is projected to grow by less than production,
suggesting that wheat imports will decline and production will be
determined by how much producers are willing to supply at the import
parity price level. In contrast, demand for sugar, which cannot be
produced efficiently, is expected to grow by more than 10 percent,
suggesting that sugar imports will likely increase in the future.
The World Bank (1995) projects that Pakistan's export market
will grow by 6-7 percent a year between 1995 and 2005, a rate slightly
less than the 1980-90 average and lower than that of some of
Pakistan's competitors. The Bank also projects world cotton
consumption to grow by 1.9 percent a year through 2005. Domestic
consumption in Pakistan should increase by 0.7 percent a year between
1991 and 2005, compared with 0.4 percent annual growth between 1970 and
1990.
The demand prospects for cotton-based manufactures depend on
international trade agreements. The recent Uruguay Round Agreements
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) call for a
ten-year phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which should provide
greater access for Pakistani products, especially to the U.S. and
European markets. Because most of the phase-out is concentrated toward
the end of the ten-year period, no immediate improvement can be
expected, however.
Challenges for the Future
The future prospects for the agricultural sector depend on its
ability to increase the output and income of the producers. Two direct
means of achieving higher output and income are technological change and
commercialisation. What are the positive effects of technological change
and commercialisation? If demand for agricultural goods is elastic,
technological innovation that increases land productivity can set off a
chain of beneficial effects [Binswanger and von Braun (1991)]. Higher
profits will initially accrue to farmers who adopt new technology, and a
supply response to higher profits will lead to increased production.
Demand for agricultural labour and other inputs will rise, as will
demand for marketing and transport services, leading to more employment.
Higher levels of consumer spending (as a result of higher profits) will
increase the demand for domestic goods and labour, and the rural wages
will rise. Commercialisation can also open up new domestic and
international markets to small farmers.
The two forces may work in tandem. Developing countries that
shifted their crop mix toward marketed and traded crops have shown
higher growth in yields per acre in staple food crops. For Pakistan
specialising in labour-intensive crops can create employment and reduce
food prices by stimulating the adoption of new technology in staple
foods.
But the poor could also lose from technological change and
commercialisation as farmers are caught on the agricultural treadmill.
Because demand for agricultural products is often inelastic consumers
capture most of the gains from technology--that is, as output increases,
prices fall because demand does not increase correspondingly. In the
extreme, farmers reap none of the gains from technology. Farmers can,
however, cushion the impact of technological change by diversifying into
other crops. And although they may not gain from innovation as
producers, they benefit as consumers through lower food prices. The
benefit of falling food prices often outweighs the cost of falling
profits and the government can limit price declines by eliminating or
reducing export restrictions.
Government can do little to avoid the constraint of world demand,
however. Countries can avoid losses imposed by technological change
elsewhere by accelerating their own rate of technological change. If
they fail to do so, loss of competitiveness can lead to balance of
payments difficulties and depreciation of the exchange rate, which in
turn will have negative consequences for the agricultural sector. The
loss of income associated with a loss of competitiveness will fall on
both consumers and producers.
Constraints on Future Agricultural Growth and the Need for Reforms
The relative productivity of most crops is low and the productivity
growth has been slow. Past growth relied mainly on expansion of
cultivable land, expansion that is no longer possible. Fertiliser use is
levelling off, suggesting that returns to further intensification are
falling. Productivity growth through technological progress appears to
have petered out once the green revolution technology was diffused
widely throughout the country. What can be done to revitalise the sector
so that it can achieve growth rates that are both satisfactory and
sustainable? The answer lies in increased productivity compared to the
present level, which will require major changes in systems, policies,
and institutions for agriculture over the next 3 to 5 years.
Broadly speaking, agriculture faces two sets of constraints in
Pakistan--resource constraints and policy distortions. Resource
constraints fall into four categories: (a) the inappropriate use of
land, causing soil erosion and land degradation; caused partly by
inappropriate incentive policy (b) a pattern of land concentration that
does not promote efficiency (many farms are either too large or too
small) and the absence of secure tenure, which creates disincentives for
investment in land; (c) a problem-plagued irrigation system; and (d)
inadequate human resources and infrastructure.
As for policy constraints, although there has been some
improvement, they are still serious. Direct intervention by the
government in agricultural markets has diminished in recent years but
remains excessive. Subsidisation of wheat imports, duty and period
restrictions on cotton exports, and protection of sugarcane continue to
distort incentives. Nominal protection coefficients reveal a persistent
policy bias against cotton and wheat and in favour of sugarcane.
Indirect intervention, through protection of industry, penalises
agriculture through its impact on relative sectoral prices. Government
policy also affects vital inputs (fertilisers and seeds) and the credit
market.
The composition of public expenditure in agriculture is also
distorted. Spending is dominated by subsidies that do not help farmers,
either because of rent seeking and inefficiencies or because the subsidy
is designed to help consumers at the expense of producers.
Growth rates achieved in the past can be sustained and even
surpassed if major changes are made in systems and policies. The most
important change will be a redefinition of the role of government in
which the government is limited to ensuring the smooth functioning of
markets and promoting private sector activities. Investment and public
expenditure in agriculture will have to be reshaped, with government
spending focusing on public goods and market failures.
The next sections of this paper deal with major resource and policy
constraints currently facing Pakistani agriculture: policy distortions,
public enterprises, the land market, irrigation, and rural credit. Other
key constraints are also examined briefly.
Policy Distortions
Massive government involvement in agriculture has done little to
benefit farmers in Pakistan. Government policy has severely distorted
agricultural incentives--directly through agricultural pricing policy
and indirectly, until recently, through exchange rate policy.
The effect of price reforms in Pakistan will be determined by
producer response. Reforming all policies that impose indirect taxes on
agriculture should result in a broader, more substantial response than
reform of direct interventions alone. Producers will respond to price
reforms that are credible; credibility can be affected by macroeconomic
uncertainty, which dampens the response to price reforms because it
creates instability in relative incentives. When inflation is high and
the real exchange rate overvalued, indirect taxation is high and highly
variable. Removing direct price interventions may not lead to a large
supply response because of uncertainty and because the impact of nominal
price changes on relative prices is difficult to discern.
Although the negative effects of the government's exchange
rate policy have been eliminated, the indirect effects from providing
heavier trade protection to certain industries linger and input markets
remain distorted by subsidies. Those distortions dissipate most of the
benefits directed at farmers.
Public institutions have proliferated in almost every area of
agriculture, with little benefit to the sector. Public enterprises
dominate the marketing and distribution of agricultural products,
crowding out private sector involvement. The research and extension
institutions are particularly weak and the underpricing of electricity
and water has entailed hidden expenditures that make the continued
provision of those essential inputs financially unsustainable.
For agricultural growth to be sustainable basic reforms are needed.
The proper role of the government should be to encourage the development
of a smoothly functioning market through institutional and regulatory
reform that facilitates market efficiency and private sector activities.
Where market failure is not an issue and government inefficiency is
evident, the role of government should be drastically reduced.
Government spending should focus on public goods and market failures,
not on activities better suited to the private sector. The government
should continue to play an active role in reducing poverty and
protecting the environment.
Public Enterprises
The problems of market distortions caused by public enterprises in
agriculture are significant. Public enterprises have not yielded
tangible benefits, have inhibited the development of an efficient market
in agricultural services, and have been a drain on the budget. They show
that the long-run cost of price intervention on agricultural producers
has been substantial.
Pakistan's agricultural public enterprises suffer from
economic, financial, and managerial deficiencies. From an economic
perspective, pursuit of noncommercial goals, noncommercial pricing, and
a drive for import protection have led to operating inefficiency, a high
cost structure, and inadequate capitalisation to meet potential demand.
From a financial perspective, low profitability, heavy debt,
overreliance on government bailouts, and preferred credit have
contributed to a poor return on investment. On the management side,
overstaffing and loose control of human resources and inadequate
accounting and cost control procedures have led to administrative
inefficiency.
Given the poor performance of public enterprises and the
distortions created by their intervention in production and marketing
activities, what kind of reforms are needed? Faruqee, Ali and Choudhry
(1999) suggest specific institutional and policy reforms. They argue
that institutional reforms should focus on divestiture of all commercial
activities to the private sector and that only those institutions and
functions that support the creation of public goods should remain in
government hands. The privatisation of viable but large enterprises
could take place in stages to allow the private sector to absorb the
entities' assets gradually, increase competition, and prevent the
growth of private monopolies. To supplement the institutional reform and
privatisation process, policy reforms should focus on four main issues:
macroeconomic policy reform (such as eliminating trade barriers and
exchange rate controls), price reform, regulatory reform (including
strengthening the legal environment for business), and financial reform
(especially easing government credit restrictions of financial
institutions).
Land Markets
The main resource inputs--and constraints--to any country's
agriculture are land and water. Farmers require access to these basic
natural resources if crops are to be sustainable. Whatever a
country's natural endowment these resources require proper
management and protection.
Both equity and productivity can be improved by land reform. Land
reform in Taiwan (China), instituted between 1949 and 1953, greatly
improved the distribution of income and raised agricultural output. From
the outset the government pursued several broad goals [see Fei, Ranis
and Kuo (1979)]. It sought to strengthen farmers associations and other
components of the organisational and financial infrastructure and to
repair physical infrastructure. Farmers associations, once dominated by
landlords and nonfarmers, were reorganised to serve farmers'
interests. These associations also began to provide credit and
facilities for purchasing, marketing, warehousing, and processing
agricultural products.
At the same time, the Taiwan government sought to restructure the
agricultural economy by reducing farm rents, selling public lands, and
introducing a land-to-the-tiller programme. Land rents were reduced by
fixing a limit for farm rents and enabling tenants to appeal for a lower
rent if crops failed, allowing tenants to pay rents at the end of the
period, mandating the registration of written contracts and fixed
leases, and giving tenants the option of purchasing land from owners. As
a result of these policy prices of farmland dropped. Tenants, who would
now benefit by working harder, raised crop yields and increased their
incomes. These farmers were then able to purchase the land. With this
success the government accelerated land reform by selling public land,
giving priority to land less tenants and cultivators of public land. The
stage was then set for the most dramatic reform, the compulsory selling
of land. The government stipulated that privately owned land in excess
of a specified area had to be sold to the government, which then resold
that land to the tenants. This measure gave the farmers new incentives
to increase production.
As a result of the reforms the distribution of landholdings changed
dramatically between 1952 and 1960. Wealth was substantially
redistributed from landlords to new owner-cultivators. The distribution
of income also became more equitable. Between 1941 and 1956 the share of
property in total agriculture dropped from 63.7 percent to 44.3 percent.
The share of farm income going to cultivators rose and that to
landowners and moneylenders fell [Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1979)]. Important
features of the Taiwanese experience relevant for Pakistan include
imposition of higher taxes for farmers not fully utilising cultivable
land and selling public lands to the landless.
Land resource management in Pakistan leaves much to be desired.
Much of the poor quality of the land can be attributed to soil erosion
and irrigation-related problems, such as salinity and water logging.
Imperfections in the agrarian land market and the need for reform are
discussed by Mahmood (1999). Despite attempts at land reform, the
agrarian land market in Pakistan remains imperfect and represents one of
the important obstacles to increased agricultural output. Mahmood
addresses three key questions: what market failures characterise land in
Pakistan, how can these market failures be explained, and what kinds of
reforms are needed to address these problems? He argues that an
efficient land market has failed to develop because property rights to
land do not exist in many areas and because the system of land records
and registration is obsolete and inefficient. The result is limited
access to land and a highly concentrated pattern of landholdings. The
inequitable distribution of land resulting from market failures
adversely affects agricultural output because the resulting size
distribution of farms inhibits agricultural growth.
Given the distribution of landholding size and the rigidities of
the land market, would land reform help? Ill-conceived land and tenancy reforms have created a bias against a fixed-rental land market: poor
implementation of earlier reforms resulted in little benefit to sitting
tenants. Uncompensated land redistribution would be politically
unfeasible; compensated land reform would be very expensive and would
likely be met with widespread evasion.
While the costs and benefits of future land reform should be
studied more carefully before further reform is considered certain
actions could be implemented in the short-term. These include removing
distortions in the machinery and credit markets that have facilitated
self-cultivation at the expense of tenants, giving tenants-at-will
greater security of tenure, improving the operation of land markets by
streamlining the land titling and registration process, and using a land
tax to increase the efficiency of land use.
Irrigation
About 90 percent of agricultural output in Pakistan is entirely
dependent on irrigation. Yet Pakistan's irrigation and drainage
system is in dire straits. Despite substantial budgetary input the
system suffers from severe and worsening operational problems, including
water logging and salinity, overexploitation of fresh ground water, low
efficiency in delivery and use, inequitable distribution, unreliable
delivery, and insufficient cost recovery.
These problems have many sources. The government treats water as a
public good, not a private tradable good for which markets can operate.
Lack of well-defined property rights and the illegality of sales of
surface water severely constrain informal irrigation water markets. The
government has failed to make budgetary provision for operation of the
system and maintains separate public bodies for irrigation maintenance
and revenue collection. Administrative discipline, which was adequate in
the past, has now broken down and the cost of irrigation maintenance has
vastly increased.
Unlike on-farm drainage, off-farm drainage is a public good (since
it is generally not possible to exclude individuals from the area wide
drainage benefit of lowering the water table). Off-farm drainage will
have to continue to be supplied by the government. The underlying
problem of inappropriate institutional framework will nevertheless
require reforms that will ensure autonomy, transparency, and
accountability.
What can be done to improve the irrigation and drainage system and
what should be the strategy for institutional changes? Ahmad and Faruqee
(1999) suggest that sustained improvement in performance is possible
only with market-determined incentives for irrigation and on-farm
drainage. A first step is to draw up enforceable property rights to
water, without which any attempt to legalise and commercialise water
markets would be futile.
Ahmad and Faruqee argue that establishing individual property
rights will not be enough and that the move toward commercial water
markets will require major institutional changes in the delivery of
irrigation and drainage. The best option for the government is to
develop user-directed, autonomous, commercially orientated public
utilities to ensure operational transparency and cost recovery of all
operations and maintenance and future investment expenditures. As the
major users of water, farmer organisations will also be vital to any new
market-based irrigation system. These groups could be organised
immediately to carry out some maintenance, ensure that water is
distributed in accordance with property rights, monitor groundwater use,
organise on-farm drainage development, and collect delivery and drainage
changes. Off-farm drainage, a public good, must continue to be the
responsibility of the government. The public sector institutions in
drainage need to be reconstituted to provide them with the autonomy
needed to pursue broad-based investment and cost recovery.
Rural Credit
Pakistan's credit institutions are not helping to accelerate
agricultural growth and reduce poverty. Although the rural sector
accounts for more than 70 percent of employment in Pakistan and roughly
two-thirds of rural employment is in agriculture, less than a third of
rural households receive loans, only 10 percent of which are from
institutional sources. Qureshi, Nabi and Faruqee (1999) argue that rural
credit markets must be liberalised to improve performance in the rural
economy and efficiency in financial institutions.
They suggest reforms in several areas, including policies to
stabilise the economy and the replacement of produce and price controls
with prudent regulation and supervision. Commercial banks must also
operate in a competitive environment and must be free to set interest
rates for rural lending that cover their transaction costs. Credit must
be made available to support productivity growth for agricultural small
holders and small producers of the rural nonfarm sector, where
Pakistan's growth potential lies. The authors highlight the
importance of providing credit to women and the rural poor for
consumption smoothing and sustainable income-generating activities.
Credit policy should be directed at developing a market-based
financial system for rural finance. Because of the market's failure
to support disadvantaged groups, however, a special priority programme
may be needed to direct credit to women, small holders, and the rural
nonfarm sector (including small-scale nonfarm activities, such as
livestock, fisheries, forestry and range lands, and industrial micro
enterprises).
Subsidising interest rates is not the way to help marginal
borrowers, who can be better, served by fixed-cost subsidies and
self-selected targeting. NGOs should be encouraged to help. Commercial
banks should be encouraged to lend on bases other than the mortgage and
passbook system; to experiment with wholesale credit through input
suppliers, marketing agents, and NGOs; and to consider lending for such
downstream agricultural activities as agro processing.
The biggest challenge facing rural finance is the restructuring of
cooperatives. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan should
undertake a portfolio audit, the result of which will determine whether
a major restructuring of its portfolio or a change in ownership is
required. To improve rural financing the system of property rights,
title, and default enforcement must also be strengthened.
Other Constraints to Productivity Growth in Agriculture
Human resource constraints, poor rural infrastructure (in
particular, transport and energy), and the weakness of the research and
extension system are other areas that need to be addressed. A brief
discussion of these issues follows. However, because of paucity of
relevant data, these constraints are not addressed as separate chapters.
Human Resources
Pakistan's overall education levels compare unfavourably with
those of other developing countries (Table 8). Educational spending is
low and primary school enrolment is well below expected levels based on
per capita income. Large gender differences exist, with women's
literacy at just 21 percent (compared with 45 percent for men). Low
female literacy is costly because in many East Asian economies educated
women who do not enter the labour force are able to educate their
children at home. Low literacy and numeracy inhibit agricultural
productivity and complicate the. task of agricultural support services.
Indeed, the lack of education could well be the binding constraint on
agricultural productivity over the next ten to fifteen years. Human
capital improvements are particularly important to the poor, whose major
asset is their labour. Human capital deficiencies lower the return to
labour and make it difficult for unskilled labourers to move out of
poverty.
Declining investment in education explains a significant part of
the stagnation of agricultural productivity since 1975. A study of total
factor productivity in Pakistan covering the 1955-85 period revealed the
importance of education. Using data from 35 districts [Rosegrant and
Evenson (1993)] found that a 10 percent increase in rural male adult
literacy increased total factor productivity by 2.7 percent. In
comparison, a 10 percent increase in the area under irrigation was found
to increase total factor productivity by 2.4 percent and a 10 percent
increase in the share of land under high-yielding varieties increased
total factor productivity by just 1.3 percent.
Quality of education is also a major concern. Butt (1985) found
that the productivity of farmers with secondary schooling (used as a
proxy for quality education) was significantly higher than the
productivity of farmers with only primary education. Primary education
increased productivity by 7 percent; secondary education was associated
with an 11 percent rise in productivity. Education was also positively
correlated with fertiliser use.
Rural Infrastructure
Rural investment is an important source of public capital and
raises the quality of human capital by facilitating health improvements;
rural infrastructure deficiencies represent obstacles to broadly based
agricultural growth. Improved infrastructure also facilitates the
development of nonfarm income generating opportunities, which are key to
poverty alleviation. The poor benefit to the extent that infrastructure
lowers the cost of either agricultural inputs or purchased goods.
Infrastructure may also expand the labour market and increase the demand
for unskilled labour. Good transportation can allow the poor to take
advantage of jobs in urban areas.
The transportation network is central to the timely delivery of
inputs and outputs, as well as to promoting commercialisation.
Telecommunications play an important role in commercialisation and
information dissemination. Energy becomes increasingly important as
agriculture becomes more mechanised. Investment in rural areas has been
a hallmark of the East Asian success story. The balance between rural
and urban public investment in roads, water, and sanitation facilities
has been less even in Pakistan than in the Republic of Korea or
Thailand.
Transportation. Road volume in Pakistan is among the lowest in the
world. Less than a third of Pakistan's 45,000 villages have access
to wholesale trading centres through the network of all-weather roads
and some areas are cut off from the rest Of the country throughout the
year. Although overall rural road length increased by 70 percent between
1981 and 1991, the roads remain largely inadequate and the road network
is in poor condition. More than half of the network is still unpaved and
more than two thirds of the paved arterial roads do not have enough
carriage way width for two lanes.
Poorly maintained roads are estimated to increase transport costs
by 30-40 percent. The distances between villages and marketing and
transportation points would not pose a serious problem if roads were of
high quality, but the poor state of the rural road network severely
inhibits the timely transport of inputs and outputs. Such constraints
are likely to be particularly important as Pakistan seeks to improve its
position in the high-value foods sector, which includes perishable fruits and vegetables. A study by Vesque (1994) used a multiple
regression model on Pakistani household data to show that higher road
status (metal paved or rock paved rather than unpaved roads) has a
positive influence on the production of two key staples, wheat and rice.
In a careful study of Indian districts Binswanger et al. (1993)
found that a 1.0 percent increase in road provision led to a 0.2 percent
increase in output. Infrastructure provision also had important indirect
effects on output: according to the study, a 1.0 percent increase in
road provision produced a 0.8 percent expansion in banking services.
Improved management of Pakistan's ports to facilitate timely
transportation of inputs and outputs is also needed, as is
rehabilitation of the railway network, which is in steady decline.
Energy. Reliable energy supply is vital to the agriculture sector.
Tubewells guarantee timely water delivery only if their power source is
ensured. The prompt harvesting of crops is particularly important in
Pakistan's double-cropping system: losses in wheat yields from late
harvesting of cotton are considerable. A more intensive livestock sector
and a move toward production of high-value foods will also require
greater energy input for cooling milk and preserving perishable crops.
Pakistan faces significant energy supply constraints compared with
other developing countries. Converting all forms of energy consumption
to kilograms of oil equivalent, energy consumption per capita was 243
kilograms in 1991, well below the South Asian average of 289 kilograms.
Electric power cuts affect the rural sector for up to ten hours a day,
forcing rural residents to rely on generators, which are very expensive
to operate. Many problems--notably the under pricing of energy and state
control--can be traced to Pakistan's energy sector policy, which
has led to crowding-out of public and private capital formation.
Research and Extension
Research. Agricultural research is underfunded in Pakistan, with
operational funds particularly scarce. In many provinces the ratio of
wage to operational (nonwage) expenditure in agricultural research is
80:20, much higher than the target ratio of 60:40. The effectiveness of
research has declined because of lack of material support, effective
planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the research programme.
Researchers lack the proper equipment and journals (notably foreign
journals), creating an inadequate research environment. Different
research institutes have overlapping responsibilities and duplication of
research is common.
Crop management research emphasises increases in productivity
through research on such issues as land preparation, harvesting, and
timing and method of application of input. Resource management research
focuses on preservation of the natural resource base. For most crops in
Pakistan, it is difficult to find good examples of these types of
research that have been applied to farmers' fields. Much evidence
indicates that key inputs, such as water and fertiliser, are
inefficiently used. Crop and resource management research lacks a
systems perspective. Specialised research tends to ignore interactions
between different crops and different agronomic issues. Important
long-term issues, such as necessary natural resource investments, are
generally ignored.
Research has failed to increase input efficiency. Outcomes from
well-controlled experiments need to be better tailored to farmer
conditions. Merely issuing technical packages to large, heterogeneous
groups of farmers is insufficient. Farmers must be given the means to
adapt these packages to their own circumstances.
Extension. Most studies indicate that farmer inefficiency is caused
mainly by lack of knowledge and skills. As emphasis switches from input
intensification to input efficiency, improvements in information and
skills play a larger role in increasing productivity. Small farmers may
find it more expensive to acquire knowledge; public extension can
equalise access to new methods.
Many farmers question the usefulness of the elaborate extension
system in place for crops. The more than 5,000 village extension workers
often lack adequate training and extension workers with higher education
and communication skills are likely to be assigned administrative
responsibilities. Moreover, the system now succeeds in transferring
technology to only a few poorly chosen farmers. Women and small farmers
are often ignored and feedback from farmers is poor. Organisational
problems are severe (especially lack of accountability) and operational
funding for extension workers is low.
Although much effort was made in the 1980s to implement the
training and visit (T&V) extension system, the system's
centralised, hierarchical approach limits feedback and adaptability to
local conditions and the system has had only modest success. Measures of
farmer contact did rise and extension services may have had an impact on
increasing pesticide use. But Hussain et al. (1994) could find little
evidence that T&V had improved the quality of extension advice. Some
of the success of the T&V system can be explained by the poor state
of extension service before the system was introduced. By introducing
organisational discipline and some additional funding, the T&V
system was able to improve the previously deficient extension services.
Less clear, however, is whether the system represented the most
cost-effective use of resources.
The notion of extension as a top-down supply-driven process needs
to be revised. The goal should instead be to create a demand for
information among farmers and to satisfy that demand through the efforts
of extension workers. The service should concentrate more on
participatory problem solving with farmers at the local level, which
will require substantially improving the education levels of farmers and
extension workers.
Research-Extension Linkage. The research-extension linkage is weak
in Pakistan. In Punjab the research and extension services collaborate
each year in creating a recommended crop package, which is then issued
to farmers. Because many farmers are illiterate, these packages (issued
in the form of a leaflet) are difficult for many farmers to implement.
Moreover, issuing an all-embracing technical package represents an
overreliance on the recipe approach to delivering extension messages.
Restructuring research and extension must be done simultaneously. Crop
and resource management research will require greater on-site
specificity and decentralisation, but will be effective only if the
extension service delivers site-specific information.
A STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE
Given the problems facing agriculture in Pakistan, what policies
and programmes should the government adopt to sustain and improve
agricultural growth? Before specific strategies are adopted, the
appropriate role of the government should be clearly defined as limited
to encouraging the development of a smoothly functioning market through
institutional and regulatory reforms that facilitate private sector
activities and market efficiency. In cases in which market failure is
not an issue and intervention has led to market inefficiency, the best
strategy is to reduce the government's role through policy reforms
and the strengthening of the process of market liberalisation. Thus,
intervention failures should not result in a situation worse than that
without intervention.
Recognising the Role of the Private Sector
A key component of the government's strategy must be to
reshape investment and public expenditure on agriculture. Spending
should be focused on the provision of public goods and the correction of
market failures, not on activities better suited to the private sector,
even if such activities may be profitable. In areas such as poverty
alleviation and environmental protection, where the government has a
legitimate role to play, market-friendly policy reforms should be
adopted to ensure economic efficiency and growth and to achieve the
government's social goals.
Changing Policies Affecting Incentives
Policies that affect incentives distort both input and output
markets and result in a sub-optimal allocation of resources. Changes in
price policy, trade policy, and fiscal policy are needed if agriculture
in Pakistan is to continue to grow.
Price Policy
As part of the structural reform, agricultural output prices should
be determined by the market, thereby allowing market signals to be
transmitted to farmers without distortion. The government should remove
all price supports and controls, not only because they distort market
signals and represent a drain on the budget, but also because such
liberalisation will improve production incentives for crops in which
Pakistan has a comparative advantage. Price fluctuations that result
from market liberalisation can be stabilised by other means, such as
promoting on-farm storage, private sector storage, and futures trading.
The government should also consider ending the subsidy on wheat
imports. Such a policy change would likely have little effect on
consumers, since the price of flour is already determined by the market
and is close to import parity. It would, however, help farmers by moving
the producer price of wheat toward the import parity level. At the same
time the government would need to eliminate quantitative import
restrictions on wheat and flour. Another desirable step would be to
remove protection of sugarcane by eliminating support prices and sugar
import restrictions, thus allowing scarce resources (such as water and
land) to be used more productively.
Before it removes price supports, the government must ensure that a
competitive and efficient private sector is ready to step in as it
withdraws. Where competition is not possible (as in sugarcane
processing, for example), strict regulation of the monopoly will be
necessary; if emerging monopolies are not adequately regulated the move
toward privatisation will be discredited and the reform process will
suffer.
Trade Policy
Rather than striving for self-sufficiency in industrial output,
Pakistan should direct its resources to their most efficient uses across
sectors and exploit agriculture's comparative advantage to finance
import requirements. Trade policy reform, which must be completed
rapidly, should be structured so that products in which Pakistan has a
comparative advantage are not penalised and products in which Pakistan
lacks a comparative advantage are afforded no protection. In particular,
the government should consider removing taxes on cotton exports, duties
on sugar imports, and quantitative restrictions on both. Any loss of
revenue could be offset by eliminating the wheat subsidy. In addition,
the sectoral terms of trade could be improved for agriculture by
reducing industrial protection. Experience in other East Asian economies
shows the considerable benefits of a much smaller bias against
agriculture in trade policies. Ideally, the current system of high and
heterogeneous duties and barriers should be replaced with a uniform duty
[World Bank (1992)].
Fiscal Policy
Tax reform will need to ensure that all sectors are treated equally
in terms of the tax burden. All special agricultural tax exemptions
should be eliminated, especially once intersectoral transfers have taken
place following the removal of distortions. The system of agricultural
income and wealth taxation that has been proposed should be put in place
as soon as possible and extended to meet the goals of equity and
efficiency. The tax base should be periodically reassessed to ensure
that the poor are not taxed too heavily and that taxes do not create
intersectoral distortions and inequity.
Changing Policies Affecting Input Markets
The government should consider reducing its level of intervention
in agricultural input markets, as it has begun to do in moving toward
privatising urea production and distribution. Additional efficiency
could be achieved by making the National Fertiliser Corporation more
commercially oriented or by divesting it to the private sector.
Privatising the import of phosphatic fertiliser should be
accelerated. The ability of the private sector to take over imports
effectively will depend on it being able to compete fairly with the
government during the transition. Given the strategic importance of
fertiliser the government should strive to ensure that private firms are
given the same facilities as the public sector. A smooth transition to a
market dominated by the private sector may also require the elimination
of public sector imports; policy reform in other sectors will likely
include removal of price controls on natural gas and fertiliser, which
is likely to lead to price increases that reflect full economic pricing.
Government involvement in the marketing of improved (certified)
seed is unwarranted and should be ended. Government seed corporations
should be run along commercial lines and privatised as soon as possible.
In the meantime private firms should be given the same facilities as
public sector companies. A legitimate role for government does exist in
providing quality control and certification of seed; this role needs to
be fully funded and strengthened as use of improved seed increases.
The irrigation system should be decentralised. At the distributary level downstream operations and maintenance should be handled by water
user associations, which should provide timely and efficient water
delivery. Upstream, at canal command (areas covered by main and branch
canals), operations should be handled by commercially oriented public
utilities that enter into explicit contractual obligations with the user
associations. At the provincial level autonomous water authorities
should be responsible for major provincial storage, link canals,
off-farm and provincial drainage, and flood control and management.
Irrigation charges can be raised to reflect the cost of service
provision, the quality of service provided, and the cost of competing
alternatives. Disputes between the different groups using the irrigation
system could be resolved by powerful, politically unbiased regulatory
authorities. A legal and institutional framework for the market exchange
of water rights could also be established. Although off-farm drainage (a
true public good) must continue to be the responsibility of the
government its costs can be recovered from farmers.
A careful study of the costs and benefits of land reform should be
initiated. Some immediate measures, such as elimination of low machinery
prices and improved access to credit (the lack of which makes it
difficult for small farmers to expand their holdings), should be adopted
to correct land market distortions. Removing these distortions would
increase opportunities for farming and for wage labour on
employment-intensive farms. The land title process should be modernised and streamlined through the establishment of a system of permanent title
deeds to land. Security of tenure should be ensured without creating new
disincentives to rent out land. These measures would likely facilitate
long-term investment, especially investment in natural resource
management.
Directed credit in any form should be eliminated. Groups that have
difficulty gaining access to credit could be assisted by a scheme under
which the initial set-up costs of extending credit could be underwritten
by the government in order to reduce transaction costs. Recurrent credit
subsidies should not be provided, however. Credit policies should be set
with a view to ensuring high loan repayment rates and sustaining lending
activities, special credit arrangements should not interfere with
liberalisation of interest rates. The government should also consider
developing an institutional and legal framework that would allow
efficient lending to agriculture, unhindered by highly restrictive
collateral requirements and seasonal credit regulations.
RECOGNISING THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Most subsectors of Pakistani agriculture have entered a post-green
revolution stage of development that requires new strategies to enhance
input efficiency and to maintain and improve the quality of the resource
base. By most measures of productivity Pakistan's institutions have
not evolved to meet this challenge. Reform in public spending is
critical to achieving these institutional changes. The government's
new role will require institutional changes but no independent
institutional reform should be needed. Some institutions (such as output
marketing agencies) will have to be phased out as the reform programme
progresses, however.
Research
Support for research should continue, but expenditure needs to be
restructured so that salaries do not absorb most of the available funds.
Research institutions should be made more autonomous, salary
restrictions should be lifted, and other funding sources should be
mobilised. Training programmes for research professionals should help
them understand the problems of farming systems, including irrigated
agriculture, and publicly funded research should focus on
growth-enhancing public goods, environmental impact, poverty reduction,
and the transfer of technology.
Greater importance should be attached to research on cropping
systems. Wheat fields, for example, are a breeding ground for pests that
attack the cotton crop, calling into question the viability of the
cotton-wheat system. Improvements in the major cropping systems to
overcome such problems as delayed planting and depletion of soil organic
matters are needed. Adaptive research (which should be a part of the
extension service) should provide site- and season-specific
recommendations and information to individual farmers.
Both productivity and sustainability can be enhanced by
improvements in crop and resource-management research. Greater attention
to local conditions can be achieved by defining major agroecological
zones and subsystems within these zones, rather than within political
boundaries. Such zones could then serve as the basis for organising crop
and resource-management research aimed at monitoring changes in the
resource base at the farm level.
Universities should continue to play a key role in providing
manpower training for research, and producers, NGOs, and other
participants from the private sector should be encouraged to take part
in setting research priorities. Research that can be profitably financed
by the private sector need not be underwritten by the limited public
budget, although joint public-private funding of research is desirable.
Private and public sector research financing could, where possible, be
provided on a competitive basis, so that funding to institutions would
be tied to performance. Monitoring of research--albeit under a system
that allows for greater decentralisation--and coordination among both
national and provincial research institutions needs to be improved so
that unnecessary duplication is avoided.
Extension Services
Some reduction in the size of the extension service may be
necessary, particularly among the cadre of extension agents at the Union
Council level, and continued public funding should be contingent on improved organisational capability. Extension already being undertaken
by private sector companies and NGOs, such as the provision of advisory
services by adaptive research institutions to medium and large farmers
on a fee basis, should be encouraged.
Operational management of extension services needs to be
decentralised, farmers need to be encouraged to play a larger role in
controlling and evaluating these services, and services need to be
geared to the problems of all farming systems, including livestock,
forestry, and water management, not just those of major crops. A more
diversified approach to extension that responds to the needs of farmers,
including women farmers, and makes use of all sources of extension
services, including the private sector, is desirable.
The "contact farmer" approach, which makes extensive use
of audio-visual teaching methods, extensive on-farm demonstrations, and
farm fairs, should be reconsidered. A group approach to message delivery
would complement groups in other areas, notably in water and credit
provision.
Education
Greater investment in formal schooling will be critical in raising
technical efficiency and productivity. In the short run functional
education of farmers can be improved through adult literacy programmes
and training by government fieldworkers. Such training will also prepare
farmers for the increased organisational burden that will be placed on
them as a result of the formation of water user associations and other
user groups. In the long run more emphasis on primary education will
help increase human capital in rural areas.
Rural Infrastructure Provision
Government's role in providing rural infrastructure needs to
be strengthened. The increased revenue from tax reform and savings from
the rationalisation of public expenditures on agriculture could be used
to finance farm-to-village road construction, which would improve the
distribution of inputs and the marketability of outputs; especially
high-value (often perishable) foods.
Poverty Alleviation
Swift alleviation of rural poverty depends on rapid agricultural
growth, which in turn depends on government policy; price reforms that
improve the incentives facing farmers are especially urgent. But to
achieve growth additional reforms are required to maximise poverty
reduction. In a labour-abundant economy such as Pakistan, subsidies on
capital (tractors, combine harvesters, and so on) are inappropriate
because they distort factor markets and lead to labour displacement.
Incentives to mechanise that displace labour without increasing output
significantly should be removed.
Provinces should be encouraged to better target their development
spending toward the rural poor by giving districts with the largest
concentration of poor people higher priority in the allocation of public
investment (such as rural roads and health and education facilities).
Rural credit policy should ensure that viable small-scale rural
investment opportunities can be efficiently financed, Directed credit,
quotas, and interest rate ceilings should be terminated, and the private
sector should be relied on for credit provision wherever possible. The
government should also consider removing land market distortions, which
impair efficiency as well as restrict access to land by the poor.
Participatory community-based organisations also offer great
promise in terms of reducing poverty. These organisations could be
integrated with groups that provide rural credit. Institution building
in rural communities will complement the increased reliance on user
groups in water and extension services.
Environmental Protection
To protect the environment the government must place more emphasis
on natural resource management problems in agriculture. The lessons of
successful resource management suggest that policy interventions should
be based on three principles:
* Adjusting prices for scarce natural resources to provide
appropriate incentives for conservation.
* Identifying-regulatory mechanisms that could be effective in
addressing market failures, bearing in mind the poor record of existing
regulatory agencies.
* Restructuring public expenditures to focus on natural resource
management priorities.
Government needs to phase out policies, such as the underpricing of
irrigation water, that give private agents incentives to use natural
resources suboptimally. Factor price distortions that lead to labour
displacement and increased environmental stress (farming on marginal
land or rural-urban migration, for example) should also be removed.
Elimination of subsidies--such as the sapling subsidy, the rationale for
which no longer exists--would release resources for natural resource
management projects.
Environment and natural resource management problems are often
associated with market failure and require public regulation. Increased
pesticide use has created growing resistance among pests and destroyed
natural predators. One approach would be to adopt integrated pest
management techniques that would be more effective against pest problems
as well as more environmentally friendly. An effective institutional
mechanism for transmitting knowledge about integrated pest management is
essential.
Increasing the regulatory powers of government agencies will be
counterproductive if they continue to protect the politically powerful,
seek rents for themselves, and enforce laws selectively. It may,
therefore, be wise to include NOGs in Pakistan's environmental
strategy and to support them wherever appropriate and according to their
comparative advantage. NGOs have had considerable success in increasing
farmers' awareness of environmental issues, have played an
important role in formulating environmental policy, and have recorded
some notable victories in the civil courts.
Lack of property rights and institutions to manage common property
resources can result in one-site damage and create negative
externalities. Successful watershed management projects need to be
extended and community management institutions established to address
common property resource management problems. Government intervention
should be limited to providing incentives for the adoption of
sustainable resource management techniques, such as new technologies
that enhance the physical status of common property resources.
Core Elements of the Strategy
Although all components of this strategy must be implemented to
ensure sustainability certain elements should be implemented first.
Allowing the Market to Operate
Policy reforms that support the ongoing structural adjustment
should be given top priority. These reforms include all actions that
involve government withdrawal from activities better suited to the
private sector. Market forces should be allowed to determine agriculture
output and input prices. Trade and tariff policy reform will improve the
incentives to the agricultural sector, ending distortionary
policy-induced intersectoral transfers out of agriculture. To make the
tax system equitable and nondistortionary agriculture must contribute
its fair share to government revenue, a change that will also improve
Pakistan's internal balance and increase stabilisation. These
reforms will not only help adjustment (including stabilisation) but will
improve agricultural efficiency and growth as well.
Addressing the Irrigation Crisis
Irrigation is the life-blood of agriculture in Pakistan. To address
the crisis in irrigation management market-determined incentives (that
is, water prices) must be allowed to determine resource allocation
within the irrigation system. The scope for raising water charges is
considerable and reform here can be implemented quickly. In the longer
term decentralisation of water provision is essential and preparatory
steps should be taken immediately. The government will also have to
establish enforceable property rights to water and legalise water
markets, thereby making the opportunity cost of water transparent and
encouraging more efficient use of water. Administering institutions will
have to be restructured along commercial lines.
The best option is to develop autonomous, commercially oriented
public utilities on a canal command basis, ensuring cost recovery of all
current operations and maintenance and future capital expenditures.
Since the government cannot collect all costs of operations and
maintenance from farmers, farmers must become responsible for operations
and maintenance through water user associations, which will better
maintain the system.
Reforming Extension
Given the potential of increasing productivity of most crops by
30-50 percent effective diffusion of existing technology and best
farming practices is paramount. Reform of extension is critical in four
key areas:
* Establishing closer links with research institutions.
* Reducing the number of front-line extension workers and replacing
them with fewer, better-trained workers who are more responsive to the
needs of farming systems.
* Providing consulting services by adaptive research institutes to
better-off farmers on a cost-sharing basis.
* Using mass media and other group approaches to communicate basic
messages about available technology and better farming systems.
Correcting Distortions in the Land Market
Full-fledged land reform is difficult to enact and can be
considered only after a comprehensive study of costs and benefits. Some
important measures can be implemented immediately, however. Foremost is
providing security of tenure to many farmers, especially
tenants-at-will, thereby improving responsiveness to incentives and
creating better incentives for long-term investments. Property rights
can also be reinforced by improving and streamlining land registration
by establishing a system of permanent title deeds. Finally, the
government needs to consider eliminating artificial incentives to large
holders, such as low machinery prices and unequal access to credit.
Comments
1.
The thrust of Mr Rashid Faruqee's paper is: how the
agriculture sector has performed in the past, prospects in the future
issues and constraints facing the sector and strategic reforms to boost
its performance in the future. He points out that historical growth rate
in agriculture has been around 3 to 4 percent per annum which in view of
the comparatively better endowment of natural resources could have been
higher. In view of the higher growth rate in population it is imperative
to accelerate the growth rate in agriculture sector. In the past
increase in agricultural production has been achieved through extending
margins of cultivation rather than crop intensification, and technical
progress has been slow. In view of the limited scope for increasing
irrigation water there is not substantial potential for horizontal
expansion in cultivated area. Accordingly, the sources which have
previously contributed to the growth in the sector may not be relied
upon in future. Thus, future growth will have to come from productivity
enhancing measures and resource allocation in favour of crops in which
the country enjoys a comparative advantage, Mr Faruqee has concluded.
No doubt, the scope for horizontal expansion of crop area and
agricultural production is limited but there is still a vast scope for
increasing farm production through the adoption of known technology and
judicious mix of inputs as indicated by wide gap existing between the
crop yields of 'progressive' farmers, constituting around
30-35 percent of the farmers, and the vast majority of the
'average' and 'traditional' farmers. The surveys
conducted by the Agricultural Prices Commission have indicated that
average yields of 'progressive' farmers because of their
improved crop husbandry, judicious use of inputs, adoption of improved
technology, etc. are more than double the yields of traditional farmers
(relying on outdated methods and inadequate use of inputs) and 30 to 50
percent higher than those of 'average' farmers, who have not
yet adopted the complete technology package. What is important in this
context is to bridge this yield gap by removing the constraints and
supply bottlenecks of the average and traditional farmers so as to
facilitate their graduation to progressive farmers. The supply side
constraints where fertilisers, quality seed, weedicides, pesticides,
improved implements have been in short supply and unavailable to the
vast majority of farmers at the right time have thwarted the progress of
agriculture. The sector has also witnessed tremendous resource transfers
to other sectors due to the manipulation of inputs and output prices as
imperfect market structures and administrative interventions have
deprived the sector not only of the resources but also resulted in an
environment which did not foster investment, notwithstanding input
subsidies which have also been phased out.
The domestic resource cost co-efficient quoted in the study to
indicate the comparative advantage of various crops are almost 10 years
old and may have become irrelevant in view of the significant changes
experienced in the technical environment coefficients of many crops as
well as the substantial changes in the input and output price regimes,
both economic and financial, during the intervening years.
The author has identified the resource constraints in agriculture
as: (i) inappropriate use of land, partly because of inappropriate
incentive policy; (ii) a pattern of land concentration and the absence
of secure tenure; (iii) problem plagued irrigation system; and (iv)
inadequate human resources and infrastructure.
It may be noted that use of land is conditioned/predicated by a
number of technical, social, institutional, cultural and economic
considerations. No doubt, economic considerations and incentives have
profound impact on resource allocation among competing crops but in
developing countries where markets are undeveloped, considerations of
food security, risk aversion etc. also play important role in this
context. The irrigation system has suffered much because of inadequate
investment for its maintenance and poor enforcement of the rules, and
deteriorating law and order situation in the countryside. Those
dominating the rural landscape have also deprived the tail enders of
their water share. The agriculture sector has suffered and continues to
do so because of the tremendous drain of resources/capital, both human
and physical, on account of a number of push and pull factors. Thus, to
improve the policy environment and remove the distortions, the author
has rightly pleaded for redefining the role of government and limiting
it to ensure the smooth functioning of markets and promote private
sector activity. Reforming policies that impose indirect tax on
agriculture may result in higher response than those reforms aimed at
direct interventions alone, the author contends. No doubt it is
imperative to provide a conducive environment for the participation of
private sector in the marketing of farm inputs and outputs. But, at the
same time, it ought to be recognised that the presence of public sector
to prevent the exploitation of the small and marginal farmers by the
dominating class of processors and their cartels in situations of market
failure has been a crying need of the growers. There has been a number
of instances when the traders and processors have manipulated the market
to their own advantage but at great cost to the growers. It is going to
take considerable time to completely phase out the public sector from
the marketing of inputs and outputs which has assumed a critical role in
the quest for commercialisation of agriculture. In fact, the presence of
public sector organisations in agricultural marketing may be helpful for
promoting agricultural growth as left to the vagaries of market
functionaries, farmers get a raw deal. The development of physical and
institutional infrastructure to support commercial agriculture is going
to take time.
The recent experience of structural reforms has provided mixed
results. As the input subsidies were phased out, the prices of inputs
have increased. However, the output prices have not increased
proportionately and lagged behind. Accordingly, the terms of trade of
agriculture sector have deteriorated. With the increasing power tariff,
the economics of tubewell irrigation has been adversely affected.
Resultantly, many tubewell owners have had either to give up their
tubewells or switch over to other sources of energy. In the wake of
down-sizing, a number of public sector institutions serving agriculture
have been closed. Research organisations facing the resource crunch have
not been able to recruit scientific manpower, adversely affecting their
activities which have also suffered due to the inadequacy of operational
funds. Some of the macro-economic policy targets may have been achieved
but what has been the social and economic cost at the micro level is not
definitely known. As the instability in the agriculture sector in the
70s could be related to uncertainty characterising the production
relationships and policy environment facing the sector at that time.
instability in agricultural production during the 90s could be
attributed, to a large extent, to the policy environment characterising
the marketing of farm commodities.
For sustainable growth in agriculture, it is imperative to provide
a conducive environment for farm investment and to have a continuous
stream of new technologies, techniques and innovations which will
require adequate investment in research and development activities.
Regular monitoring of developments and analysis of emerging issues will
need development of indigenous institutional capacity to provide policy
guidelines. A pragmatic approach based on ground realities rather than a
dogmatic one is the need of the hour.
Before concluding my comments, I would like to thank the Organisers
of the Conference for inviting me to discuss an interesting paper.
Abdul Salam
Agricultural Prices Commission, Islamabad.
2.
It is a neat paper in an important area. However, because it is
based on data up to 1994-95--and there have been important changes in
the agriculture sector since then, the conclusions drawn in the paper
may not be valid any longer. As Dr Faruqee has already pointed out that
the paper is based on a book being published, one did not expect
analysis of most recent data anyway.
Rashid Faruqee relates performance with strategic interventions in
the agriculture sector and examines growth rates and swings in the
agricultural output over time in various crops. As the data relate only
up to 1994-95, the paper tries to examine factors responsible for an
increase in the share of cotton production. Cotton's share in the
agricultural output went down up to the year 1998-99, and has started
rising only in recent years. It would have been useful to examine trends
in the subsequent period.
The average growth rates may conceal more than they reveal because
of wild swings from year to year. It would be interesting to analyse
dispersion around the mean as well. To what extent dispersion in the
growth rate in a particular time-period is reflective of the incentives
to the farmers will be of crucial interest.
While the analysis of the share of crops versus livestock is
interesting, there is a need to examine if the share of livestock is not
overstated. It needs to be understood that the fodder crops are excluded
from estimates of the value-added of the crop sector, and this
underestimates the output of the crop sector. Because fodder as an input
is not considered, the 'share of livestock in the value-added of
the livestock is overstated. While trends in the share of crops vs.
livestock need to be analysed, it is pertinent to ask: Why are people
moving towards the livestock instead of the crop sector? Is it because
they get a better price for livestock as compared to crops?
Three types of results seem to contradict each other, viz.,
low-yield across all crops, stagnant productivity, and DRCs showing
highly efficient agriculture. These seemingly contradictory results can
be reconciled. If we are efficient producers of almost all the crops,
such as sugarcane, why have we not been able to increase the production
per acre up to the international level. What constrains the increase and
why has there not been any improvement in the productivity? It needs to
be noted that while every exporting country is subsidising agriculture,
Pakistan is discriminating against it. This is because we have not
provided them the international market prices and, correspondingly, they
have not been able to increase the inputs to obtain optimal output per
acre. Why is total factor productivity not increasing? Given the same
technology, a change in prices with the diminishing return results in a
decline in productivity. Obviously, if computed total factor
productivity is stagnant following an increase in the use of inputs as a
result of increase in prices, it does indicate an improvement in
technology. To what extent has the setting in of diminishing returns
been counterbalanced by an improvement in technology needs to be
ascertained.
The main thrust of Dr Faruqee's paper is that the production
decisions-should be left to the private sector, and that it should
intervene only when there is a market failure. Of course, that is what
the economic theory suggests. That research and extension should be in
the public sector is reflective of market failure, and everyone agrees
with it. But why is the fixation of prices and procurement by the
government not considered a market failure? If the price overshoots, why
can't it be called a market failure and why should there be no
government intervention? Can it be argued that there is no need for
government intervention even when the market signals are imperfect? The
market structure has to be relevant for both the producers and
consumers. It must reflect long-run prices and a movement towards
equilibrium. If one cannot predict prices with reasonable degree of
accuracy, there is a case for public intervention.
There is a lot of talk about the cost of public intervention, in
terms of the losses a public corporation sustains. When the public
sector has to intervene and buy at a price higher than that prevailing
in the market, losses cannot be avoided. Probably, what needs to be
discussed is not whether to intervene or not, but how we can make the
intervention more efficient.
Irrigation facilities have increased productivity over the last ten
years. The latest estimates show that there has been a decline in water
availability. That may continue because of siltation and all sorts of
related problems, and consequently the availability of water may go
down. Ten percent increase in irrigation suggested by the author,
however, requires massive investment.
In his paper Dr Faruqee presents demand projections, but one
wonders if the estimates given in 1988 are still relevant. Overall, this
is an interesting paper that needs to be updated.
A. R. Kemal
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Author's Note: This paper is based on Strategic Reforms for
Agricultural Growth in Pakistan edited by Rashid Faruqee (World Bank,
1999).
REFERENCES
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Impacts of the Training and Visit Extension System on Farmers'
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Comparative Advantage in Pakistan: An Update to 1991-92. Prepared for
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Rashid Faruqee is Principal Economist at the World Bank Resident
Mission in Bangladesh, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Table 1
Average Annual Agricultural Growth, 1960-95
(Percent)
Period Average Annual Growth
1959-60 to 1969-70 4.9
1969-70 to 1979-80 2.3
1979-80 to 1987-88 3.6
1988-89 to 1994-95 3.9
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan.
Note: Calculations to 1988 are taken from GNP at constant factor
cost for 1959-60 under the national accounts methodology; growth is
assumed to be continuously compounded. The change in the national
income methodology after 1988 prevents us from presenting complete
comparable figures since 1979-80. For this reason, figures are
presented through to and since 1988.
Table 2
Agricultural Performance in Pakistan by Subsector, 1970-71--1994-95
(Billions of 1980 Rupees)
Subsector 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81
Crops 35.9 41.7 49.8
Wheat 12.5 13.8 16.1
Cotton 5.4 7.3 10.2
Sugar 7.2 7.5 8.7
Rice 7.2 7.7 8.5
Noncrops 15.6 18.5 23.6
Livestock 15.3 16.9 20.1
Fisheries 0.2 1.4 2.7
Total 51.4 60.2 76.4
Memorandum Items
Share of GDP (Percent)
All Agriculture 40.4 32.9 29.2
Crops 28.2 22.8 19.8
Noncrops 12.2 10.1 9.4
Subsector 1985-86 1990-91 1994-95
Crops 62.9 74.5 79.3
Wheat 20.2 21.7 24.7
Cotton 18.3 24.8 22.4
Sugar 7.9 10.3 13.1
Rice 8.6 9.8 10.5
Noncrops 30.6 40.0 48.9
Livestock 25.9 34.1 42.8
Fisheries 3.6 4.4 5.0
Total 93.5 114.5 128.2
Memorandum Items
Share of GDP (Percent)
All Agriculture 25.0 25.1 24.0
Crops 16.8 16.3 14.9
Noncrops 8.2 8.8 9.1
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 1994-95.
Table 3
Annual Growth in Agriculture and Population in Selected Asian Countries
(Percent)
Agriculture Population
Country 1990-95 1970-95
China 4.1 1.4
Egypt 1.8 2.0
India 2.9 2.0
Indonesia 3.2 1.7
Pakistan 3.0 2.8
Thailand 3.2 1.7
Source: World Bank (1995).
Table 4
Annual Growth Rates in Total Factor Productivity in Various Cropping
Systems in Pakistan, 1970-79 and 1980-89
System/Region 1970-79 1980-89
Wheat-cotton, Punjab -0.62 0.01
Wheat-maize, Punjab 0.42 -8.79
Wheat-mixed, Punjab -1.92 -1.53
Wheat-rice, Punjab -2.00 -2.90
All Punjab -1.30 -0.80
All Sindh -0.50 -1.70
Source: Ali and Velasco (1993).
Table 5
Decomposition of Crop Growth in Area and Yield Effects, 1961-1989
Crop Period Area Yield Multiple
Wheat 1961-67 111.4 -9.9 -1.5
1967-76 13.7 75.7 10.6
1976-89 40.0 47.3 12.7
Rice 1961-67 44.5 46.2 9.3
1967-76 18.6 73.6 7.8
1976-89 78.5 16.5 5.0
Cotton 1961-67 45.8 39.9 14.3
1967-76 1.7 91.2 7.1
1976-89 19.1 56.4 22.5
Source: Mahmood et al. (1992).
Note: The decomposition is Q=A Y, where Q is output, A is area, and
Y is yield. The change in output between any two years t and u,
t>u, is DQ Qt - Qu and can be broken down as DQ = YuDA + AuDY +
DYDA. The effects sum to 100 for each crop in each period. For
methodology on total factor productivity (TFP) calculation see
Byerlee (1994).
Table 6
Trend Values of Domestic Resource Costs for Major Crops, 1991-92
Crop, Location DRC
Cotton, Multan 0.28
Cotton, Nawabshah 0.26
Sunflowers, Multan 1.10
Yellow Maize, Faisalabad 1.29
Coarse Rice, Larkana 1.09
Broilers, Sindh 0.23
Broilers, Lahore 0.77
Wheat, Multan 0.68
Wheat, Gujranwala 0.29
Wheat, Nawabshah 0.58
Basmati Rice, Gujranwala 0.49
Sugarcane, Faisalabad 2.09
Sugarcane, Larkana 1.91
Sugarcane, Mardan 1.57
Source: Longmire and Debord (1993), Table 16.
Table 7
Projected Average Annual Growth Rates for Demand of Selected
Commodities, 1993-94 to 2000-01
(Percent)
Moderate Growth High Growth
Commodity Projection Projection
Wheat 3.6 5.4
Basmati Rice 8.0 11.8
Other Rice 2.2 3.8
Maize 3.0 5.4
Cotton 7.0 9.4
Sugar 10.0 13.1
Meat 10.2 14.6
Horticulture 8.6 11.9
Source: Pakistan (1988).
Note: Moderate growth projections assume 2.5 percent annual
population growth and 5.5 percent annual GDP growth. High growth
projections assume 3.5 percent annual population growth and 6.5
percent annual GDP growth.
Table 8 Education Levels in Selected Developing Countries, 1994
Children
Reaching
GNP Per Net Primary Adult Fourth Year
Capita Education Literacy of School
Country (1994 Dollars) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Mexico 4,180 81 92 95
Egypt 720 48 91 99
Indonesia 880 77 97 89
Pakistan 430 35 29 59
China 530 73 82 86
India 350 52 66 61
Source: UNESCO and UNICEF.