Rehabilitating agriculture and promoting food security after the 2010 Pakistan floods: insights from the South Asian experience.
Dorosh, Paul ; Malik, Sohail J. ; Krausova, Marika 等
The 2010 floods in Pakistan had a devastating effect on the
Pakistani population. This paper summarises recovery experiences from
previous natural disasters in South Asia, including the 2005 earthquake
in Pakistan and the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, and suggests several
lessons relevant for recovery efforts following the 2010 Pakistan flood.
First, market and trade policies should maintain adequate price
incentives so that private trade and imports can contribute to
post-disaster recovery. Second, a strong institutional framework is
needed to coordinate the large-scale disaster response. Third, recovery
efforts should also include support for livelihood security and
restoration, ensuring inclusion of the stakeholders. Fourth, restoring
and upgrading infrastructure facilities can lead to enhanced flood
resistance as well as a reduction in future disaster loss. Two
alternative institutions may be possible vehicles for
poverty-alleviation the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) and the
Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). To address future disasters,
however, it is important to establish and strengthen disaster response
capability, including applying lessons learned from the relief and
rehabilitation response to the 2010 floods.
JEL classification: Q18
Keywords: Pakistan, Floods, Post-disaster Recovery and
Rehabilitation, Food Security
1. INTRODUCTION
The 2010 floods in Pakistan, which began in the northern part of
the country in late July and gradually spread south along the Indus
River basin in August, were devastating in terms of the loss of life and
other damage. As of early September, 1,677 flood-related deaths had
occurred, and by one estimate, $6.5 billion worth of damage to crops,
housing, other buildings, roads, and irrigation infrastructure had been
incurred [OCHA (2010)]. Moreover, there remain serious concerns about
rural livelihoods in heavily flooded areas with damaged infrastructure,
potential problems with planting of the rabi (winter) crop if flood
waters are slow to recede, the spread of water-borne disease, and
absence of food security for the poor.
There is an increasing consensus that flood recovery and
rehabilitation efforts have to take a multi-sector development approach.
Severe floods affect not only the country's infrastructure but also
the education, health, water and sanitation, transportation,
communications, agricultural, trade, and industrial sectors. Though the
differences between the current Pakistan flood and other floods in
Pakistan and elsewhere in SouthAsia are many, one can nevertheless glean
important insights from other experiences, particularly the massive
flood in Bangladesh in 1998. The designs and evaluations of past flood
prevention and rehabilitation projects in Pakistan and elsewhere in
South Asia can also suggest useful approaches to an effective response
to the 2010 floods.
In this paper, we group these lessons into four broad categories:
market and trade policies; institutional framework and sources of
financing; livelihood support programmes and welfare transfers; and
rehabilitation of agriculture and infrastructure. We summarise the major
insights that may be relevant to Pakistan's post-flood
rehabilitation efforts. We also look at the existing national and
sub-national authorities involved in disaster management as well as
other possible mechanisms by which disaster rehabilitation funds and
efforts can be channelled. We discuss their possible roles in the
delivery of poverty-alleviating interventions and resources. In the
final part of the paper, we address the implementation challenges that
can hinder the stakeholders' ability to undertake the
reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.
The following section presents a brief overview of the 2010
Pakistan flood, highlighting the effects of the flood on agriculture and
food security. Section 3 discusses other floods in South Asia, focusing
on research and policy insights, as well as lessons from the experience
of other flood relief and rehabilitation projects. Section 4 provides a
brief description of Pakistani institutions that may play a key role in
flood rehabilitation. The last section gives a brief summary of the
findings.
2. THE 2010 PAKISTAN FLOODS: DAMAGE AND THREATS TO AGRICULTURE AND
FOOD SECURITY
The 2010 Pakistan floods are the direct result of extraordinarily
heavy monsoon rains in July and August, though other factors, including
deforestation in upland areas and inadequate drainage, have played a
role as well. The floods have affected far more people (18.7 million)
than other recent natural disasters in Pakistan such as the October 2005
Pakistan earthquake (3.5 million), the Nargis cyclone of May 2008 (2.4
million), or the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (2.3 million) (Table
1). The number of deaths (about 1,700 people), however, was far lower
than from the 2005 earthquake (about 73,300 people) or the tsunami
(about 230,000 people).
In comparison with other recent floods, the 2010 flood has
displaced far more people, about 18 million; this is more than four
times the number of people displaced by the 1992 flood (about 4
million), which was the next largest Pakistan flood since 1985 (Figure
1). (1) Floods in other parts of South Asia, especially in Bangladesh
and India, often displace far greater numbers of people. The total
number of displaced people due to floods in South Asia has exceeded 20
million people in six of the past 25 years. Moreover, as Table 2 shows,
the floods have caused very substantial economic losses. Those include
losses of nonagricultural businesses ($0.3 billion) and housing ($3.6
billion) in both rural and urban areas as well as damage to agricultural
and nonagricultural infrastructure (not included in the table).
Other recent floods in Pakistan affected wider areas than did the
2010 flood even though they displaced fewer people. As Figure 2 shows,
floods in 1992, 2003, and 2005 each affected more than 400,000 square
kilometers, as compared to less than 200,000 square kilometers for the
Pakistan flood of 2010. (2)
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
As Table 2 shows, the damage to agricultural crops, livestock,
irrigation systems, and infrastructure has been substantial, though it
has varied across regions due to differences in agroecology and other
factors. Most of Pakistan's agriculture is concentrated in the
Indus River basin, the world's largest irrigation network, and is
irrigated through an extensive canal system, often supplemented with
groundwater (typically pumped with small-scale tube wells). (3) The
floods have caused extensive damage in these regions to the major
monsoon season (kharif) crops: basmati rice in northern Punjab and
cotton in southern Punjab and northern Sindh. In the generally hilly and
mountainous regions of the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(formerly North-West Frontier Province) and similar non- irrigated
(barani) areas of northern Punjab, most of the agricultural land is not
irrigated. Here, the floods have also caused substantial damage to maize
and other crops.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Pakistan's most important food staple, wheat, is cultivated in
the winter season (rabi), in the barani areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
northern Punjab as well as in the irrigated Indus River basin areas of
northern Sindh. How the floods will affect the rabi wheat crop, to be
planted in October through early December, remains uncertain. In some
areas, floodwaters may have deposited sediments that add to soil
fertility and thus may actually lead to increased yields. Wheat
cultivation in other areas could suffer, however, due to damage to
irrigation infrastructure and roads, as well as farmers' losses of
seeds, tools, and machinery. (4) Further south, in southern Sindh,
drainage problems limit cotton cultivation and the warm nighttime
temperatures make the area unsuitable for wheat cultivation. Here,
ordinary (nonaromatic) rice is cultivated as a rabi crop. The other
major crop in Pakistan, sugarcane, is grown almost exclusively on
irrigated land and typically remains in the field nine to 15 months.
The 2010 floods caused extensive damage to monsoon season (kharif)
crops, mainly cotton, rice, sugarcane and vegetables, which were still
standing in the fields in August and early September. In August, OCHA
and FAO estimated the crop area damaged at 3.58 million hectares (Table
3). Though the flooding initially began in the northern parts of the
country, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the crop area affected
(400,000 hectares) in those less densely populated, hilly areas was far
smaller than in the more densely populated and more intensively
cultivated, (mainly) irrigated Punjab (1.5 million hectares).
In October, the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (NRD-PARC)
released their own independent estimates of the crop area damaged by the
floods. The total estimated crop area affected was sharply lower than
the initial OCHA estimates of 3.6 million hectares: 1.3 million hectares
[NRD-PARC (2010)]. Subsequently, on October 30, the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation [World
Bank/ADB/FAO (2010)] released the results of the Pakistan Flood Damage
and Needs Assessment estimating the crop area damaged at 2.1 million
hectares resulting in the loss of 7.5 million tons of sugarcane, 2.5
million tons office, 0.8 million tons of vegetables, 0.7 million tons of
cotton and 0.3 million tons of maize. As seen in Table 3, compared to
the early September 2010 OCHA estimates, the October 2010 estimates for
crop area damaged dropped most sharply for Balochistan--from 628
thousand (OCHA) to only 74 to 132 thousand hectares (NRD-PARC and
WB/ADB/FAO). For Sindh, estimates of crop area damaged fell from 999
thousand hectares (OCHA) to only 362 thousand hectares (NRD-PARC), but
increased to 1.04 million hectares in the WB/ADB/FAO estimates. Area
damage estimates changed less for Punjab and KPK, but even in these
cases the NRD-PARC and WB/ADB/FAO estimates of October 2010 were less
than half the early September OCHA estimates.
Alternative estimates of the flood damage to crops were constructed
using household survey data from the 2007-08 Pakistan Household Income
and Expenditure Survey (HIES; Table 4) and the initial OCHA figures for
area damaged. (5) Assuming a 20 percent loss in crop output, and using
the mean crop land productivity by province from the HIES, the value of
crop losses is estimated at 118 billion Pakistani rupees (PKR) ($1.4
billion). Using the median crop land productivity by province as a base
(which effectively gives less weight to the highest-productivity farms),
the estimated loss is 101 billion PKR ($1.2 billion). Alternatively, a
50 percent crop loss would imply losses of 294 billion PKR ($3.5
billion) based on mean land productivity and 251 billion PKR ($3.0
billion) based on median land productivity. These latter figures for
yield losses are slightly higher than the NRD-PARC estimate of $2.15
billion released mid-October, but significantly lower compared to the $5
billion crop losses estimated by the WB/ADB/FAO (Table 3).
Reduction in agricultural incomes will likely lead to lower
spending on rural non-farm goods and services (processing, marketing,
rural services, and so on), and thus reduce rural non-farm incomes as
well. These multiplier effects can be quite large, equivalent to an
extra 1.5 PKR of lost non-farm income for a 1 PKR loss in crop incomes.6
Further, a significant wheat supply reduction (and increase in the wheat
price) would have major adverse effects on most Pakistani households.
Wheat accounts for 23.0 percent of food expenditures for the poorest 20
percent of households in both urban and rural areas, and 14.9 percent of
food expenditures nationally for all household groups (127
PKR/person/month out of a total food expenditure of 850PKR/person/month;
Table 5). In quantity terms, wheat and wheat flour consumption is about
eight times larger than rice consumption nationally (7.8
kilograms/person/month for wheat and wheat flour, compared with 0.9
kilograms/person/month for rice; Table 6). A reliance on wheat as the
major staple food is especially great for rural households, particularly
the rural poor, for whom wheat consumption (7.2 kilograms/person/month)
is about 10 times greater than rice consumption (0.7
kilograms/person/month). As discussed below, changes in trade policy
could help stabilise wheat prices in the event of a major wheat
production loss.
Livestock loss data are currently unavailable for Punjab, but
estimated livestock losses in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are available
and are equivalent to 42 percent of crop losses (Table 2). Assuming the
national average of livestock losses for all affected areas in Pakistan
(including Punjab) is equal to 40 percent of crop losses gives a
livestock loss of 74.3 billion PKR ($870 million). Alternatively, using
the HIES-derived estimates, if the livestock loss is 40 percent of crop
loss, the estimates range from 40 to 188 billion PKR ($0.47 billion to
$1.38 billion). Total agricultural loss would then be 141 to 352 billion
PKR ($1.7 billion to $4.8 billion).
3. RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS IN SOUTH ASIA
In recent years, there has been a gradual shift away from dealing
with floods as stand-alone events to managing the recovery and
rehabilitation efforts as part of a multisector development approach.
Increasingly greater attention is being placed on mitigation,
preparedness, and socioeconomic and political factors [PAHO (2000)].
There is a growing consensus that the flood policy context must include
multidisciplinary, multisector, multistakeholder participation as well
as initiatives to address the flood environment characterised by the
transboundary nature and influences of an integrated water system
[ADPC/UNDP (2005)]. The experience of recovery from previous major
natural disasters in Pakistan and throughout South Asia offers numerous
lessons that may be relevant for post-2010 Pakistan flood rehabilitation
and recovery efforts.
The discussion below groups these lessons in four major categories:
market and trade policies; institutional framework and sources of
financing; livelihood support programmes and welfare transfers; and
rehabilitation of agriculture and infrastructure. Many of the lessons
derive from the disaster recovery efforts after the 2005 earthquake in
Pakistan and the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, a flood of" comparable
extent and duration to the present Pakistan flood. (7)
Market and Trade Policies
Immediately following a major natural disaster, there are often
major disruptions to roads, port facilities, transport services,
physical market structures, and both internal and external trade flows.
Households that lost livelihoods face serious problems related to lack
of access to food, safe drinking water, and proper sanitation
facilities. In the relief operations immediately after the disaster
strikes, government agencies, international agencies, and
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) may have to provide food, clothing,
healthcare, and other goods and services. However, restoration of
private trade (and even promotion of expansion of trade) can enhance
both price stability and food security more effectively and at far less
cost, particularly in the post-disaster rehabilitation phase, and also
in the relief stage.
Following the 1998 floods in Bangladesh that destroyed about 20
percent of the monsoon season rice crop, the Government of Bangladesh
took steps to promote private-sector imports to supplement its own
commercial imports and food aid inflows. In particular, the government
removed a 2.5 percent tariff on rice imports, expedited clearance of
rice imports, and announced strict limits on government sales of
subsidised rice. Moreover, past investments in roads and liberalisation
of domestic and import trade in rice and wheat had helped make private
markets more efficient and able to respond quickly to production
shortfalls. Given these past investments and clear, transparent, and
consistent policy with adequate price incentives at the time of the
flood, private-sector imports exceeded 200,000 metric tons per month for
eight consecutive months, in spite of food aid wheat imports of more
than 1 million metric tons and large-scale public foodgrain distribution
[Dorosh (2001); del Ninno, et al. (2001); Dorosh, del Ninno, and
Shahabuddin (2004)].
In Pakistan, by contrast, a combination of fluctuating prices in
international markets and uncertainty regarding government policy has
greatly limited private sector imports of wheat. Incentives for
private-sector import (and export) trade in wheat shifted several times
between June 2005 and June 2010. However, world prices fell sharply in
October 2008, and from October 2008 to June 2010, domestic prices were
above export parity prices; private-sector exports were not profitable
in this period. Instead of profitable opportunities for exports, the
combination of the world price decline and an increase in
Pakistan's domestic price provided an opportunity for profitable
imports as domestic prices were approximately equal to import parity
from December 2008 to April 2009.
Private sector imports did not occur on a large scale, however, and
from July 2009 through June 2010, domestic prices were substantially
above import parity. Although, there were substantial incentives for
private-sector imports in this period, but private imports of wheat were
minimal. Instead, the Trading Corporation of Pakistan imported wheat.
Large domestic stocks (procurement exceeded releases by a combined 5.2
million metric tons in fiscal years 2008-09 and 2009-10) and lack of
clarity about government interventions likely played a major role in
discouraging private imports.
World wheat prices increased 39 percent between June 2010 and
August 2010 from $182.8/metric ton to $254.0/metric ton, due in large
part to fire and smoke damage to Russia's wheat crop and
Russia's ban on wheat exports. In spite of a recent increase in
international wheat prices due to Russia's wheat export
restrictions, Pakistan's wheat prices were still near import parity
at the time of the 2010 floods (Figure 3).
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Thus, it was unclear whether or not the recent floods would have
major effects on the wheat market. Kharif season rice and maize crops
account for only a small share of cereals consumed in Pakistan, and a
decline in their availability has relatively little effect on wheat
demand or wheat prices. Depending on further developments in world wheat
markets, the extent to which flood damage affects Pakistan's
2010-11 harvest, and domestic wheat demand, private-sector wheat imports
may provide a zero-fiscal-cost means of stabilising domestic wheat
prices at an acceptable import parity level in the coming year.
Institutional Framework and Sources of Financing
In response to the October 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani
government established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Authority (ERRA) with the specific mandate to carry out early recovery,
reconstruction, and rehabilitation efforts in the affected areas. A
major objective of the recovery and rehabilitation effort was to
"build back better," that is, not to simply restore
infrastructure and services to pre-earthquake levels, but to avail of
the opportunity to address previous shortcomings and establish improved
facilities and services [ERRA (2010)]. The post-earthquake efforts
demonstrated the need for a strong institutional framework to coordinate
the large-scale disaster response, and they offer the 2010 recovery and
rehabilitation efforts a number of pertinent lessons. First, all phases
of the disaster response should be handled by the same institution and
all stakeholders should be included in the disaster response mechanism
[ERRA (2010)]. Second, there is a need to account for long-, medium-,
and short-term goals in the postdisaster response and to connect these
goals together in one framework [ERRA (2010)]. Third, the participation
of two key stakeholders, the government and the affected communities,
must be ensured [ERRA (2010)]. Fourth, post-disaster improvement should
not be confined to physical infrastructure and facilities but should
include "soft" components as well, such as policy-making,
planning, systems and procedures, human resource management, and so on
[ERRA (2010)]. Fifth, capacity development has to be an integral and
concurrent component of all reconstruction work. Finally, the recovery
strategy should be monitored and evaluated and the findings fed back
into the recovery process at all stages [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Given the Pakistani government's limited resources and the
urgency of the recovery efforts, the sources of financing and the speed
at which required funds are delivered to stakeholders both play an
important role in the success of the disaster recovery efforts. Previous
flood rehabilitation projects demonstrated that financing rehabilitation
costs under ongoing projects, rather than through a new, omnibus
emergency project, is quicker and likely to be more flexible. This is
because high start-up costs are involved in helping the government
design a new project and high coordination costs are involved in
ensuring that different government agencies and interests involved in
such a project are properly aligned. Reprogramming already-existing
projects is also more likely to ensure that the response to the floods
will be better integrated in the country programme, will influence the
design of future projects, and will avoid the tendency of emergency
operations to be stand-alone, one-off actions [World Bank (2000)].
However, it is important to include a plan that accounts for future
replenishment of project funds, in order to avoid damaging the affected
projects' medium- and long-term goals.
Livelihood Support Programmes and Welfare Transfers
Donors and governments tend to focus on projects that rehabilitate
major infrastructure. They put much less effort into understanding the
impacts of disasters on livelihoods or investing in programmes to
support recovery of livelihoods [ADPC/UNDP (2005)]. A second,
livelihoods-focused, needs assessment may be useful at the start of the
recovery phase in order to prioritise communitie' and
individuals' needs. Such an assessment could also improve
understanding of existing livelihoods in the post-flood environment
[Beck (2005)]. Recovery efforts should include support for livelihood
security programmes, and in the immediate aftermath of a natural
disaster, a provision of compensation based on loss of livelihoods might
be necessary to assist affected groups [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Well-targeted transfers can be effective in enhancing food security
of poor households, particularly when using existing effective targeting
mechanisms and distribution channels. Bangladesh successfully avoided a
famine through a combination of effective immediate relief efforts and
well-targeted public food distribution [del Ninno and Dorosh (2001)].
Following the Bangladesh flood of 1998, distribution of wheat through
the targeted Vulnerable Group Feeding programme was greatly expanded.
Survey evidence shows that selection of the most vulnerable rural
households through village-level committees successfully targeted that
programme to the poor [del Ninno and Dorosh (2001)]. As stated above,
NGOs with an ongoing development programme are most likely to be
effective in the recovery phase, as they are in a better place to
effectively target poor households and support their livelihoods [Beck
(2005)].
Panel survey analysis of flood-affected households in Bangladesh
also indicates that, as a result of the flood, many poor households
experienced a substantial increase in debt. Borrowing from private
creditors was a major coping strategy for households that lost crops or
employment opportunities. This coping strategy was effective in
augmenting household access to food and thereby limiting the decline in
food consumption following the flood. However, many households carried
debts equal to one month's average expenditure more than one year
after the floods had ended. This suggests the need for credit (or even
cash transfers) to poor households in the aftermath o f a flood or other
natural disaster not only to enhance food security in the short run but
also to avoid a long-term loss in household welfare [del Ninno, Dorosh,
and Smith (2003)].
There are many ways to incorporate livelihood strategies into the
recovery and reconstruction efforts [IDS (2010); ADPC/UNDP (2005)]. The
following are a summary of lessons learned in this area:
--Social protection should be prioritised in a disaster response so
that the most vulnerable groups are protected. Awareness-raising is an
important component to ensure participation.
--There must be active participation of key stakeholders from a
multisector base as well as the community in the decisions made for each
programme. Activities, where possible, should be linked with government,
local enterprises, organisations, and industries.
--Intervention should be tailored to target specific needs of
different groups.
--Efforts should be made to promote livelihood opportunities for
people through provision of temporary work schemes such as debris
clearance, construction, public awareness, project management and
assessments.
--Partnering with NGOs to provide sustainable livelihood support
(provision of seeds and tools, animals, capacity building) should be a
component of the recovery efforts as NGOs can play a big part in relief
initiatives and microcrediting.
--Developing forums and focus groups for particular industries will
enable them to pool resources, share equipment and experiences, and
support each other as well as plan for the future. Institutions such as
community funding schemes that can help people restart businesses should
be considered.
--Loans from the government or private sector and government grants
can be used to fill consumption shortfalls.
--Enhancing skills through training to supply more
construction-sector artisans (masons, carpenters, electricians, etc.)
and training them in hazard-resistant construction technology can
upgrade the future workforce.
--Compensation should be paid to people without delay to enable
them to rebuild their lives.
Rehabilitation of Agriculture and Infrastructure
Reestablishing community access to necessary livelihood and
infrastructure has been one of the first priorities of past recovery
efforts. Given the large percentage of Pakistan's population that
is dependent on agriculture, the resumption of agricultural activities
is vital for the country's recovery and ability to sustain the
flood damages. Several lessons drawn from previous experiences can
inform postdisaster initiatives and hasten the speed of the restoration
of agricultural production and solid infrastructure.
Restoration of Agricultural Activities
--Provision of seeds to smallholders can help these, and even
"landless," (8) households regain access to food and
income-generating activities in the medium term [Beck (2005)].
--Likewise, replenishing the livestock assets, such as chickens and
goats, of the poor can help them generate food and income in the medium
term [Beck (2005)].
--Overall, rehabilitation of small-scale agricultural capital is
essential. Temporary duty exemptions and other assistance can be
critical to inducing renewed investments. For example, in Bangladesh,
exempting imports of power tillers from duty in September 1998 promoted
a near tripling in imports, from 6,300 (September 2007 to March 2008) to
17,500 (September 2008 to March 2009), as well as a change in technology
that facilitated multiple cropping [Benson and Clay (2001); Beck
(2005)]. (9)
--In addition, it will be advantageous to adapt farming techniques
to the local environment by, for example, planting crops that are not at
risk from seasonal flooding [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Restoration of Infrastructure
Evaluation of previously implemented post-disaster rehabilitation
projects suggests the following [IDS (2010); ADPC/UNDP (2005); ADB
(1996)]:
--Rapid initial economic assessment of individual subprojects of an
emergency loan to determine priorities among subprojects and improve
their scope and design is necessary.
--The focus should be not only on restoring infrastructure
facilities but also on upgrading them to enhance flood resistance.
--Projects continuous implementation needs to be accounted for by
ensuring future upkeep of restored facilities, and transfer of
management to local entities.
--The speed at which emergency projects have to be organised should
not allow inclusion of unsustainable or economically or socially
unjustifiable subprojects.
--Accurate records of landownership and new infrastructure (roads,
telecommunications, water supply systems, etc.) need to be maintained so
as to provide a baseline for damage assessment in case future disaster
strikes. (10)
--There should be strict adherence to proper building codes in
reconstruction; appropriate land use should be ensured; and in certain
areas, disaster-proof construction techniques should be deployed so as
to mitigate the impact of future disaster. This particularly applies to
health and education facilities.
--Measures should be implemented to minimise loss of communications
in the event of a disaster. For example, telecommunications equipment
and essential facilities should be housed in prefab accommodation or
quake-proof buildings; exchanges of major towns should be linked to a
minimum of two media to provide fall-back options; fixed-line networks
should be kept to a minimum with more use of Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) and wireless local loop technologies.
--In rehabilitation efforts, provisions should be made to ensure
effective communication between affected areas and those coordinating
the disaster response: portable GSM setups should be maintained at the
national level for speedy deployment in disaster zones; spare equipment
such as switches, satellite phones, and microwave links should be
readily available to support emergency rescue and relief efforts; in
emergency conditions detailed documentation and everyday standard
operating procedures should be relaxed to avoid unnecessary delays in
relief operations.
--A cadre of engineers and other technical personnel should be
identified and trained in disaster response operations such as road
clearance, bridge reconstruction, and the provision of technical
assistance to households' reconstruction efforts to ensure safety
standards.
--Contingency plans should be made for restoration of
infrastructure, communications, and other services in the event of a
disaster.
--Finally, an owner-driven approach to housing reconstruction is
effective in allowing large-scale implementation.
4. TOWARDS DESIGNING OF A 2010 PAKISTAN FLOOD RESPONSE PROGRAMME
In this section, we discuss some of the key institutions that can
play critical roles in the response to the 2010 floods; in addition, we
address the implementation challenges that their efforts face.
Pakistan National Disaster Management Authorities
The 2010 Pakistan National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) sets up
national, provincial and district level disaster management authorities
in order to serve as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring
bodies for disaster management at their respective levels. In addition,
the national and subnational authorities are responsible for preparing
disaster management plans, at their respective levels, and for their
implementation during impending disaster [Pakistan National Disaster
Response Authority (2010)]. However, the subnational-level authorities
do not yet exercise their functions, and need significant funding and
capacity-building support to meet the roles and responsibilities
outlined for them in the NDRP. In addition, although efforts are to be
coordinated among the national, provincial, and district levels, as we
discuss later in this section, coordination among these levels of
government can be problematic.
Public Institutions and Programmes
Arange of institutions are involved in the flood recovery work. Of
these, the two most prominent in terms of the nature of their mandate
and the scale of their operations and geographic coverage are the
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) and the Benazir Income Support
Programme (BISP). PPAF was set up by the Government of Pakistan with
donor and government funding to act as an apex wholesaler and manager of
funds to the NGO sector in the area of poverty reduction. BISP, the
largest government safety net intervention in the country, was initially
designed to provide financial support to old and destitute women. The
two together are considered by most decision makers to be the main
vehicles for the delivery of flood recovery resources.
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (11)
Conceptually, the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund is one possible
vehicle for the delivery of poverty-alleviating interventions and
resources. It adopts a participatory development model using social
mobilisation, skill development, and capital accumulation as guiding
principles. The model is community based and involves formation of
groups or community organisations (COs) at the grass roots. It focuses
on social organisation, creates awareness, and builds capacity. Under
the PPAF model, communities organise themselves for establishing new
groups and consolidating existing ones. The approach is demand-driven
with high priority given to community-identified projects.
Responsibility for operations and maintenance also falls on these
groups. PPAF works through a network of NGOs or partner organisations
(POs) that are committed to community-driven development. (12) Potential
POs are required to undergo a rigorous selection process with both desk
and field appraisals. Disbursements from and performance assessments by
PPAF to selected partners take place on a quarterly basis. Compliance
with implementation plans and adherence to contractual obligations are
mandatory. The POs are generally expected to mobilise and train
communities, act as intermediaries for microcredit loans, provide
communities with health and education facilities as well as small-scale
water and infrastructure projects, and assist communities in the
preparation of feasible proposals and aid in their implementation; in
addition, POs are responsible for supervising and monitoring PPAF
projects.
Sponsored by the Government of Pakistan and funded by the World
Bank and other leading donors, PPAF is currently working with 75 POs. It
has a grassroots network of more than 130,000 COs and groups in 127
districts covering 30,000 villages, or nearly 70 percent of the villages
in the country. PPAF programmes target poor rural and urban communities
and place particular emphasis on gender and the empowerment of women.
These characteristics position PPAF well for providing relic f and
rehabilitation in times of disaster. However, there has been no serious
evaluation of the PPAF model over the more than 10 years of its
existence despite its having grown to become an organisation with a
reported resource base of $1,062.79 million as of April 19, 2010 [PPAF
(2010)].
While the absence of an in-depth evaluation of PPAF is a serious
handicap, a number of factors lend support to using it as one of the
major vehicles for flood relief and rehabilitation work, not the least
of which is the absence of any other credible organisation with the
reach and capacity to deliver in a timely manner. Those factors include
the large network of POs directly working at the grassroots level, with
footprints in 127 districts across Pakistan; the model of participatory
grassroots development through which COs have formed over the past 10
years of PPAF operations; the capacity and experience of the PPAF POs in
appraising community needs as a necessary component of all development
interventions; and PPAF's experience in relief activities,
especially after the October 2005 earthquake in Azad Jammu and Kashmir
and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
PPAF's experience in the 2005 earthquake, particularly in the
relief phase, could prove useful in terms of ensuring the formation of
an efficient logistical and operational edifice to provide planned
relief activities to address the 2010 flood situation. PPAF has valuable
experience in terms of networking with other governmental agencies and
NGOs, including the armed forces, multilateral and bilateral donors, and
specialised agencies.
PPAF can leverage these advantages. However, a number of factors
need to be considered. First, there are significant gaps in the
effective coverage of the PPAF POs at the grass roots. Overall coverage
can be claimed in perhaps only a few districts. While the extent of
coverage is difficult to assess, the PPAF POs do have a presence in the
most affected areas. Second, the capacity and quality of COs through
which the POs work also vary by region and type of interventions.
Therefore, even where a large number of union councils are covered in a
particular district, the quality of coverage varies with the type of PO
(rural support programme, NGO, or microfinance institution), their
maturity, and the duration of their partnership with PPAF, as well as
with their overarching goals, mode of operations, and types of services
delivered (whether infrastructure, health and education, microcredit, or
any combination of these). It is important to note that PPAF at the
implementation level is really the COs that its POs have set up. Third,
the floods will likely diminish the capacity of the COs to be effective.
Therefore, one must ascertain how many PPAF COs are presently active.
Insofar as floods have destroyed infrastructure and displaced
populations, the potential capacity of COs in the affected areas might
have been badly affected.
Despite the above qualifiers, PPAF's strengths position the
institution to contribute in the national flood relief effort. This is
manifested by its quick response in terms of resource mobilisation,
networking with other partners (chiefly the army and the National
Disaster Management Authority INDMA]), and efficient strategising for
provisioning relief goods and medical services.
Benazir Income Support Fund
In a meeting on August 27, 2010, the president of Pakistan directed
that the partnership between BISP and NADRA (the National Database and
Registration Authority) being used in the ongoing income support
programme be used in a similar manner to provide necessary financial
support to flood victims in various parts of the country. Under BISP,
income support of 1,000 PKR per month is provided to deserving destitute
women on the basis of verification of the computerised national identity
card (CNIC) by the postal system and the banks. Under the
president's flood relief directive to BISP and NADRA, the
government intends to award 20,000 PKR ($232 dollars) (13) to each
flood-affected family as compensation for their losses. The money will
also be used to repair damages to their homes. The first installment of
5,000 PKR ($58) was to be disbursed before Eid ul Fitr (the Muslim
holiday that marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), around
September 10, 2010.
In order to meet the presidential directive, these agencies will
have to surmount two obstacles. First, the task of registering the
population affected by the floods is huge. Currently the task of
registering the flood victims rests with the provincial governments. A
large number of people are being registered at the flood relief camps
established by the army and the government. However, an equally large
number of people have not been able to reach the camps or have been
denied space in them due to overcrowding. Second, initial reports in the
newspapers indicate that a large percentage of persons affected by the
floods do not possess CNIC cards. They were either not registered or
have lost their cards along with their belongings in the flood. If the
verification procedure through NADRA is similar to the procedure of
BISP, the victims who do not possess a CNIC will be excluded.
Unfortunately, the families who do not possess the CNIC are the poorest
of the poor. As it waits for the listing of the flood victims, BISP is
initiating support to the existing flood-affected beneficiaries of BISP
by providing them the announced flood relief assistance of up to 20,000
PKR. They propose to expand this operation as the verified database
becomes available.
Therefore, for the programme to function, priority needs to be
given to the comprehensive listing of all flood victims. This listing
exercise should be expanded to elicit basic socioeconomic information
that can be used as a baseline to monitor the relief and rehabilitation
effort.
Implementation Challenges
The above discussion of the institutions that are likely to be
active in flood relief and rehabilitation has indicated some of the
specific challenges that arise. In this subsection, we extend and
generalise this discussion.
Difficulties of Flood Damage Restoration Projects
The internal rates of return for previous Pakistan flood damage
restoration projects involving irrigation and other infrastructure
investments, estimated by the Asian Development Bank have generally been
low. Several lessons from the 1989-to-1993 Pakistan Flood Damage
Restoration Project may help Pakistan avoid low rates of return on such
projects in response to the 2010 flood. In particular, a rush to
implement the 1989-993 project led to the inclusion of some
unsustainable or economically/socially unjustifiable subprojects and to
inefficient fund distribution. A clear set of criteria for subprojects
in current rehabilitation efforts can help avoid the problem of poor
subproject selection. Channeling disaster recovery funds through
existing projects can result in faster and more flexible response.
Moreover, beneficiaries were not consulted in any stage of the
1989-1993 project. There were no special efforts to promote employment
of local people during implementation or arrangements for organising
them for maintaining the restored facilities. Greater involvement of
local people in design of subprojects and in their implementation and
maintenance needs to be given priority. A long-term perspective to
investment planning is also needed so as to build infrastructure and
drainage systems that can minimise damage from future floods.
Lack of Coordination between the Federal and Provincial Authorities
There has traditionally been a lack of coordination among
institutions at the federal and provincial government levels in
Pakistan. This has been evident historically in the sharing of federal
revenues as well as the successive and long drawn out deliberations
around the provincial finance awards, the issues around the sharing of
the waters from the Indus River basin, and the lack of agreement on
constructing the Kalabagh and other dams. Moreover, based on the
experience following the earthquake of 2005 and evaluation of the
earthquake response preparedness [Buttenheim (2009)], the provincial
authorities have no or very little preparation to respond to the
situation and are dependent on assistance from the armed forces and the
federal government agencies. The National Disaster Risk Mitigation Plan
indicates establishment of Provincial Disaster Management Authorities,
but this plan has yet to materialise. Apart from the province of Punjab,
which has set up some mechanisms of disaster mitigation (in the form of
the emergency telephone number, rescue 1122), the other provinces were
unprepared to respond to the destruction brought by the floods. There is
little proactive planning and timely access to early warning. In
addition, there is an increasing lack of confidence and trust between
the provinces. The provinces have already started showing their
discontent over the distribution of funds as there is increasing demand
from provinces, reported in the national newspapers, that the funds
should be directly given to the provinces instead of being routed
through the federal government.
Rapid Damage Assessment
Experience suggests that a realistic assessment of the damage is
needed after the floodwaters recede. Relief efforts will need to address
the myriad issues of displacement, the lack of food and healthcare, and
the economic crisis that the entire country will be facing. These losses
will escalate if not addressed quickly. In that light, it is imperative
that damage assessments be conducted quickly and in a manner that builds
ownership among the key stakeholders so that findings can be addressed
effectively.
Channelling Funds
There is growing concern among the national and international
community involved with the flood relief efforts about channeling funds
for relief and rehabilitation in the most effective way. The United
Nations and other key donors work directly as well as through the
government (NDMA) and national and international NGOs. The World Bank
and Asian Development Bank traditionally channel their resources through
government ministries and line departments. While it is too early to
assess in this case, the experience of the October 2005 earthquake
suggests that there is a need for a central pool of resources,
administered by the government with representation from donors,
semi-autonomous bodies (e.g., PPAF, rural support programmes, and so
on), and the civil society, who should work in coordination to formulate
and implement strategies for use of the funds and monitoring of
progress. All funds should be subject to third-party audits to ensure
transparency of the process.
Political Inconsistency
Backsliding on commitments or being inconsistent between policy and
action can be a serious constraint on the effectiveness of any relief
and rehabilitation measure. This historical issue of inconsistency
between policy and implementation can pose serious challenges during the
current crisis. The present government's low level of ownership for
the NDMA set up by the previous government is a case in point. The prime
minister has expressed dissatisfaction in his public statements over the
performance of NDMA and has recently announced establishing a parallel
body called the National Disaster Management Committee with the same
role and responsibilities as NDMA. This act is likely to have many
implications in terms of duplication of activities, lower ownership on
the part of both bodies, and confusion among the donors. Any such
actions at this point can compromise the effectiveness of relief and
rehabilitation efforts.
Capacity and Delivery Issues
Despite the several weeks' warning downstream areas had after
the floods struck the northern areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the
provinces were ill equipped to protect the population with the basic
necessities like shelter and food. Several weeks after the floods, the
lack of transportation facilities, sufficient supplies like tents, and
knowledge and information about disaster mitigation continued to be
major constraints.
Disaster response employs multiple disciplines, such as developing
competent in-country education programmes aligned with internationally
accepted standards [NDMA (2010)]. Operational contingency planning must,
there fore, be refined in disaster-vulnerable districts. Disaster
response agencies have their strengths and weaknesses. In disaster-prone
countries like Pakistan, it is imperative to develop basic disaster risk
mitigation knowledge and skills not only among the policy-makers and
implementation groups but also among members of the at-risk communities.
Enhancement such knowledge and skills among the current
generation's students is also pertinent in enabling future
generations to deal with disaster risk problems [NDMA (2010)]. Training
and education should involve orientation about disaster risks and
vulnerabilities, skill development on risk assessment, vulnerability
reduction, hazard mitigation, and emergency response management INDMA
(2010)]. Specialised training in areas of response, such as search and
rescue, first aid, fire fighting, evacuation, camp management, and
relief distribution will also be necessary [NDMA (2010)]. Considering
the importance of media, NDMA and the provincial disaster management
authorities need to establish partnerships with electronic and print
media and develop awareness of media personnel.
Lack of Early Warning Systems
Pakistan needs to establish and strengthen early warning system
mechanisms to ensure appropriate responses to recurring natural
disasters like the recent flood. This will include bringing together the
latest technologies that provide early warnings (these already exist
within Pakistan's national space research agency, the Space and
Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) and acquiring adequate scientific
training to monitor such situations and disseminate timely information
so that hazards can be met with preparation. Such systems have the
potential to contribute significantly to reduce disaster losses.
Mainstreaming Concerns for Women and Children
Initial reports in the national newspapers indicate that women and
children were the worst affected demographic during the recent floods in
Pakistan. Traditionally, the needs of this most vulnerable section of
society are overlooked in countries like Pakistan. Ignoring gender
aspects in disaster response, recovery, and preparedness is likely to
result in worsening existing poverty and inequality levels. It is
imperative that the assessments and the programs developed for
rehabilitation of flood victims are gender sensitive and aim at
deintensifying the existing political, social, and economic inequalities
faced by women [NDMA (2010)]. In spite of the devastation that they
cause, natural disasters provide opportunities for social and economic
change. Women can be empowered as equal stakeholders to act as key
resources before, during, and after disasters to reduce deaths, restore
the household economy, and reduce the breakdown of social safety nets.
5. CONCLUSION
The experience of recovery from previous natural disasters in
Pakistan and throughout South Asia offers numerous insights and lessons
that may be applicable to the post-2010 Pakistan flood rehabilitation
and recovery efforts. We have grouped these lessons into four broad
categories: market and trade policies; institutional framework and
sources of financing; livelihood support programmes and welfare
transfers; and rehabilitation of agriculture and infrastructure.
Under clear, transparent, and consistent policy with adequate price
incentives, private trade and imports can substantially contribute to
the country's postdisaster recovery. Restoration of private trade
(and even promotion of expansion of trade) can enhance both price
stability and food security. It can do so more effectively and at far
less cost than government-led or international organisation-led efforts,
particularly in the post-disaster rehabilitation phase.
There is a need for a strong institutional framework to coordinate
the large-scale disaster response. Long-term and short-term goals need
to be accounted for and integrated into this comprehensive post-disaster
response framework. Involvement of all affected stakeholders in the
policy formulation is important to ensure representation and
participation. The experience in Bangladesh suggests that financing of
recovery efforts through existing projects and delivery mechanisms
enables a faster and more flexible response.
Recovery efforts should include support for livelihood security
programmes. In the immediate aftermath of the floods, a provision of
compensation based on loss of livelihoods might be necessary to assist
affected groups. Stakeholders and vulnerable groups should be included
in the recovery efforts in a variety of ways ranging from participation
in the rehabilitation plan formulation to inclusion in temporary work
schemes related to the relief and reconstruction efforts. Alternative
strategies for the poor to cope with loss of income need to be examined
in order to avoid high and unsustainable indebtedness of households,
resulting from the flooding.
There are opportunities for not only restoring infrastructure
facilities but also upgrading them to enhance flood resistance. In
addition, the rapid resumption of normal agricultural activities is
vital for the country's recovery. Therefore, provision of inputs to
affected smallholders is essential.
Finally, it is important to establish and strengthen disaster
response capability so that the country can better respond to recurring
natural disasters. Emergency early warning system mechanisms have the
potential to substantially reduce casualties and economic losses from
disasters, and they need to be strengthened. Likewise, the lessons
learned from the relief and rehabilitation response to the 2010 floods
should be incorporated in contingency plans for future natural
disasters.
APPENDIX A
FLOOD HISTORY IN PAKISTAN, 1985 TO 2010
Table A.1
Major Floods in Pakistan 1985 to 2010 (Floods with 50, 000 or more
Displaced Persons)
Start Duration No. Of Number of
Date in Days Deaths Thousands
of
Displaced
Persons
All Four Provinces 7/27/1910 41 * 1,677 18,699
Punjab Province 8/9/1908 12 37 90.75
Peshawar and Khyber 8/2/1908 100 35 200
Pakhtunkhwa
Balochistan
Province: Turbat,
Sibi, Kech, Jal
Magsi, Gawador,
and Orinara. Pasni,
Bela, Mara, Bolan,
Dasht, Naal,
Khuzdar,
Awaran, Kharan,
Khurdar, Noshki,
Jaffarabad,
Naseerabad, and
Dera Allah Yar. 6/26/1907 25 280 400
Lasbella. Nal. Sindh
Province: Jacobabad
and
Qambar. Thatta and
Badin districts-
Keti Bandar, Shah
Bandar,
Jati, Larkhana.
Shahdad Kot
District. Talhar.
Kamber--
Shahdadkot. Dadu
area. Qubo Saeed
Khan, Dhori Minor,
Ghabi
Dero, Warah, Nasirabad.
Punjab Province:
Districts: Layyah,
Dera Ghazi Khan,
Rajanprl
Muzzaffargarh, Rahim
Yar Khan, Multan,
Bhakkar. Towns:
Sahiwal, Chimot,
Leiah, and Kot
Mithan Sharif
Marala, Gujrat,
Wazirabad, 7/5/1905 41 40 452
Gujranwala, Mandi
Bahauddin, Sargodha,
Muzaffarabad. Other
districts: Sialkot,
Jhang, Hafiz Abad,
Chiniot, Narowal.
Bajwat. Sindh
Province: Districts:
Sukkur,
Ghotki, Kashmore,
Shikarpur, Dadu, and
Jamshoro. Guddu.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:
Districts:
Charsadda, Nowshera,
Peshawar, Swat, 6/21/1905 46 5 50
Chitral, Karak, and
Shangla, Tapu
Koroona,
Sheikhabad, and Jala
Bela. sera ismail
Khan, Monda.
Sindh Province- 5/20/1999 3 168 200
Thatta and Badin
districts; Coastal
towns of
Hyderabad,
Tharparker, Umer
Kot, Mirpur.
Makran Coastal 3/2/1998 4 300 240
District
Provinces: Punjab, 8/12/1997 23 165 836
North-West Frontier-
Shinkiari, Gilgit,
Lahore, Rawalpindi,
Jhelum, Chenab,
Sutlej.
Punjab Province 9/2/1996 6 119 100
Provinces: Punjab, 7/19/1995 23 600 600
Sindh, Balochistan,
North-West Frontier.
Northern and Central 9/8/1992 11 2,750 3,000
Pakistan-Azad
Kashmir, Punjab.
Sindh Province 7/15/1992 27 94 1,280
Sindh Province- 8/18/1988 8 200
several dozen
villages destroyed.
Punjab Province-13
districts. North-
West Frontier
Province--
Tochi River in North 7/18/1988 19 158 163,000
Wazirastan.
Chugarzai village in
Swat
District. Indus
River. Kohistan.
Kashmir Province--
Jhelum and Chenab
rivers. Sindh.
Damage Area
(Millions Affected in
of Thousands
SUSD Square
Kilometers
All Four Provinces 160.0
Punjab Province 165.9
Peshawar and Khyber 32.5
Pakhtunkhwa
Balochistan
Province: Turbat,
Sibi, Kech, Jal
Magsi, Gawador,
and Orinara. Pasni,
Bela, Mara, Bolan,
Dasht, Naal,
Khuzdar,
Awaran, Kharan,
Khurdar, Noshki,
Jaffarabad,
Naseerabad, and
Dera Allah Yar. 115.8
Lasbella. Nal. Sindh
Province: Jacobabad
and
Qambar. Thatta and
Badin districts-
Keti Bandar, Shah
Bandar,
Jati, Larkhana.
Shahdad Kot
District. Talhar.
Kamber--
Shahdadkot. Dadu
area. Qubo Saeed
Khan, Dhori Minor,
Ghabi
Dero, Warah, Nasirabad.
Punjab Province:
Districts: Layyah,
Dera Ghazi Khan,
Rajanprl
Muzzaffargarh, Rahim
Yar Khan, Multan,
Bhakkar. Towns:
Sahiwal, Chimot,
Leiah, and Kot
Mithan Sharif
Marala, Gujrat,
Wazirabad, 433.5
Gujranwala, Mandi
Bahauddin, Sargodha,
Muzaffarabad. Other
districts: Sialkot,
Jhang, Hafiz Abad,
Chiniot, Narowal.
Bajwat. Sindh
Province: Districts:
Sukkur,
Ghotki, Kashmore,
Shikarpur, Dadu, and
Jamshoro. Guddu.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa:
Districts:
Charsadda, Nowshera,
Peshawar, Swat, 28.6
Chitral, Karak, and
Shangla, Tapu
Koroona,
Sheikhabad_ and Jala
Bela. sera ismail
Khan_ Monda.
Sindh Province- 10.9 59.6
Thatta and Badin
districts; Coastal
towns of
Hyderabad,
Tharparker, Umer
Kot, Mirpur.
Makran Coastal 165.6
District
Provinces: Punjab, 276.9
North-West Frontier-
Shinkiari, Gilgit,
Lahore, Rawalpindi,
Jhelum, Chenab,
Sutlej.
Punjab Province 203.0
Provinces: Punjab, 672.3
Sindh, Balochistan,
North-West Frontier.
Northern and Central 2,400 873.4
Pakistan-Azad
Kashmir, Punjab.
Sindh Province 4 137.6
Sindh Province- 117.9 33.0
several dozen
villages destroyed.
Punjab Province-13
districts. North-
West Frontier
Province--
Tochi River in North 220.5
Wazirastan.
Chugarzai village in
Swat
District. Indus
River. Kohistan.
Kashmir Province--
Jhelum and Chenab
rivers. Sindh.
Source: Dartmouth Flood Observatory (2010). * The current-year
information was updated from IDS (2010).
Authors' Note: We are thankful to anonymous referees of this
journal for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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(1) See Appendix A for a summary of major floods in Pakistan from
1985 to 2010.
(2) One reason for the greater number of displaced people in 2010
is that heavy floods this year have inundated urban areas. The increase
over time in the number of people who have settled in the katcha areas
(areas alongside the banks of canals and rivers) is another factor.
(3) See World Bank (2007) for a recent succinct review of
Pakistan's agricultural sector.
(4) Note that in Bangladesh, the winter season crop of rice
following a major monsoon season flood has typically been much larger
than in preceding years, most likely due to a combination of improved
price incentives and deposits o nutrient-rich sediments [del Ninno, et
al. (2001)].
(5) The 2007-08 HIES is a nationally and province level
representative survey of 15,453 households covering information about
households' income and expenditures. The HIES also includes
detailed information about households' crop and livestock
production, consumption and expenditures which enable the calculation of
household level crop land productivity levels for individual provinces.
(6) Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli (2003)
(7) In 1998, Bangladesh suffered a major flood in which, at its
peak in early September, floodwaters covered two-thirds of the country.
More than 20 percent of the monsoon season (aman) rice crop was
destroyed (more than 2 million tons of rice), road infrastructure was
badly damaged, and many landless rural poor households suffered losses
of wages [Dorosh (2001)]. There are, of course, major differences
between the 1998 Bangladesh floods and the 2010 Pakistan floods,
including the much greater damage to irrigation infrastructure in
Pakistan and the substantially larger safety net system already in
existence in Bangladesh at the time of the 1998 floods.
(8) Many households who are technically "landless" have
small gardens.
(9) In Pakistan, a small Agricultural Income Tax (AIT), equivalent
to less than 0.2 percent of crop sector value added, is imposed on
farmers based on area cultivated and type of crops grown. Charges for
canal water (abiana) are also small, and do not cover operating and
maintenance costs of the canals. Relief from these taxes may be of
marginal help, but much more is required to compensate farmers who have
lost crops and livestock. See Chaudhry (1999) and Kizilbash (2010).
(10) The state of land records management in Pakistan raises
concerns regarding the protection of property fights in the aftermath of
the floods. In parts of northern Pakistan, land demarcations in rural
areas have been washed away and in some places, paper-based land records
and Board of Revenue office files may have been lost as well. Moreover,
Pakistan's laws relating to land and property are designed to
collect revenues, rather than to guarantee title. Though all
transactions are to be recorded under the law, none guarantee title, but
only provide a presumed ownership [World Bank (2004)]. In this
situation, there is the possibility of land-grabbing and corruption, and
it is crucial that efforts are made to provide poor households with
legal assistance to help them keep their land.
(11) This section is based on PPAF's Annual Report 2009 IPPAF
(2010)] and personal interviews with PPAF staff,
http://www.ppaf.org.pk/db/PPAF%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202009.pdf
(12) The National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) is one of the
larger partner organisations of the PPAF.
(13) 1 US dollar is equal to 86.2 Pakistan rupees.
Paul Dorosh <
[email protected]> is Director, Development
Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research
Institute, Washington, DC. Sohail J. Malik <
[email protected]> is
Chairman, Innovative Development Strategies (Pvt.) Ltd. Islamabad.
Marika Krausova <
[email protected]> is Research Analyst at the
Development Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy
Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Table 1
Pakistan 2010 Flood Comparison with Other Recent Natural Disasters
Katrina Nargis
Flood Earthquake Cyclone Cyclone
Pakistan Pakistan USA Myanmar
(Aug. (Oct. (Aug. (May
2010) 2005) 2005) 2008)
Population 18.7 * 3.5 0.5 2.4
Affected (Million)
Area Affected 132 * 30 23
(Thousand sq. km.)
Deaths 1,677 * 73,338 1,836 84,537
Injured 2,605 * 128,309 19,359
Households Damaged 1.25 * 0.60 0.45
(Million)
Estimated Economic 6.5 ** 5.2 125.0 4.0
Damage (Billion US$)
Tsunami
Indian
Ocean
(Dec.
2004)
Population 2.3
Affected (Million)
Area Affected
(Thousand sq. km.)
Deaths 230,000
Injured 125,000
Households Damaged
(Million)
Estimated Economic 7.8
Damage (Billion US$)
Sources: * Relief Web (2010): Information as of September 4,2010;
** Authors' estimates based on area data from OCHA (2010).
Table 2
Impact of the 2010 Floods
Khyber Punjab Sindh
Pakhtunkhwa Rural Rural
Rural
Barani
(Mainly in
North) and
Canal Canal
Agroecology Barani- Irrigated Irrigated
Wheat, Wheat,
Rice, Rice,
Wheat, Sugarcane, Sugarcane,
Major Crops Maize Cotton Cotton
Impact of Floods *
Deaths 1,121 103 151
Injured 1,165 350 845
Houses Damaged 192 500 470
(Thousands)
Population Affected 43 82 4.7
(Million) *
Crop Area Affected 443 1,516 998
(Thousands Ha)
Flood Damage by
7ype (Million
US$) **
Crops 192 1,658 838
Livestock 65 233
Residential Property 1,151 828 84
Nonagricultural -- -- --
Establishments
Nonagricultural --
E-quipment -- -- --
Total Damages 1,371 2,031 873
Balochistan All All
Rural Pakistan Pakistan
Urban Total
Agroecology Barani
--
Wheat,
Major Crops Rice
Impact of Floods *
Deaths 48 -- 1,677
Injured 98 -- 2,605
Houses Damaged 75 -- 1,248
(Thousands)
Population Affected 1.0 -- 18.3
(Million) *
Crop Area Affected 627 -- 3,676
(Thousands Ha)
Flood Damage by
7ype (Million
US$) **
Crops 269 -- 2,957
Livestock 144 -- 441
Residential Property 81 1,491 3,634
Nonagricultural 13 220 233
Establishments
Nonagricultural 2 60 62
E-quipment
Total Damages 509 1,771 6,555
Notes: Crop area is defined as land of which at least 60 percent is
cultivated. Barani: nonirrigated. 'totals for Pakistan include Azad
Jammu and Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Source: * OCHA (2010) as of September4, 2010; ** Authors' estimates
based on area data from OCHA (2010).
Table 3
Alternative Estimates of the 2010 Pakistan Flood Impact on Agriculture
Province
Date of KPK Punjab Sindh
Estimate
Crop Area
Damaged
(Thousands Ha)
OCHA/FAO 4-Sep-10 443 1,517 999
NRD-PARC 15-Oct-10 169 953 362
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct-10 121 746 1,043
Crop Losses
(Billion US$)
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.19 1.66 0.84
NRD-PARC 15-Oct-10 0.35 1.01 0.64
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct-10 0.28 1.75 2.11
Livestock Damage
(Billion US$)
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.07 -- 0.23
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct-10 0.11 0.09 0.19
Total Agriculture
Damage (Billion
US$)
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.26 1.66 1.07
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct-10 0.40 1.84 2.30
Province
Balochistan Pakistan
Crop Area
Damaged
(Thousands Ha)
OCHA/FAO 628 3,676
NRD-PARC 74 1,558
WB/ADB/FAO 132 2,093
Crop Losses
(Billion US$)
IFPRI 0.23 2.96
NRD-PARC 0.15 2.15
WB/ADB/FAO 0.26 5.04
Livestock Damage
(Billion US$)
IFPRI 0.14 0.44
WB/ADB/FAO 0.17 0.57
Total Agriculture
Damage (Billion
US$)
IFPRI 0.37 3.40
WB/ADB/FAO 0.43 5.04 *
Notes: IFPRI calculations based on crop area damaged data from OCHA
(2010); WB/ADB/FAO and IFPRI totals of crop area damaged and crop loss
estimates include AJK and Gilgit/Baltistan; * WB/ADB/FAO Total
agriculture damage includes fisheries.
Source: OCHA (September 4, 2010), NRD/PARC (October 15, 2010), IFPRI
(September, 4, 2010), WB/ADB/FAO (October 31, 2010).
Table 4
Alternative Estimates of the Value of Agricultural Crop Losses from
the 2010 Pakistan Floods
Mean Land Median Land
Affected Area Productivity Productivity
Province (Thousands Ha) Q KR/Hectare) (PKR/Hectare)
Punjab 443 11,501 10,136
Sindh 1,517 11,883 11,441
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 999 11,150 8,805
Balochistan 628 14,287 7,917
Azad Jammu and 80 11,150 8,805
Kashmir
Gilgit-Baltistan 10 11,150 8,805
All 3,676 11,847 10,122
Billions US$ n/a n/a n/a
20% Crop
Loss at 50% Crop
20% Crop Median Loss at
Loss at Mean Land Mean Land
Land Productivity Productivity
Productivity (Billion (Billion
Province (Billion PKR) PKR) PKR)
Punjab 64.0 56.4 160.0
Sindh 29.6 28.5 74.0
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 8.3 6.5 20.7
Balochistan 14.3 7.9 35.8
Azad Jammu and 1.4 1.1 3.4
Kashmir
Gilgit-Baltistan 0.2 0.1 0.4
All 117.7 100.5 294.2
Billions US$ 1.38 1.18 3.46
50% Crop
Loss at
Median
Land
Productivity
(Billion
Province PKR)
Punjab 141.0
Sindh 71.2
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 16.3
Balochistan 19.8
Azad Jammu and 2.7
Kashmir
Gilgit-Baltistan 0.3
All 251.3
Billions US$ 2.96
Notes: Mean and median land productivity are calculated from
HIES (2008) data. PKR: Pakistani rupees.
Source: Authors' estimates; affected area data are from OCRA (2010).
Table 5
Food Expenditures (PKR/Capita/Month):
Pakistan HIES 2007-08, by Total Expenditure Quintiles
Pakistan
Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Wheat 127 110 125 132 135 132
Rice 36 21 29 32 41 57
Other Cereals 3 1 2 3 4 5
Pulses 20 13 17 19 23 28
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 32 9 16 24 35 78
Vegetables 67 45 55 65 75 97
Milk and Dairy 213 92 142 184 249 398
Meat Poultry and Fish 47 17 28 37 48 104
Fish 6 3 4 5 5 12
Edible Oils and Fats 99 66 81 94 113 140
All Food Items 850 483 642 768 941 1,414
Urban Pakistan
Wheat 113 104 110 113 115 115
Rice 39 19 25 31 40 57
Other Cereals 3 1 2 2 3 5
Pulses 21 13 17 18 22 26
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 44 10 17 25 36 83
Vegetables 73 45 55 62 72 97
Milk and Dairy 226 85 124 162 215 359
Meat Poultry and Fish 68 19 29 42 54 123
Fish 9 2 4 5 6 17
Edible Oils and Fats 101 63 77 89 102 130
All Food Items 935 462 594 717 868 1,402
Rural Pakistan
Wheat 134 111 130 140 147 153
Rice 35 21 31 32 42 58
Other Cereals 3 1 2 3 5 5
Pulses 19 13 17 20 24 30
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 26 9 15 23 35 71
Vegetables 65 45 55 66 78 96
Milk and Dairy 207 94 147 193 270 446
Meat Poultry and Fish 37 17 27 35 45 81
Fish 4 3 4 4 5 7
Edible Oils and Fats 98 66 83 97 120 151
All Food Items 808 488 658 789 986 1,429
Source: HIES (2008).
Note: Food categories total include "Other" food category.
Table 6
Monthly per Capita Consumption (in Kilograms) of Major Cereal Groups by
Total Expenditure Quintiles
Quintile
Major Cereal Items Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Pakistan
Wheat and Wheat Flour 7.8 7.1 7.7 8.0 8.1 7.9
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1
Pakistan Urban
Wheat and Wheat Flour 6.5 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.6 6.5
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1
Pakistan Rural
Wheat and Wheat Flour 8.4 7.2 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.5
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
Source: HIES (2008).
