Black-white differences in intergenerational economic mobility in the United States.
Mazumder, Bhashkar
Introduction and summary
The large and persistent gap in economic status between blacks and
whites in the United States has been a topic of considerable interest
among social scientists and policymakers for many decades. The
historical legacy of slavery and segregation raises the question of how
long black Americans are likely to remain a disadvantaged minority.
Despite the enormous literature on black-white inequality and its
historical trends, few studies have directly measured black-white
differences in rates of intergenerational mobility, that is, the ability
of families to improve their position in the income distribution from
one generation to the next. Estimates of rates of intergenerational
mobility by race can provide insight on whether racial differences in
the United States are likely to be eliminated and, if so, how long it
might take. Furthermore, they might also help inform policymakers as to
whether there are lingering racial differences in equality of
opportunity and, if so, what the underlying sources for these
differences are.
More generally, the relatively low rate of intergenerational
mobility in the United States compared with other industrialized
countries has been a growing concern to policymakers across the
political spectrum. (1) Understanding the sources of racial differences
in intergenerational mobility might also shed light on the mechanisms
behind the relatively high degree of intergenerational persistence of
inequality in the United States.
In this study, I attempt to advance our understanding along several
dimensions. First, I use two data sets containing larger
intergenerational samples than have been used in the previous
literature. One of the data sets matches individuals in the U.S. Census
Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to
administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration
(SSA). This matched data set provides many more years of data on
parents' earnings than most surveys and is likely to be less prone
to measurement error, since it is derived from tax records. In addition,
the SIPP contains data on key characteristics of the parents, such as
wealth levels and marital history. The other data source I use is the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY). In addition to containing a rich array of information as
children transition from adolescence to adulthood, such as test scores
and personality traits, the NLSY also measures total family income in
both generations, giving it an advantage over the SIPP. Using a measure
of economic status that includes the income of the spouse avoids
selecting only women who participate in the labor market.
Second, I use two types of measures of intergenerational mobility.
The first is a set of transition probabilities of relative income status
across generations. An example is the probability of moving out of the
bottom quintile of the income distribution from one generation to the
next. Hertz (2005) was the first to use transition probabilities to
examine black-white differences in intergenerational mobility. Using the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Hertz found that blacks were less
upwardly mobile and more downwardly mobile over generations than whites.
Since then, a few other studies mostly using the PSID have found similar
results. (2)
The second set of measures, called directional rank mobility,
compares whether the rank of a child in the income distribution is
higher or lower than their parents' rank in the previous
generation. (3) Both types of measures are able to distinguish upward
movements from downward ones and can be measured at different points in
the income distribution. The directional rank mobility measure is a
useful complement to the transition probability because instead of using
an arbitrarily chosen cutoff, it uses a natural yardstick, one's
own parents' rank. As I discuss later, the directional rank
mobility measures also appear to be very robust to many measurement
issues.
A key finding is that in recent decades, blacks have experienced
substantially less upward intergenerational mobility and substantially
more downward intergenerational mobility than whites. These results are
shown to be highly robust to a variety of measurement issues, such as
the concept of income used, the age of the sample members, and the
length of the time average used. The results are found in two different
data sets that cover different birth cohorts and differ in their gender
composition. Moreover, these results utilize relatively large samples of
black families, so that racial differences can be shown to be
statistically significant. An important implication of the results that
has not been shown explicitly before is that if these patterns of
mobility were to persist into the future, the implications for racial
differences in the "steady-state" distribution of income would
be alarming. Instead of eventually "regressing to the mean,"
as some traditional measures of intergenerational mobility (when applied
to the whole population) would suggest, these results imply that black
Americans would make no further relative progress. Of course, it is a
strong hypothetical to assume that current rates of mobility will hold
in future generations. Indeed, over the past 150 years, there have been
clear periods in which the racial gap in economic status has narrowed
and it is certainly possible that black-white gaps could converge. (4)
This study also tries to shed light on which factors are associated
with the racial gaps in upward and downward mobility. To be clear, while
the analysis is descriptive and not causal, it nonetheless provides some
highly suggestive "first-order" clues for the underlying
mechanisms leading to black-white differences in intergenerational
mobility. It appears that cognitive skills during adolescence, as
measured by scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), are
strongly associated with these gaps. For example, conditional on having
the median AFQT score, the racial gaps in both upward and downward
mobility are relatively small. (5) Consistent with previous studies
linking AFQT scores to racial differences in adult outcomes (for
example, Neal and Johnson, 1996; Cameron and Heckman, 2001), I do not
interpret these scores as measuring innate endowments but rather as
reflecting the accumulated differences in family background and other
influences that are manifested in test scores. (6) If these results are
given a causal interpretation, they suggest that actions that reduce the
racial gap in test scores could also reduce the racial gap in
intergenerational mobility. (7)
A commonly proposed explanation for racial gaps in achievement has
been the relatively high rates of black children growing up with single
mothers. I find evidence that for blacks, the lack of two parents in the
household throughout childhood does indeed hamper upward mobility.
However, patterns in downward mobility are unaffected by family
structure for either blacks or whites. Importantly, the negative effects
of single motherhood on blacks are only identified in the SIPP, where
the entire marital history during the child's life is available.
This highlights the importance of access to data on family structure
over long periods rather than a single snapshot at one point in time. I
also find that black-white gaps in both upward and downward mobility are
significantly smaller for those who have completed 16 years of
schooling. (8)
In many ways, this work is complementary to the recent study by
Chetty et al. (2014) that has deservedly received a great deal of media
attention. Chetty et al. used very large samples of tax records to
construct measures of intergenerational mobility at a very detailed
level of geography. (9) They then showed how differences in
intergenerational mobility across places vary with other aggregate
measures, such as the level of segregation or family structure. However,
their tax data do not include basic individual characteristics, such as
race or education. Therefore, they are unable to show how
intergenerational mobility differs by race, which is the first key focus
of this article. (10) In addition, they cannot include individual-level
variables, such as parent education, marital status, wealth, or
children's test scores, in order to explain mobility differences,
which is the second key focus of this article.
Finally, I should also note that the focus of this article is on
relative mobility across generations and that the measures are relevant
for answering questions concerning the progress of blacks relative to
whites. It may also be interesting to consider measures of absolute
mobility, but that is not the focus of this article.
Measures of mobility
Transition probabilities
The upward transition probability (hereafter UTP) used in this
analysis is the probability that the child's income percentile
([Y.sub.1]) exceeds a given percentile, s, in the child's income
distribution by an amount [tau], conditional on the parent's income
percentile ([Y.sub.0]) being at or below s in the parent's income
distribution:
1) [UTP.sub.[tau],s] = Pr([Y.sub.1] > s + [tau] | [Y.sub.0]
[less than or equal to] s).
For example, in a simple case where [tau] = 0 and s = 0.2, the
upward transition probability ([UTP.sub.0.02]) would represent the
probability that the child exceeded the bottom quintile in the
child's generation, conditional on parent income being in the
bottom quintile of the parent generation. (11) The empirical analysis of
upward transition probabilities will vary s in increments of 10
percentiles throughout the bottom half of the distribution (that is,
10,20,..., 50). Therefore, ass increases, each successive sample will
add more families to the already existing sample. For example, when s =
0.1, only families in the bottom decile of the income distribution will
be included. When s = 0.2, the sample will now include families in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution, so that families in the
bottom decile are common to both samples but families who are between
the 11 th and 20th percentiles are now added. This approach and the use
of x are helpful for making comparisons with the directional mobility
estimator that I will introduce shortly. I will also show results that
use non-overlapping percentile intervals of the parent income
distribution (for example, s [less than or equal to] 10th percentile,
10th percentile > s <[less than or equal to] 20th percentile ...
40th percentile > s [less than or equal to] 50th percentile).
Although in principle the interval-based estimates might be more
transparent in pinpointing mobility differences at different points in
the distribution, unless one has much larger samples, the results are
also much noisier than those from using the cumulative samples.
It is straightforward to see that this estimator can be modified to
measure downward transition probabilities by altering the inequality
signs:
2) [DTP.sub.[tau],s] = Pr([Y.sub.1] [less than or equal to] s +
[tau] | [Y.sub.0] > s).
In this case, I vary s from 50 to 90. I also consider intervals
such as the highest decile: 90th percentile < s [less than or equal
to] 100th percentile, next highest decile: 80th percentile < s [less
than or equal to] 90th percentile,..., 50th percentile < s [less than
or equal to] 60th percentile.
Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011) show how the transition
probability can be estimated conditional on continuous explanatory
variables using nonparametric regression techniques and demonstrate that
bootstrapping is a valid approach for calculating the appropriate
standard errors. (12) Using this methodology one can, for example,
estimate the difference in transition probabilities between blacks and
whites while controlling for the effects of children's test scores
and determine whether these differences are statistically significant.
Directional rank mobility
Following Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011),
I use a measure of upward rank mobility (URM) that estimates the
likelihood that an individual will surpass their parent's place in
the distribution by a given amount, conditional on their parents being
at or below a given percentile:
3) [URM.sub.[tau],s] = Pr([Y.sub.1] - [Y.sub.0] > [tau] |
[Y.sub.0] [less than or equal to] s).
In the simple case where [tau] = 0, this is simply the probability
that the child exceeds the parent's place in the distribution. As
with the UTP measure, positive values of x enable one to measure the
amount of the gain in percentiles across generations. Results will be
shown for a range of values for x and also as s is progressively
increased. Bhattacharya and Mazumder show that the URM measure can also
be estimated conditional on continuous covariates using nonparametric
regressions.
Bhashkar Mazumder is a senior economist and research advisor and
the director of the Chicago Census Research Data Center at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The author thanks Katherine Meckel. Nathan
Chan, Benjamin Jakes, Wetting Zhang, and especially Jon Davis for
excellent research assistance. He thanks Nathan Grawe, Gregory Clark,
Derek Neal, Jason Faberman, and Dick Porter for their helpful
suggestions and seminar participants at the University of California,
Davis 2010 Conference on Social Mobility, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago, the 2011ASSA (Allied Social Science Associations) Meeting, and
the 2011 World Bank/IAE Conference on Socio-Economic Mobility and the
Middle Class in Latin America for helpful comments. Any opinions and
conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of
the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no
confidential information is disclosed.
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Similarly, one can construct a measure of downward rank mobility
(DRM) using an analogous approach:
4) [DRM.sub.[tau],s] = Pr([Y.sub.0] - [Y.sub.1] > [tau] |
[Y.sub.0] [greater than or equal to] s).
Comparison of transition probabilities and directional rank
mobility
One criticism of transition probabilities is that they require
using arbitrarily chosen cutoffs such as the 20th percentile. In
contrast, the directional rank mobility measures simply compare the
child's rank to the parent's rank rather than to an
arbitrarily chosen quantile. (13) In other respects, however, neither
estimator is perfect, as discussed by Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011).
Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider both measures and to examine
a range of estimates. As I show next, the DRM appears to be robust to
the differences across data sets.
Data
NLSY79
The first source of data I use is the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY79), a data set that has several attractive
features. Most notably, there is a very large sample of more than 6,000
individuals for whom we know both family income in adolescence (1978-80)
and various economic outcomes as adults (1997-2005).
The NLSY79 began with a sample of individuals who were between the
ages of 14 and 21 as of January 1, 1979, and who have since been tracked
through adulthood. The NLSY79 conducted annual interviews until 1994 and
has since shifted to biennial surveys. The analysis is restricted to the
sample of youth who were living at home with their parents during the
first three years of the survey and for whom family income was directly
reported by the parents in any of these years. Respondents also must
have stayed in the sample to adulthood and been interviewed in one of
the surveys beginning with 1998 and ending in 2006. (14) The final
sample includes 3,440 men and 3,250 women.
The measures of mobility utilize data on the family income of the
children during the years 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005, when sample
members were between the ages of 33 and 48. The measures of permanent
family income are constructed for each generation by using multiyear
averages using any available years of data. Years of zero income are
included in the averages. Family income is converted into 2004 dollars
using the headline Consumer Price Index CPI series.
A nice feature of the NLSY79 is that it also includes a rich set of
explanatory variables pertaining to the children. Measures of human
capital include completed years of education and scores on the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test (ASVAB), which was given to
all NLSY respondents. I will focus on the composite AFQT score, which is
used as a screening device by the military and has been used in many
previous economic studies.
SIPP-SSA
The second data source pools the 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993
panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) matched
to administrative earnings records maintained by the Social Security
Administration (SSA). (15) The Census Bureau attempted to collect the
social security numbers of all individuals in the surveys and they were
subsequently matched to SSA administrative databases of summary earnings
records (SER) and detailed earnings records (DER). Davis and Mazumder
(2011) show that the match rates are high for most SIPP panels and that
selection does not appear to be a serious concern.
The SER data cover annual earnings both from employers and
self-employment over the period from 1951 to 2007. In the SER data, the
earnings of individuals who are not covered by the social security
system will have their earnings recorded as zero. Further, the SER data
are censored at the maximum level of earnings subject to the social
security tax. While the DER data are not subject to either of these
issues, they are only available from 1978. Further, the DER data used in
this article only cover labor market earnings reported on W-2 forms and
not self-employment earnings. Therefore, I combine information from both
the SER and DER by taking the maximum value of earnings from the two
sources in order to have earnings data from both labor market earnings
and self-employment, and I only use the data beginning in 1978. (16)
In order to maximize the sample size, I use a relatively liberal
set of sample selection rules. I start with a sample of white or black
males who were living with their parents at the time of the SIPP and who
were no older than 25. (17) I also require that the adult earnings of
these men are observed when they are at least 21 years old. Sons'
earnings are taken over the five years spanning 2003 through 2007, so as
to take earnings at as late a stage in the life cycle as possible to
minimize life-cycle bias for the younger cohorts. Although years of zero
earnings are included in the average, sons must have positive earnings
in at least one year to be included. This produces a sample of 16,782
men, who could have been born anytime between 1959 and 1982 and are
observed as adults between the ages of 21 and 48. (18)
For children who lived with both their mother and their father,
both parents' earnings are combined and averaged over all years
between 1978 and 1986 to construct a measure of permanent earnings. For
those children who only lived with a single parent at the time of the
SIPP, the parent earnings are recorded as the single parent's
earnings. To be included in the sample, parents must have had positive
earnings in at least one year.
A limitation of the SIPP-SSA data is that there is little
information available for the children during their adult years, aside
from their administrative earnings records. However, unlike the NLSY,
the SIPP-SSA provides a rich set of data on the parents. In this
article, I utilize information on the complete marital histories of the
parents present at the time of the SIPP.
Comparison of NLSY79 and SIPP-SSA
Table 1 presents summary statistics for each sample. There are a
number of potentially important differences between the samples. The
NLSY79 sample includes both sons and daughters and uses family income
for both generations. Family income is useful as a way of including
daughters in the sample and avoiding issues dealing with selective labor
force participation. The administrative data in the SIPP-SSA only has
earnings and only for the individuals (not the spouse). Since there is
no ideal way of dealing with selection of which daughters participate in
the labor force, the analysis with the SIPP-SSA only uses sons. The
NLSY79 covers individuals born between 1957 and 1964, while the SIPP
sample covers those born over a much longer time span, 1959-82. (19)
Parent income is measured over just a three-year period (1978 to 1980)
in the NLSY79, but over a nine-year period from 1978 to 1986 in the
SIPP. All ranks and quantiles used in the NLSY are based on
distributions that include individuals who are neither white nor black.
The SIPP-SSA data in contrast is restricted to just whites and blacks.
Finally, the NLSY will continue to track respondents and collect income
data among respondents even if they become incarcerated. The SIPP-SSA
data, in contrast, is confined to the civilian noninstitutionalized
population.
Unconditional estimates of intergenerational mobility
Upward transition probabilities (UTP)
The race-specific estimates of upward transition probabilities from
both data sets are plotted in figure 1. (20) The x-axis varies the
sample used based on the percentile range of family income in the parent
generation, while the y-axis shows the transition probability that
income of children from these families surpassed this range. The blue
lines show the estimates for whites, while the red lines show the
estimates for blacks. The green lines plot the difference in the
probabilities by race, along with standard error bands. (21) The solid
lines show the estimates using the NLSY and the dashed lines use the
SIPP-SSA sample.
I begin by discussing the results using the NLSY. Among white men
and women (solid blue line) whose parents' income was at or below
the 10th percentile, 84 percent exceed the 10th percentile as adults. As
we move to the right and gradually increase the percentile range of
family income, the upward transition probabilities fall. For example,
among whites starting below the 40th percentile in the parent generation
only 54 percent exceed the 40th percentiles as adults. In all cases, the
comparable UTP estimates are much lower among blacks (solid red line).
For example, among blacks starting in the bottom decile, only 65 percent
exceed the bottom decile as adults, a 19 percentage point difference
compared with whites. The black-white gap in the probability of rising
out of the bottom quintile (solid green line) is even higher at 27
percent.
The SIPP-SSA sample consists only of sons, includes only blacks and
whites, includes many more recent cohorts, and uses administrative
earnings data rather than family income. Despite these different
concepts and measures, the UTP estimates are very similar to those using
the NLSY. The general pattern of large and statistically significant
differences in point estimates is also evident in the SIPP-SSA data. The
fact that the key findings are so similar across the data sets is
advantageous, since each data set has its own exclusive set of
explanatory variables.
Downward transition probabilities (DTP)
Figure 2 (p. 8) plots an analogous set of downward transition
probabilities. Using either data set, I find that blacks are more
downwardly mobile. This is most evident when the sample includes a broad
range of the upper income distribution in the parent generation. For
example, about 60 percent of blacks whose parents were in the top half
of the income distribution fall below the 50th percentile in the
subsequent generation. The analogous figure for whites is 36 percent.
(22)
Upward rank mobility (URM)
Figure 3 (p. 9) plots the estimates of upward rank mobility based
on equation 3. As might be expected, the rates of upward mobility using
the URM are somewhat higher than for the UTP. For example, using the
NLSY 1 find that 75 percent of blacks whose parents were below the 20th
percentile surpass their parents' percentile in the family income
distribution. In contrast, only 48 percent of this same subsample exceed
the 20th percentile, implying that although about 37 percent of blacks
starting in the bottom quintile exceed their parents' percentile
but do not transition out of the bottom quintile. For whites, the
difference in upward mobility between the two measures is much smaller.
Therefore, the URM estimator (for x = 0) shows a much smaller
black-white gap that fluctuates around 0.1 across the samples in the
bottom half of the income distribution of parents. Interestingly, figure
3 shows that the estimates based on the URM are nearly identical across
the two data sets, which suggests that it is an especially robust
measure.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The finding of a smaller black-white gap using the URM rather than
the UTP measure is sensitive to the chosen value of [tau]. For example,
if [tau] is set to 0.2, then the black--white differences in upward rank
mobility rise considerably. For example, among men and women in the NLSY
whose parents' family income placed them in the bottom quintile,
blacks are nearly 25 percent less likely to surpass their parents'
rank by 20 percentiles or more. Using the SIPP-SSA data, the analogous
black-white difference for men is 21 percent. Figure 4 (p. 10) plots the
full set of estimates for the case where [tau] equals 0.2.
Downward rank mobility (DRM)
Estimates of downward rank mobility are shown in figure 5 (p. 11).
Using the simple measure ([tau] = 0), I again observe higher rates of
downward mobility among blacks than whites that is less pronounced in
the top two deciles. The estimates of DRM are higher, however, than
those of DTP. For example, among whites in the NLSY sample whose
parents' income was in the top half of the income distribution, 69
percent were in a lower rank in the distribution than their parents,
even though only 36 percent fell below the median. For blacks starting
in the top half of the income distribution, 79 percent fell below their
parents and 61 percent also dropped below the median. Therefore, the
estimates of the black-white gap in downward mobility using the baseline
DRM measure are considerably smaller in absolute value than the
analogous estimates using DTP.
The comparison of the two downward mobility measures is also
sensitive to the choice of [tau]. For example, if we consider the
probability of those in the top half of the distribution falling 20
percentiles or more, the black-white gap is 18 percent in the NLSY and
14 percent in the SIPP-SSA. The racial differences in DRM when [tau] =
0.2 show somewhat different patterns across the income distribution
depending on the data set used, as shown in figure 6 (p. 12). For
example, the black-white difference in the probability of falling 20
percentiles below one's parents among those who start in the top
decile is only 7 percent in the NLSY, but it is 23 percent in the
SIPP-SSA. This likely reflects differences that are due to the relevant
concept of income. Compared with whites, blacks starting in the top
decile are more likely to suffer larger drops in their earnings rank
than in their family income rank.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Upward mobility using interval-based samples
The results presented so far have used samples that have
progressively expanded the range of families, starting from either the
bottom or the top of the parent income distribution. It might also be
interesting to see the results within much narrower percentile ranges to
see how mobility changes across the distribution. Figure 7 (p. 13) shows
estimates of UTP and URM using interval-based samples from deciles in
the bottom half of the income distribution. (23) For most of the bottom
half of the income distribution, the racial differences in upward
mobility are consistently between 20 and 30 percent. The greater
similarity between the UTP and URM estimates is not surprising since, as
the interval range becomes smaller, the two estimates will converge.
(24)
Implications of transition probabilities on the steady-state
distributions by race
The transition matrix of movements across quintiles of the income
distribution over generations for blacks and whites based on the
SIPP-SSA are shown in table 2 (p. 14). The general patterns concerning
racial differences in upward and downward mobility are again evident.
For example, more than 50 percent of blacks who start in the bottom
quintile in the parent generation remain there in the child generation,
but only 26 percent of whites remain in the bottom quintile in both
generations. Whites are less likely to transition out of the top
quintile compared with blacks, suggesting a distribution that may not be
exhibiting racial convergence. Assuming that these specific
probabilities are a
permanent feature of the U.S. economy, they can be used to
calculate an implied steady-state distribution using standard matrix
algebra methods for solving Markov chains. The results show, for
example, that in the steady state, 39 percent of blacks would occupy the
bottom quintile of the income distribution and only 8 percent would be
in the top quintile. (25) This finding suggests that rather than
convergence, blacks will remain perpetually disadvantaged in American
society if mobility patterns continue to evolve as they have for the
cohorts studied in this article. As I discuss next, however, there are
potential levers through which policy could address this problem.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Estimates of intergenerational mobility controlling for explanatory
variables
Ideally, we would like to understand the causal factors that
explain the observed patterns of intergenerational mobility and the
possible implications for policies designed to address racial
differences in mobility. For example, we might like to know whether a
particular schooling intervention such as smaller classes might improve
students' prospects for upward mobility and whether this could
reduce the racial gap in upward mobility. Such a study would not only
require a convincing research design to address standard concerns about
endogeneity bias--for example, to ensure that the intervention was not
directed at individuals who would have succeeded even in the absence of
the intervention--but would also likely require high-quality income data
spanning multiple years of adulthood for two generations of the same set
of families. Instead, like the recent work by Chetty et al. (2014),
which also does not attempt to estimate causal effects, 1 opt for a more
modest goal and conduct a descriptive analysis to explore how the
inclusion of other available explanatory variables affects the racial
differences in upward and downward intergenerational mobility. Such a
"first pass" analysis may yield useful clues about which
factors are potentially important.
To simplify the analysis, I focus only on transition probabilities.
(26) For a representative measure of upward mobility, I use the
transition probability of moving out of the bottom quintile. For
downward mobility, I focus only on the probability of moving out of the
top half of the income distribution over the course of a generation. I
first consider the effects of two explanatory variables from the NLSY,
the child's education level and the child's test score. I then
turn to a measure of family structure from the SIPP-SSA data, which
compares children who have ever lived with just one parent with children
who have always lived with two parents.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
For the first two measures, I use a statistical technique that
shows how each explanatory variable affects whether a child exceeds the
bottom quintile as an adult and how this association changes at
different values of the explanatory variable. (27) I produce a series of
plots of the upward transition probability at each value of the
explanatory variable for each racial group. In addition, I plot the
black-white difference, along with 95 percent confidence bands. Finally,
as a point of reference, I include the baseline transition probabilities
that do not account for the explanatory variables in lightly shaded
horizontal lines. An explanatory variable with a positive association
with upward mobility will produce an upward sloped line and may reduce
the black-white gap in upward mobility.
Effects of education
The left-hand-side panels in figure 8 (p. 15) show the results for
upward mobility and the right-hand-side panels show the plots for
downward mobility. Panel A shows that, as would be expected, more years
of completed schooling are associated with a greater likelihood of
rising out of the bottom quintile. For example, 89 percent of whites
with exactly 16 years of schooling will escape the bottom quintile,
compared with 75 percent of whites with exactly 12 years of schooling.
For blacks, rates of upward mobility are extremely low for those with
less than a high school education but begin to rise sharply for those
who attain more than a high school education. For example, for blacks
with exactly ten years of schooling, only 28 percent will transition out
of the bottom quintile, compared with 69 percent of blacks with exactly
14 years of schooling.
With respect to the racial gap in upward mobility, controlling for
education provides something of a mixed picture. On one hand, the point
estimate for the racial gap in upward mobility among those with less
than a high school education is actually higher than the estimate when
education is not controlled for, although this difference is not
statistically significant. On the other hand, the racial gap narrows
sharply with additional years of post-secondary education. Indeed, among
those with 16 years of schooling, the racial gap in upward mobility gap
is essentially closed. Nevertheless, the racial gap is still quite large
among those with some post-secondary education who have not completed
college. For example, the black-white gap among those with 14 years of
schooling is still sizable at 16 percent. Given that only 17 percent of
blacks in the NLSY attained more than 14 years of schooling, this
suggests that marginal improvements in educational attainment may not do
a great deal to improve the overall upward mobility prospects of blacks.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
The effects of education on downward mobility are shown in panel B
of figure 8. As expected, the lines slope downward. Since I am sampling
only families with parents in the top half of the income distribution,
the samples of individuals with less than a high school education are
relatively small, so the estimates for these values are especially
noisy. As was the case with upward mobility, additional years of
post-secondary schooling are associated with a reduction in the racial
gap in downward mobility. Among those with 16 years of schooling, the
black-white gap is reduced to just 14 percentage points, and it
disappears entirely among those with 17 years or more of schooling.
Effects of test scores
The effects of including one's AFQT score on rates of upward
mobility are shown in panel C of figure 8. Flere, the results provide a
relatively clean and compelling story. For both blacks and whites,
upward mobility rises with AFQT scores in a fairly similar fashion.
There are especially sharp gains in upward mobility associated with
increases in test scores at the low end of the AFQT distribution. Upward
mobility continues to rise at a somewhat slower but still strong rate in
the middle and in the upper half of the AFQT distribution. Remarkably,
the lines for blacks and whites are relatively close throughout the AFQT
distribution. For example, the black-white gap in moving out of the
bottom quintile is only 5.2 percentage points for those with median AFQT
scores, compared with the unconditional gap of 27 percentage points.
This suggests that cognitive skills measured at adolescence can
"account" for much of the black-white difference in upward
mobility. This result echoes previous findings by Neal and Johnson
(1996) and Cameron and Heckman (2001), who have also found that AFQT
scores can account for much of the racial gap in adult earnings and
college enrollment rates. As with these aforementioned studies, I
interpret this finding as reflecting the cumulative effect of a broad
range of family background influences rather than reflecting only innate
differences. (28)
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
The effects of AFQT scores on downward mobility (panel D of figure
8) are also quite striking. The lines for whites and blacks converge
quite a bit and for a broad swath of the AFQT distribution, the racial
gap is below 10 percentage points and is not statistically different
from 0. Therefore, as was the case with upward mobility, test scores
during adolescence are strongly associated with rates of downward
mobility.
Effects of family structure
To understand the role of family structure, I use data from the
SIPP-SSA where I have data on family structure throughout the
child's life. (29) For whites, upward mobility out of the bottom
quintile actually declines slightly from 0.75 (0.02) for those who ever
lived with just one parent to 0.71 (0.02) for those who always lived
with two parents. For blacks, however, we see an increase in the
transition probability from 0.47 (0.02) to 0.58 (0.02). The black-white
gap declines from 0.28 (0.02) to 0.13 (0.06). This 15 percentage point
improvement in upward mobility for blacks relative to whites is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. On the other hand, I
find virtually no difference in downward mobility by whether sons always
lived with two parents or not, for either blacks or whites.
It is worth noting that Chetty et al. (2014) show that the
strongest predictor of intergenerational mobility differences between
commuting zones is the fraction of families in the commuting zone headed
by single mothers. However, Chetty et al. do not show the direct effect
of having a single parent on intergenerational mobility differences at
the individual level.
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
Conclusion
One can potentially gain insight into the dynamics of the racial
gap in economic status in the United States and better understand how
long it will take before there is complete convergence by examining
rates of intergenerational income mobility. Using measures that are
suited to describing racial differences in intergenerational mobility
with respect to a common distribution, I find dramatically lower rates
of upward mobility from the bottom of the income distribution and
dramatically higher rates of downward mobility from the top of the
distribution among blacks born between the late 1950s and early 1980s.
In combination the estimates imply a steady-state income
distribution that shows no racial convergence. In other words, if future
generations of white and black Americans experience the same rates of
intergenerational mobility as these cohorts, we should expect to see
that blacks on average would not make any relative progress. While these
results are provocative, they stand in contrast to other epochs in which
blacks have made steady progress in reducing racial differentials. These
findings, therefore, should not be taken to imply that racial progress
is infeasible but rather to highlight what current trends, if they were
to continue, would suggest about the future.
These results also underscore the importance of understanding what
kinds of policies can potentially foster greater upward mobility and
reduce downward mobility for blacks. While this article does not seek to
identify definitive causal channels, the use of statistical models that
include explanatory variables suggests a few potential areas for
policymakers to consider. Similar to previous studies that have looked
at static gaps in black-white earnings and college-going rates using
NLSY data (for example, Neal and Johnson, 1996; Cameron and Heckman,
2001), it is apparent that the cumulative effects of a variety of
influences that affect cognitive ability by adolescence play a critical
role in accounting for racial differences in upward and downward
mobility. A growing literature has shown that black-white differences in
test scores, and military test scores in particular, have been narrowed
through large-scale policy interventions throughout American history
(for example, Chay, Guryan, and Mazumder, 2009; Aaronson and Mazumder,
2011). Other studies (for example, Dobbie and Fryer, 2011) have also
shown the potential for modern educational interventions to improve the
black-white gap in educational achievement.
Educational attainment also appears to matter for both upward and
downward mobility, but the effects of education on reducing racial
mobility differentials occur primarily at the margin of acquiring higher
education. If racial gaps in college attainment are primarily due to
skill differences determined in adolescence (Cameron and Heckman, 2001),
then this also points to the importance of interventions earlier in
life. Still, there may be some scope for higher education policies that
ease credit constraints for families for whom those constraints are
binding.
Many commentators have pointed to the prevalence of black children
raised by single mothers as a source of racial gaps in economic success.
I find supportive evidence that blacks raised in two-parent families
throughout childhood experience significantly greater upward mobility.
However, family structure appears not to matter for whites or for rates
of downward mobility for either blacks or whites. Future research may
provide greater insight into these patterns of results.
[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
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NOTES
(1) President Obama highlighted equality of opportunity in an
address in 2011. See www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/
remarks-president-economy-osawatomie-kansas. Republican leaders have
also raised concerns about low economic mobility See
http://business.time.com/2012/01/05/the-loss-of-upward-mobilityin-the-u-s/.
(2) These include Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins (2008), Mazumder
(2008), and Acs (2011), which were all produced as part of the Pew
Economic Mobility Project. Mazumder (2008) uses the NLSY, while the
other studies use the PSID.
(3) In a methodological paper, Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011)
introduced these measures and demonstrated their properties. This
article builds upon Bhattacharya and Mazumder in several ways, including
adding a second data source that utilizes administrative records; adding
daughters' outcomes; considering racial differences in downward
mobility; and adding many more explanatory variables to the analysis.
(4) Smith and Welch (1989) show that there was significant
convergence in the black-white wage gap from 1940 to 1980 that was due
to improvements in black educational attainment and school quality and
migration patterns.
(5) This was first found by Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011). The
residual racial gap in upward mobility conditional on AFQT, however, is
higher in this study and may be due to the fact that this paper uses
children's family income rather than earnings, includes women, and
uses income measured at later ages.
(6) A growing literature suggests that black-white differences in
test scores can be strongly affected by environmental influences. For
example, see Chay, Guryan, and Mazumder (2009) and Aaronson and Mazumder
(2011).
(7) There may be other race-specific behavioral differences that
can affect the interpretation of economic gaps that adjust only for AFQT
scores. Lang and Manove (2011) argue that for signaling reasons, blacks
obtain more education than whites conditional on AFQT scores.
(8) In the working paper version of this article (Mazumder, 2011),
I show that low levels of parental wealth among blacks also inhibit the
prospects for upward mobility.
(9) Chetty et al. (2014) measure intergenerational mobility at the
level of "commuting zones," which are an aggregation of
counties that include rural areas.
(10) They conduct one exercise using samples that vary in the share
of the population that is white (inferred based on geographic residence)
in order to show that segregation is associated with reduced upward
mobility of whites as well as blacks.
(11) Many previous papers on intergenerational mobility have used a
quintile transition matrix to characterize mobility by showing what
proportion of those who start in each quintile end up in each quintile
in the subsequent generation. This example would measure 1 minus the
probability of remaining in the bottom quintile A quintile transition
matrix is shown in table 2.
(12) Formby, Smith, and Zheng (2004) develop a distribution theory
for marginal transition probabilities that can be easily extended to the
case of discrete co variates. Unfortunately, for many covariates of
interest that are commonly treated as continuous, such as years of
schooling or test scores, this is not of much practical value. In order
to implement the TP estimator, one must first estimate quantiles of the
income distribution. Since the TP estimates conditional on continuous
covariates will involve non-smooth functions of these initially
estimated functions, it is technically challenging to show that one can
bootstrap the standard errors.
(13) When making comparisons between population subgroups, there is
an unambiguous advantage to using the URM. However, Bhattacharya and
Mazumder (2011) show that when using the full sample (that is, pooling
all subgroups), the URM measure is only meaningful if there is some
cutoff, s, used to condition the sample. The choice of s, of course, is
likely to be arbitrary. Even in this case, however, children's
ranks are still directly compared to their parents' rank as opposed
to an arbitrary quantile.
(14) The analysis includes individuals from both the
cross-sectional representative samples and the supplemental samples (for
example, blacks and Hispanics). Following Neal and Johnson (1996) and
Cameron and Heckman (2001), I combine the cross-sectional and
supplemental samples of blacks and utilize the 1979 sampling weights.
(15) This data source is not publicly available. Researchers must
apply to obtain the data through the Center for Economic Studies at the
U.S. Census Bureau (www.census.gov/ces).
(16) For a small set of self-employed individuals whose earnings
were above the taxable maximum, this approach understates their true
earnings To address this, 1 obtained the full DER data (including the
non-top-coded self-employed earnings) and redid all of the analysis. I
found that using the full DER data has an imperceptible effect on the
results (typically only changing estimates at the third decimal place).
Since there are procedural difficulties in releasing a second set of
statistical results through the Census Bureau disclosure avoidance
review process in cases where revised estimates lead the sample size to
change by just one or two individuals, and since the current results are
virtually identical to the corrected ones, I have opted to show the
current results that combine both the SER and DER data.
(17) Restricting the sample to whites and blacks avoids implicitly
disclosing any information concerning men who are neither white nor
black, thereby making it easier to pass Census Bureau disclosure
avoidance review. Similarly, the upper age restriction of 25 is not
ideal--one might prefer a younger age cutoff, such as 17 or 18, to avoid
including men who lived at home into adulthood--but I chose it to make
it easier to maximize sample sizes for the purposes of Census Bureau
disclosure avoidance review. It is worth noting that in the SIPP
individuals residing at college are included in the household. To some
degree, this mitigates the concern of having an older age cutoff. In any
case, the results are not sensitive to restricting the age cutoff to 18.
There is no lower bound on the age when living at home.
(18) As I discuss later, the results are not sensitive to requiring
sons to be at least 28 years old.
(19) Haider and Solon (2006) demonstrate that estimates of
intergenerational elasticity can be biased depending on the ages at
which the incomes of children and parents are measured. They find that
such bias is minimized when income is measured around the age of 40. It
is not clear whether a similar bias would arise with respect to the
statistical measures utilized here, since they are very different from
the regression coefficients analyzed by Haider and Solon. Indeed, the
directional rank mobility measures, in particular, seem to be robust to
the various measurement differences between the samples. In any case,
life-cycle bias is likely to be minimal in the NLSY79 sample, since the
mean age of the children in 2001 (the middle year of the sample) is 39,
which is close to ideal according to Haider and Solon. In the SIPP-SSA
sample, the mean age of the sons in 2005 (the middle year of the sample)
is 31. However, I found very similar results using an older SIPP-SSA
sample.
(20) The underlying estimates and the standard errors are available
in tabular form in Mazumder (2011), which is a working paper version of
this article
(21) Owing to the large samples, all of the estimated gaps are
highly statistically significant.
(22) There is a somewhat notable difference between the two data
sets in the degree of downward mobility out of the top decile for
blacks. In theNLSY, which uses family income in both generations, 81
percent of black children whose parents were in the top decile fall
below the top decile as adults. The comparable figure is 88 percent in
the SIPP-SER data, where the income concept is earnings.
(23) The UTP estimates are drawn from the NLSY sample, while the
URM estimates are drawn from the SIPP-SSA sample.
(24) This is obvious at the limit, since the probability of
exceeding the percentile (URM) of one's parent(s) and the
probability of exceeding any given percentile threshold (UTP) will be
identical if the sample is conditioned on the same percentile in each
case.
(25) Further, 22 percent of blacks would be in the second quintile,
17 percent in the third quintile, and 14 percent in the fourth quintile.
The shares of whites across the distribution from the bottom to top
quintiles is as follows: 17 percent, 20 percent, 20 percent, 21 percent,
and 22 percent.
(26) I found the same general pattern of results using the DRM
measures.
(27) Following Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011), I use locally
weighted regressions and calculate standard errors using the bootstrap
method.
(28) A growing number of studies (Neal and Johnson, 1996; Hansen,
Heckman, and Mullen, 2004; Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Chay, Guryan, and
Mazumder, 2009; and Aaronson and Mazumder, 2011) have shown that
environmental influences can have large effects on military test scores
and narrow racial differences.
(29) The latter category includes those whose parents were ever
separated, divorced, or widowed. The sample includes those who were
given the marital history topical module in the SIPP and who had
non-missing data. There are no significant differences between this
subsample and the full SIPP analysis sample.
TABLE 1
Summary statistics
All
Number of Standard
observations Mean deviation
Panel A: NLSY79
Family income (1997-2005) 6,690 69,395 58,953
Child's age in 2001 6,690 39.1 2.2
Education 6,673 13.0 2.3
AFQT 6,432 46.0 28.5
Parent income (1978-80) 6,690 57,760 36,299
Single mother at age 14 6,690 0.13 0.33
Panel B: SIPP-SSA
Son's log earnings 16,782 10.14 1.07
Son's age in 2005 16,782 30.93 5.69
Single parent 16,782 0.21 0.41
1984 panel 16,782 0.26 0.44
1990 panel 16,782 0.23 0.42
1991 panel 16,782 0.14 0.35
1992 panel 16,782 0.20 0.40
1993 panel 16,782 0.18 0.38
Parent log earnings 16,782 10.32 1.06
Father's age in 1982 15,354 35.72 8.85
Whites
Number of Standard
observations Mean deviation
Panel A: NLSY79
Family income (1997-2005) 3,205 76,284 61,316
Child's age in 2001 3,205 39.1 2.2
Education 3,199 13.2 2.3
AFQT 3,080 52.5 27.0
Parent income (1978-80) 3,205 64,354 35,965
Single mother at age 14 3,205 0.08 0.27
Panel B: SIPP-SSA
Son's log earnings 14,757 10.23 1.00
Son's age in 2005 14,757 30.97 5.71
Single parent 14,757 0.17 0.38
1984 panel 14,757 0.25 0.43
1990 panel 14,757 0.23 0.42
1991 panel 14,757 0.15 0.35
1992 panel 14,757 0.20 0.40
1993 panel 14,757 0.18 0.38
Parent log earnings 14,757 10.42 1.00
Father's age in 1982 13,467 36.09 8.75
Blacks
Number of Standard
observations Mean deviation
Panel A: NLSY79
Family income (1997-2005) 2,143 42,289 39,070
Child's age in 2001 2,143 39.2 2.2
Education 2,136 12.4 2.1
AFQT 2,082 21.6 19.8
Parent income (1978-80) 2,143 33,743 26,725
Single mother at age 14 2,143 0.3 0.5
Panel B: SIPP-SSA
Son's log earnings 2,025 9.48 1.32
Son's age in 2005 2,025 30.66 5.55
Single parent 2,025 0.53 0.50
1984 panel 2,025 0.27 0.45
1990 panel 2,025 0.23 0.42
1991 panel 2,025 0.12 0.33
1992 panel 2,025 0.19 0.40
1993 panel 2,025 0.18 0.38
Parent log earnings 2,025 9.63 1.26
Father's age in 1982 1,887 33.11 9.14
Notes: NLSY79 is the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. AFQT is the Armed Forces
Qualification Test. SIPP-SSA matches data from the U.S. Census
Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation to administrative
earnings records from the Social Security Administration.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, and U.S. Social Security
Administration.
TABLE 2
Transition matrices by race using SIPP-SSA sample
Child's income quintile
Parents' income
quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Whites
1 0.263 0.267 0.208 0.159 0.103
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,510
2 0.205 0.239 0.219 0.204 0.133
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
2,815 2,815 2,815 2,815 2,815
3 0.156 0.203 0.236 0.223 0.182
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
2,999 2,999 2,999 2,999 2,999
4 0.147 0.162 0.206 0.234 0.250
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165 3,165
5 0.113 0.136 0.155 0.217 0.380
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
3,268 3,268 3,268 3,268 3,268
Panel B: Blacks
1 0.508 0.207 0.155 0.092 0.038
(0.017) (0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.048)
846 846 846 846 846
2 0.357 0.246 0.203 0.129 0.065
(0.013) (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.041)
541 541 541 541 541
3 0.341 0.212 0.176 0.190 0.081
(0.012) (0.018) (0.021) (0.030) (0.045)
358 358 358 358 358
4 0.272 0.236 0.173 0.178 0.141
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.028) (0.042)
191 191 191 191 191
5 0.213 0.180 0.180 0.191 0.236
(0.007) (0.011) (0.015) (0.026) (0.048)
89 89 89 89 89
Notes: SIPP-SSA matches data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of
Income and Program Participation to administrative earnings records
from the Social Security Administration. Both panels use subsamples
drawn from a sample of 16,782 men from the SIPP-SSA data and a
multiyear average of sons earnings over 2003-07 and parents' earnings
over 1978-86. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Sample
sizes are shown below the standard errors.
Sources: Author's calculations based on data from U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, and U.S. Social Security
Administration.