Constitutional designs and democratization in the Third World.

Kim, Young-Choul ; Lee, Sangmook

INTRODUCTION

Theoretical debates about constitutional designs of new democracies started from Linz's criticism on presidentialism based on his research of the Latin American experience. (1) According to him, presidentialism is a system that structurally produces conflict and instability, thus it becomes a cause of the breakdown of fragile presidential democracies. In contrast, a parliamentary form of government is very flexible, hence is conducive to stable democracy. (2) Since then, debates on constitutional choices have been actively progressed by counter-arguments of scholars preferring a presidential form of government. (3) Their theoretical arguments, however, simply compare constitutional designs and a particular regime's survival. In addition, their concerns are mainly limited to Latin America countries. Thus, it is necessary to extend their disputes into other cases of new democracies.

In fact, a new constitution is the result of a combination of the political actor's rational choice with some constraints on his/her rational choice such as political traditions and political institutions. According to Lijphart, of the twenty-one continuous democracies of the world since World War II, seventeen were pure parliamentary democracies, two were mixed, one was semipresidential, and only one, the United States, was pure presidential. (4) Especially, with the exception of the United States, Fifth Republican France, and Switzerland, the industrial democracies have all been variations on the basic parliamentary theme. (5)

Over ninety countries in the world have become independent since World War II. Some of them have chosen parliamentary systems and others have chosen presidential or mixed systems. Many of the developing countries have been interrupted democracies in spite of their desire. The purpose of this study is to find empirical difference between parliamentary systems and presidential systems for democratization in the developing countries. This research starts with the following questions: Can we detect the difference between parliamentary systems and presidential systems for democracy in the developing countries? If so, which one is more effective? By a quantitative analysis of political outcomes of ninety-three developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, this study tests a hypothesis: parliamentary systems are more effective for democratization than presidential systems in the developing countries. Whether the difference is statistically significant or not, the result of this research will have some utility for understanding the relationship between constitutional frameworks and political outcomes. This study first looks over the theoretical debates on the characteristics of constitutional designs themselves. Then, it empirically compares the political outcomes of the parliamentary systems and presidential systems using a quantitative analysis.

THEORETICAL DEBATES ON CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS

While considering constitutional choices in new democracies, it is important to take into account the criteria used by constitution designers. Those criteria might be representation and effectiveness of a constitutional form. These are essential elements for a good political system. (6) However, these two concepts actually are not easily mixed in a constitutional form. This is because there is basically a conflict between the legislative and the executive branch. Thus, good government depends on how this conflict can be solved well within a certain constitutional framework. Theoretical debates between presidentialism and parliamentary system are ultimately related to executive- legislative relations. (7) In particular, the issue of the role of executive power and its limitation for good government is the core of this debate. This study examines the characteristics (strengths and weakness) of constitutional forms (parliamentary system, presidential system, and alternatives) in terms of executive-legislative relations and limitation of executive power.

Parliamentary Systems

Since J. J. Linz criticized the presidential form of government, parliamentary system has been regarded as the superior form of democratic government. (8) Many empirical studies showed that the parliamentary system is more conducive than the presidential one in divided societies in terms of ethnicity, culture, and region because of its flexible and consensual characteristics. (9) For the impact of different constitutional frameworks on democratic consolidation, Linz argues that while a parliamentary constitution has a positive effect on democratic consolidation, the presidential one has the opposite effect. Stepan and Skach also insist that there is "a much stronger correlation between democratic consolidation and pure parliamentarism than between democratic consolidation and pure presidentialism." (10) In addition, Przeworski et al., from their analysis of 135 countries observed annually between 1950 and 1990, argue, "Parliamentary regimes last longer, much longer, than presidential ones." (11)

According to Stepan and Skach, in pure parliamentary system there are two distinctive characteristics that mutually depend on each other. First, "the chief executive power must be supported by a majority in the legislature and can fall if it receives a vote of no confidence." Secondly, "the executive power has the capacity to dissolve the legislature and call for elections." (12) Indeed, a parliamentary system does not allow for any "separation of powers." The parliament and the cabinet, which is accountable to the elected assembly, hold all of the government power. Because of this simple concentration of power, a parliamentary system can reduce the possibility of deadlock between the executive and the legislative branch in the decision making process. (13)

As advantages of parliamentary government, first, it is flexible to the changes of circumstances. Parliamentary government can make directly policy response to the changes of the external circumstances because of unified power between the cabinet and the parliament. Secondly, in a parliamentary system the lines of responsibility for policy making are clear. Because voters easily know that the failure of government policies are caused by the majority in parliament, the government's accountability is high, and the change of government is swiftly accomplished.

A parliamentary system, on the other hand, possesses some structural problems. First, parliamentary systems can be less stable than presidential systems because of the frequent changes of the cabinet and legislature. According to Sartori, parliamentary regimes that usually lead to many political parties are vulnerable to frequent cabinet crises due to polarized pluralism. (14) Although cabinet crises, as F. W. Riggs argues, do not always result in regime collapse, frequent cabinet change still become a major cause of political instability, especially in new democracies. (15) Moreover, in a parliament composed of a coalition among two or more parties, disagreements on policies or issues among them often delay policy-making and its implementation. Secondly, because the position and power of the prime minister is unstable and relatively weak under parliamentary system, it is difficult to create and implement strong policies and to have powerful leadership to resolve the problems such as dual transitions, which new democracies usually face. Thirdly, parliamentary systems have developed in the countries in which political party systems are well developed. Therefore, without a solid party system, parliamentary systems are not successful without a solid party system. Indeed, parliamentary systems can be an easy tool for seeking goals by political elites in the developing countries where party systems are usually immature.

Presidential Systems

The most famous presidential form of government in the world is the United States. It has been emulated especially in many developing countries, especially in Latin American countries where Linz criticized the problems of presidential democracy. In fact, these developing countries taking presidential systems have experienced unstable constitutional continuity. Recently, former Soviet Union and post communist countries have also followed the presidential system of government, but its results are not yet apparent. (16)

On the other hand, since Linz criticized the problems of presidentialism, many scholars such as Horowitz, Mainwaring and Shugart, and Mettenheim have pointed out the weaknesses of Linz's arguments or explored the strengths of a presidential democracy through examining individual case studies. (17) In particular, Mainwaring and Shugart argue, "The superior record of parliamentary systems has rested partly on where parliamentary governments have been implemented." They claim that some advantages of presidential system partially offset its drawbacks, and that these advantages can be maximized by analyzing various presidential systems. (18)

In pure presidential system, both the legislative power and the chief executive power have a "fixed electoral mandate that is their own source of legitimacy." (19) The president is always the chief executive and is elected by the people. The president has "the right to retain ministers of his or her choosing regardless of the composition of the congress." (20) With these characteristics, a presidential system has some advantages. First, a presidential system gives the voters "two electoral choices" through the direct election of both the chief of executive and the legislature. (21) In particular, the direct election of the president increases the legitimacy of the rule in new democracies that have often experienced nondemocratic practices in presidential elections. In addition, even if presidential systems combine with a multiparty system and the majority in the legislature supports the president, the government effectively can implement policies.

Secondly, because the legislature power has own source of legitimacy, the members of the legislature can act on legislative matters independently. This "congressional independence in legislative matters" can check the excess power of the executive or its "ill-considered legislation," and can maintain the balance of power with the executive. (22) As Horowitz argues, while presidential system can produce "winner-take-all" outcomes that Linz criticizes as one of the weaknesses of a presidential system, the sound legislature also produce "interbranch checks and balances" that is the main desire of the United States' founding fathers. (23) Indeed, under presidential system the strong president power is checked by the legislature. Thus, this system provides both effective government and system's stability through a separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches.

The presidential systems also have some drawbacks. As Linz pointed out in his essays, presidential government has two main structural problems that make it more prone to breakdown. First, the dual democratic legitimacy of presidential system is easy to cause deadlock between the president and parliament. When both branches clash, in particular, "there is no democratic principle to resolve it." (24) Moreover, when presidents' parties are in the minority under the fragmented multiparty systems, legislative deadlock can more easily ensue. (25)

Secondly, the fixed terms of the presidents cause rigidity in the political process. When a president loses his or her leadership, in particular, it is difficult to expect effective governmental functions. This situation encourages the military to intervene in politics to solve the sociopolitical conflicts in the developing countries. Lastly, as Linz argued, the propensity for political stalemate coupled with the concentration of formal powers might cause the probability for nondemocratic regime outcomes in new democracies. The excess concentration of powers of the president might cause authoritarian behavior of the president, and hinder democratic relations with other institutions, especially the legislature. (26)

Mixed Systems (Alternatives)

Alternative constitutional systems include some hybrid forms of government such as "semipresidentialism," "alternating presidentialism," "premier-presidentialism," and "president-parliamentarism" or "presidential parliamentarism." (27) The mixed systems would not only take advantage of either presidential systems or parliamentary systems, but also diminish some weaknesses of each pure type of government. Indeed, the mixed systems are a form of government that combines characteristics of a parliamentary system with the elements of a presidential system, especially a popularly elected presidency. In this system there are both a prime minister as a head of government and popularly elected president who have a secure term in office as a head of state. According to Duverger, this system combines three elements: (1) the president is elected by universal suffrage; (2) the president possesses quite considerable powers; and (3) the prime minister possesses executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to her/him. (28)

According to S. Fabbrini, the mixed systems have some advantages. First, because the prime-ministerial race and the parliamentary race would be bound together politically by pacts of allegiance and would be decided simultaneously, there should arise a clear-cut competition between distinct political options. Secondly, the simultaneous and politically coordinated election of the premier and the parliamentary majority would serve to distinguish between parliamentary and prime-ministerial prerogatives while creating favorable conditions for executive-legislative cooperation in the work of governing. Thirdly, at the institutional level, presidential parliamentarism combines individual accountability of presidential regimes with collective responsibility of parliamentary regimes. (29)

However, these systems also have similar problems as these of other institutional arrangements. It does not provide clear mechanisms for the resolution of conflict between the prime minister popularly elected and opposition assemblies. When the prime minister's party is in the minority in parliament, her/his leadership could be checked by the legislature. That is, it could cause the problem of dual legitimacies under pure presidential system. Moreover, these systems can cause the problem of frequent elections under pure parliamentarism. In these systems, the parliament can break both the prime minister and parliament by no confidence. The prime minister also can dissolve parliament and call new elections in the event of legislative deadlock. Accordingly, the probability of deadlock and political instability might be increased by frequent elections.

CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS IN THE THIRD WORLD

The developing countries in the Third World have adopted own constitutional designs since achieving independence. More than 60 % of them are presidential systems, and the remaining are parliamentary systems. The fact is the Third World is interestingly opposite to the situation of Western democracies that are mainly parliamentary systems with a few exceptions such as the United States of America.

Countries in the Third World with presidential systems include Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Puerto Rico, and South Korea. Indeed, most countries in Latin America as well as much of Africa and Central Asian countries have adopted presidential systems. The widespread use of presidential systems in Latin America, especially, has caused some scholars to call the countries the continent of presidential systems. The presidential systems in Latin America struggled to achieve democracy until 1990s although they achieved at least an electoral democracy recently.

For example, Ecuador is sometimes presented as a case study of democratic failure of presidential systems over the past quarter-century. Presidents have ignored the legislature or bypassed it altogether. One president had the legislature teargased while another was kidnapped by paratroopers until he agreed to certain congressional demands. From 1979 through 1988, Ecuador staggered through a succession of executive-legislative confrontations that created a near permanent crisis atmosphere in the policy.

Colombia has similarly exhibited the problems said to be inherent in presidential system in the last two decades. Presidents have also gone around Congress to legislate and simply to govern. In Brazil, presidents have accomplished their objectives by creating executive agencies over Congress that had no say. Unlike the other parts of Latin America, there are some countries in the Caribbean Sea with parliamentary systems.

Like countries in the Latin America the vast majority of the counties in Africa also have adopted presidential systems. There are a few countries such as South Africa that have powerful presidents who are elected by the legislature. These presidents are chosen in the same way as a prime minister, yet are both heads of state and heads of government. These executives are titled "president," yet are in practice similar to prime ministers. In addition, while many dictators in the Third World, especially in Africa, style themselves "President", this constitutes a dictatorship, not a real presidential system, regardless of the title.

Presidents in presidential systems in the Third World are always active participants in the political process, though the extent of their relative power may be influenced by the political makeup of the legislature and whether their supporters or opponents have the dominant position therein. In some presidential systems such as South Korea, there is an office of the prime minister or premier, but unlike in semi-presidential or parliamentary systems, the premier or prime minister is responsible to the president rather than to the legislature.

On the other hand, relatively fewer numbers of developing countries in the Third World have adopted parliamentary systems. The parliamentary systems in the Third World include Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Burkina Faso, Dominica, Grenada, India, Iraq, Jamaica, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turkey.

Even though the majority of countries in the Third World prefer presidential systems to parliamentary systems, some of the developing countries have changed their constitutional designs for democratization from time to time. Especially, among presidential systems in the Third World, many legislators, including the President of the Philippines, want a constitutional amendment to switch a presidential to parliamentary form of government.

Brazil: Case Study of Presidential Systems

Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, the third most populous new democracy, and the ninth largest economy today. Brazil was colonized by Portugal from 1500 until its independence in 1822. The republican system has been adopted since 1889. In the 1980s, Brazil made a transition from military- authoritarian rule to a democracy, and in the 1990s, it has begun a transition from state-led to a market-oriented economy. (30)

Since the establishment of the republican system in 1889, Brazil has been governed by a presidential system with the brief exception of the period from 1961 to 1963. However, the decision rules of Brazilian politics--how power and authority have been distributed, the limits on state and government authority, and how policy is framed and executed--have changed substantially with each change of regime and constitution. Because of its troubled political history, Brazil has experienced five regime changes and had seven constitutions. The most recent one was ratified in 1988.

In 1930 the first republic (the Old Republic) was proclaimed in a military coup. The leader of military junta, Getulio Vargas, took office soon after and would remain as dictatorial ruler until 1945. He was re-elected in 1951 and stayed in office until his suicide in 1954. The military forces took office again in 1964 and remained in power until 1985. After twenty years of centralized authoritarian rule by military-dominated governments, democracy was re-established in Brazil in 1988. Fernando Collor de Mello was the first president truly elected by popular vote after the military regime.

The President of Brazil is both head of state and head of government and is elected for a four-year term with the possibility of re-election for a second successive term. Currently the President of Brazil is Luiz Incacio Lula da Silva who was elected in 2002 and re-elected in 2006. The president appoints the Ministers of State who assist in governing.

Brazil's mix of presidential system of government and multiparty system creates the problem for the country's system of representation. Given the political fragmentation of the legislature and the weakness of the party system, presidents are unable to maintain majority alliances in congress, a requirement for stability in a multiparty system. In Brazil, the president has never been able to maintain a supraparty alliance in congress. More often, Brazilian presidents have attempted to govern above parties, dispensing favors to key congressional politicians to get legislation approved. Alternatively, presidents have not been shy about railroading reform through congress by using their discretionary authorities. (31)

Brazil is the ninth economy in the world and the largest in Latin America with large and developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing, and service sectors, as well as a large labor pool. The country has been expanding

its presence in international financial and commodities markets, and is regarded today as one of the group of four emerging economies call BRIC. (32) However, it was a long road to reach the position of ninth largest economy in the world.

For more than a few decades, policymakers and ordinary Brazilians have been most worried about the economy. Brazil has been affected by very high inflation, and the typical remedies applied to bring down prices also dampened growth and increased unemployment. The most urgent problem facing policymakers is to complete the reforms of the state administration, pension, and taxation systems, so that Brazil can climb out of recession and resume economic growth.

In sum, Brazil's average growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1971 and 1990 was 2.85 %. According to Freedom House survey, the level of freedom and democracy in Brazil had changed from "Partly Free" between 1972 and 1985 to "Free" between 1985 and 1992. Although Brazil had fallen to "Partly Free" status again between 1993 and 2001, it has been "Free" since 2002. (33) The average number of years presidents of Brazil remain in office is only 3.2 years. Brazil now is governed under the fifth (or perhaps sixth) distinctly different political regime. It also has experienced 7 military coups and over 35 years of military rule since 1889. Therefore, Brazil's political history in the twentieth century was marked by political instability.

A nation vast in population, territory, and resources, it has become in some ways nearly ungovernable. Brazil is by far the most industrialized of the South American countries and has the highest per capita income in the region; but no other major country in the world has an income distribution so unequal, and its politics has been characterized by paradoxes and frustrations. (34) Therefore, as a transitional democracy, Brazil can provide insights into which constitutional systems work better than others. As a negative example, Brazil's ongoing experiment with presidential system and multiparty democracy might well confirm the superiority of alternative parliamentary systems in India.

India: Case Study of Parliamentary Systems

India is the seventh-largest country by geographical area, the second most populous country, and the most populous democracy in the world. India was colonized by the British until its independence in 1947. Since the establishment of the republican system in 1950, India has been governed by a parliamentary system of government. The President of India is the official head of state elected indirectly by an electoral college for a five-year term. The Prime Minister is, however, the de facto head of government and exercises most executive powers. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, with the requirement that they enjoy the support of the party or coalition securing the majority of seats in the lower house of Parliament. In the Indian parliamentary system, the executive is subordinate to the legislature, with the Prime Minister and his Council being directly responsible to the lower house of the parliament. (35)

For most of its democratic history, India has been led by the Indian National Congress (INC). From 1950 to 1990, the INC enjoyed a parliamentary majority barring two brief periods. The INC was out of power between 1977 and 1980 when the Janata Party won the election owing to public discontent with the "Emergency" declared by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In 1989, a Janata Dal led National Front Coalition in alliance with the Left Front Coalition won the elections but managed to stay in power for only two years.

The years 1996-1998 were a period of turmoil in India with several short-lived alliances holding sway. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed a government briefly in 1996, followed by the United Front Coalition. In 1998, the BJP formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) with several regional parties and became the first non-Congress government to complete a full five- year term. In the 2004 Indian elections, the INC won the largest number of the lower house seats and formed a government with a coalition called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), supported by various left-leaning parties and members opposed to the BJP. The current Prime Minister is Manmohan Singh who is considered one of the most qualified and influential figures in India's recent history because of the economic reforms he had initiated in 1991 when he was Finance Minister under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. (36)

India at the time of independence was largely a poor, agricultural economy. For most of its post-independent history, India adhered to a quasi- socialist approach with strict government control over private sector participation, foreign trade, and foreign direct investment. However, since the introduction of economic liberalization policies under Rao's administration in 1991, India has gradually opened up its markets through economic reforms and reduced government controls on foreign trade and investment. (37) Although it still has a very large agricultural sector and considerable poverty continues, the Indian economy has grown steadily over the last two decades. With Brazil, Russia, and China, India is one of four emerging economies today call BRIC. Its growth, however, has been uneven when comparing different social groups, economic groups, geographic regions, and rural and urban areas. Despite significant economic progress, it currently battles high levels of poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and environmental degradation.

In sum, India's average growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1971 and 1990 was 2.30 %. According to Freedom House surveys, the level of freedom and democracy in India has always been "Free" status since 1972 with the brief exceptions of the period from 1975 to 1976 and from 1977 to 1990. (38) The average number of years prime ministers of India remain in office is 4 years. Since the establishment of the republican system in 1950, India with a parliamentary system of government has never experienced a regime change or military intervention in politics unlike other developing countries as Brazil. Although three prime ministers were assassinated or died in office, most of its history was politically stable and democratic. (39)

Since the constitutional adoption in 1950, the basic character of India's political system has remained unchanged although there have been many profound changes in the distribution and the use of power. Moreover, for much of this period, India has been stable, democratic country with universal suffrage and periodic elections at all levels--local, provincial, and national. This continuity and democratic stability are remarkable among developing countries.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The analysis of democratic stability and democratization between parliamentary systems and presidential systems is based on a systematic comparison of countries. Several scholars provide evidence for the greater or lesser likelihood of stability and breakdown in both types.

Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart (40) list twenty-four countries with thirty years of uninterrupted democracy between 1959 and 1980. Of those twenty-four countries, eighteen have parliamentary regimes, three are presidential, two are semipresidential, and one has a unique form of government. Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach focus on the eighty-six countries that became independent between 1945 and 1979. Among them fifteen were democratic for ten consecutive years. Stepanand Skach (41) also count thirty-two countries that were parliamentary the first year of independence, of which fifteen were continuous democracies between 1980 and 1989.

Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey (42) take a different approach by listing forty-eight countries that had by 1990 held at least two democratic elections without breakdown. Among them they list twenty-seven pure parliamentary democracies, twelve president-parliamentary, and nine other types (e.g., five premier-presidential, two president-parliamentary, and two assembly independent, using their typology of regimes). If these twenty-three developing countries were classified, nine are parliamentary, eleven presidential, and three other types.

Shugart and Carey's question of a relationship between regime type and democratic stability is based on an analysis of the breakdowns of democratic regimes in the twentieth century. They list a total of 40 cases of breakdown--some countries experiencing more than one--twenty-two of parliamentary systems, twelve of presidential systems, and six of other types (one premier-presidential [Austria] and five presidential-parliamentary). They conclude that the type of regime makes little difference, or even those parliamentary regimes are more vulnerable than pure presidential ones.

The purpose of this research is to find empirical difference between parliamentary system and presidential system on the democratization in the developing countries. Thus, the general hypothesis of this study is:

Ho: Parliamentary systems are more effective on the political stability in the developing countries than presidential systems.

Independent Variable: Constitutional Designs

The independent variable of this study is two different types of constitutional designs such as parliamentary systems and presidential systems. This study dichotomizes constitutional frameworks to parliamentary and presidential systems because mixed systems as semi-presidential systems can be categorized to presidential systems. Classification of constitutional designs in this paper is based on previous researchers such as Linz (1978), Shugart and Carey (1982), Lijpart (1984), and Vanhanen (1997). According to Shugart and Carey there are two defining criteria (43); (1) the government's survival is more dependent on the president or parliaments and (2) the presidents or the parliament is the principal authority over the government. The two criteria are measured as a continuum ranging from 'maximum' to 'none." According to the criteria, among ninety-three developing countries in the World thirty-six countries are parliamentary systems, and fifty-seven countries are presidential systems.

Dependent Variables: Political Stability, Economic Development, and Democratization

The concept of democratization as a dependent variable of this study is hard to be measured in quantitative methods. This is because democratization is a complex historical process that consists of several analytically distinct but empirically overlapping stages. (44) Explicitly, it involves bringing about the end of the nondemocratic regime, the inauguration of the democratic regimes, and then the consolidation of the democratic system. Moreover, it is hard to distinguish between the democratic transition and consolidation period. Thus, many scholars have tried to find good indices of democratization.

Nevertheless, these indices are highly exploratory and tentative in nature. As a consequence, the choices of indices of democratic consolidation depend on scholars' preferences. Therefore, this study chooses three indicates of democratization such as political stability, economic development and democratization index itself. Among many indices for these three indicates, this study uses six operationalized measurements of each country: 1) the average number of years chief executive officers remain in office; 2) the total number of coups d'etat; 3) the mean annual GDP growth rate; 4) the freedom index of political rights by Freedom House; 5) the freedom index of civil liberties by Freedom House, and 6) the index of democratization by Vanhanen.

Political stability is an essence of democratization. (45) Without political stability, it is difficult for developing countries to achieve democratization. In the democratic transition and consolidation process, developing countries entail the explosion of various demands from civil society. The destiny of the developing countries depends on their capability to mediate or control theses socioeconomic conflicts. Thus, the maintenance of political stability for developing countries is one of the urgent tasks. As a measurement of political stability this study uses two variables--the average number of years a chief executive officer remains in office and the total number of coups d'etat. This study collects data from 93 developing countries in the Third World: 47 African; 22 Asian; and 24 Latin American countries. Data for the two variables are calculated from Current World Leaders Almanac. The time period for these data covers between the independent year of each country and 1998. In order to improve confidence of the data, this study does cross check by various Internet resources.

Economic development is an important factor for democratization. According to modernization theory, economic development is strongly related to democratization. It is obvious that economic development is another necessity of democratization in the developing countries. This study uses the average GDP growth rate between 1971 and 1990 period. For the data of the variable it uses World Leaders Almanac and World Tables published by World Bank.

This study also uses a couple of democracy indexes. One is the recent democracy index calculated by the Freedom House. Since its inception in the 1970s, Freedom House's Freedom in the World Survey has provided an annual evaluation of political rights and civil liberties throughout the world. The Survey attempts to judge all countries and territories by a single standard and to emphasize the importance of democracy and freedom. At a minimum, a democracy is a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not designated by the government. According to the Freedom House, political rights means that people are able to participate freely in the political process, which is the system by which the polity chooses authoritative policy makers and attempts to make binding decisions affecting the national, regional, or local community. In a free society, this represents the rights of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies. Civil liberties include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and personal autonomy apart from the state. (46)

Freedom House uses twenty-three checklists to rate the level of democracy across nations. The freedom of political rights is measured by 10 checklists, and the freedom of civil liberties is depicted in 13 checklists. Using a 7-point scale, the political rights and civil liberties dimensions are each coded from 7 to 1 point. A one to seven scale in each dimension represents the highest and the lowest degree of democracy, respectively.

In order to improve confidence of the data for the index of democracy, this study also uses another index of democratization in 1980 constructed by Tatu Vanhanen. (47) He creates the political Index of Democratization (ID) based on (1) the total percentage of the vote received by all parties except the largest vote getter and (2) the total percentage of the population that voted. According to the Index of Democratization (ID), the higher ID score represents the higher level of democratization in the country.

Based on the operationalization process of independent and dependent variables above, this study proposes six operational hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (political stability): Parliamentary systems are more effective for political stability in the developing countries than presidential systems.

Hypothesis 2 (military intervention in politics): Parliamentary systems are more effective for preventing military coups d 'etat in the developing countries than presidential systems.

Hypothesis 3 (economic development): Parliamentary systems are more effective for economic development in the developing countries than presidential systems.

Hypothesis 4 (political rights)." Parliamentary systems are more effective for freedom of political rights than presidential systems.

Hypothesis 5 (civil liberties): Parliamentary systems are more effective for freedom of civil liberties than presidential systems.

Hypothesis 6 (democratization): Parliamentary systems are more effective for democratization in the developing countries than presidential systems.

ANALYSES AND FINDINGS

To test these hypotheses, this study analyzes the means of each group and uses two independent sample t-tests. Table 1 shows the means of each variable by constitutional designs and the results of a series of t-tests.

Political Stability

In the average years of chief executive officers, parliamentary systems (5.40 years) are shorter than presidential systems (8.39 years). In the average number of military coups d'etat, parliamentary systems (1.50 times) are slightly higher than presidential systems (1.35 times). The means of those variables show totally opposite direction of our original hypotheses.

According to the results oft-tests for equality of the means of the two variables, the variable of the average years of chief executive officers is a significant variable. On the other hand, the variable of the average number of military coups d'etat is not significant. Therefore, the results show that presidential systems cause longer average years of chief executive officers in the developing countries than parliamentary systems.

As an indication of political stability, the average years of chief executive officers seem to be relevant in developed countries in Western Europe. It, however, may not be very relevant in the developing countries because developing countries have frequently experienced authoritarian governments or military governments before democratic transition period.

Thus, chief executive officers in nondemocracies and authoritarian governments have relatively enjoyed longer terms than those in democratic governments.

Economic Development

In the average GDP growth rate in 1971 through 1990, parliamentary systems (4.75%) are higher than presidential systems (3.24%). The means of those variables show the same direction of our original hypotheses. That is, parliamentary systems have been more effective on the economic growth than presidential systems.

According to the results oft-tests, the variable of economic growth is a significant variable. Therefore, the results show that parliamentary systems have been more effective furthering economic development in the developing countries than presidential systems.

Democratization

In the freedom of political rights and civil liberties, parliamentary systems (3.14 and 3.47) are lower than presidential systems (4.09 and 4.05). Furthermore, in the index o f democratization, parliamentary systems (9.66) are very higher than presidential systems (2.58). Thus, in those three variables, the means show the same direction of our original hypotheses.

According to the results of t-tests for those three variables, all variables are significant variables. That is, parliamentary systems have been more successful achieving democratization in the developing countries.

Table 2 shows the means of each variable by constitutional designs and regions, and the results of a series oft-tests. In the average years of chief executive officers, there is a statistically significant difference by constitutional designs only in African countries. In the Asian and Latin American countries, this study fails to reject the null hypothesis. One of the interesting findings about the variable is about Latin American countries. Unlike other regions, the mean of parliamentary systems in Latin American countries (5.57 years) is slightly higher than presidential systems (4.26 years). In the number of military coups d'etat, this study also fails to reject the null hypothesis in all regions. Furthermore, even though the mean of parliamentary systems in African countries (2.13 times) is higher than presidential systems (0.97 times), the means of parliamentary systems in the other regions (1.14 and 1.00 times) are lower than presidential systems (1.38 and 1.94 times). In the average GDP growth rate, this study also fails to reject the null hypothesis in all regions. Unlike other regions, the mean of parliamentary systems in Asian countries (1.95%) is slightly lower than presidential systems (3.01%). And, in the freedom of political rights, there is a statistically significant difference by constitutional designs only in Latin American countries. This study fails to reject the null hypothesis in African and Asian.

Another interesting finding is about the variable of the freedom of civil liberties. The null hypothesis can be rejected in the African and Latin American countries. Furthermore, unlike other regions, the mean of parliamentary systems in Asian countries (4.14) is slightly higher than presidential systems (3.50). In the democratization index, there is a statistically significant difference by constitutional designs only in African countries. This study fails to reject the null hypothesis in Asian and Latin American counties. In sum, from the Table 1 and 2 this study finds that the effectiveness of each constitutional design for democratization differs in terms of different variables as well as regions.

CONCLUSIONS

Since the World War II more than ninety countries in the World have achieved independence and adopted democratic constitutional designs. Over 6 % of them have chosen presidential or mixed systems, and the other 40 % have chosen parliamentary systems. Furthermore, some of the developing countries have changed their constitutional designs for democratization from time to time. Regardless of their types of constitutional designs all of the developing countries commonly eager to a stable democracy as well as economic growth. Yet, many of them have been interrupted democracies for various reasons.

Which type of constitutional design is more effective for democracy? Recent debate about constitutional designs and democratization in the developing countries in the Third World has made political institutions matter. Although there have been contradictions about the effect of constitutional designs in the Third World countries, there is no clear answer because each constitutional system has own strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, it is hard to argue that political outcomes depend singularly on the choice of constitutional designs.

According to a quantitative analysis of ninety-three developing countries in the Third World, it is hard to conclude that any one type of constitutional design has better performed for democratization than the others do. This empirical study shows that the difference between the performances of two types of constitutional designs for democracy differs by the different variables and especially regions. The results of our research suggest that the significance of constitutional designs for democratization is less obvious than some scholars have suggested. As a political institution constitutional designs seem to be an outcome of political process rather than a causal factor of democratization.

NOTES

(1.) J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 74.

(2.) J.J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy 1:1 (Winter, 1990).

(3.) S. Mainwaring and M. Shugart, (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); K. Mettenheim (ed.), Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and national Contexts (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); G.M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," Worm Politics 49.'2 (January 1997).

(4.) A. Lijphart, Democracies." Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 1.

(5.) L. Mayer and J.H. Burnett, Politics in Industrial Societies: A Comparative Perspective (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977).

(6.) R.K. Weaver and B. A. Rockman analyze political institutions in terms of governmental effectiveness in their book, Do Institutions Matter? (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993); S. Fabbrini. "Presidents, Parliaments, and Good Government, "Journal of Democracy 6:3 (July 1995).

(7.) A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries, p. 70.

(8.) J. Linz, "The Virtues of Parliamentarism," Journal of Democracy 1:4 (Fall 1990); S. Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political Studies 26:2 (July 1993); A. Stepan and C. Skach (1993), "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46:1 (October 1993); A. Valenzuela, "Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis," Journal of Democracy 4:4 (October, 1993); J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (1994), The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 74.; A. Lijphart, "Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering," European Journal of Political Research 25 (1994).

(9.) A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); A Lijphart, "Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1 : 1 (1989), pp. 33-48; A. Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czech-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland: 1989-1991," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4:2 (1992), pp. 207-223; A. Lijphart, "Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering," European Journal of Political Research 25 (1994), p. 2.

(10.) A. Stepan and C. Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," p. 5.

(11.) A. Przeworski et al., "What makes Democracies endure?" Journal of Democracy 7:1 (January 1996), p. 47.

(12.) A. Stepan and C. Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," p. 3.

(13.) W.P. Shively, Power and Choice (New York: The McGraw-Hill, 1997), p. 247.

(14.) G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 131.

(15.) F.W. Riggs, "Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism: Implications for Representativeness and Legitimacy," International Political Science Review 18:3 (1997), p. 258.

(16.) According to G.M. Easter, countries taking presidential systems in this area are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. See G.M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," p. 190.

(17.) K.V. Mettenheim (ed.), Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics." Comparing Regional and national Contexts.

(18.) S. Mainwaring and M.S. Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, p. 449.

(19.) A. Stepan and C. Skach (1993), "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," p. 4.

(20.) S. Mainwaring and M.S. Shugart, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, p. 449.

(21.) Ibid., p. 460.

(22.) Ibid., p. 463.

(23.) D.L. Horowitz, "Comparing Democracies Institutions," Journal of Democracy 1:4 (fall 1990), p. 75.

(24.) J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Makes a Difference?" in J. Linz and A, Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, p. 7.

(25.) S. Mainwaring, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.

(26.) J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy, pp. 54-55.

(27.) M. Duverger, "A New Political-System Model: Semipresidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8 (1980); M.S. Shugart and J.M. Carey, Presidents and Assembles." Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); G. Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structure, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York University Press, 1994); S. Fabbrini, "Presidents, Parliaments, and Good Government;" R. Y. Hazen, "Presidential Parliamentarism: Direct Popular Election of the Prime Minister, Israel's New Electoral and Political System," Electoral Studies 15:1 (1996).

(28.) M. Duverger, "A New Political-System Model: Semipresidential Government," p. 166.

(29.) Ibid., p. 135.

(30.) G. Almond et al., Comparative Politics Today (New York: Addition Wesley Longman, 2000), p. 515.

(31.) M. Kesselman et al., Introduction to Comparative Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), p. 358.

(32.) BRIC or BRICs are terms used to refer to the combination of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. See J. O'Neill, "2003 Dreaming with BRICSs," Goldman Sachs Thesis (New York: Goldman Sachs, 2003). The paper deals with rapidly developing economies in the four countries.

(33.) A rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. These ratings determine whether a country is classified as Free, Partly Free or Not Free by the survey. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2007. Retrieved September 18, 2007, from http://www.freedomhouse.org.

(34.) M. Sodaro, Comparative Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), p. 733.

(35.) G. Almond, Comparative Politics Today, pp. 649-654.

(36.) Ibid., p. 629.

(37.) M. Kesselman et al. Introduction to Comparative Politics, p. 256.

(38.) Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972-2007.

(39.) M. Kesselman et al. Introduction to Comparative Politics, p. 265.

(40.) S. Mainwaring and M. Shugart, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy," in Politics, Society, and Democracy." Latin America. Essays in Honor of Juan J. Linz (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).

(41.) A. Stepan and C. Skach, "Meta-Institutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation," (1992).

(42.) M. Shugart and J. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies." Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 40-41.

(43.) Ibid., p. 26.

(44.) G. O' Donnell and P. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

(45.) A. Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

(46.) Freedom House, Freedom in the World." The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 1998-1999 (New York: Freedom House, 1999), p 546; A. Karatnycky, A. Motyl, and C. Graybow, Nations in Transit 1998 (Freedom House, 1999).

(47.) T. Valdaanen, Prospects of Democracy: a study of 172 countries (New York: Routledge, 1997). According to Tatu Vanhanen's index of democratization, the United Kingdom is 31.4, the United States is 18.7, and China is 0.

By Young-Choul Kim and Sangmook Lee *

* Young-Choul Kim is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Evansville, 1800 Lincoln Avenue, Evansville, IN 47722; and Sangmook Lee is a Research Fellow, Korean Research Institute for Local Administration, 1552-13 Seocho-dong, Seeho-gu, Seoul Korea

Table 1--T-Test by Constitutional Designs

                         Parliamentary              Presidential

Dependent Variables   N     Mean     Std. Dev.   N    Mean   Std. Dev.

Average Years of a    36   5.40(a)     3.42      57   8.39     5.16
Chief Executive **

Number of Coups       36   1.50(b)     1.83      57   1.35     1.36
d'etat

Average GDP Growth    21   4.75(c)     2.97      37   3.24     1.91
Rate **

Political Rights **   36    3.14       2.02      57   4.09     2.00

Civil Liberties *     36    3.47       1.63      57   4.05     1.39

Democratization       35    9.66       9.33      54   2.58     4.92
Index **

(a) years; (b) times; (c)

* P < .05; ** P < .01

Table 2. T-test by Constitutional Designs and

                                Africa (47)

Dependent Variables       Parliament     President

Average Years of a        5.99(15) *     10.94(32)
Chief Executive (a)

Number of Coups d'etat    2.13(15)       0.97(32)
(b)

Average GDP Growth        5.34(9)        2.95(16)
Rate (c)

Political Rights          3.67(15)       4.84(32)

Civil Liberties           3.60(15) *     4.63(32)

Democratization Index     8.67(15) *     0.91(30)

                                 Asia (22)

Dependent Variables       Parliament     President

Average Years of a                       7.14(8)
Chief Executive (a)

Number of Coups d'etat    1.14(14)       1.38(8)
(b)

Average GDP Growth        5.48(8)        5.34(4)
Rate (c)

Political Rights          3.50(14)       4.00(8)

Civil Liberties           4.14(14)       3.50(8)

Democratization Index     9.43(14)       3.39(7)

                           Latin America (24)

Dependent Variables       Parliament     President

Average Years of a        5.57(6)        4.26(18)
Chief Executive (a)

Number of Coups d'etat    1.00(6)        1.94(18)
(b)

Average GDP Growth        1.95(4)        3.01(17)
Rate (c)

Political Rights          1.33(6) *      2.61(18)

Civil Liberties           2.00(6) *      3.11(18)

Democratization Index     11.36(5)       5.97(18)

(a) years; (b) times; (c)

* P < .05; ** P < .01