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  • 标题:Public funds versus private endeavors: catalogs and conflict in Alaska.
  • 作者:Roberts, Wayne A., Jr.
  • 期刊名称:Journal of the International Academy for Case Studies
  • 印刷版ISSN:1078-4950
  • 出版年度:2010
  • 期号:July
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:The DreamCatchers Group, LLC
  • 关键词:Catalogs;Mail order business;Mail-order industry;Marketing management;Nonprofit organizations;Public administration

Public funds versus private endeavors: catalogs and conflict in Alaska.


Roberts, Wayne A., Jr.


INTRODUCTION

The Rural Alaska Community Action Program, or RurAL CAP, is a leading nonprofit organization in Alaska whose mission is "to protect and improve the quality of life for rural Alaskans through education, training, direct services, advocacy and strengthening rural people's ability to advocate for themselves." RurAL CAP began in 1965 as a consequence of the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act. In pursuing its mission it has started or otherwise managed well over a dozen statewide programs, including Head Start, weatherization assistance programs, information services, programs related to alcohol abuse, AmeriCorps, and a program to provide legal assistance to villages. By 1995 RurAL CAP's annual budget exceeded $8 million, and it had over 200 employees.

As a nonprofit social agency the majority of RurAL CAP's funds come from federal and state grants. However, RurAL CAP does obtain some funds from Rural Electric Enterprises (REE), a profitable wholly-owned subsidiary formed in 1987. REE grew out of an effort to import and sell cost saving, efficient, affordable heating sources to rural native Alaskans through rural product dealerships. The initial feasibility analysis was funded by a grant from the Department of Energy, and was initially supported by Community Service Block Grant funds. REE is a profitable operation that wholesales various energy saving products, including Toyostoves, to more than 60 dealers in the United States and Canada.

THE AURORA CATALOG EXPERIENCE-PLANNING

In February 1992 the Board of Directors of RurAL CAP gave the go-ahead to the staff to begin examining the feasibility of producing a catalog that would feature products made by rural, native Alaskans. As subsequently stated, the following were the goals/mission of the project:

1. Develop income opportunities for Alaska natives that promote increased self-sufficiency;

2. Develop wider markets for Alaska native arts, crafts and products;

3. Create value for the subsistence way of life and distinct Alaska native cultures by providing accurate education and information about rural Alaska; and

4. To supply RurAL CAP with an unrestricted source of funds to help support other programs and activities.

The executive director, accompanied by several board members, traveled to nine villages to discuss the project and to buy representative sample products. At this point it was made clear that artisans would be paid what they asked for their products--there would be no haggling or negotiations. Further, they were informed that goods would be purchased when it was convenient for the artists and producers. Rural residents showed overwhelming support for the project.

Throughout 1992 staff members began to become acquainted with the catalog industry. Based on discussions with representatives from other catalogs, such as the catalog operations of the World Wildlife Fund and Robert Redford's Sundance catalog, RurAL CAP decided to hire an experienced, highly recommended catalog consulting firm from San Francisco to help in the analysis and planning of a catalog.

The decision was made to forego undertaking an in-depth feasibility study. Rather, based on the success of catalogs such as The Hemmeter Collection, Faith Mountain, and Sundance, it was decided to proceed directly to a test market. The strategy was to develop a high quality, distinctive catalog that would appeal to the socially conscious consumer.

Expected costs associated with the first year's mailings in 1993 were much higher than expected revenues: catalog design costs, consulting fees, and other start-up costs associated with this research and development effort were understandable. A consultant's feasibility study estimated that, based on industry experience, it would take 2 or 3 years before the catalog achieved profitability. In the business plan developed by another consultant, published in January of 1993, profitability was predicted in 1994.

In pursuing its strategy RurAL CAP relied on knowledgeable consultants for overall planning, product selection, catalog copy, mailing list evaluation and choice, promotion planning and execution, and in projecting results. Fulfillment operations (order taking, billing, packing and shipping, and information tracking) were to be contracted out to other organizations, as is common in catalog operations. RurAL CAP was responsible for the procurement of product and overall approval of various aspects of the project. It was the intention of RurAL CAP to bring responsibilities in-house, over time, as their expertise improved.

The intention of RurAL CAP was to have three mailings of a 24 page catalog during 1993; once on August 1, a second in late September, and a third in November, which would include four pages of Christmas items. Advertisements in publications touting the catalog and specific products were planned. The merchandise mix was to include some native and some non-native products in several categories, including jewelry, native dress, candles, food, artwork and other sundry items. In addition, short articles about Alaska and Alaska natives were to be included. If the results were encouraging, the intention was to expand the catalog operation to four mailings in 1994. A continued reliance on consultants in 1994 again was expected to result in high costs.

Internally one employee, the Economic Development Manager, spent the majority of her time on the catalog project. Other employees contributed according to their areas of expertise as time allowed. Some of this was quite extensive. After the first year's mailings a marketing specialist who had retail experience, as well as experience as an assistant buyer for Nordstroms, was hired to assist in the procurement and management of inventory. Shortly afterwards the Economic Development Manager had to leave Alaska because of a job offer for her husband, and the marketing specialist was thrust into that slot. Another woman was hired to assist her, and the two of them devoted all their energies to the project. One interesting practice was a weekly, one hour catalog project meeting that involved various RurAL CAP program managers and talented professionals, including the internal CPA and the Executive Director. The purpose was to brainstorm and to discuss problems and issues.

THE FUNDING CONTROVERSY

Initially the funds for planning the catalog operation, including travel, personnel time, sample acquisition, and consulting fees, were obtained by borrowing funds from child care, alcohol and abuse programs, and from the planning and research component of a Community Services Block Grant. The intention, of course, was that funds borrowed from programs would be returned.

In December of 1992 RurAL CAP requested an amendment of $190,000 to its current year Federal Community Services Block Grant (CSBG), administered through the State of Alaska's Department of Community and Regional Affairs (DCRA), to fund the catalog project. The request was denied, however, on the grounds that the proposed catalog was controversial and had not gone through the required application process and had not been part of the required public hearing.

The controversy regarding the project was largely the result of the president and founder, as well as the investors, of The Great Alaska Catalog. As a privately funded firm, The Great Alaska Catalog had been struggling for several years to build up its business to where it would be a viable, ongoing concern. The business required a lot of hard work, a lot of risk taking, and a lot of uncertainty. To find that a new competing operation was now in the arena was bad enough, but to find one that was run on lots of public grant money that did not have to be repaid was galling. How could a private firm, accountable to shareholders and lenders, compete against an organization that did not have to turn a profit, and could easily hire high-paid consultants and others?

The market for Alaskan products was not perceived to be overly large or expandable, and so the two catalog operations were perceived to be in direct competition for a fixed number of customers. Both were targeting the same customers with the same product mix through the same channels.

Not only were the two organizations competing for the same customers, they were also competing for supplies. Both featured a variety of native and non-native Alaskan goods. Supplies, particularly native products, were limited--there were only so many talented artists producing so many sellable products. The Great Alaska Catalog people argued that RurAL CAP's efforts, particularly RurAL CAP's policy of accepting whatever prices the natives wanted, were affecting their ability to obtain products from the small number of sellable artists. A museum buyer found that none of RurAL CAP's artists were unknown and without a current market for their products.

The Great Alaska Catalog people argued that RurAL CAP, to the extent they should be allowed to compete at all, should be restricted to promoting and selling rurally produced products from unknown artists in the bush.

An official complaint against the Department of Community and Regional Affairs was filed by the president of The Great Alaska Catalog with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 12, 1993, prior to the first mailing, contending that:

"(1) The catalog has not been supported by an adequate departmental review for compliance with federal requirements that funded activities must have a measurable and potentially major impact on the causes of poverty in the community or those areas of the community where poverty is a particularly acute problem.

(2) DCRA's approval of federal funds for this project is in conflict with Alaska's stated encouragement of private enterprise and the development of small businesses to provide needed goods and services whenever possible."

RurAL CAP and its supporters felt RurAL CAP had the right to help develop markets for their constituents, had a mission that went beyond making a profit (although they certainly intended to do that), and were entitled to the funds. They also argued that using non-native products and well-known native artists was a legitimate way to build a successful catalog operation. RurAL CAP also contended that they were, in fact, selling little-known artists, and further, that other talented, enthusiastic natives were gearing up.

In early to mid-1993 the Department of Community and Regional Affairs brought together both groups to try to come to a reasonable compromise. At that less-than-cordial meeting RurAL CAP's planning manager rejected any joint undertaking, since, to paraphrase her, far too much money had already been invested in their current operations.

Both sides lined up supporters and argued their points. No less than 3 State Representatives and 1 State Senator actively supported the stance of The Great Alaska Catalog. RurAL CAP had support from at least 1 State Senator and various native organizations and native leaders. A petition was circulated during native community and village functions, and garnered well over 200 signatures in support of RurAL CAP's Aurora Catalog project. Legislative hearings on the issue were held in November 1994.

The Department of Community and Regional Affairs was, of course, very concerned about this. Early in 1993 the Commissioner sought advice from the Alaska State Attorney General's office. In March, 1994, approximately 1 year later, the Attorney General's office simply responded that there was no legal prohibition against using CSBG money to fund a for-profit venture. This clearly wasn't enough to decide one way or the other whether to continue funding this project.

While the controversy raged, DCRA did provide almost $600,000 to RurAL CAP for the project during 1993 and 1994. The pressure to suspend future financing was intense, but so was the pressure to continue the financing.

It was finally decided to see whether the project could be self-sustaining, or whether it would always have to be subsidized with public and grant money. No one in the Department was excited about continually funding a losing proposition that did, indeed, compete against private sector operations. Therefore, a consultant was hired to see if the project warranted the investment of money from a private sector perspective. In other words, would private investors invest in a project characterized by the risk and returns that had been experienced so far?

THE AURORA CATALOG--THE MARKETPLACE EXPERIENCE

RurAL CAP developed a beautiful catalog. In fact, it won an award at the Direct Marketing Association conference as the best new catalog of the year. There was no question it was beautiful, and that it portrayed Alaska and Alaska natives in a favorable light.

At least partially because of funding difficulties there were two, rather than three, mailings of a 24 page catalog in 1993; one in mid-September and another in early November. The catalog and select products were advertised in consumer magazines, and the catalog and seven products were highlighted in an insert that accompanied mileage statements for 168,000 Alaska Airlines' frequent flier customers

During 1994 print advertising and similar activities were not undertaken. Instead, RurAL CAP opted for investing in more catalogs. Again, there were only two mailings. Table 1 provides income statements for 1993 and 1994, along with circulation numbers, the number of orders, and the average order size for the two years.

Table 2 provides information regarding the sales/book (as the sales/catalog is referred to in the industry), response rates, and average order sizes for 1993 and 1994 for various types of customer lists.

In order to appreciate these results it is necessary to understand industry terms and the way in which a catalog operation builds a profitable operation. Building a profitable catalog business is contingent upon building a sizable House Buyer File. The House Buyer File consists of customers who have purchased a catalog's products. These are people or organizations that have clearly demonstrated an interest in a catalog's products. Customers in this file buy more frequently than average, and usually spend more. A more general list is referred to as the House File, which generally includes the names of people who have contacted the catalog company for one reason or another, and may include as past purchasers (here past purchasers are reflected only in the House Buyers File). In Table 2 the House File contains the names of people who contacted RurAL CAP in 1993 and were mailed a catalog in 1994. House Files are built through advertising the catalog, advertising select products

from the catalog, and by sending catalogs or other promotional materials to lists owned by others (referred to as outside runs or outside tests).

Typically catalog operations 'rent' lists of people from other catalogs, magazines, and other sources. Results from rented lists are listed in Table 2 as Outside Tests and Outside Runs. The cost/rented name for the Aurora catalog operation was $.14/name. Rented names normally can be used once/contract. If the recipient does not respond to the mailing, the name is lost. However, if a recipient contacts the organization that rented the name for any reason, that name and address is added to the House File, and the organization can use it as it pleases. It can even rent that name to others for their use. Catalog operations will rent a relatively large number of small lists when searching for lucrative lists. They may, for example, rent 20 different lists of 5000 names (e.g., 5000 names from Good Housekeeping, 5000 names from Outside Magazine). When the catalog operation, through these outside tests, which essentially is a type of reconnaissance prospecting, finds a list where the response rate and sales/book is high, they will commit to renting much larger lists of names, and the names associated with these lists are termed outside runs. Costs associated with outside runs are similar to prospecting and development costs: the primary purpose is to locate customers who can be added to the House Buyers File or the House File. Usually the costs of finding customers through the use of rented mailing lists are expected to exceed the net revenue from initial purchases. Therefore losses in the initial years of a catalog are expected.

In Table 2 there are two other lists: Catalog Requests consist of the results from sending the catalog to those who have asked for one during the current year's operation, and Multi-Buyers, which consists of the names of those that have purchased more than once. Finally, note that the lists are all mutually exclusive: if a person's name is added to the Multi-Buyer list, for example, it is deleted from the House Buyers list. No name appears on more than one list.

The results from the Aurora Catalog were discouraging. While much of what the RurAL CAP consultants predicted would happen in 1993 did occur, at least with regard to market reaction, and much of it was better than expected, the 1994 results were very disappointing. In looking for explanations, a number of problems and potential causes were cited, including the following:

1. Poor performance by the fulfillment houses. Because of complaints and a lack of confidence in the fulfillment house used in the first year, a different organization was used the second year. But several people, including the RurAL CAP consultants, felt that information capture, and performance, of the second fulfillment house was suspect. One RurAL CAP consultant said she heard that 24 out of 200 orders were not entered, recorded, or fulfilled by the second organization. As a result, plans were made to bring fulfillment operations in-house, even though this was expected to drive up costs considerably.

2. Suspension of advertising and promotion for the catalog during 1994. RurAL CAP decided they wanted to put all money into catalogs and mailings, rather than spend any money on promoting the catalog through advertisements, or promotions such as what was done with Alaska Airlines.

On hindsight, it was felt that those activities could have been important.

3. Not all catalogs were delivered by the U.S. Post Office. There were no efforts to control for this possibility, such as sending catalogs to employees.

4. Prices were high. The margins were too narrow, some thought, to support a catalog operation.

While not a reason for the poor performance, clearly RurAL CAP employees, particularly the Executive Director, were discouraged and frustrated by the intense and continuing effort that had to be devoted to obtaining and justifying funds. It distracted her and the other employees from focusing on doing a good job.

The Department of Community and Regional Affairs consultant decided to project the income statement out to 1997 based on different combinations of factors from the 1993 and 1994 experience. In all cases the results indicated that the cash flows would be large and negative. Table 3 contains some representative pro forma income statements.

Another tack was to compute the break-even point for this operation based on the 1994 experience. Table 4 provides some of what was computed based on a detailed analysis of RurAL CAP figures (some numbers are not directly derivable from Table 1). The analysis is incomplete, though, in that it does not take into account printing and mailing costs. The average printing and mailing cost per name in the House File (those people who either had purchased from RurAL CAP before, or requested a catalog) was $.38. The average cost/name on rented lists was $.14 higher, or $.52 each. This reflects the charge of using someone else's mailing list on a one-time basis. (As stated above, once the customer has contacted the organization seeking a response that name can be transferred to the House File list, where it may be used without an additional charge.)

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Do you believe it made sense to forego a detailed feasibility study and instead actually put together a catalog operation, complete with products, contracts with fulfillment houses, etc.? What are the dangers of pursuing such a strategy? What are the benefits? Under what conditions does acting, rather than analysis, make sense? Under what conditions do analysis, prior to acting, make sense?

2. Are there other ways RurAL CAP could achieve the objectives and goals set out for the catalog? In other words, what other marketing strategies could be considered as competitors to a catalog operation? Do you believe that a catalog is the best means for achieving the identified goals?

3. RurAL CAP decided to target individual, upscale, socially conscious consumers. What other target groups could have been chosen or considered?

4. Examine the results for 1993 and 1994 (Tables 1 and 2). Do the results bode well for the catalog operation? What conclusions can you, as an analyst, draw from these data? Does your examination of the pro formas in Table 3 support your expectations?

5. Complete the break-even analysis begun in Table 4. In doing so, assume only 2 categories of lists: outside runs (rented names), and House Buyer File names. Further, assume 9 outside run names need to be used for every House Buyer File name (this is necessary to replace House Buyer File customers who cease to be interested in the catalog's products). Finally, assume the average sales/book for House Buyer names is $4.14, while the average for rented lists is $1.00. The $4.14 figure represents the sales/book for 1994 for those sent to names in the House Buyers File. The $1.00 figure is admittedly on the high side for the rented names, but will suffice for this exercise.

6. A useful analysis is to compute the customer acquisition cost, and the contribution from each customer over the customer's lifetime. These numbers can be used to generate customer lifetime values. When answering the following ignore all taxes.

a. How much money will The Aurora Catalog lose or make on a mailing to 1000 rented names? How much per acquired customer? Consistent with The Aurora Catalog's experience, assume i) the marginal cost of renting names and mailing a catalog to each person is $.52, ii) the response rate is .9%, iii) the average order size is $76, and iv) the contribution margin is 31.04%.

b. Once a person becomes a customer costs go down and response rates and sales/book go up. Compute how much money RurAL CAP will make or lose, on average, the next time they send customers acquired from the initial list of 1000 a catalog, assuming i) the cost of sending a catalog to each customer is $.38 (note the cost is lower because the names are not rented), ii) the response rate is 4% (that is, there is a 4% chance each customer will buy), and iii) the average order size is $102. Further, assume that the contribution margin remains 31.04%. These figures, of course reflect The Aurora Catalog's experience. Determine how much RurAL CAP will net on this mailing, as well as how much they will net per acquired customer.

c. If we assume that the 4% response rate will be good for 2.5 years (5 mailings), and that the average order size remains at $102, compute the net present value of renting a list of 1000 names using a discount rate of 5%/half year. Under the assumptions implied in this analysis, is renting names a good investment strategy for The Aurora Catalog?

7. In addition to the quantitative analyses relating to RurAL CAP's experience, what else would you want to know before making a judgment as to whether this catalog has a chance of becoming profitable? If you were part of RurAL CAP's management team, what would you recommend?

8. When do you think public money should be used to support for-profit forays by nonprofits? Should DCRA continue to support the catalog? Under what conditions? If you were the Commissioner of the Department of Community and Regional Affairs what would you recommend?

Wayne A. Roberts, Jr., Southern Utah University
Table 1 Income statements and other data, 1993 and 1994

                                                   1993

                                           Dollars       % of Net
                                                           Rev.

REVENUES- Merchandise Sales              $204,786.00      111.53%
Less Returns and Allowances              $21,164.00       11.53%
TOTAL NET REVENUES                       $183,622.00      100.00%
COST OF GOODS
Product purchases                        $107,183.00      58.37%
In-Bound Freight                           $829.95         0.45%
TOTAL COST OF GOODS                      $108,012.95      58.82%
GROSS MARGIN                             $75,609.05       41.18%
EXPENSES
Direct Marketing Expense                 $184,891.00      100.69%
Operations Expense                       $41,683.79       22.70%
Administrative                           $229,655.26      125.07%
TOTAL                                    $456,230.05      248.46%
Income (loss) from Operations           ($380,621.00)    -207.29%
List Rental Income                          $0.00          0.00%
Net Income from Operations              ($380,621.00)    -207.29%
GRANT FUNDING                            $361,450.00
NET REVENUE FROM OPERATIONS & GRANTS    ($19,171.00)
Circulation                              187,846.00
Number of Orders                          2,096.00
Average Order Size                         $87.61

                                                   1994

                                           Dollars       % of Net
                                                           Rev.

REVENUES- Merchandise Sales              $284,770.02      104.85%
Less Returns and Allowances              $13,184.05        4.85%
TOTAL NET REVENUES                       $271,585.97      100.00%
COST OF GOODS
Product purchases                        $129,506.00      47.69%
In-Bound Freight                          $3,709.00        1.37%
TOTAL COST OF GOODS                      $133,215.00      49.05%
GROSS MARGIN                             $138,370.97      50.95%
EXPENSES
Direct Marketing Expense                 $239,182.00      88.07%
Operations Expense                       $34,983.00       12.88%
Administrative                           $206,255.00      75.94%
TOTAL                                    $480,420.00      176.89%
Income (loss) from Operations           ($342,049.03)    -125.95%
List Rental Income                         $359.81         0.13%
Net Income from Operations              ($341,689.22)    -125.81%
GRANT FUNDING                            $360,874.00
NET REVENUE FROM OPERATIONS & GRANTS     $19,184.78
Circulation                                374,886
Number of Orders                            3,452
Average Order Size                         $78.67

Table 2: Sales-book, response rates, and average order sizes 1993-
1994

                   Sales/Book     Response Rates  Average Order Sizes

                   1993    1994    1993    1994      1993       1994

Catalog Requests   $0.88   $0.82   1.29%   1.13%    $67.79     $73.07
Outside Tests      $1.06   $0.53   1.10%   0.71%    $96.09     $74.25
Outside Runs       $0.92   $0.66   0.95%   0.87%    $96.89     $75.66
Multi-Buyers       $2.83   $1.66   2.35%   2.06%   $120.54     $80.61
House File *               $0.76           1.01%               $74.95
House Buyers       $3.31   $4.14   0.82%   4.06%   $403.50    $101.82
Overall            $1.03   $0.71   1.06%   0.92%    $87.61     $78.67

* Those who formerly requested a catalog

Table 3: Representative pro forma income statements, 1995-1997

                                                1995

REVENUES- Merchandise Sales                 $920,586.29
Less Returns and Allowances                  $95,170.45
TOTAL NET REVENUES                          $825,415.84
COST OF GOODS
Product purchases                           $393,640.82
In-Bound Freight                             $3,714.37
TOTAL COST OF GOODS                         $397,355.19
GROSS MARGIN                                $428,060.66
EXPENSES
Direct Marketing Expense                    $535,196.00
Operations Expense                          $137,141.09
Administrative                              $231,041.73
TOTAL                                       $903,378.82
Income(loss) from Operations               $(475,318.16)
PROPOSED GRANT FUNDING:
Grant 1                                     $400,000.00
Grant 2                                     $100,000.00
CSBG Grant                                  $250,000.00
TOTAL GRANT MONEY                           $750,000.00
NET REVENUES FROM OPERATIONS AND GRANTS:    $274,681.84

                                                1996

REVENUES- Merchandise Sales                $2,556,277.37
Less Returns and Allowances                 $264,268.61
TOTAL NET REVENUES                         $2,292,008.76
COST OF GOODS
Product purchases                          $1,093,058.98
In-Bound Freight                             $10,314.04
TOTAL COST OF GOODS                        $1,103,373.02
GROSS MARGIN                               $1,188,635.74
EXPENSES
Direct Marketing Expense                   $1,269,197.00
Operations Expense                          $297,925.56
Administrative                              $261,840.18
TOTAL                                      $1,828,962.75
Income(loss) from Operations               $(640,327.01)
PROPOSED GRANT FUNDING:
Grant 1                                     $400,000.00
Grant 2                                     $100,000.00
CSBG Grant                                  $250,000.00
TOTAL GRANT MONEY                           $750,000.00
NET REVENUES FROM OPERATIONS AND GRANTS:    $109,672.99

                                                1997

REVENUES- Merchandise Sales                $5,271,485.63
Less Returns and Allowances                 $544,967.54
TOTAL NET REVENUES                         $4,726,518.10
COST OF GOODS
Product purchases                          $2,254,076.48
In-Bound Freight                             $21,269.33
TOTAL COST OF GOODS                        $2,275,345.81
GROSS MARGIN                               $2,451,172.28
EXPENSES
Direct Marketing Expense                   $2,046,376.00
Operations Expense                          $515,781.32
Administrative                              $331,870.95
TOTAL                                      $2,894,028.27
Income(loss) from Operations               $(442,855.99)
PROPOSED GRANT FUNDING:
Grant 1                                     $400,000.00
Grant 2                                     $100,000.00
CSBG Grant                                  $250,000.00
TOTAL GRANT MONEY                           $750,000.00
NET REVENUES FROM OPERATIONS AND GRANTS:    $307,144.01

Table 4: Breakeven analysis data based on 1994 experience

FIXED COSTS:
Marketing Expenses                   $47,260.00
General and Administrative          $191,257.00
TOTAL                               $238,517.00

Contribution Margin as a Percentage of Gross Merchandise Sales Before
Catalog Variable Expenses *:

Gross sales                             100.00%
Returns and allowances                   -4.63%
COGS                                    -46.78%
Excess S&H charge                       -12.28%
Variable Administrative Expense          -5.27%
Adjusted Gross Margin                    31.04%

* In Table 1 total net revenues is equal to 100%.


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