Spinderella on safari: British policies toward Africa under New Labour.

Taylor, Ian

Under New Labour, the British government was claimed to be operating under guidelines that sought to have an ethical dimension to British foreign policy. A particular focus of New Labour's foreign policy, rhetorically at least, was Africa. During this period, London sought to bring the G8 in line with London's claimed policies vis-a-vis the continent. However, upon closer analysis, vocal flourishes and presentations aside, policy was never adequately supported by, and in many respects was contradicted by, much of what Blair's government actually did in relation to Africa. The disparity between the high-profile media presentation of policy and what was actually delivered by Blair and company in Africa reflected a wider problem in the British polity that New Labour and its spin doctors came to symbolize. KEYWORDS: Africa, Tony Blair, United Kingdom, New Labour.

IN 2005, GREAT BRITAIN HOSTED THE GROUP OF 8 (G8) SUMMIT AT Gleneagles, Scotland. In the immediate run-up to the summit and afterward, a great deal of effort was ostensibly (and ostentatiously) expended by the Tony Blair government's focus on Africa. While New Labour's stance on Africa before, during, and after the Gleneagles summit was often portrayed as emblematic of London's new tilt toward an "ethical" foreign policy, the G8 flourish was never adequately supported by, and in many respects was contradicted by, most of what Blair's government actually did in relation to the continent. The disparity between the high-profile media presentation of policy and what was actually delivered by Blair and company in Africa reflected a wider problem in the British polity that New Labour and its spin doctors came to represent. In discussing how British policy toward Africa played out under Blair and how the G8 was drawn into the process, I will bring the contours of contemporary British political life into sharp focus.

Great Britain and Africa: A Problem Best Avoided

In contrast with other former colonial powers (notably France), for a relatively extended period, Britain showed limited interest in postdecolonization Africa. Rather, as Paul Williams suggested, British policy sought to "turn its imperial legacies from liabilities into assets," (1) and perceived the continent principally as a "source of trouble rather than an opportunity." (2) Under New Labour (1997-2010), however, there was a relative prioritization of the continent in official British foreign policy. Indeed, under Blair and, to a lesser extent, his successor Gordon Brown, New Labour formally elevated Africa to a major policy concern for London. Much of this was personality driven, with Blair being the most media-obsessed leader Britain had had in modern times. Projecting himself as a personal savior of Africa came, for a time, to be a core on-message for London. However, when one examines the results of this policy rather than the rhetoric, it seems apparent that New Labour's Africa policies largely continued on the same path as previous governments, preserving a "calculating eye to the national interest and Britain's international reputation." (3) In order to come to this conclusion, I will discuss the main features of New Labour's Africa policies and contrast the substantial media spin that accompanied almost everything that Blair and his government did, then follow with an evaluation of the results and subsequent legacy.

New Labour and Media Presentation

A defining characteristic of New Labour was a strong focus on presentation and the careful control of the public representation of policy--in colloquial terms, "spin." Early on, the customarily Blair-approving Independent newspaper depicted New Labour as "Spinderella: A People's Pantomime in Two Acts." (4) Without doubt, under New Labour, "public statements [were] no longer fact-based, but operational. Realities and political narratives [were] constructed to serve a purpose, dismantled, and the show move[d] on." (5) British foreign policy was no exception, and "never before ha[d] the public of a democratic state been subject to such a tirade of propaganda about a government's moral motives than Britain under New Labour." (6)

In the early stages of the Blair government it has to be admitted that a change in British policy toward Africa was in the offing, most graphically illustrated in the 1999 intervention in Sierra Leone. (7) The intervention succeeded, rescuing British citizens, decisively defeating rebel forces, and reestablishing both UN authority and the incumbent government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Britain remained in-country and dispensed a substantial assistance program to post--civil war Sierra Leone. Yet "while the Sierra Leone intervention ... demonstrated the government's commitment to global responsibilities, it ... also illustrated various contradictions in New Labour's international agenda, stemming from a reluctance to match rhetoric with action." (8) Though publicly forceful in its calls to end corruption and malgovernance in Africa, Britain "proved reluctant to speak out about Kabbah's own rather poor record on human rights and corruption," provoking questions about Britain's level of commitment to "good governance." (9) Such questions remained unresolved even as New Labour left office.

The other key African situation that Blair sought to resolve, Zimbabwe, proved to be an unmitigated failure. London found itself hidebound in how it could act toward Robert Mugabe, being frustrated by the broad refusal of African leaders to criticize Mugabe's behavior. Other than pushing for Harare's suspension from the Commonwealth and "smart" sanctions against the Zimbabwean regime, New Labour found itself impotent. (10) As one commentator noted, "It was in Zimbabwe where the limits of British influence were most sharply exposed ... ultimately Britain was shown up as having responsibility but not power." (11)

In retrospect, it seems clear that Blair had a wholly naive and idealistic view of Africa, one where a grateful continent was enthusiastic to lap up the largesse and vision of the British leader. With his famed projection of Africa as a scar on the conscience of the world (which he would heal), Blair's evangelical approach to the continent was inappropriate for dealing with the matters at hand. In fact, once Blair's charismatic approach floundered and he was confronted with the complexities of Africa rather than the projected caricature, he simply gave up. Zimbabwe was a case in point: "a political researcher who works closely with MPs involved in Africa suggested: 'Blair found the whole subject so painful, that he wouldn't allow officials to brief him. ... If you've got a bit of an idealized view of Africa it [Zimbabwe] really buggers it up.'" (12)

Claiming to advance a Third Way between socialism and capitalism, stated policy was early on framed by New Labour's first foreign minister, Robin Cook, who famously claimed that British foreign policy would henceforth have an ethical dimension to it, in which London would focus "more sharply on issues like political governance and human rights, and ... tighten up on arms exports to regimes with poor records in these areas." (13) The media spin put on this argued that an "age of internationalism" had dawned, where Britain (and by extension, the West) were "obliged to accept moral responsibility" for activities occurring beyond borders. In this formulation, "foreign policy is not divorced from domestic policy ... our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves." (14)

Hoisted on their own petard, New Labour's Africa policies were ultimately shown to have fallen far short of such claims. Under New Labour, no attention was seriously paid to which actors and processes were responsible for the "inequality, economic decline, state collapse [or] history" of Africa. (15) Certainly, how and in what ways London might have needed to change its own policies if it truly wished to promote positive change on the continent were never considered. Instead, like most of his G8 counterparts, Blair was entirely dedicated to a "neo-liberal interpretation of global economics which aimed to protect and spread free markets in order to increase worldwide prosperity." (16) Part of this commitment to free trade was a persistent support for British weapons manufacturers and exporters.

Great Britain: Arms Supplier to the World

Britain's role in the international arms trade is controversial and this controversy embroiled New Labour's Africa policies. Soon after assuming office, Blair visited South Africa to "lobby for a British chunk of a 4 billion pound arms deal that South Africa defense officials signed. In the same year, Clare Short's DFID [Department for International Development] granted a miserly 4.7 million pound aid package to Pretoria." (17) This pattern "completely undermineldl the [British] government's professed agenda of global development." (18)

In spite of its public commitment to an ethical dimension to its foreign policy, British arms exports under New Labour accelerated. Export licenses were freely granted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Algeria, Sudan, Zambia, Uganda, Namibia, and Somalia, four of which were at the same time listed as priority countries for poverty reduction by DFID. Despite claims to be "different," under Blair and Brown, Britain remained among the top tier of weapons exporters, supplying billions of dollars' worth of military materiel to Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, among others. The receipts from such sales and the 400,000 people in the United Kingdom employed by the arms industry obviously explained why "national interests" systematically trumped the promises of the British government, even while New Labour was asserting how qualitatively different it was from previous British administrations. (19) Under New Labour, "British commercial interests, including arms sales, [were] promoted in Africa with little regard for human rights and governance." (20) According to Cook, Dick Evans, then chairman of British Aerospace, seemed to have "the key to the garden door of No 10." (21) Arms export licenses and ethics in general do not go side by side and this was a constant source of criticism of New Labour's Africa policies. Former secretary of state for international development Short was quoted as saying that "my dear friend Tony Blair ... absolutely, adamantly, favoured all proposals for arms deals." (22) Consequently, in the periods 2001-2005 and 2006-2010, the volume of British arms export orders increased by 67 percent. (23)

In its defense, the Blair government continually asserted that "tackling the [arms trade] problem I would] require comprehensive action that not only addresseldj the issue of illegal transfers, but also ensure[d] large scale destruction of surplus weapons." (24) New Labour's policies belied this apparent concern, however. Although London "introduced a number of progressive policies on arms exports ... its apparent reluctance to enforce its own guidelines, and its willingness ... to flout them ... undermined the potential improvements that these policies seemed to promise." (25) Put bluntly, when British jobs (and votes) were dependent on Britain remaining a premier arms exporter, the ethical dimension to New Labour's Africa policies was quietly set aside. Reportedly, Blair "considered it [his] duty to promote British arms sales whenever possible." (26) In fact, New Labour was exposed as being split on the issue of selling questionable equipment to some of Africa's poorest states. Infamously, in 2001, Tanzania signed a contract for a [pounds sterling]28 million military air-traffic control system with London-based BAE Systems, which many, including the World Bank, said was "both unnecessary and beyond Tanzania's means." (27) It was subsequently discovered by the Serious Fraud Office that a third of the contract's price had been diverted into secret offshore bank accounts that had been "used to pay bribes to Tanzanian politicians and officials." (28) Pushed through by Blair against the wishes of both his foreign secretary and development minister, the deal was "in clear breach of a revised EU [European Union] code for arms sales negotiated by Robin Cook to honour a 1997 manifesto promise to tighten controls on arms exports." (29) The Tanzanian deal became emblematic of a government that was good on rhetoric, but short on subsequent implementation. As Short noted:

 Every way you looked at it, it [the deal] was outrageous and
 disgraceful. ... It was an obviously corrupt project. Tanzania
 didn't need a new military air traffic control system, it was
 out-of-date technology, they didn't have any military aircraft--they
 needed a civilian air traffic control system and there was a modern,
 much cheaper one. Everyone talks about good governance in Africa as
 though it is an African problem, and often the root of the "badness"
 is companies in Europe. (30)

Under New Labour, "specific licences for arms sales to Africa [totalled] more than [pounds sterling]631 million since 2000. But experts believe that the true figure is closer to [pounds sterling]l billion when the values of 'open' licenses are taken into account." (31) Through such clear contradictions between an ethical foreign policy and an activist arms-exporting regime, London under Blair was continuously placed in a "contradictory position: trying to keep the peace, while simultaneously supplying the warriors with weapons." (32)

The contradictions between rhetoric and reality were further revealed when looking at British trade policies toward Africa. In fact, "Trade, as before, comes first, second and third in importance even when it is a trade in arms; [meanwhile] human values, and coherence, come amongst the also-rans." (33)

British Trade and Africa

Under New Labour, British policy sought to foster favorable "business climates" for British companies internationally. A government-supported arm, Business Action for Africa, was launched in 2005 aimed at promoting British corporate interest on the continent. While active in promoting the accumulation aspect of trade with Africa, "on the issue of labour standards in international trade, the New Labour silence [was] deafening." (34) The "primary concern [was] with winning arms contracts, securing export credits and maintaining stable trade relations with African countries." (35) New Labour never exhibited "enthusiasm for regulatory measures that would make it harder for UK businesses to get involved in or facilitate the abusive exploitation of African resources." (36)

The Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) served to insure British foreign trade. The department's remit is to help exporters of British goods and services to win contracts and to facilitate British companies investing overseas by providing guarantees, insurance, and reinsurance against loss. In practice, through the ECGD, "arms companies pursue deals to countries which may well default on payments, and the debt itself is then owed to the exporting government." (37) Where African countries have become indebted to the ECGD, debt has at times been canceled through being written off "against the overseas development aid (ODA) budget." (38) Since "most of the debt owed to the ECGD involves arms deals, in effect the ODA [was] being used to finance the arms, something it's not supposed to do." (39) One report noted that, under New Labour, "the ECGD ... merrily used public money to back what were in fact bent deals, and ... successfully investigated none." (40) Instead, over [pounds sterling]2 billion of "toxic debts" from failed British exports had to be repaid by developing countries, making up 96 percent of third world debt to the United Kingdom. (41)

Under New Labour, the unfair trading practices engendered by mass subsidization for European producers continued. While on the one hand New Labour claimed to promote agricultural development in the developing world, on the other hand, "UK wheat exports [were] being sold at 30% less than the cost of production, whil[e] white sugar [was] being sold at 40% below production costs." (42) In such circumstances, how "can African agricultural exporters hope to compete in the West when it is estimated that Western nations pay their farmers $350 billion per year in subsidies (nearly $1 billion per day)?" (43) In fact, Britain was at the "forefront of pushing this trade liberalisation on Africa, and remain[ed] one of the most ardent proponents of the 'free trade' model." (44) As one commentator noted on British trade policies toward Africa, London's stance reflected "an ever-widening gap between the noble rhetoric of Western politicians on the links between trade and development and the reality of what their governments were actually pushing for on behalf of domestic farming and manufacturing interests in world trade negotiations." (45) New Labour was no exception.

This reality was perhaps no better exemplified than when French president Jacques Chirac, with an eye to hosting the 2003 G8 summit in Evian, approached the George W. Bush administration to propose that the EU stop subsidizing its food exports to Africa if the United States did likewise. For years, the EU subsidized food production, creating unfair competition and largely undermining any developmental goals made under the various trade agreements between the EU and the developing world, such as the Lome and Cotonou Accords. Bush, however, was unprepared to match Chirac's offer. According to one report, "had the European Union, and in particular the member which claims to act as a bridge across the Atlantic [i.e., London], supported France, the moral pressure on Bush might well have become irresistible." (46) Instead, Blair made it clear that he would not support Chirac's plan: "thanks to our conscience-stricken prime minister ... Africa is now well and truly stuffed. Every trade distortion Blair once promised to address remains in place." (47)

The British Aid Policy

Official rhetoric under New Labour had it that DFID exemplified the "moral aspect of the UK government, claiming a relationship of partnership between the UK and developing countries based on a common concern for poverty reduction and respect for human rights." (48) DFID was created as an independent ministry in 1997 by the Blair government, replacing the previous development agency that had been based in the Foreign Office. However, despite the creation of DFID by New Labour and the claim to have placed Africa at the center of British foreign policy, there was a continuous "tension between the liberal internationalism of the Third Way and traditional concerns for the national interest." (49)

New Labour asserted that British developmental assistance was to be untied from British commercial interests. (50) However, the notion of untied aid usually suggests that the delivery of aid is neither bilateral nor required to be expended on given areas, both of which DFID actually stipulated. While asserting that British "aid should no longer have the parallel aim of promoting UK business interests," (51) by using "the concepts of human rights, humanitarian principles and a poverty focus, DFID developed a terminology that was seductive domestically, being ostensibly ethical, long term and positive sum." (52) In fact, Blair "introduced a policy of political conditionality whereby British aid [was] linked to political reforms by African governments." (53)

Under New Labour, there was a recurrent strategy of double counting budget streams and issuing deceptive press statements concerning Britain's aid contributions and initiatives. For instance, when the issue of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) was addressed, "the UK proposal use[d] money from existing aid budgets, rather than providing genuinely new money to fund debt relief." (54) While claiming to be "passionate" about poverty alleviation and development, British aid figures "include[d] debt relief, often on loans that were taken out for purposes unrelated to poverty reduction." (55) Furthermore, despite loud claims to have a set of development policies qualitatively superior to that of previous British governments, aid devoted to Africa in 2005/2006 was only equivalent to the 1989 figures. (56)

As mentioned, Britain famously hosted the 2005 G8 summit. Then chancellor of the exchequer Brown early on declared that 2005 would "be a milestone in our campaign to meet the UN Millennium Development Goals to reduce poverty, illiteracy and disease across the world." (57) However, the proposals advanced by London at the time of the G8 summit were unsurprising and essentially centered on the doubling of the G8's development aid. Specifically, E26 billion was to be collectively added for that purpose each financial year. The plan also included getting wealthy countries to meet the UN target of spending 0.7 percent of their gross national income on overseas aid. Brown set out detailed plans to use the International Monetary Fund's gold to write off debt owed to the institution and to request from World Bank shareholders that they take over the debts owed them by up to seventy of the poorest states. (58) Brown also advocated that an International Finance Facility (IFF) be set up to generate $50 billion annually between now and 2015. The IFF was to be instituted on the basis of long-term donor commitments from the Group of 7 (G7). Yet the spin around the IFF at the time of the summit that it would create "additional" aid money was proved false. The IFF would merely bring forward future aid promises in a supposedly binding manner to ensure that donors keep their pledges. Indeed, the IFF's structure meant that it could actually eat into future aid budgets.

Problematically, over New Labour's tenure it became clear that DFID (despite the plethora of well-paid development "experts" employed as consultants--the department's budget for consultants for the period 2008-2013 was around [pounds stealing]l billion) failed to comprehend the political dynamics behind Africa's poverty. (59) In its landmark 2000 White Paper, (60) the most explicit acknowledgments by DFID of the "problem of corruption" were stated thus: "More effective government and greater benefits from markets require tougher action by developing and developed countries to deal with corruption. The evidence suggests that investment levels are lower in countries with high levels of corruption, due to the uncertainty created, the cost of bribes, and time-consuming bureaucracy. ... It is poor people who suffer most from corruption." (61) Weak and ineffective states, "with problems of corruption, inadequate infrastructure and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, are not an attractive destination for [private capital' flows." (62)

These meek comments were essentially side thoughts, tacked on incidentally. DFID naively treated the neopatrimonial norms prevalent across Africa as minor "corruption problems" to be healed (like everything else) with the simple bandage of "more effective government" and liberalization. DFID's resulting technocratic prescriptions, "requiring tougher action on corruption" by those who were themselves corrupt, were doomed to fail. A real and deep focus on the politics involved, rather than "governance" symptoms, was needed: "The donor community has played down the significance of clientelist politics as anything more than 'incidental,' focusing instead on the symptoms of weak capacity and corruption. This leads to a technical approach, with capacity building programmes and anti-corruption reforms that promote greater administrative 'hygiene' and technical expertise. This ignores the real nature of the hybrid neo-patrimonial system." (63) On the basis of its superficial analysis of Africa, then, DFID's practices in the field under New Labour left much to be desired. Instead, going for the headlines, New Labour focused on issues more obviously recognized by the media, rather than structural issues such as the roots of inequality in Africa and social justice. While this was understandable for a media-conscious regime, it did not greatly assist in identifying Africa's real problems. (64) A simplistic desire to increase aid became central to New Labour's Africa strategy and, by extension, the core of the G8 agenda.

Conclusion

Britain's foreign policy toward Africa under New Labour consistently found "itself caught between rhetoric and performance." (65) A major issue when disentangling British policies toward Africa under Blair and Brown was getting behind the media presentations and spin. It was true that after the 2005 G8 summit, the British seemed to have extracted apparently new commitments. But when one dug behind the headlines, there was a whole host of difficulties with what was "achieved" at Gleneagles. First, the G8 initially appeared to have agreed to increase aid by $48 billion a year by 2010, along with canceling 100 percent of the multilateral debts of the most indebted countries. But later on it emerged that the aid "increase" included money put aside for debt relief. In fact, Russia's increase in aid was made up entirely of debt write-offs while one-third of France's aid budget was money for debt relief. In short, the debt deal was not in addition to the aid increase, as Blair asserted, but part of it. And the "100 percent debt write-off' applied to only eighteen countries, saving only around $1 billion a year in payments. The deal also involved only debts to the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Yet the 08 summit is usually held to be Blair's crowning glory vis-a-vis Africa.

Much of New Labour's much-vaunted plans for Africa seemed more headline grabbing than well thought through. Though the profile of Africa was undoubtedly raised during the New Labour period, the easy solutions proffered to intractable--and complicated--problems were ultimately self-defeating. Furthermore, the cynicism that the British public developed toward the political spin and manipulation of the media by the government in office seriously damaged public confidence in its own government, something that continues to this day. Notably, in 2010 it was revealed that only 9 percent of British people polled had any trust in politicians, ranking Britain's political parties in twenty-first place among the twenty-seven EU members, below Romania and Bulgaria. (66) It is a fact that the gap between rhetoric and practice, "political lying" as it has been otherwise called, became acute under New Labour and a defining aspect of Blairism. (67) It is perhaps this residue that will live on, long after talk of making poverty history has subsided.

Notes

Ian Taylor is professor in international relations and African politics in the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews. He is also chair professor in the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China, professor extraordinary in political science at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, and honorary professor in the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University, China. He holds a DPhil from the University of Stellenbosch and an MPhil from the University of Hong Kong. Prior to joining St Andrews he taught African politics for four years at the University of Botswana.

(1.) Paul Williams, "Britain and Africa After the Cold War," in I. Taylor and P. Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (London: Routledge, 2004), P. 41.

(2.) Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 88.

(3.) Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams, "Ethics and Foreign Policy: The Antinomies of New Labour's 'Third Way' in Sub-Saharan Africa," Political Studies 49, no. 2 (2001): 249.

(4.) "Spinderella: A People's Pantomime in Two Acts (of Parliament)," The Independent (London), 30 December 1997, p. 6.

(5.) Peter [degrees]borne, The Rise of Political Lying (London: Free Press, 2005), p. 6.

(6.) Mark Curtis, "Blair's Jaw Jaw Means War War," Red Pepper, October 2002: 5-7.

(7.) See Paul Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Andrew Dorman, Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).

(8.) Comfort Ero, "A Critical Assessment of Britain's Africa Policy," Conflict, Security, and Development 1, no. 2(2001): 57.

(9.) Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, P. 85.

(10.) See Ian Taylor, "'The Devilish Thing': The Commonwealth and Zimbabwe's Denouement," Round Table: Commonwealth Journal of International Relations 94, no. 380 (2005): 367-380; Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, "The Limits of Engagement: British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe," International Affairs 78, no. 3 (2002): 547-566.

(11.) Geoff Hill, The Battle for Zimbabwe (Johannesburg: Struik, 2003), p. 347.

(12.) Quoted in Julie Gallagher, "Healing the Scar? Idealizing Britain in Africa, 1997-2007," African Affairs 108, no. 432 (2009): 441.

(13.) Tom Porteous, "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa Under New Labour," International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 285.

(14.) "Robin Cook's Speech on the Government's Ethical Foreign Policy," The Guardian (London), 12 May 1997, p. 6.

(15.) Department for International Development, The Causes of Conflict in Africa: Consultation Document (London: DFID, 2001), p. 6.

(16.) Zoe Ware, "Readdressing Labour's Relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa," Round Table 95, no. 383 (2006): 143.

(17.) "Tanzanian Government Deserves Short Shrift," The Guardian (London), 3 February 2002, p. 5.

(18.) Ibid.

(19.) Ware, "Readdressing Labour's Relationship," p. 140.

(20.) Porteous, "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 284.

(21.) "The Saudi-GPT Deal Inquiry Must Not Be Another Whitewash," The Guardian (London), 6 February 2010, p. 4.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) "Global Arms Sales 'Rose as Recession Hit,'" The Guardian (London), 14 March 2011, p.7.

(24.) Department for International Development, The Causes of Conflict in Africa, p. 18.

(25.) Saferworld, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: A Decade of Labour's Arms Exports (London: Saferworld, 2007), p. 3.

(26.) Clare Short, An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power (London: Free Press, 2004), p. 120.

(27.) Porteous, "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 287.

(28.) "The BAE Files," The Guardian (London), 10 February 2010, p. 7.

(29.) Short, An Honourable Deception? p. 119.

(30.) Quoted in ibid.

(31.) "Arms Sales to Africa Reach One Billion Mark," The Guardian (London), 12 June 2005, p. 6.

(32.) Abrahamsen and Williams, "Ethics and Foreign Policy," p. 253.

(33.) Chris Allen, "Britain's Africa Policy: Ethical or Ignorant?" Review of African Political Economy 27, no. 77 (1998): 405.

(34.) David Coates and Colin Hay, "The Internal and External Face of New Labour's Political Economy," Government and Opposition 36, no. 4 (2001): 455.

(35.) Gordon Cumming, "UK African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: From Realpolitik to Moralpolitik?" Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 42, no. 2 (2004): 114.

(36.) Porteous, "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 295.

(37.) Campaign Against Arms Trade, G8: Arms Dealers to the World (London: Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2005).

(38.) "Time to End the Underwriting of Unethical Business Abroad," The Guardian (London), 25 April 2011, p. 8.

(39.) Ibid.

(40.) "Mark Thomas Finds Corruption Sadly Unregulated," New Statesman (London), 1 January 2005, p. 8.

(41.) Jubilee Debt Campaign, The Department for Dodgy Deals: Ending the UK's Support for Toxic Debts (London: Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2011).

(42.) Actionaid, The African Commission for Britain (London: Actionaid, 2005), p. 7.

(43.) Ian Taylor, "Advice Is Judged by Results, Not by Intentions: Why Gordon Brown Is Wrong About Africa," International Affairs 81, no. 2 (2005): 307.

(44.) Actionaid, The African Commission for Britain, p. 5.

(45.) Tom Porteous, Britain in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2008), p. 48.

(46.) "Blair Trashes Africa," The Guardian (London), 3 June 2003, p. 9.

(47.) Ibid.

(48.) Zoe Marriage, "Defining Morality: DFID and the Great Lakes," Third World Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2006): 489.

(49.) Abrahamsen and Williams, "Ethics and Foreign Policy," p. 249.

(50.) Porteous, "British Government Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa," p. 282.

(51.) Abrahamsen and Williams, "Ethics and Foreign Policy," p. 255.

(52.) Marriage, "Defining Morality," p. 488.

(53.) Cumming, "UK African Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," p. 110.

(54.) Actionaid, The African Commission for Britain, p. 11.

(55.) Ibid., p. 8.

(56.) Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, p. 53.

(57.) Gordon Brown, "The Challenges of 2005: Forging a New Compact for Africa," New Economy 11, no. 3 (2004): 127.

(58.) Rita Abrahamsen and Paul Williams, "Britain and Southern Africa: A 'Third Way' or Business as Usual?" in Korwa Adar and Rok Ajuiu, eds., Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States' Foreign Policy-making Process (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 316.

(59.) See Sara Fyson, "Sending in the Consultants: Development Agencies, the Private Sector and the Reform of Public Finance in Low-income Countries," International Journal of Public Policy 4, nos. 3-4 (2009): 314-343.

(60.) Department for International Development, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor (London: DFID, 2000).

(61.) Ibid., p. 25.

(62.) Ibid., p. 23.

(63.) Matthew Lockwood, The State They're In: An Agenda for International Action on Poverty in Africa (London: Intermediate Technology Development Group. 2005), p. 91.

(64.) See Ian Taylor, "Blind Spots in Analyzing Africa's Place in World Politics," Global Governance 10, no. 4 (2004): 411-417.

(65.) Coates and Hay, "The Internal and External Face of New Labour's Political Economy," p. 466.

(66.) "Trust in British Politicians Falls to Sub-Romanian Levels," The Guardian (London), 12 November 2010, p. 4.

(67.) Oborne, The Rise of Political Lying.