The seniors concession allowance and utility allowance: equity implications.
Temple, Jeromey
The purpose of this brief policy note is to draw attention to two
new payments available to elderly Australians: the Seniors Concession
Allowance and the Utilities Allowance. It examines their potential
equity outcomes and argues that, combined with recent changes to the
eligibility requirements for the Commonwealth Seniors Health Card
(CSHC), the new Seniors Concession Allowance serves to reduce equity in
Australia's welfare system. The second concession, the Utilities
Allowance that targets elderly Australians in need, is necessary due to
deficiencies in the current method of indexing the aged pension. (1)
**********
WHAT ARE THE NEW CONCESSIONS AND HOW MUCH WILL THEY COST?
Following the 1993 State Premiers conference, State Governments
agreed that Commonwealth concession card recipients (2) (excluding CSHC)
would receive State level subsidies on a set of 'core
concessions' including council rates, water and sewerage,
electricity, registration and public transport. These subsidies are in
addition to subsidized pharmaceuticals through the Pharmaceutical
Benefits Scheme (PBS) available to concession card holders (including
CSHC). In 2001, the Federal Government began to negotiate with State
governments to extend these 'core concessions' to Commonwealth
Seniors Health Card (CSHC) holders. (3) However, the Federal Government
was unsuccessful in securing these additional concessions. During the
2004 election campaign, in recognition of this the Federal government
proposed two new concessions: the Utilities Allowance and Seniors
Concession Allowance (SCA) costing between 867.9 million and 877.2
million dollars over the next four years. (4)
The Utilities Allowance is an ongoing annual $100 payment made to
recipients of the aged pension (5) and recipients of specific Veterans
income support payments to subsidise the cost of utilities. The payment
is calculated as $100 per lone person household and as $50 for each
member of a couple, and is indexed against the Consumer Price Index
(CPI). That is, couples and lone person households receive the same
payment. The payment is made at the same amount for full and part
pensioners. In contrast, the SCA is an ongoing payment of $200 per year
(paid in two installments) for each CSHC holder, and is also indexed
against the CPI. As the CSHC is available only to self-funded retirees,
aged pensioners are not eligible for the SCA. For example, a lone female
holding a CSHC will receive two $100 tax-free payments each year. Couple
only households will receive $400 per year. Thus, the economies of scale
differ between the Utilities Allowance and the SCA.
ARE THE NEW CONCESSIONS EQUITABLE?
Two criticisms levelled at the system of concessions in Australia
is the lack of consistent eligibility criteria and the preferential treatment given to seniors of pension age, when compared with low income
earners in the broader population. (6) Amongst others, the ACT Council
of Social Services, the Standing Committee on Family and Community
Affairs and the Standing Committee of Community Services and Income
Security Administrators have suggested a set of criteria to evaluate
concessional payments. (7) For the purposes of the following brief
discussion I draw upon several of the suggested criteria: identification
of the target group, evaluation of the desired outcome, effect on equity
and the concession's consistency with other government policy.
WHO ARE THE TARGET GROUPS?
There is a clear delineation in eligibility requirements for the
two concessions. Eligibility for the SCA is determined by whether an
elderly person holds the Commonwealth Seniors Health Card (CSHC). In
contrast, the less generous Utilities Allowance is available to the
heavily means tested Aged Pension (part or full pensioners) or selected
recipients of Veterans Affairs payments who are of pension age. In 2005,
to receive the full rate age pension, a lone person must not be earning
in excess of $3,172 per annum, or hold more than $153,000 in assets if
they own their own home. For couples, the thresholds are $5,616 and
$217,500 for annual income and assets respectively.
In contrast, access to CSHC is not subject to an asset test, (8)
and the income thresholds are set high. The Commonwealth Seniors Health
Card (CSHC) is available to persons of pension age, but who are
ineligible for the aged pension. Originally, the CSHC was introduced in
1994 to enable low-income retirees whose assets excluding them from the
aged pension, to receive the same health benefits as offered to
Pensioner Concession Card (PCC) holders. As part of the 1997 enquiry
into concessions, the Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs
argued for a slight extension to $29,352 per single and $49,037 per
couple covering access to the PBS only. (9) This level would be capped
at 40 per cent above the PCC income cutoff. Allowing for CPI increases,
the income cut-off for the CSHC would equate to $30,212 for singles and
$50,323 for couples in 2003.
As shown in Table 1, after January 1999, the Federal Government
increased the income eligibility requirement from $20,841 to $40,000 and
from $34,798.40 to $67,000 for singles and couples respectively. Then
again, in 2000 the CSHC eligibility requirements were lifted in response
to the introduction of the new Goods and Services Tax (G.S.T). Under
current policy settings, couples with a combined income of less than
$80,000 and singles with an income less than $50,000 are eligible for
SCA. In addition, there is no assets test for the CSHC.
At the time of the announcement of this lift in eligibility
requirements in the 2001 budget, The Council on the Ageing,
Australia's peak seniors' representative body stated: 'We
believe that policies which seek to provide an unfair advantage to older
people at the expense of the rest of the community are foolish,
unsustainable and harmful over the long term. This year's Federal
budget ignored the concept of targeting .... This was bad public
policy'. (10) Among other independent bodies, the National Welfare
Rights Network and the Council of Social Services have argued against
the concessions made available to CSHC holders. (11) In April 1997,
prior to the change in eligibility requirements, 37,844 older persons
held a CSHC. (12) The figure at the end of 2004 was approximately
287,000. (13)
WHAT IS THE DESIRED OUTCOME?
The Government has two distinct desired outcomes for each new
payment. The Utilities Allowance is targeted at the low income elderly,
and the government hopes to increase the economic welfare of this group:
'the Coalition recognizes that some older Australians who rely on
income support payments can experience difficulty in saving up to pay
regular household bills such as the gas or electricity bill'. (14)
That is, this supplement seeks to improve the well-being of those older
Australians most in need.
In contrast, the SCA was proposed as a means of promoting greater
equity in access to services between different card holders,
irrespective of the clear delineation in economic well-being between
pensioners and 'self-funded' retirees: 'People receiving
the aged pension have enjoyed concessions for many years via the
Pensioner Concession Card. This payment for self-funded retirees
recognizes that they have been unable to benefit from these concessions.
The coalition considers that self funded retirees should not miss
out'. (15) A similar argument was made when the income eligibility
requirements for the CSHC were increased in 2001, when it was argued
that: 'This measure further recognizes the important contribution
made by self funded retirees in providing for their own
retirement'. (16)
However this argument ignores the advantages that many self funded
retirees have accrued, including large tax concessions on their
superannuation. Furthermore, the larger incomes of many of the self
funded retirees on the CSHC enable them to benefit more easily from the
new 35 per cent and 40 per cent health insurance rebate for retirees. As
argued in an earlier paper, the probability of purchasing health
insurance increases significantly with income, and many poorer elderly
Australians who currently do not hold health insurance (predominately
those on the Pensioners Concession Card or Health Care Card) will not
benefit from the new insurance subsidies due to Lifetime Health Cover.
(17) Furthermore, the Government's argument ignores the substantial
subsidies provided to this group over the life course, prior to
retirement. For example, a recent paper by Wang, Wilson and Yates shows
that indirect housing benefits (through foregone taxation revenue)
accrue most heavily to high income earning home-owners in retirement.
(18)
ARE THE SUPPLEMENTS CONSISTENT WITH HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EQUITY?
An important consideration is the new payments' degree of
horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity refers to the ability
of the concession to produce the same outcome for people in similar
financial circumstances. More specifically, households on the same level
of income receive the same benefit from the concession. In contrast,
vertical equity refers to the ability of the concession to produce
similar outcomes for people in different financial circumstances. That
is, households with different levels of income are treated differently,
so that the overall level of financial burden is similar for high and
low income earners. (19)
In opposition to the notion of horizontal equity, persons on social
security payments subject to the same income and asset tests will not be
eligible for the Utilities Allowance. For example, widow B pensioners,
sole parent pensions, disability support pensions, invalidity support
pensions (below pension age) and carer pensions will not receive the
supplement. Although this is an important point, the more serious
concern is the vertical inequity developed by the new payments.
As stated above, the main reason for the SCA is to subsidise
self-funded retirees as they cannot receive the same concessions as
Pension Concession card holders on such items as rates, utilities etc.
If in fact, the self-funded retirees are financially disadvantaged by
lack of these concessions, then it would be expected that this group
would pay a larger portion of their retirement income to cover these
expenses when compared with pensioner only households.
As noted earlier, the CSHC income eligibility limits have changed
significantly over the period 1997 to 2001. Data from the 1998-99
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Household Expenditure Survey (HES)
give an interesting insight into the expenditure behaviour of elderly
households (of pension age) who receive the aged pension, CSHC, or who
are beyond eligibility requirements. The 1998-99 cross section of the
HES was sampled over four points in time: two before the 1998 CSHC
eligibility shift, and at two points in time after the CSHC eligibility
shift. (20) A limitation of the data set is that it does not provide a
measure of whether the household contains a person with a concession
card. As a proxy for this variable, I utilize the eligibility
requirements for the various concessions to create a variable measuring
whether the household has a PCC, CSHC or neither. (21)
Viewing Table 2, it can be seen that pensioners and 1998 CSHC
holders spend remarkably similar amounts and proportions across the
selected commodity categories, with some exceptions. Although these two
groups spend similar dollar amounts, pensioners devote a slightly larger
portion of their budget to food and health care and the 1998 CSHC
holders spent more and devote a larger portion of their budget to food.
The lower portion of the budget devoted to food is important in the
context of Engel's law which states that, as the proportion of
income spent on food increases, well-being decreases. Support is
provided for this proposition as about seven per cent of pensioners
report having a cash flow problem, compared with about two per cent of
1998 CSHC holders. Of all pensioners, almost five per cent record
difficulty paying for utilities and have registration, compared with two
per cent of the 1998 CSHC holders. Focusing only on households with a
CSHC enumerated in 1999 (for example, under the first change to the
eligibility requirements), this group devotes a smaller proportion of
their income to food (about 18 per cent compared with 23 per cent by
pensioners) and about three per cent report a cash flow problem.
Although the 1999 CSHC group spend about double the amount on health
care per week when compared with pensioners, there is no difference in
the proportion of income spent on health care between these two groups.
In 1999, those groups who were not eligible for CSHC or income support
spent more per capita across the major commodity categories, but due to
their greater level of economic resources, devoted less of their
household income to meeting these costs, with the exception of medical
costs. As can be expected, none of these respondents reported having a
cash flow or problem paying for utilities or registration, though the
sample is small. A significant proportion of this final group would be
eligible for CSHC in 2005 given the more generous income eligibility
requirements.
In other research using the 2000 General Social Survey and a
non-linear demand model, I have shown that, as income increases, the
probability of an older household being unable to pay utilities and
shelter costs on time reduces significantly. Similarly, holding any kind
of asset in retirement was found to be strongly associated with being
able to pay for utilities and shelter costs on time. More generally,
across the domain of necessities (including health care, shelter,
utilities and food), I have found that as an elderly household's
income rises the amount spent on necessities rises, but the proportion
of the household budget that is allocated to meeting these costs falls.
(22)
Combined with other findings, these data provide evidence that CSHC
holders are not having to devote larger portions of their income to
meeting expenses that are subsidized by State governments for holders of
the aged pension. However, it is not possible to form a definitive
conclusion given the small sample of elderly households in the HES.
ARE THE CONCESSIONS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT POLICY?
Quite clearly, the extended CSHC eligibility requirements made
available to self funded retirees are not consistent with the heavy
means tests on both income and assets for receipt of other social
security payments. Whereas the original CSHC introduced in 1994 aimed to
provide cheaper medicines through the PBS to the 'asset rich, cash
poor' group of retirees, recent changes to the CSHC mean that the
new SCA is no longer targeted at self funded retirees who may be in need
of assistance.
A further point, established by the Standing Committee of Community
Services and Income Security Administrators, is that the concessions
should not attempt to compensate for deficiencies in the Social Security
system. (23) This issue relates specifically to the Utilities Allowance.
Currently the aged pension is indexed twice yearly against the CPI and
is also linked to wages growth. (24) However, a major reason for the
proposal of the Utilities Allowance by the government was to help
elderly households cope with energy costs. If rising energy costs is
indeed an issue, then a preferable measure would be to re-index the aged
pension against a CPI measure that accounts for the expenditure
composition of elderly households. For example, research using American
data has shown that, over the period 1982 to 1993, the experimental
price index for older Americans rose faster than the CPI for the broader
population. (25) A detailed discussion is not warranted here, but
ongoing research in the ANU's Demography program is using cross
sections of the ABS Household Expenditure Surveys to develop an
elderly-specific CPI to serve as a means of pension indexation.
CONCLUSION
Recent changes to the eligibility requirements for the CSHC mean
that concessions provided to this group are no longer targeted at those
most in need. It is important to recognize that many self-funded
retirees are indeed asset rich but cash poor, indicating a need for
concessions such as access to PBS subsidized pharmaceuticals. However,
elderly households in receipt of income at the higher end of the
existing income limits (up to $80,000 for couples and $50,000 for
singles) can hardly be recognized as being cash poor.
By ensuring that concession payments meet both horizontal and
vertical equity objectives, concessions made available through the
concession card system are able to produce greater intra-cohort equity
whilst minimising government expenditure. This important aspect of
concessional payments was recognized by the former Department of Social
Security at the time of the 1997 concession card enquiry. However, in
addition to the recently announced 35-40 per cent rebate for elderly
Australians' health insurance, the new concessions will accentuate rather than reduce intra-cohort and inter-cohort inequity. Apart from
the resulting growth in income inequity, poorly targeted payments
increase public expenditure, reducing the efficiency with which the
government can deal with policy issues arising due to population ageing.
Although the cost of the SCA is not overtly burdensome (about $258.2
million over four years), the cost is likely to increase rapidly due to
cohort flow over the short to medium term. With a fixed level of
government expenditure, concessions should be targeted at those most in
need. In the context of an ageing population, this presents a delicate
balancing act between constraining public expenditure and providing
adequate services to those older persons most in need. As argued by the
Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs enquiry into
Commonwealth concession cards: 'While a national concession system
of the future will cost more, due to the ageing population, this must be
weighed against the community benefits of Australia's social
welfare system for low income individuals and families'. (26)
Table 1: Income Eligibility Requirements--Commonwealth Seniors Health
Card (CSHC), 1997-2005
Each member of
an illness-
Date Single Person Couples separated couple
1/01/1997 20,841.60 34,798.40 20,529.60
1/01/1999 40,000.00 67,000.00 36,398.00
1/07/2000 41,000.00 68,376.00 37,615.00
01/07/2001-05 50,000.00 80,000.00 50,000.00
Source: Centrelink, unpublished
Table 2: Median weekly expenditure and median expenditure-income shares
for households headed by a person of pension age, 1998 to 1999
Pensioners CSHC 1998 CSHC 1999
1998-99
$ Per $ Per $ Per
Week Income Week Income Week
(per Share (per Share (per
capita) capita) capita)
Housing 19.42 9.93 23.31 9.87 23.96*
Fuel & Power 8.14 4.09 10.28* 4.40 8.58
Food 45.02 23.00 46.78* 20.81 48.33*
Services 12.77 6.75 15.37* 7.53 15.88*
Medical 8.44 4.41 5.40 2.65 18.76*
Transport 16.87 8.46 19.29* 8.04 23.68*
Recreation 15.43 8.31 22.65* 11.74* 19.845*
Percentage with 7.01% 2.33% 3.23%
Cash Flow Problems
Percentage who 4.62% 2.33% 0.81%
could not pay
utilities, registration
on time
N = 628 86 124
CSHC 1999 CSHC (98 & 99) Other
$ Per $ Per Income
Income Week Income Week Share
Share (per Share (per
capita) capita)
Housing 8.58 24.01* 9.59 27.05* 4.39*
Fuel & Power 3.26* 9.12* 3.67* 10.35* 1.93*
Food 18.12* 47.60* 19.44* 62.39* 9.68*
Services 5.37 15.99* 6.23 17.76* 2.49*
Medical 4.97 13.47* 4.58 32.45* 4.67
Transport 8.13 21.58* 8.46 29.04* 4.20*
Recreation 8.32 20.01* 9.69 37.6* 5.12*
Percentage with 2.86% 1.41%
Cash Flow Problems
Percentage who 1.43% 0%
could not pay
utilities, registration
on time
N = 210 71
Notes: * 95% confidence interval for difference in medians excludes
zero. Comparison case for the statistical test is pensioners.
Source: 1998-99 ABS Household Expenditure Survey
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Bob Birrell and Katharine Betts for useful
comments.
References
(1) This payment was originally proposed as the 'Utility
Supplement', but is now also known as the 'Utilities
Allowance'.
(2) Commonwealth concession cards include the Pensioners Concession
Card (PCC), the Health Care Card (HCC) and Commonwealth Seniors Health
Card (CSHC). Two additional cards are issued by the Department of
Veteran's Affairs: the Gold Repatriation Health Card and the White
Repatriation Health Card.
(3) Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services,
Inquiry into long-term strategies to address the ageing of the
Australian population over the next 40 years, Occasional Paper No. 8,
2003
(4) Howard Government, 'Recognising Senior Australians--Their
needs and their carers', 2004, available from
<http://www.liberal.org.au/2004-policy/Oct01_Recognising_Senior_Australians_-_Their_Needs_and_Their_Carers.pdf> (accessed December 2004).
Australian Government, 'Mid year economic and fiscal outlook:
Appendix A policy decisions taken since the 2004-05 budget', 2004,
available from <http://www.budget.gov.au/2004-05/myefo/download/11_Appendix_A.pdf> (accessed January 2005).
(5) The age of eligibility for the aged pension is 65 for men. The
age eligibility requirement for women is below that for men, but is
slowly increasing to age 65. For full details see:
<http://www.centrelink.gov.au/internet/internet.nsf/payments/qual_how_agepens.htm> (accessed Feburary 2005).
(6) National Welfare Rights Network, 'Room for improvement:
Renovating for a simpler and fairer system', 2004
(7) ACT Council of Social Service, 'ACTCOSS submission on ACT
Government Concessions', 2002, <www.actcoss.org.au> (accessed
January 2005). Standing Committee of Community Services and Income
Security Administrators, 'Proposed national framework for
concessions for low income Australians', 1997. House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs,
'Concessions--Who benefits. Report on concession card availability
and eligibility for concessions', Australian Parliamentary Papers,
vol. 27, 1997, pp. 300-311
(8) The implication is that so long as the household satisfies the
income threshold, the household is entitled to hold any amount of
assets.
(9) House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and
Community Affairs, op. cit., 1997, p. 62
(10) D. Correll, 'Equitable policy responses to population
ageing', Impact, December 2001, p. 8
(11) National Welfare Rights Network, op. cit., 2004, pp. 26-27
(12) House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and
Community Affairs, op. cit., 1997, p. 8
(13) Howard Government, op. cit., 2004, p. 3
(14) ibid., 2004, p. 4
(15) ibid., 2004, p. 5
(16) Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services,
'Budget 2001-02 What's new what's different', 2001,
available from <http://www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/budget/budget2001-wnwd_b.htm> (accessed January 2005).
(17) J. Temple 'Will the government's proposed insurance
reform increase the health insurance coverage of older
Australians?' People and Place, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004, pp. 1-9
(18) H. Wang, D. Wilson and J. Yates, Measuring the distributional
impact of direct and indirect housing assistance, Australian Institute
of Health and Welfare, Canberra, 2004
(19) ACT Council of Social Service, op. cit., 2002, p. 5
(20) It is important to recall that this is the shift in
eligibility from around $21,000 to $40,000 for lone persons and from
about $35,000 to $66,000 for couples, not the more recent shift out to
$50,000 for singles and $80,000 for couples.
(21) There are two significant limitations on the data in Table 2:
firstly, due to the lag between the change in the CSHC eligibility
requirement and the conduct of the survey, a large proportion of persons
may have become eligible for the CSHC but had been yet to claim the
card. Second, restricting the HES sample to households headed by persons
of pension age restricts the sample considerably with 628 pensioners,
210 CSHC holders (86 enumerated in 1998 and 124 in 1999) and 71 who were
not eligible for any concession (including Veterans affairs payments).
As such the data should be treated with caution.
(22) J. Temple, The role of selected demographic variables in
explaining elderly Australian's expenditure on necessities, Ph.D
thesis, Demography program, The Australian National University, 2005
(23) Standing Committee of Community Services and Income Security
Administrators, op. cit., 1997
(24) The maximum single rate of the pension cannot fall below 25
per cent of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings.
(25) N. Amble and K. Stewart, 'Experimental price index for
elderly consumers', Monthly Labor Review, vol. 117, no. 5, 1994,
pp. 11-16. The experimental price index for elderly consumers is a
measure of the rise in prices, weighted specifically for the consumption
profile of older households. That is, it is a measure of the level of
inflation experienced by elderly households.
(26) House of Representatives Standing Committee on Family and
Community Affairs, op. cit., 1997, p. 28