Patient election in Australian hospitals: how do private and Medicare admissions differ?
Temple, Jeromey
Recently, the Premier of Queensland has proposed placing
restrictions upon privately insured patients electing to be treated as
Medicare patients in public hospitals as is currently permitted under
the Australian Health Care Agreements. The purpose of this paper is to
examine differences in four kinds of patient admissions in Australian
hospitals. Results drawn from the 2001 Australian Bureau Statistics
(ABS) National Health Survey show that almost 11 per cent of all
hospital admissions in 2001 were by privately insured patients admitting
themselves as Medicare (public) patients. A further 37 per cent were by
privately insured patients in either private or public hospitals. Of the
remaining 48 per cent of hospital admissions, approximately six per cent
were by uninsured persons who are admitted as private patients in either
private or public hospitals. The final 42 percent of admissions were
uninsured Medicare patients in the public hospital sector. These four
groups of patients are found to differ considerably by their
socio-economic characteristics, use of hospitals and also by reported
reasons for purchasing or not purchasing private health insurance.
INTRODUCTION
In October 2005, Queensland's Premier Beattie and the Minister
for Health, Stephen Robertson, launched an Action Plan to improve
Queensland's public health system, at the cost of $6 billion over
five years. (1) Although the plan is quite comprehensive, one aspect
that has generated considerable interest is implementing a program to
increase the proportion of privately insured patients in public
hospitals who elect to be treated as private patients rather than as
Medicare (public) patients. The reform package also includes the
introduction of co-payments or means testing for non-urgent surgical
procedures, as well as for dental and specialist outpatient services.
Beattie has argued: 'We're sick of the public system being
ripped off. We actually believe those people who are making a financial
contribution to a private health fund would expect their fund to
contribute'. (2)
Currently, under the Australian Health Care Agreements (AHCA), all
Australians regardless of health insurance status, are entitled to admit
themselves as Medicare patients in public hospitals, thereby receiving
free treatment. Upon entry to hospital, all patients are required to
fill in a patient election form which records whether they are to be
treated as a public patient, thereby avoiding out of pocket expenses, or
as a private patient, enabling them to skip the public sector surgical
queue for elective procedures. Indeed, the Federal Minister for Health,
Tony Abbott, has stated that Beattie's proposed reforms constitute
a breach of the AHCA, and he is investigating means of blocking them.
(3)
Beattie, however, is not the first to draw attention to the use of
public hospitals as public (Medicare) patients by privately insured
patients. In February 2005, The Productivity Commission released the
Review of National Competition Policy Reforms. (4) This report
summarises '... it is generally accepted that the financing and
delivery arrangements give rise to considerable inefficiency and waste
in the health system'. (5) One of the proposals for reducing this
inefficiency was 'allowing, or obliging, those people who can
afford adequate private health insurance to opt out of the public
system'.
A month later, the Australian Government Department of Health and
Ageing released a report examining the use of public hospitals by
private patients. (6) This study found that, of the privately insured
who had admitted themselves as private patients in public hospitals,
about 65 per cent made the choice freely. About eight per cent reported
that they were pressured into being admitted as private patient, and a
further 10 per cent said they were not given a choice as to whether they
were to be admitted as a Medicare or private patient.
More recently, in September, the Queensland Health Services Review
was released; the precursor to Beattie's new health plan. (7) This
report estimated that about six per cent of patients in
Queensland's public hospitals are privately insured but do not
elect to use their private insurance when being treated. The report
makes a list of recommendations for reform, including, to
'encourage all patients with private health insurance to use it as
private patients in public hospitals or in the private hospital
system'. (8)
The aim of this paper is to examine how privately insured patients
who admit themselves as public patients differ from other types of
hospital admissions. More specifically, this paper seeks to provide
evidence on the following: firstly, why do the privately insured who
admit themselves as public patients in public hospitals purchase health
insurance if they do not use it for hospital care? and; secondly, how do
the economic and demographic characteristics of the privately insured
who admit themselves as Medicare patients differ from other patients?
THE PRIVATE/MEDICARE PATIENT DECISION
Between 1997 and 2004, the Federal Government introduced key
reforms to the private health insurance market: the Private Health
Insurance Incentives Scheme (PHIIS), the Private Health Insurance
Incentives Act (PHIIA) and Lifetime Health Cover.
PHIIS encouraged private health insurance membership through a
series of subsidies and tax penalties that were applied at different
income levels. PHIIS introduced the Medicare levy surcharge, which is an
additional one per cent tax on annual income paid in addition to the 1.5
per cent Medicare Levy. Singles with incomes higher than $50,000 per
annum and couples with an income in excess of $100,000 were required to
pay the one per cent Medicare surcharge, in addition to the 1.5 per cent
Medicare levy, if they did not purchase a registered private hospital
insurance policy. PHIIA replaced PHIIS in January 1999. The key
component of this new policy was a 30 per cent subsidy on household
health insurance premiums for all persons regardless of their income.
PHIIA retained the one per cent Medicare surcharge. The final reform
over this period was 'Life Time Health Cover' (2000), which
changed the age component of community rating, by offering low premiums
to people who invested in health insurance prior to turning 30. All
persons aged over 30 at July 2000 are required to pay a two per cent
surcharge on their insurance premium for each year that they remain
uncovered. One important provision in Life Time Health Cover was that
individuals born before 1st July 1934 were exempt from the surcharge.
At the time of these changes, the then Minister for Health and Aged
Care claimed that these reforms would 'take pressure off the public
hospitals'. (9) The current Minister for Health and Ageing, Tony
Abbott, has continually supported the notion that increasing private
health insurance coverage leads to less pressure on the public health
care system. (10)
A growing body of literature has questioned the assumption that
increased health insurance coverage in the population relieves
'pressure' from the public hospital sector through shifting
surgical procedures to the private hospital sector. Many argue that the
30 per cent rebate in particular is an inefficient, expensive means of
reducing pressure on public hospitals and that the rate of increase in
health insurance premiums is continuing to increase the public subsidy
cost. (11) The 30 per cent rebate has also been criticised as it covers
many non-essential ancillary services not offered in the public hospital
sector. (12)
Vigorous debate also continues on the effect of the reforms on
public sector waiting lists for elective surgery. Some researchers have
provided evidence that waiting lists have remained stagnant or actually
increased, while others argue waiting lists would have been larger
without the reforms. (13) It has been suggested that differences in
wages paid to doctors for different surgical procedures performed in
private and public hospitals result in a flow of services being offered
in the private hospital system, resulting in increased public sector
waiting lists. (14)
Through the Australian Health Care Agreements (AHCA) all
Australians covered by Medicare are eligible for treatment and
accommodation in public hospitals. Medicare patients are not entitled to
choose their doctor, nor are they eligible to be treated in a private
hospital. For some elective procedures, Medicare patients may be placed
on a considerable waiting list. However, the advantage of being treated
as a Medicare patient in a public hospital is that all costs are met
through Medicare. A privately insured patient may elect to admit
themselves as a Medicare patient in a public hospital. When admitted to
a hospital, all patients are required to sign a 'Patient Election
Form' recording whether the patient is admitted as a Medicare or
private patient. (15)
Alternatively, a patient may elect to enter a public hospital as a
private patient, giving the advantage of choice between doctors and a
shorter waiting period for elective surgical procedures. A private
patient may also admit themselves as a private patient into a private
hospital. A patient is defined as 'private' if they have
private hospital insurance, or if they meet the expenses for hospital
care out of their own pockets, that is, they self- insure. As will be
discussed, the disadvantage of treatment as a private patient is the
possibility of out-of-pocket expenses through 'gap' fees, or
Front End Deductibles (FED).
In the context of the health insurance reforms and debate about the
effect on the public hospital sector, it is suprising that only a few
studies have examined the characteristics and prevalence of privately
insured patients admitting themselves as public patients in public
hospitals. In a recent study Walker and colleagues, find: firstly, among
the privately insured about 31 per cent who had been admitted to a
hospital in the previous 12 months were admitted to a public hospital as
either private or Medicare patients and; secondly, low income earners,
with or without health insurance, were more likely to use a public over
a private hospital. (16)
In an earlier study, Sullivan et al., examined the difficulty of
encouraging the insured to use their health insurance when admitted into
public hospitals. (17) They showed that about 33 per cent of insured
patients in Victorian metropolitan hospitals declared and used their
private health insurance. Out of a small sample of 38 respondents, about
31 per cent cited out of pocket expenses as a reason for not using their
health insurance. A further 47 per cent cited 'no
extras/benefits' for not declaring their private health insurance
status.
Among the limited data available, results from the 1998 ABS health
insurance survey show that about 15 per cent of public hospital
admissions are by privately insured patients electing to be treated as
public patients. A further 13 per cent of public hospital admissions are
by privately insured patients admitting themselves as private patients.
(18) Given the timing of recent reforms to the private health insurance
industry, these figures require revision. The health insurance reforms
have increased the proportion of the population with health insurance,
creating a higher propensity for hospital admissions to be from those
who are privately insured. This implies a differing distribution of
those entering hospitals by health insurance status.
TYPOLOGY OF PATIENT ELECTIONS
Data from the 2001 ABS National Health Survey enable an examination
of the socio-economic characteristics of persons who have been
hospitalised in the past 12 months tabulated by health insurance status
and by whether the patient was admitted as a private or Medicare
patient. (19) An important limitation of these data is that it is not
possible to separate those patients admitted into private hospitals from
public hospitals. However, given the rules governing access to private
hospitals, it is possible to formulate the hospital admission typology
shown in Table 1.
Respondents in cell A have private health insurance but admit
themselves as Medicare (public) patients in public hospitals. This group
accounts for almost 11 per cent of hospital admissions. These patients
have been the focus of recent government reports and are the target of
Beattie's new health funding reforms as discussed above. A further
46 per cent of admissions are uninsured patients who admit themselves as
public patients (Cell B). Cells A and B represent fully funded Medicare
patients in the public hospital (most large public hospitals have
private wards for such patients) sector. One caveat, however, is that
the ABS defines Department of Veterans Affairs patients as Medicare
patients. Some of these admissions may have occurred in private
hospitals.
In contrast, cell C consists of the privately insured who admit
themselves to private hospitals or admit themselves as private patients
in public hospitals. These patients are estimated to account for about
37 per cent of all admissions. The final six per cent of hospital
admissions are the uninsured, who elect to be treated as private
patients in either public or private hospitals (cell D). These patients
are the self insured and meet the cost of hospitalisation out of their
own expenses.
WHY PURCHASE OR NOT PURCHASE PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE?
The AHCA guarantees free accommodation and treatment in public
hospitals for all Australian citisens. Given this subsidised alternative, why do Australians who are admitted to hospital purchase
health insurance at all? Tables 2 and 3 present results from the 2001
National Health Survey, which asked respondents why they purchased
health insurance and, in the case of, non-purchase, why they did not.
Respondents could select more than one option. These data enable an
examination of the differing reasons for purchasing or not purchasing
health insurance by patient election type.
As shown in Table 2, there are shared reasons given by Medicare and
private patients regarding why they chose to purchase hospital
insurance. Both agree that access to shorter waiting times for surgery
and security or peace of mind were important factors driving their
decision to purchase hospital insurance. In contrast, private and
Medicare patients differ significantly when asked whether Life Time
Health Cover or to gain government benefits were significant factors in
their decision to purchase health insurance. About 7.5 per cent of
public patients cite Life Time Health Cover as a reason for purchasing
insurance, when compared to just two per cent of private patients. A
further nine per cent of public patients cite to 'gain government
benefits or to avoid the Medicare levy surcharge', compared to just
4.5 per cent of private patients. However, private patients are more
likely than Medicare patients to report allowing treatment as a private
patient in a public hospital (10.2 versus 3.6) and having always had it
(17.1 versus 9.6) as reasons for purchasing health insurance.
These results provide evidence that many insured persons purchase
health insurance simply to avoid government levies through the Medicare
Surcharge and Lifetime Health Cover. One potential consequence of this
is that, when they do purchase health insurance, they tend to purchase
lower cost policies, which include high Front End Deductibles (FED). A
FED is an excess that must be paid by patients to the health insurance
fund before they can be admitted as a private patient in either a
private or public hospital. Many commentators contend that high
FED's are a reason that the privately insured do not use their
private health insurance when admitted into hospital. (20) That is,
rather than admitting themselves as private patients and therefore
incurring the deductible, a person can admit themselves as a Medicare
patient and have no out-of-pocket costs.
Figure 1 displays the proportional growth in FED products relative
to non front-end policies over the period 1997-2001. At the time of the
implementation of PHIIS, approximately 32 per cent of policies had a
FED. By 2000, with the introduction of Lifetime Health Cover, FED
products grew to 52 per cent. In 2000, the Federal Government excluded
products with a high FED from the list of registered health insurance
policies that enables the purchaser to avoid the Medicare Levy
Surcharge. A high FED policy is defined as one that involves an excess
payment of more than $500 for single contributors and $1000 for single
parent, family or couple memberships. (21) All persons who had purchased
a high FED policy prior to May 2000 are excluded from this clause so
long as they maintain the same policy. Despite this policy change, the
proportion of FED products relative to non-FED health insurance policies
has continued to rise. As of June 2005, approximately 60 per cent of all
policies have a FED. Due to the clause excluding purchases prior to
2004, a substantial proportion of FED policies may have a high FED.
In addition to FED charges, a disadvantage of admission as a
private patient into a public hospital is the possibility of 'gap
fees'. The Commonwealth Government has established a
'recommended' schedule of fees and services, known as the
Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS). Medicare covers approximately 75 per
cent of the MBS fee, and the patient's health insurance fund covers
the remaining 25 per cent for in hospital services. (22) However,
doctors and specialists are not legally obligated to charge in
accordance with the MBS. For example, a doctor may charge 120 per cent
of the MBS fee, leaving a 20 per cent 'gap' in expenses that
are not meet by Medicare or by the patient's health insurance fund.
Gap insurance can be provided by the patient's health insurance
policy. However, gap insurance rests on the provision of an arrangement
between the patient's health fund, doctor and/or hospital to have a
gap agreement or gap cover scheme in place. This undermines one of the
key advantages of private health insurance: choice of doctor. A recent
report commissioned by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing
showed that 44 per cent of private patients experience gap payments and
36 per cent perceived the gap payment to be 'considerable'.
(23) Responding to these findings, the Minister for Health, Tony Abbott
stated: 'There will always be some cases where patients face
unanticipated costs. Still, the sector needs to do better than this if
private medicine is to continue to flourish'. (24)
From either perspective, through gap payments or payment of an
excess on FED insurance policies, the insured can incur significant
out-of-pocket health expenses for care as a private patient in the
public or private hospital sector. This acts as a strong disincentive to
admit oneself as a private patient in a public or private hospital.
However, the strong incentive to purchase a hospital health insurance
policy remains: to avoid the additional one per cent Medicare surcharge
introduced under PHIIS and to avoid the two per cent tariff imposed
under Life Time Health cover.
Table 3 displays the percentage of persons reporting different
reasons for not purchasing private health insurance, classified by their
most recent patient election type. Compared to uninsured private
patients, uninsured Medicare patients are far more likely to report
'Can't afford to' as a reason for not purchasing health
insurance (49.8 versus 17.7). Medicare patients are also more likely
than private patients to report 'Medicare cover sufficient'
(10.7 versus 2) or 'Don't need it' (4.6 versus 0.7) as
reasons for not purchasing health insurance. In contrast, private
patients are far more likely to report a health concession card as
providing adequate health coverage when compared to public patients
(48.3 versus 11.5). (25) Private uninsured patients are also more likely
than Medicare patients to report that health insurance is not worth it
or that they are prepared to pay for health care out of their own
resources as reasons for not purchasing health insurance.
These data provide evidence that uninsured private patients are
wealthier and, by virtue of their concession card status, older than
uninsured public patients. Unlike younger Australians who are only
eligible for the low income health care card, many older Australians may
be eligible for concessions through the Pensioners Concession Card
Commonwealth Seniors Health Care card or the Veterans Affairs card. The
income eligibility requirements are particularly generous for the
Commonwealth Seniors Health Care Card. (26)
DIFFERENCES IN PATIENT ELECTION BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND HEALTH
CHARACTERISTICS
Table 4 classifies type of patient admission by selected
demographic, economic and health characteristics, using two comparison
categories. In the first panel, Medicare patients with no private
hospital insurance are compared with private patients who hold no
private health insurance. In the second, privately insured patients
admitted as Medicare patients are compared with privately insured
patients admitted as private patients.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Relative to uninsured Medicare patients, uninsured private patients
are older. For example, just over half of all uninsured private patients
are aged 60 and over, compared with just 31 per cent of uninsured
Medicare patients. Reflecting this older age profile, uninsured private
patients are more likely to have multiple long-term health conditions
and are also over represented among higher income earners. It is
important to recall that all persons born before 1934 were excluded from
the Lifetime Health cover rules, as discussed earlier.
Compared to the privately insured admitted as Medicare patients,
the insured admitted as private patients are more likely to be older
but, interestingly, there is no distinction in the income profile
between these patient admission types. Results from the National Health
Survey also show that, compared to insured Medicare patients, insured
private patients tend to have a larger number of long-term health
conditions. Importantly, the insured Medicare patients have also held
their insurance policies for a much shorter period of time than the
private patients. For example almost 52 per cent of privately insured
public patients purchased health insurance in the past two years,
compared with just 14 per cent of insured public patients.
DISCUSSION
In light of continual criticisms of the recent health insurance
reforms, Premier Beattie has suggested implementing a policy to
'encourage' private patients to admit themselves as private
patients, rather than as Medicare patients, in public or private
hospitals. Such a policy is an exercise in cost shifting, from the state
government to private health insurance companies and ultimately
individuals (through insurance premiums, FEDs and gap payments).
Due to the substitution between Medicare and private election
status, the health insurance reforms are acting against the
policy's stated intention: reducing pressure from public hospitals.
For example, results from this study show that, when admitted to
hospital, significant proportions of the insured do not declare their
health insurance status and admit themselves as public patients. Given
the billions of dollars that the Australian Government has spent on
subsidising private health insurance in recent years, 11 per cent is a
very significant figure. These groups of insured Medicare patients were
more likely than insured private patients to report Lifetime Health
Cover or to gain government benefits as the reason for purchasing health
insurance. That is, they were encouraged to purchase a health insurance
policy to avoid penalties imposed upon them by the Government, rather
than necessarily choosing a policy that best meets their health care
needs. Moreover, this former group tends to be younger and healthier
Australians who have held their insurance policies for a much shorter
period of time: about 52 per cent of respondents had purchased their
policy between 1999 and 2001. (27)
A potential explanation for the admission of insured patients as
public patients is the risk of out-of-pocket expenses through FED
policies (which have accounted for a greater proportion of insurance
purchases) or through gap fees. So long as a free alternative exists
through Medicare, there will be a strong incentive for patients subject
to FED policies or high gap fees to admit themselves as Medicare
patients. This poses important implications for any policy aimed at
forcing the privately insured to admit themselves as private rather than
as Medicare patients. Many of the insured Medicare patients may have
purchased health insurance simply to avoid the one per cent Medicare
surcharge, or to avoid the two per cent Life Time Health cover surcharge
and thus their policies may not adequately cover hospital services
without significant out-of-pocket costs. Moreover, any policy that
'forces' a patient to admit themselves as 'private'
undermines the key foundation of Medicare: free universal health care
for all Australian citizens.
This paper has also provided significant insight into the
characteristics of the uninsured who chose to admit themselves as
Medicare or private patients. Whereas there was little difference in the
income profile of the insured Medicare and insured private patients, the
decision for the uninsured to admit themselves as private or Medicare
patients is strongly related to their household income. About half of
uninsured Medicare patients didn't purchase health insurance
because they couldn't afford to, compared with about 18 per cent of
uninsured private patients. The later group also tended to be older, and
consisted of a larger number of retirees with access to a health
concession card. It is important to recognise that this older group of
patients (born before June 1934) were exempt from the two per cent Life
Time Health Cover surcharge. That is, they have the alternative to
self-insure without being subject to the penalties under Life Time
Health Cover. An important question for ongoing research is: will
cohorts subject to the Life Time Health cover surcharge have adequate
financial resources to maintain their private health insurance coverage
into advanced old age? If so, will they choose to admit themselves as
private or Medicare patients?
The problems surrounding patient choice upon admission to public
hospitals underscore how hard it is for the recent health insurance
reforms to realise their proposed aim: reducing pressure on the public
hospital sector. Rather than tinkering at the edges of health care
financing at the state level, what is required is an overhaul of the
interaction between private and public health care markets in Australia.
Acknowledgement
The 2001 ABS National Health Survey was made available to the
author through an agreement between the Australian Bureau of Statistics
and the Australian Vice Chancellors Committee. The author benefited from
comments by Bob Birrell and Katharine Betts and an anonymous reviewer.
References
(1) Queensland Government, Action Plan: Building a Better Health
Service for Queensland, 2005. Available from:
http://www.health.qld.gov.au/publications/corporate/ActionPlan.pdf,
accessed: 10/2005
(2) M. Christiansen, 'Beattie wants private hospitals to cater
for private health insurance patients' The World Today, Australian
Broadcasting Commission (ABC), 2005. Transcript available:
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2005/s1485908.htm, accessed:
10/2005
(3) S. Parnell, 'Beattie's cure for hospital woes',
The Australian, 20/10/2005
(4) Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition Policy
Reforms: Inquiry Report No. 33, Productivity Commission, Canberra, 2005
(5) ibid., p. 328
(6) TQA Research, Consumer Survey: Informed Financial Consent,
2005. Available from: www.health.gov.au, accessed 10/2005
(7) P. Forster, 'Queensland Health Systems Review', 2005.
Available from: www.healthreview.com.au, accessed 10/2005
(8) ibid., p. xxxii
(9) M. Wooldridge, 'Second Reading Speech by Minister for
Health and Aged Care Introducing the Private Health Insurance Incentives
Bill 1998' House of Representatives. Hansard, 12 November, 1998 p.
263
(10) T. Abbott 'Media release: Private patient gap
payments', 2005. Available from: http://www.health.gov.au,
accessed: 01/2006
(11) S. Duckett and T. Jackson, 'The new health insurance
rebate: An inefficient way of assisting public hospitals', Medical
Journal of Australia, vol. 172, no. 9,2000, pp. 439-42; P. Clarke,
'The effect of the 30 per cent private health insurance rebate on
the purchasing behaviour and intentions of the Australian
population', Australian Health Review, vol. 22, no. 3, 1999, pp.
7-17; L. Segal, 'Why it's time to review the role of private
health insurance in Australia', Australian Health Review, vol. 27,
no. 1, 2004, pp. 3-15; B. Lokuge, R. Denniss and T. Faunce,
'Private health insurance and regional Australia', Medical
Journal of Australia, vol. 182, no. 6, 2005, pp. 290-93
(12) H. Frech and S. Hopkins, 'Why subsidise private health
insurance?', The Australian Economic Review, vol. 37, no. 3, 2004,
pp. 243-56
(13) S. Duckett, 'Private care and public waiting',
Australian Health Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2005, pp. 87-93; V.
Sundararajan, K. Brown, T. Hendersen and D. Hindle, 'Effects of
increased private health insurance on hospital utilisation in
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320-29; B. Birrell, L. Hawthorne and V. Rapson, The Outlook for Surgical
Services in Australasia, Royal College of Surgeons, 2003; B. Hanning,
'Has the increase in private health insurance uptake affected the
Victorian public hospital surgical waiting list?', Australian
Health Review, vol. 25, no. 6, 2002, pp. 64-71
(14) J. Richardson and L. Segal, 'Private health insurance and
the pharmaceutical benefits scheme: How effective has recent government
policy been?', Australian Health Review, vol. 29, no. 1, 2004, pp.
34-47
(15) T. Abbott, 'Know Your Rights and Responsibilities as a
Private Patient in Hospital', Australian Government Department of
Health and Ageing, 2004. Available from:
http://www.health.gov.au/privatehealth/consumers/charter/index.htm, date
accessed: 11/2005
(16) A. Walker, R. Percival, L. Thurecht and J. Pearce,
'Distributional impact of recent changes in the private health
insurance policie", Australian Health Review, vol. 29, no. 2, p.
167
(17) N. Sullivan, R. Redpath and A. O'Donnell, 'Public
hospitals: Who's looking after you? The difficulties in encouraging
patients to use their private health insurance in public
hospitals', Australian Health Review, vol. 25, no. 3, 2002, pp.
6-14
(18) Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Health Insurance
Survey, Australia, ABS, Cat. no. 4335.0, Canberra, 1998
(19) These data include information on 2,634 individuals who
reported admission into a hospital in the previous 12 months, and who
fully reported their health insurance status and patient admission type.
Although persons under 15 reported admission to hospital, it is not
possible to measure their health insurance status using the basic NHS and they are therefore omitted from the analysis. Information on the
hospital admission refers to the most recent admission. It is important
to recognise that a patient may choose to be either private or Medicare
patient at each admission
(20) Sullivan, Redpath and O'Donnell op. cit., 2002
(21) Department of Health and Ageing. Private health
insurance--Medicare levy surcharge, 2005. Available from:
http://www.health.gov.au, accessed: 10/2005
(22) The one exception to the treatment of the privately insured in
private hospitals is that different rules apply if the patient is
presented at the emergency department of the hospital. In this
situation, patients are treated as 'not admitted patients' and
Medicare subsidises 85 per cent of the MBS schedule fee as when visiting
a GP. If tests are required at the emergency department there is no gap
arrangement in place between private hospitals, doctors and private
health insurance funds. In this situation, the gap fees could be quite
substantial.
(23) TQA Research, op. cit., 2005
(24) Abbott, op. cit., 2006
(25) Commonwealth concession cards include the Pensioners
Concession Card, the Health Care Card and the Commonwealth Seniors
Health Card. Two additional cards are issued by the Department of
Veteran's Affairs: the Gold Repatriation Health Card and the White
Repatriation Health Card. Although benefits offered by these cards
differ, they all provide subsidised pharmaceuticals through the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.
(26) J. Temple, 'The seniors concession allowance and utility
allowance: equity implications' People and Place, vol. 13, no.1,
2005, pp. 23-30
(27) During this time period, both PHIAA and Life Time Health cover
were introduced.
Table 1: Typology of hospital admissions, by insurance status and
patient election type, Australians aged 15 years and over
Hospital Health Insurance Status
Insured Uninsured
Medicare Patient* A. In the public hospital B. In the public hospital
sector as a Medicare sector as a Medicare
patient. patient.
10.7% (CI=9.5, 11.9) 46.0% (CI=44.2, 48.0)
n=282 n=1,213
Private Patient C. In the public or D. In the public or
private hospital sector private hospital sector as
as a private patient. a private patient.
37.4% (CI=35.5, 39.2) 5.9% (CI=5.0, 6.8)
n=984 n=155
Source: 2001 ABS National Health Survey
Notes: CI = 95 per cent Binomial Wald Confidence Interval; n = cell
size;
* includes an undisclosed number of Department of Veterans Affairs
patients who may be treated as public patients in private hospitals,
hence the term Medicare patient.
Table 2: Reasons for purchasing hospital insurance, by patient election
type, Australians aged 15 years and over, 2001.
Insured, Medicare Insured, Private
Patient per cent Patient per cent
Security / peace of mind 13.8 10.8
Life time cover / avoid age 7.5 1.9 ***
surcharge
Choice of doctor 1.8 3.1
Allow treatment as private patient 3.6 10.2 ***
in public hospital
Provides benefits for ancillary 4.6 4.3
services
Shorter waiting time 16.7 17.8
Always had it / condition of 9.6 17.1 ***
employment
Gain government benefits / avoid 9.2 4.5 **
medicare levy (surcharge)
Other financial reasons 5.7 4.9
Has condition that requires 7.1 8.1
treatment
Elderly / getting older / likely to 9.2 8.4
need treatment
Other reason 11.4 9.0
Total (N) 282 984
Source: 2001 ABS National Health Survey
Notes: Base category for test of proportion is Insured Medicare Patient;
*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01.
Table 3: Reasons for not purchasing hospital insurance, by patient
election type, Australians aged 15 years and over, 2001
Not Insured, Not Insured,
Medicare patient Private patient
per cent per cent
Can't afford to 49.8 17.7 ***
High risk category 0.5 0.7
Not worth it 5.1 10.2 *
medicare cover sufficient 10.7 2.0 ***
Don't need it / in good health 4.6 0.7 ***
Won't pay both medicare levy and 1.3 2.0
insurance
Disillusionment about out-of-pocket 3.2 2.0
costs / gap fees
Prepared to pay out of own resources 0.6 5.5 **
Concession card adequate 11.5 48.3 ***
Not high priority 4.9 4.1
Other 7.9 6.8
Total (n) 1171 147
Source: 2001 ABS National Health Survey
Notes: Table excludes 50 respondents who have ancillary insurance only;
Base category for test of proportion is Insured Public Patient; ***
p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05.
Table 4: Differences in hospital admission, by insurance and patient
type, and selected Factors, Australians aged 15 years and over
No Private Hospital Private Hospital
Insurance Insurance
Medicare Private Medicare Private
Patient, Patient, Patient, Patient,
per cent per cent per cent per cent
Age
15-29 28.8 13.6 *** 17.4 12.7 *
30-44 23.9 21.3 37.9 28.7 **
45-59 16.1 14.8 23.8 22.7
60-74 18.7 11.6 ** 13.8 23.8 ***
75+ 12.5 38.7 *** 7.1 12.2 **
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Equivalent Income
0-20% 41.7 26.6 *** 12.3 14.9
20-40% 30.3 36.2 14.4 16.9
40-60% 14.3 12.5 21.6 20.1
60-80% 8.7 10.9 23.3 21
80-100% 5 14.8 *** 28.4 27.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Has Concession Card?
No 32 36.1 69.9 64.4 [dagger][dagger]
Yes 68 63.9 30.1 35.6 [dagger][dagger]
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Length of Time Held Health Insurance
< 1 Year n.a. n.a. 27.7 5.1 ***
1-2 Years n.a. n.a. 23.7 9.4 ***
2-5 Years n.a. n.a. 7.1 7.8
> 5 Years n.a. n.a. 41.5 77.7 ***
Total 100.0 100.0
Number of Long Term Health Conditions
0 8.3 1.9 *** 9.2 4.4 **
1-2 26.6 24.5 31.9 27.7
3+ 65.1 73.6 * 58.9 67.9 **
Total 100 100 100 100
Total N 1213 155 282 984
Total per cent 46.1 5.9 10.7 37.4
Source: 2001 ABS National Health Survey
Notes: *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 [dagger][dagger] p<0.10