On the road (and bridge) again: in this era of declining revenues, more states are turning to the private sector to complete transportation projects.
Reed, James B.
We've heard it for years. The nation's bridges are
crumbling, our roads are peppered with potholes, Congress won't
pass a comprehensive transportation funding plan, and gas tax revenue
isn't cutting it.
There's just not enough money to fix the millions of miles of
roads and the tens of thousands of bridges spanning the country. What we
need is some $134 billion to $262 billion each year for the next 20
years. What we have: 40 percent to 70 percent less.
What's even more alarming is that one in nine bridges in the
United States--and the average is 42 years old--is structurally
deficient, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers'
2013 Infrastructure Report Card. And to fix them, we need $8 billion
more each year than we already spend.
Wisconsin plans on about $2.5 billion in state and federal
transportation money each year, but it needs $480 million more to
maintain, improve and modernize its existing roads and bridges.
In 2013, 5,540 of Pennsylvania's bridges--24 percent--were
structurally deficient. Today, that number has dropped to 4,200, thanks
to an aggressive program and a not-so-new idea with a new twist:
public-private partnerships (P3s or PPPs).
The fuel taxes drivers pay at the pump have paid for most
transportation projects, but that money is decreasing every year. And
without "the political will to raise the revenue necessary to pay
for what is needed," says Minnesota Senator Scott Dibble (DFL), P3s
may be one solution.
Sharing the Risk
The concept is simply a new take on an old idea: Fund and finance
complex projects by cobbling together a variety of local, state, federal
and private sources, but change the stakes. These public-private
partnerships bring new money and shift some of the risks to the private
partner, so a state's department of transportation can do what it
does best--plan the project and obtain environmental permits and
rights-of-way.
This is the key feature distinguishing P3s from conventional
government projects: Through a performance-based, long-term service
contract with a government agency, the private entity takes on what has
typically been the responsibility of the public sector--financing,
design, construction, operation and maintenance, even toll revenue
collection.
There is a public cost to transferring risk to the private side.
The bigger the risk assumed by the private sector, the greater the cost
to the state because of its guarantee of return on private investments.
But the private party also has "skin in the game" in terms of
its financial investment, so keeping up operation standards on its side
is pretty much guaranteed.
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"Giving a private partner an equity stake in a project, as
well as control over the project's execution, generally encourages
more efficient management than the traditional approach affords,"
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) stated in testimony to Congress in
March 2014. The contracts specify that when finished, the private side
must hand back projects to the public side in improved condition.
P3s are viable for "some, but certainly not all infrastructure
projects," says Representative Ed Soliday (R), chair of the Indiana
House transportation committee, whose state has embarked on a number of
these projects. "There are many types of P3s. The key is having a
state revenue source to make payments to the private entity as project
phases are completed."
This is the key caveat. P3s do not free up or create new public
funds. They may reduce some of the initial upfront public debt, but
revenues from tolls or other state transportation tax revenues are
needed to pay back the private investment.
In 2006, 23 states allowed public-private transportation
partnerships and that number grew to 33 states by 2013. The trend
continued, and last year 22 states considered at least 70 bills to allow
P3s or tweak existing laws. Some $61 billion is committed to P3 projects
over the past 25 years--half in the last five years.
The Promise of P3s
The new P3 approach is an effort to provide high quality roads and
bridges in an era of diminishing gas taxes, as well as uncertainty and
lack of growth in the federal transportation program, which pays for
about 25 percent of the average state's transportation costs. By
providing additional capital through private-sector financing, P3s can
help bring about projects that otherwise might have been delayed or not
built at all because of declining revenue and debt limit ceilings.
Projects costing more than $100 million reduced design and
construction time by as much as a year under the P3 approach, according
to the CBO. "The research has found that, compared with the
traditional approach, public-private partnerships have slightly reduced
the time required to complete the design and construction phases of road
projects and lowered construction costs by a small amount, on
average."
Well-executed P3s, according to a recent study by the Eno
Foundation, a transportation think tank, can control costs, allocate
risks properly, accelerate project construction, and develop essential
infrastructure that might otherwise not have been built.
The P3 model that offers the "largest potential gains in terms
of risk sharing and efficiency is one that includes a private role in
all phases of a project: design, build, finance, operate and maintain,
and hand back, commonly referred to as a DBFOM," the report states.
This model incorporates private financing and retains public ownership,
and the private entity is paid with revenues generated by the tolls or
payments made by the state's annual transportation budget. Other P3
arrangements include design-build, whereby a single contractor designs
and constructs the project in a seamless process, rather than though
multiple separate contracts with separate companies.
The Concerns About P3s
When the private sector is involved in transportation projects, it
raises a series of concerns: loss of public control and flexibility;
private profits at public expense; assignment of future public revenues;
risk of project bankruptcy by the private partner; the degree of
accountability and transparency in the procurement and contracting
process; adherence to environmental regulations; labor issues; the
involvement of foreign companies; controversies surrounding public
acceptance of tolls; and specific contract terms.
P3s "speed up construction of large facilities that would
otherwise languish," says Dibble, chair of the Minnesota Senate
transportation committee, but there are disadvantages. "Without
additional revenues, financing is merely borrowing. As well, there is
perception that wealthier areas are being advantaged, that labor is
being undermined, that otherwise public assets are owned and controlled
by corporations, or that private interests are profiting from
transportation operations. All are politically problematic." Dibble
authored legislation in 2013 allowing the transportation commissioner to
establish a joint program office to oversee and coordinate activities to
develop, evaluate and implement public-private partnerships involving
public infrastructure investments.
P3s are clearly not a panacea. In the past several months reviews
have been mixed. In Indiana, the concession consortium leasing the
Indiana Toll Road went bankrupt. The revenues anticipated in 2006 when
the deal was initiated didn't materialize due to the Great
Recession, but the agreement insulated the state and taxpayers from loss
and the state retained the upfront $3.8 billion payment it received from
the private entity. In the meantime, the road is open, a bankruptcy sale
is scheduled and a new toll operator will be named soon. Despite all
this, the driving public has not been inconvenienced.
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In Virginia, two toll road projects with signed P3 contracts are
under review. There have been delays in getting project permits and
concerns over tolling and certain contractual payment provisions to the
private partner. In response, the Virginia Department of Transportation
recently issued revised guidelines for the state P3 program. Nevada
considered a P3 for its NEON highway project, but determined that a
traditional procurement would be more cost-effective.
The bottom line is that no P3 project is the same as the one before
and each one can have both uniquely successful and problematic elements.
P3s are complex and entail significant transaction costs. And, they are
new enough that the public doesn't fully understand how they will
function, how the public's interest in these contracts is
protected, and how the governmental agency interacts with the private
company.
So what's the best approach to reap the benefits of P3s?
* A clear, transparent legislative framework with adequate funding
to implement a P3 program.
* An understandable procurement process that gives business
interests confidence that preparing bids is a worthwhile investment.
* Open and timely communication to address potential controversies
that may arise because the process is new.
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Indiana's Soliday believes states need to "clearly define
what the expectations are for the maintenance of the current
infrastructure, to sustain a certain level of quality, and how that will
be measured. In addition, the state needs to spell out how it plans to
evaluate the potential economic contribution of new projects in order to
set new construction priorities."
What's the Federal Role?
There are several federal tools to aid states in pursuing P3s. The
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act is a credit
assistance program that helps make projects more feasible by lowering
the cost of capital by providing lower cost debt, but it is not a grant.
The 2014 Build America Transportation Investment Center--housed at
the Department of Transportation--is a one-stop shop for cities and
states seeking to use innovative financing and partnerships with the
private sector for transportation infrastructure.
In September 2014, the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee issued a report on P3s that recommended creating a procurement
office in the U.S. Department of Transportation to work with state DOTs
in defining a set of best practices for the various elements of P3s,
including procurement and contracts.
The Issue of Transparency
One lesson learned is the importance of keeping the public
informed. A Colorado project serves as a good example of how important
transparency of the process can be. A few years ago, the state decided
to improve U.S. 36 between Denver and Boulder, home of the University of
Colorado, and create a toll lane in each direction. (It was a toll road
in the 1950s and '60s.) But the announcement elicited a vociferous
and lightning-fast public outcry through social media as the contract
was about to be approved. Citizens believed they had not been
sufficiently informed about a change that would affect their pocketbooks
decades after the highway had been paid for. They didn't fully
understand the tolling elements of the project, and many thought a free
highway should not be turned into a toll road.
In response, the legislature approved a bill requiring additional
public hearings at various junctures as well as online posting of
contract terms, a practice followed in many states. But Governor John
Hickenlooper vetoed the bill, primarily over a provision requiring
legislative approval for contracts exceeding 35 years. He did, however,
approve the transparency provisions by executive order. The Colorado
Department of Transportation is now following these transparency
guidelines to conduct more public meetings based on milestones reached
and improve outreach through social media.
The World Bank has weighed in with suggestions about sharing P3
project data to keep the public informed.
* Publish the P3 contract, along with a summary of it in plain
language.
* State how much the government will pay over time.
* Report on the project's performance regularly.
* Create a way to validate information, perhaps through an audit.
Public-private partnerships hold the promise--within the correct
legislative framework--to enhance a state's ability to fund and
expand all kinds of transportation projects while providing incentives
and benefits to business. They don't work in every instance and
they need strong oversight, but they are a tool for states to consider.
The Transportation Funding Crisis
From 2002 to 2011, state spending on surface transportation fell by
$20 billion, a decline of 20 percent in real terms, according to a
recent study by The Pew Charitable Trusts. Since states pay for at least
40 percent of annual highway and transit construction, operations and
maintenance, this trend is sobering. Operations and maintenance tend to
get cut when budgets are tight, and this in turn decreases the value and
condition of transportation infrastructure.
Certainly the Great Recession and its aftermath of slow economic
growth dampened appetites for spending at the state level. This has led
to underinvestment, just when an aging infrastructure needs it
desperately.
Most transportation funding comes from fuel taxes, but declining
gas tax revenue is the new reality. Why? The federal gas tax has not
increased in more than 20 years, people are driving less and cars are
being designed to be more fuel efficient. Add to that the persisting
political reluctance to raise any kind of tax, including fuel taxes, and
the result is less money to pay for new construction or maintenance of
current infrastructure.
Another concern is the continuing uncertainty of federal funding.
Declining gas tax revenue has also hurt the financially unstable federal
Highway Trust Fund. It will need annual infusions of at least $15
billion going forward, unless more federal revenue is found. Current
authority for the federal surface transportation program expires in May
2015.
--Jim Reed, NCSL
Pennsylvania Attempts to "Bridge" the Funding Gap
Pennsylvania lawmakers worked cooperatively in 2012 to pass House
Bill 3 to create a viable P3 solution to their state's
transportation funding crisis. Today, policy experts and private
entities alike are praising the law as the state readies to jumpstart
its aggressive plan to replace or repair 558 bridges in four years.
PennDOT awarded a single P3 contract to Plenary Walsh Keystone
Partners, a team including at least 11 Pennsylvania firms that will
serve as subcontractors on its huge Rapid Bridge Replacement Project. By
streamlining much of the process, the state hopes to replace bridges
faster and more cheaply, with less of an impact on drivers, than through
traditional methods.
The 28-year agreement includes a 36-month construction phase
followed by a 25-year operation and maintenance contract. The
replacement project will cost $899 million. Average cost savings over
the contract period are estimated at $400,000 per bridge, or nearly $225
million in total.
The 2012 legislation created a Public-Private Transportation
Partnership Board to oversee and advise on P3 projects in the state,
with four of the six representatives appointed by the General Assembly.
It took less than a year for PennDOT to create the Rapid Bridge
Replacement Project.
--Kevin Pula, NCSL
Kentucky P3 Bill Hits Roadblock
Public-private partnerships are not a new or unusual tool for
Kentucky. Current state statute allows for P3s to be used in nearly
every area of procurement, except for transportation. This year the
legislature overwhelmingly approved a bill to authorize the use of P3s
for transportation projects as well, but the governor vetoed it.
Although Governor Steve Beshear said he supports expanding P3s in
the state generally, he vetoed this bill because he said portions of the
legislation could have put the Brent Spence Bridge project in jeopardy
by limiting any possibility to use tolls down the road. The vital bridge
provides access to 1-75 and 1-71 between Northern Kentucky and Greater
Cincinnati and is slated for replacement at a cost estimated to exceed
$2 billion.
The bill would have required approval by the General Assembly of
any P3 project involving "bi-state authority with the state of
Ohio." In addition, an amendment introduced by Representative
Arnold Simpson (D) would have prohibited tolls on any interstate highway
project connecting Kentucky and Ohio.
The legislation passed with supermajority support, but lawmakers
were unable to override the governor's veto.
--Kevin Pula, NCSL
Jim Reed directs the NCSL Environment, Energy and Transportation
Program.