A four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict.

Stone, Peter G.

The legal basis

It seems inevitable that armed conflict will have a detrimental impact on cultural property. The mitigation of such impact has been discussed for millennia (Miles 2011) and more recently, building on the 1863 Lieber Code produced during the American Civil War, the international community has attempted to limit such damage through treaties and conventions (e.g. see Boylan 2002). Currently the primary piece ofinternational legislation relating to cultural property protection (CPP) during conflict is the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two protocols of 1954 and 1999 (hereafter the 1954 Hague Convention). CPP is also now accepted more broadly as an obligation codified as part of international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Articles 53 and 8514][d]) and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Articles 8[2] [b] [ix] and 8[2] [e] [iv]) (and see Toman 1996; Hensel 2007; Gerstenblith 2009). IHL also stresses that occupying forces should not withdraw until there are competent and effective authorities to whom governance can be handed over. No-one implies that CPP in times of armed conflict is easy (e.g. see Bevan 2006; Yahya 2008) but the responsibility of belligerents to include it in their planning, under IHL, is unequivocal.

However, as events in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and, perhaps in particular, Iraq, have demonstrated, the implementation--both at a policy and tactical level--of the 1954 Hague Convention and other relevant IHL leaves much to be desired (Figure 1). This article proposes a four-tier approach to the protection of cultural property in wartime, and it draws on the author's own experience in working with the military.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Definitions

It must be stressed that the military is only one player in a theatre that also involves politicians, civil servants, governmental and non-governmental authorities and agencies. Other types of cultural property (the contents of libraries, archives, art galleries etc.) are also equally at risk. I use here the more legal term cultural property (as used in the 1954 Hague Convention) rather than the more common term cultural heritage. This is to make a not very comfortable distinction between tangible and intangible cultural heritage and, more importantly, to distinguish between the work going on in relation to the 1954 Hague Convention and the anthropology-based work of so-called 'Human Terrain Teams' deployed by the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq (AAA-CEAUSSIC 2009 [for a list of organisational acronyms, see Appendix]) and the UK's recently created Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU 2011). It is accepted that the distinction is an artificial one and Kila (2012) prefers to use the term 'cultural resources'. However, while the two remain inextricably linked in reality, for the sake of focus the distinction is maintained in this text. The point should also be emphasised that, contrary to some speculation, there is absolutely no presumption, or implication, that cultural property related to western culture, or cultural property assimilated by western culture, has any greater call on protection than any other cultural property; nor is there any implication that cultural property dating to any particular chronological period should have priority over that dating to any other period.

Recent studies

A great deal has been written concerning the destruction and looting of cultural property in Iraq that followed the 2003 invasion by the coalition led by the USA and the UK (e.g. Foster et al. 2005; Polk & Schuster 2005; Stone & Farchakh Bajjaly 2008; Rothfield 2009) and the events have been the topic of a large number of seminars and conferences. The first PhD to study the issue has just been passed at the University of Amsterdam (Kila 2012) and another grant offered, at Deakin University in Melbourne, to carry out PhD research on 'measuring the destruction of heritage and spikes of violence in Iraq'. Less has been written about the longer-term armed conflict in Afghanistan and its equally devastating impact on that country's cultural property (although for some information see the newsletters of the Aga Khan Development Network [n.d.]). In the main, damage and looting in these countries has been a secondary issue, caused and allowed by, but not a primary focus of, the conflict--just as damage to cultural property during the Second World War was generally collateral damage (e.g. Woolley 1947; Nicholas 1995). The same is not true of the fighting in the former Yugoslavia where the destruction of cultural property was frequently a primary objective of the conflict (e.g. Chapman 1994; Barakat et al. 2001).

The ethical basis

The experience of these conflicts has prompted reflections on the ethical position of cultural property experts working with the military. My role in Iraq (Stone 2005) has been criticised essentially for providing an academic legitimacy for an illegal invasion (e.g. see Harnilakis 2003, 2009; Albarella 2009a & b), and this concern has been set within a wider literature on structural violence (e.g. Hamilakis & Dukes 2007; Bernbeck 2008a & b; Pollock 2008; Starzmann 2008). Cultural heritage, ethics, and the military (Stone 2011) attempted to contextualise the particular concerns of cultural property experts within a wider framework of humanitarian and cultural organisations working with the military, although the book was poorer for the lack of contributions from those who refused invitations to participate because they opposed the principle of cultural experts working with the military.

Other heritage professionals (e.g. Emberling 2008; Teijgeler 2008; Curtis 2011) have wrestled with their own involvement. In her 2010 edited volume Archaeology, cultural property and the military, Laurie Rush, an archaeologist working for the US Army, examined current military doctrine and practice regarding CPP across a number of NATO states in an attempt to provide a base-line from which to build better practice. However, much of this work is descriptive and essentially retrospective. On the assumption that cultural property experts will continue to work with the military (and other relevant governmental and non-governmental agencies), which is certainly the decision made by the author, what is needed is a forward vision for how cultural property might be protected better during future conflict. This is not a hypothetical exercise: recent events in Egypt, Libya, Mali, and now Syria all underline the need for a clear relationship to be established between cultural heritage experts and the military as the world struggles to come to terras with conflict in the twenty-first century.

The current status of cultural property experts

My role advising the UK Ministry of Defence in 2003 failed for a number of reasons, three of which are especially pertinent to this discussion. First, advice was requested far too late--a matter of weeks before hostilities broke out, when most troops were either deployed or in transit; as a result no troops on the ground had a clear understanding of the nature or importance of the cultural property with which they might come into contact. Second, there had been no pre-invasion discussion of the importance of cultural property and as a result no troops from any coalition army had direct orders to protect it; it was simply not on their list of 'things to do'. Finally, heritage advisers had no access to levels of seniority sufficient to influence events.

With hindsight, little of this is surprising, as neither the military, nor other relevant parts of government, nor cultural property experts, had given a great deal of thought to CPP since the early 1950s when the UK signed, but did not ratify, the 1954 Hague Convention. While claiming to 'work within the spirit' of the Convention, the UK is now arguably the most significant military power, and the only one with extensive military involvements abroad, not to have ratified this convention. This is despite a 2004 announcement by the then Minister for Heritage that the UK intended to ratify the Convention and its Protocols (DCMS 2004); despite a draft bill going through Select Committee scrutiny in 2008 (DCMS 2008); despite assurances by relevant ministers of both the current and most recent governments that ratification was a definite government objective (meetings with Barbara Follett 10 June 2009 and Ed Vaizey 10 May 2011); despite the Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport writing to the Chair of the Parliamentary Business and Legislative Committee in March 2012 'strongly registering' his interest in the inclusion of a Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Bill within the third session of this Parliament; and despite the anticipated publication in the summer of 2013 of the Iraq Inquiry that is expected, following evidence submitted by a group of 13 cultural and heritage organisations (UK National Commission for UNESCO 2010), to have ratification at the earliest possible opportunity as one of its recommendations.

To have any influence on military doctrine and practice, cultural property experts must be either fully 'on the inside'--i.e, be a relatively senior uniformed member of the armed forces--or, at the very least, be fully accepted 'by the inside' at a senior level. While most NATO forces include staff, usually referred to as either CIMIC (Civil-Military Co-operation) or Civil Affairs, who might be regarded as being where such expertise should lie, under the current financial climate it is inconceivable that the military will employ senior officers for their cultural property expertise alone, where such expertise could be co- opted from elsewhere. Cultural property experts are therefore obliged to shoulder the responsibility for creating an environment where CPP is valued, and advice accepted concerning its protection, by the military and, crucially, by their political masters.

Improving priority

Given the failures in Iraq, this may sound naive, but developments in two areas provide some cause for optimism. First, UK military operations increasingly include civilian personnel from a number of government departments related to the establishment of the rule of law during operations. There is an opportunity for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to engage with this increasingly complex operational environment, and pressure needs to be applied to ensure this opportunity, and responsibility, is taken. Second, changes in NATO military doctrine since 2003 acknowledge responsibility not only to win a war but to deliver a stable country capable of functioning independently after the war. The development of this so-called 3D--defence, diplomacy, development (see Teijgeler 2011)--or comprehensive approach, as currently being developed by NATO (e.g. Jackobsen 2008), has been matched by a call for the revision of military doctrine by a number of member states including the USA and UK (e.g. Hammes 2004). A small part of this development is the acceptance by military planners that CPP can act as a 'force-multiplier'--a positive action that makes it easier to achieve military success. At least some members of the military have learnt that, for example, if they use a minaret as an observation post or, worse still, a sniper location, they will readily lose the goodwill of the local population (Com 2005). This connection reinforces the overlap between cultural property, as a concept relating to physical buildings and objects, and cultural heritage, as epitomised by a community's relationship with such physical manifestations of their culture. If they look after and respect the minaret, goodwill, if it does not increase, is at least not damaged irreparably. Some military thinkers have also acknowledged that the looting and sale of illicit antiquities is often associated with the funding of conflict (see, in relation to Iraq, Bogdanos 2008: 124), and while dealing with the sale of illicit antiquities may not be an issue on which the military would necessarily lead, the prevention of looting during, and immediately following, conflict, and thus the strangulation of the trade, may well be a military responsibility and certainly a military force-multiplier.

Other advances can be seen in conferences and specialised meetings held by different groups and organisations regarding CPP, usually with particular emphasis on Iraq and Afghanistan. These have moved slowly from accusation and recrimination to suggesting, and indeed developing, heritage awareness training for the military (Figure 2). Other examples include the education programmes developed for US forces by the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) (Rose 2007); the playing cards for troop use showing examples of cultural property and good practice developed for a number of countries in the Middle East by the USA (Zeidler & Rush 2010); the playing cards produced for UK training areas produced by Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) (Brown 2010); and those produced for the Dutch military (Kila 2012).

In the UK, DIO archaeologists have organised archaeological excavations in order to aid the recovery of troops who have served overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan. The benefits of doing archaeology have been manifold, including the alleviation of major stresses and maladies, allowing wounded troops to sleep again and return to their units, providing new skills and a lifelong hobby, and delivering good archaeology that would otherwise not have been done. The original project was limited to the partial excavation of a damaged site on Salisbury Plain but has since been enlarged to include the recording of the crash site of a Stirling bomber at Lurgashall, and work placements with Wessex Archaeology, Canterbury Archaeology and the Churches Conservation Trust (Walshe et al. 2012; Osgood pers. coram.) (Figure 3). A number of groups with greater or lesser influence and levels of activity have sprung up, e.g. CHAMP, an informal liaison group between interested military and the AIA, Saving Antiquities for Everyone (SAFE) and the World Association for the Protection of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage (WATCH). In 2009, the International Military Cultural Resources Working Group (IMCuRWG) was established to enhance military capacity to implement CPP across the full range of operations, provide a forum for international co-operation and networking for those working within the military context, identify areas of common interest, share best practices and lessons learned and raise awareness of military commitment to CPP, both tangible and intangible. In 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Joris Kila of the Dutch Reserve became IMCuRWG President and is currently negotiating a support infrastructure with several governments (Kila pers. coram.). To date, IMCuRWG participants are primarily from Europe, North America and the Middle East, but the group is seeking to establish a network in all regions. Finally, the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), based in Rome, has developed and taught a course on 'first aid to cultural heritage in times of conflict' in 2010 and 2011, with the third iteration of the course to be held in the autumn of 2012 (ICCROM 2012).

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

Blue Shield

The international body that should be leading on CPP is the International Committee for the Blue Shield (ICBS), set up in 1996 to work to protect the world's cultural heritage threatened by wars and natural disasters, and recognised in the 1999 2nd Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention as the official adviser to the inter-governmental Committee for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. The blue shield itself was identified in Article 16 of the 1954 Hague Convention as the distinctive emblem to be used to facilitate the recognition of cultural property protected by the Convention. The ICBS is made up of representatives from five organisations: the International Council on Archives; the International Council of Museums; the International Council on Monuments and Sites; the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions; and the Coordinating Council of Audiovisual Archives Associations. With this membership the ICBS immediately, and quite correctly, broadens the whole discussion of CPP beyond archaeology.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Unfortunately, a lack of finance has limited its impact and, until it held its first international conference in November 2011 (funded mainly by South Korea), has essentially only been able to issue statements expressing, for example as it did in 2003, " ... its profound concern about the potential damage to, and destruction of, cultural heritage in the event of war in Iraq ... " urging " ... all the governments concerned to work within the spirit of the Hague Convention ... to protect archives, libraries, monuments and sites, and museums, if war breaks out in Iraq and in the region" (ICBS 2003). A more proactive approach has been taken by the Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield (ANCBS) created in 2008 partly in frustration at the inability of the ICBS to be more proactive. The ANCBS sent a small delegation, in conjunction with IMCuRWG, to liaise with and provide support for antiquity authorities over looting and damage in both Egypt and Libya (see for links Blue Shield 2011) and it also provided information to the USA, UK and NATO on sites to be protected during the aerial bombing of Libya. It is currently working on the provision of a similar list for Syria. Some of this has been possible through the agency of the US Committee of the Blue Shield, set up in 2007 as the result of tremendous hard work by a number of archaeologists and lawyers (in particular Corine Wegener, a retired US Civil Affairs (Reserve) Major who was deployed to Iraq in May 2003 and worked at the, then looted, National Museum). It was pressure from the US Committee of the Blue Shield and others that finally convinced the USA to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention.

The four-tier approach

None of the above groups, or any NGO, has taken the initiative to develop an overall framework for future co-operation between cultural property experts and relevant government and non-governmental authorities and agencies, including the military. A fourtier approach has recently been suggested by the author and has received cautious support from both cultural property experts and the military at specialised meetings in both the USA and Europe. The tiers in question are: long term, immediate pre-deployment, during conflict and post conflicc As a principle, the protection of cultural property during armed conflict is identified, for the military, as a force-multiplier.

The first tier of co-operation is 'long-term awareness training' and should be built into what the army call 'foundation training'. The whole concept of CPP needs to become an integral part, at an appropriate level, of military training for all ranks and services. It would emphasise the generic value of cultural property as a source of national pride, dignity and wellbeing; point out the economic potential of cultural property; explain the damage inflicted on cultural property, and therefore society, through the illicit trade in antiquities; and stress the potential benefits to local communities working together to use cultural property to promote social cohesion and economic development. This tier would also incorporate the existing scenario training as delivered by the civilian archaeological teams in the DIO (Brown 2010) and skills for reading landscapes to identify features valued by local populations. Tier one training could be carried out by any number of cultural property experts working in academia, by the civilian cultural property experts working in the DIO, or by CIMIC/Civil Affairs staff.

The second tier is 'specific pre-deployment training'. This would be specific to a country, or region, and involve contributing to what the military call 'detailed country briefing packs' for deploying personnel (obviously troops but also deploying political, legal, developmental, cultural and other advisers) on the type and range of buildings, sites, collections and artefacts with which they may come into contact. Training should stress any possible specific issues and note any particular requirements for CPP, such as the need for specialist expertise (e.g. mud-brick conservation). It would be in this tier of training that actual places (such as museums, libraries, archives, galleries and archaeological sites) would need to be identified and put onto military maps and, ifpossible, onto the Attorney General's so- called 'no-strike' list--a list of places in the area of operations that should not be fired upon (Chiefs of Staff 2005). The list, which includes hospitals, religious buildings and educational establishments, can also include cultural sites. Cultural property experts involved in this second tier require a very different set of expertise. They should, if possible, work closely with local experts and the civilian cultural property experts in DIO, who should be able to transfer some of their specific knowledge into pre-deployment training--for example, the construction of an 'Afghan village' at a UK training ground complete with museum, for training scenarios (Brown 2010: 70). It would also be essential to involve the uniformed CIMIC/Civil Affairs staff who would have the primary responsibility for CPP during tier three.

The third tier of co-operation is 'during conflict'. Here there is little opportunity, or need, for specific (civilian) cultural property expertise being deployed. The primary goal of the military in a conflict situation is the winning of the conflict and a non- military cultural property expert would be out of place and a liability. The CPP role would therefore focus on damage limitation and re-emphasising, wherever and whenever possible, the 'conscience' role in military operations (Nicholas 1995: 237). Key to this role would be to prevent the looting of collections and archaeological sites and to stifle the associated trade in illicit antiquities. This would require constant liaison with a key individual or group on any combat staff-the deployed military legal advisor(s). It is in this context that ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention becomes crucial. The key players during tier three have to be those individuals in uniform tasked with CPP as an aspect of their duties; it may be that there are military personnel with the relevant expertise available to the force commander, but a 'reach-back' facility to local experts, such as staff in NGOs like the ANCBS, would be essential.

The fourth and final tier is 'post conflict'. Here the emphasis has to be on stabilisation and the emergency aid, repair, and conservation required to mitigate any damage inflicted by the conflict. These are obviously not primarily military responsibilities, but may require military facilitation-for example, safe access to, and liaison between, local experts within the country and their international colleagues, and the military. It may well require the military to facilitate the provision of necessary materials and technology (e.g. conservation chemicals and equipment) and would certainly involve the military helping to counter development of the trade in illicit antiquities. It must be stressed that tier four can only begin once the military situation has been resolved and security ensured and that there may well be considerable uncertainty over when tier three blurs into tier four. In Iraq this happened too slowly, as evidenced by the almost complete failure until recently to implement any of the planned course of action agreed at the seminar on 'international support for museums and archaeological sites in Iraq' held at the British Museum in April 2003 (Curtis 2008: 203-204).

A fundamental axiom of tier four is the return of responsibility for cultural property to local authorities at the earliest opportunity. These should also be supported by colleagues from relevant NGOs, e.g. the Red Cross/Crescent, and by cultural property experts from the international community, e.g. the ANCBS. Good examples of the type of work that could be carried out under tier four are the collaborative work that was possible between an international group of archaeologists, led by the British Museum, and staff of the State Board of Antiquities in Iraq facilitated by the British Army to inspect archaeological sites in the south of Iraq; and work carried out by the British Museum with the help and support of the British Army to develop plans for a new museum in Basra (Curtis et al. 2008; Clarke 2010; Curtis 2011).

Conclusion

The above approach is intended as a first step towards implementing a viable strategy for CPP wherever armed conflict takes place, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some military colleagues have already questioned its functionality and have asked, reasonably, what aspects of other training should be dropped in order to prepare for this additional mission. The approach does not begin to address issues relating to the increasing use of private security companies by member states of NATO. Any success relies on a number of key developments, including: the ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols by the UK; a generally more engaged cultural property sector; the significant strengthening of the various elements of the Blue Shield; and the development of a university-based centre for developing a research capacity and principles, methodologies and guidelines.

The approach does, however, go some way towards addressing concerns raised by some cultural property experts as to when, and under what conditions, they should be willing to work with the military (e.g. see Shearer et al. 2011). We need to develop 'networks of the willing', where individuals can operate within their own ethical comfort zone. Crucially, we need to win the understanding and support of the politicians, and their civil servants, who decide to send military personnel to war. All these and many other issues lie in the path of the development and implementation of the four-tier approach. However, if we do not start, if we do not take the initiative, then we are condoning a situation where cultural property is put at significant risk whenever and wherever there is armed conflict in the future. Is that a risk we should be willing to take without at least trying to mitigate its potential impact?

Appendix

List of organisations referenced

AAA-CEAUSSIC American Anthropological Association Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Communities

ALA Archaeological Association of America http://www.archaeological.org/

ANCBS Association of National Committees of the Blue Shield http://www.ancbs.org/

CHAMP Cultural Heritage by AIA-Military Panel http://aiamilitarypanel.org/

CIMIC Civil-Military Co-operation http://www.cimic-coe.org/

DCSU Defence Cultutal Specialist Unit

DCMS Department for Media, Culture and Sport http://www.culture.gov.uk/

DIO Defence Infrastructure Organisation http://www.mod.uk/defenceinterner/microsite/dio/

HTS Human Terrain System http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/

ICBS International Committee for the Blue Shield

ICCROM International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property http://www.iccrom.org/

IMCuRWG International Military Cultural Resources Working Group

SAFE Saving Antiquities for Everybody http://www.savingantiquities.org/

WATCH World Association for the Protection of Tangible and Intangible Cultural Heritage http://www.eyeonculture.net/

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Joris Kila, Peter Sonnex, Corine Wegener and Barney White- Spunner for having read and commented on an earlier version of this paper. As ever, all mistakes and imperfections are the author's alone.

Received: 21 May 2012; Accepted: 21 August 2012;

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Peter G. Stone*

* International Centre for Cultural and Heritage Studies, School of Arts and Cultures, Newcastle University, 18-20 Windsor Terrace, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK (Email: [email protected])