The polls: the coalitional president from a public opinion perspective.
Cohen, Jeffrey E.
As Thomas Cronin (1980; also Cronin and Genovese 2004) insightfully
pointed out thirty years ago, the presidency is beset with paradoxes, at
times being tugged, pulled, or pushed in differing and often
contradictory directions. For instance, on the one hand the president is
a symbol, representative, and leader of the entire nation. But the
president is also a partisan who seeks benefits for some sectors of the
polity, such as his party and those who voted for him. Presidents seek
these particularized group-specific benefits as they try to build
coalitions in support of their electoral and policy goals. Thus we may
also view the president from a coalitional perspective, in which he
builds a support coalition composed of specific groups and population
subsets of the nation (Seligman and Covington 1989; Edwards 2000;
Mueller 1970, 1973).
The coalitional perspective hypothesizes that groups and/or
population subsets will hold the president accountable for conditions
and actions that specifically affect and/or target group members. In
this article, I test this coalitional hypothesis using newly available
monthly tracking polls for each of the fifty states. Do state mass
publics hold the president accountable for national economic
performance, as the national leader perspective hypothesizes, or do
their evaluations of the president hinge on state-specific factors, such
as the performance of the state economy and presidential attention to
the states, as the coalitional hypothesis would predict?
In the next section, I review these two competing perspectives on
the presidency, the national leader versus the coalition builder.
Although more research exists on public approval of the president from
the national leader perspective, a small but important strain is
compatible with the coalitional viewpoint. Then I discuss the data used
to test these two competing views, which consist of monthly tracking
polls across all fifty states from SurveyUSA. Such data have certain
advantages over the Official State Job Approval Ratings (JAR) data
(Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman 2002), the other major source of information
on state public attitudes toward the president, as reviewed in more
detail below. Succeeding sections present the specific hypotheses for
testing and the data analysis. The conclusion discusses the relative
importance of these two perspectives for understanding presidential
approval and directions for future research.
Two Perspectives on the President: National Leader versus Coalition
Builder
At one and the same time, the president is the nation's leader
but also a partisan who seeks to benefit some sectors of the polity over
others, for instance, his party versus the opposition or those who voted
for him as opposed to those who did not. Much research on the president
assumes the first perspective, with the corollary assumptions that the
public will hold the president responsible for the overall state of the
nation. Studies in this tradition have, for instance, demonstrated that
the state of the national economy affects public evaluations of the
president.
It makes much sense to view the president as a national leader. The
president, along with the vice president, is the only elected official
to have the entire nation as his constituency. Furthermore, presidents
preside over national ceremonies and occasions, such as the inauguration and the annual State of the Union address, something no other elected
official can claim as a fundamental part of their post. In foreign
policy, the president speaks for the nation, again something denied to
any other elected official. And while the secretary of state represents
the nation to other nations, the secretary does so as the
president's agent. Along with these national duties comes
accountability, as the public holds the president accountable for the
state of the nation, its economic and domestic health, and its policies
toward other nations. A large literature has studied this public
accountability function, the most impressive and repeated finding that
the health of the national economy affects public approval of the
president (the literature is huge; see the review in Lewis-Beck and
Stegmeier, forthcoming).
But the president also promotes policies and actions for the
benefit of some sectors of the polity and society, and sometimes those
actions impose costs on other sectors. For instance, presidents
routinely seek advantage for their party or for those who supported him
in his quest for the election. Presidents are more apt to appoint or
nominate candidates for government posts from their party; rarely are
those from the opposition so named. Presidents follow this
group-specific strategy in order to build a coalition of support large
enough to ensure electoral victory and congressional support for his
policy initiatives, two important presidential goals.
The Madisonian framework of our government explains this aspect of
presidential behavior and policy making. Rarely can presidents command.
To prevail on a roll call vote before Congress requires that presidents
build a coalition of support usually among specific groups, interests,
and/or subsets of the nation and polity (Seligman and Covington 1989;
Edwards 2000). At times, presidential coalitions will be composed of
specific interest groups. Sometimes the coalition will be narrowly party
based. And because of the Electoral College, in which states serve as
the fundamental unit, we can think of the president's electoral
coalition as being composed of states. In our current polarized political setting we often describe states as being red, blue, or
purple, a colorful shorthand for denoting whether a state belongs to the
Republican or Democratic electoral coalition or is up for grabs.
Presidents may use all of the tools at their disposal to build
winning support coalitions, such as persuasion, vote trading, vote
buying, dispensing patronage, evoking partisan loyalties, taking issue
stands, speaking before select audiences, naming people to office, and
so on, but never can the president command a member of Congress to
support him on a roll call and never can a president force a citizen to
vote for him or a friendly candidate from his party.
To win on roll calls (or in elections) does not require unanimity,
but only 50 percent plus 1 (or in the Senate 60 percent plus 1, to
overcome any potential filibuster). As William Riker (1962) taught us
long ago, there is no reason to build a coalition larger than necessary
to win, the minimum winning coalition. Consequently, some groups and
interests will be excluded from the winning coalition, and those
excluded may suffer, sometimes paying the costs of policy that the
winners get to implement, while groups included in the coalition will
receive benefits from the president.
Does this coalition-building activity have consequences for
presidential support among group members? Are groups that receive
targeted benefits from the president more likely to approve of his
performance as president? Do groups that pay the costs of presidential
coalition-building efforts hold the president accountable for those
costs by withdrawing their approval of the president? Or is it the case
that, despite presidential coalition-building behavior, when it comes to
general job approval, the president is only held accountable for the
state of the nation? In other words, will groups that may be harmed by
presidential coalition-building efforts, for instance, because
presidential policies impose costs on them, still approve of the
president if the nation overall is doing better? How much do sociotropic
standards enter into public evaluations of the president (the national
leader perspective) versus "pocketbook" or
"personalistic" standards (the coalitional perspective)?
Research Using the Coalitional Perspective
Although most research on presidential approval utilizes the
national leader perspective, several highly influential studies can be
viewed from the coalitional standpoint. As reviewed here, none presents
a clear test of the coalitional hypothesis, which states that
presidential approval of members in a particular group will be a
function of the benefits and costs of presidential actions and the
consequences of those actions on group members.
The seminal study in the coalitional vein is Mueller's (1970,
1973). In his early study of the dynamics of public approval of the
president, Mueller notices a general cycle across presidents--their
approval levels decline over time. Mueller offers his concept of a
"coalition of minorities" effect to explain this decline.
According to the coalition of minorities thesis, presidential approval
is an aggregation of the approval of many groups. Presidents, as policy
makers, must make decisions, and groups will respond differentially to
these decisions. Some groups will applaud the president's
decision(s), while others will criticize the decision(s). Over time, as
a group comes to disagree with the president over decisions that he
makes, members of the group will withdraw their support of the
president, and presidential approval will decline.
Mueller does not offer a direct test of his coalition of minorities
thesis, instead only suggesting that patterns in presidential approval
data are consistent with the thesis. For instance, he notes that
Eisenhower's approval slides less than other presidents, which he
attributes to Eisenhower's lower activity level: by making
relatively fewer decisions compared to other presidents, Eisenhower
alienated fewer groups. Stimson (1976) and Brace and Hinckley (1992)
offer other theoretical mechanisms to account for this cycle in
presidential approval. Time may mean or measure several things, the
coalition of minorities effect being only one possibility.
Hibbs, Rivers, and Vasilatos (1982) take the coalitional
perspective in another direction. They ask whether different groups in
the population, specifically partisan and economic classes, respond
differently to economic conditions. They find that these groups do
respond differently as their political and class interests would
predict. For instance, those in the lower class react to increases in
unemployment with declines in presidential approval, while upper-class
individuals move in an opposite direction. Taking this stream of
research in another direction, Ragsdale (1987) finds differences in
group reactions to presidential speeches. Although these studies can be
viewed from a coalitional perspective, they do not test the specific
implications of the coalitional hypothesis. That hypothesis asks whether
population subgroups respond to presidential decisions and the
implications of those decisions specific to the group's interests,
and not whether groups respond to changes in national economic
conditions or presidential behaviors, like speeches, designed for a
national audience.
Cohen and Powell (2005) is the first study to offer a direct test
of the coalitional hypothesis by asking whether presidential visits to a
state improve presidential approval in the visited state. In that study,
which uses the JAR data, a presidential visit to a state is a behavior
designed to target a population subgroup, in this instance
the mass public within a state. It was found that presidential visits
to a state result in about a two percentage point increase in
presidential approval, a modest, albeit statistical significant
increment.
Several problems plague that study's analysis, however. First,
the JAR data that was relied on, despite offering a large number of
cases for analysis, were spotty across the states, containing many gaps
in approval. Even though large number of control variables were applied,
it could only be assessed whether a presidential visit to a state is
associated with a higher approval level. The possibility always exists
that every rival explanation was not controlled for, and thus, that the
effect that was uncovered is spurious. A stronger test of causality would show that a presidential visit to a state leads to a change in
presidential approval in the state. Without presidential approval in the
prior month, something quite rare in the JAR data, one cannot make this
stronger causality test.
Second, that study did not take into account that a presidential
visit may be endogenous, that is, some factor associated with the state
that is also associated with presidential approval in the state leads
presidents to visit the state. For instance, Ragsdale (1984) found that
changes in national approval lead presidents to make primetime
television addresses. Declines in approval at the state level, perhaps
for states critical to the president's coalition, may similarly
stimulate a presidential visit to that state. By not taking into account
the simultaneity between presidential visits and state approval of the
president, the model discussed above is misspecified. As a result, the
impact of presidential visits on state-level presidential approval may
have been either over- or understated.
Thus, although several important studies can be viewed from a
coalitional perspective, all have problems. They either do not test the
core hypothesis of the coalitional perspective or data limitations
inhibit their ability to design a strong test of the coalitional
hypothesis. The next section describes newly available data that allow a
stronger test of the coalition perspective on presidential approval.
The SurveyUSA Monthly Tracking Polls
Since May 2005, SurveyUSA has been posting its monthly tracking
polls on its Web site (http://www.surveyusa.com). SurveyUSA is a polling
firm that conducts monthly polls on public attitudes toward political
personalities, issues, and elections for newspapers, television
stations, and other news outlets across all fifty states. From August
2005 through January 2006, SurveyUSA offers data on state-level
presidential job approval continuously, without any monthly gaps.
The SurveyUSA data are superior to the JAR data for this article
for several reasons. First, unlike the JAR data, at least for the August
2005-January 2006 time span, there are no monthly gaps. From these data,
one can create monthly job approval change scores, which will allow a
stronger test of causality than the JAR data permit. Second, data exist
for all fifty states, unlike the JAR data, which are more frequent for
some states than others. Third, SurveyUSA uses the same question across
all states and months, unlike the JAR data, which is a compilation of
different questions, across different survey houses, utilizing different
methodology. Thus, there is a greater degree of comparability for the
SurveyUSA data than the JAR data. The SurveyUSA question reads: "Do
you approve or disapprove of the job George W. Bush is doing as
President?" which is identical to the Gallup job approval question,
the basis of so much research. Fourth, each SurveyUSA poll uses the same
sample size per survey, 600, with a margin of error of +/- 4.1 percent,
using random digit dialing. Again, this introduces a degree of
comparability across the states absent with the JAR data.
Hypotheses and Analysis
The coalitional perspective hypothesizes that groups will hold the
president accountable for conditions and actions that specifically
affect and/or target group members. Analysis below considers two such
hypotheses, one that relates to the condition of the state's
economy and the other looks at the impact of a presidential visit to the
state. More formally,
H1: As the level of unemployment in the state rises (falls) from
one month to the next. presidential approval at the state level will
fall (rise).
H2: A presidential visit to a state will lead to an increase in
presidential approval in the state from the past month to the month of
the president's visit.
To test Hypothesis 1, the unemployment change hypothesis, requires
two variables, monthly change in state-level unemployment and monthly
change in presidential approval. Change in state-level unemployment is
formally defined as State Unemployment [%.sub.t]--State Unemployment
[%.sub.t-1], where t indicates the current month and t-1 the past month.
Change in presidential approval is defined as [Net Approval.sub.t]--[Net
Approval.sub.t-1], where t and t-1 are defined as before and net
approval is defined as Presidential Approval--Presidential Disapproval.
Subtracting disapproval from approval helps control for variations in
the percentage of "don't know" responses. Hypothesis 2
uses the same dependent variable, but includes a presidential visit
variable, scored "1" if the president visited the state in
month t and "0" otherwise. Finally, I add a control for change
in the level of national unemployment, defined as National Unemployment
[%.sub.t]--National Unemployment [%.sub.t-1]. The national unemployment
variable will allow us to test the national accountability hypothesis at
the state level and compare how much a state's mass public holds
the president accountable for the state versus the national economy. The
six-month period for which we have data produces 250 cases for analysis,
based on five pairs of months (e.g., August 2005-September 2005, etc.).
The equation to be estimated can be formally stated as:
Monthly Change in Net Approval = Constant + Monthly Percent Change
in State Unemployment + Presidential Visit Month, + Monthly Percent
Change in National Unemployment.
Before proceeding to the analysis, there are several estimation
issues that must be addressed. First, the SurveyUSA data, although
presented as point estimates, are actually poll estimates within a
sampling error of +/- 4.1 percent. This induces a degree of measurement
error into the dependent variable, although that measurement error is
likely to be random. This sampling error property of the dependent
variable will have at least one analytic consequence, namely that
results should not be highly efficient and the estimation should not
produce high [R.sup.2]'s. But this should not affect the tests of
statistical significance for the relationships between the independent
and dependent variables. To account for this measurement error, the
analysis below uses Huber-White robust standard errors.
Second, the time series element of the data set violates the
regression assumption of independence of observation. With such a short
series, six months, we have little to fear from autocorrelation, plus
the series is too short to estimate an autocorrelation function. Still,
the lack of independence of observations (past month's value of
presidential approval may affect the current month's value)
requires correction, which is accomplished by using the cluster option
in STATA 9.
Finally, it is likely that a presidential visit is endogenous, that
is, change in presidential approval may affect the presidential decision
to visit a state. Ragsdale (1987) found that changes in national-level
presidential approval lead presidents to speak to the nation on
prime-time television. Instrumental variable techniques, such as
two-stage least squares (2SLS), can be used to correct for the
simultaneity between presidential approval and visits. To implement 2SLS
requires an instrumental variable, that is, a variable that predicts
presidential visits in this case, but not change in presidential
approval. The analysis below employs two instrumental variables: [Level
of State Unemployment.sub.t-1] and a dummy variable for states directly
affected by Hurricane Katrina (Mississippi and Louisiana). (1)
Table 1, Model 1 presents the results of the 2SLS analysis,
clustered on state with Huber-White robust standard errors. First, the
overall fit of the estimation ([R.sup.2]) is meager, an implication of
the error variance in the dependent variable. Despite this issue,
however, several independent variables emerge as strong predictors of
monthly change in presidential approval at the state level and results
indicate some support for the coalitional perspective, but also support
for the national leader model.
Consistent with the national leader perspective, change in the
national unemployment level leads to changes in presidential approval.
Each one point rise (fall) in national unemployment is associated with a
corresponding drop (increase) of 5.8 percent in presidential approval,
which is statistically significant with a p value of less than .01.
Although this suggests extreme sensitivity of the public to
unemployment, recall that monthly change in unemployment at the national
level rarely exceeds 0.2 percent, the maximum in these data. A 0.2
percent change in unemployment will translate into an approximately 1.2
percent shift in approval, while a 0.1 percent change will shift
presidential approval by about 0.58 percentage points. In the short run
these shifts in approval appear meager, but when national unemployment
is trending either up or down across a period of months, the cumulative
effect of trending unemployment can have considerable effects on
state-level presidential approval.
There is some suggestion of coalitional effects in these data as
well. Results indicate that presidential approval in the states responds
to changes in state unemployment but not presidential visits. Each one
percentage point change in state unemployment, controlling for change in
national unemployment, leads to a 0.35 percent shift in presidential
approval. This finding skirts the traditional .05 cutoff for statistical
significance, at p = .055. However, as noted below, when presidential
visits, which does not affect approval, is dropped from the analysis,
the significance level of state unemployment change improves to .047.
State unemployment is more volatile in the short run than national
unemployment. For the most past, monthly state unemployment change
rarely exceeds 1 percent; when it does, presidents will realize the 0.35
percent gain or loss in approval. Again, if unemployment in a state
trends above and beyond national trends, this can cumulate into large
losses (improvements) in presidential approval. But sometimes states
feel unemployment shocks, as was the case for Mississippi and Louisiana
due to the effects of Hurricane Katrina, where the former registered a
3.3 percent drop in employment and Louisiana a whopping 7.3 percent
loss. Adding a dummy variable for Katrina does not affect substantive
results, however, but dropping the Katrina observations from the
analysis increases the effect of state unemployment change on
presidential approval. Without these states, each 1 percent shift in
state unemployment leads to a corresponding 4.4 percent shift in
presidential approval (p = .02), which is only slightly lower than the
effect of national unemployment change, which budges little from the
prior estimation (b = 5.6, p = .008).
In contrast, presidential visits to a state appear to have no
effect on state-level presidential approval, contrary to the findings in
Cohen and Powell (2005). The lack of impact of presidential visits
persists even if we drop the Katrina-affected states from the analysis.
President Bush visited Mississippi and Louisiana in these data at least
once per month almost every month of and after the hurricane. Noting
this lack of impact I reestimated the model, dropping the presidential
visit variable and thus the 2SLS estimation, but retaining the clustered
regression and robust standard errors. This produces the results in the
second panel on Table 1 labeled Model 2.
Conclusion
The analysis in this article presents evidence in support of both
the national leader and coalition builder accountability hypotheses.
Using SurveyUSA monthly tracking polls from August 2005 through January
2006, across all fifty states, and without any gaps across months or
states, analysis found that changes in the national unemployment rate
affect changes in presidential approval. As national unemployment rises,
presidential approval at the state level declines. From this result, we
can infer that even population subgroups are likely to hold the
president accountable for the state of the nation, a suggestion that
groups, in this case state mass public, apply a sociotropic standard
when evaluating presidential job performance.
But changes in the health of the state economy also affect
presidential approval at the state level. The worse the state's job
climate, holding national unemployment constant, the worse the
president's approval at the state level. Not only do voters seem to
hold the president accountable for the state of the nation but also for
the economic health of their states.
This finding suggests that groups react to the group-specific
implications of presidential policies and actions. When presidents
pursue policy directions that harm or help particular groups in American
society and polity, the president can expect to see approval declines
among groups harmed and approval rises among groups helped. In a society
as complex as the United States, presidents may often make decisions
that lead to some segments of the nation being harmed while other
segments benefit. Moreover, in an age of polarized politics, when
compromise with the opposition party is often fruitless or impossible,
presidents may be even more inclined to pursue policies that keep their
base happy, to the displeasure of the opposition. Presidents in an age
of polarized politics are basically coalitional presidents. This article
demonstrates that coalition-building behavior on the part of presidents
can have implications for his approval ratings.
At the same time, findings here indicate that presidential visits
to a state do not affect state-level approval, contrary to the analysis
in Cohen and Powell (2005) that used the JAR data, but even that study
detected only small approval gains from visiting a state. Coupling this
finding with the above findings about the impact of economics on
approval at the state level suggests that symbolic activities have less
ability to affect approval than real-world conditions, like the economy.
Still, this article looked at only one type of group-specific impact on
presidential approval--state unemployment. This leaves open the question
of whether other types of presidential decisions and actions will
similarly affect the targeted or affected group. The larger message of
this article is that the coalitional perspective may be a fruitful line
of inquiry, one which will deepen our understanding of the linkages
between the president, the public, and subsets of the public.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: I would like to thank Robert Erikson for
telling me about the SurveyUSA polls and Costas Panagopoulos for his
comments on this article.
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(1.) Both variables correlate at the zero order with presidential
visits: Katrina dummy r=.31 (p = .000), lag of state unemployment r =
.17 (p = .004).
Jeffrey E. Cohen is a professor of political science at Fordham
University and the author of several books including Presidential
Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making, as well as articles in numerous
journals including the American Political Science Review, American
Journal of Political Science, and Journal of Politics.
TABLE 1
Impact of 1% Change in State Unemployment, % Change in National
Unemployment, and Presidential Visits on % Change
in State-Level Presidential Approval (a)
b SE t p
Model 1
Second-stage results (b)
Constant -0.35 0.18 -1.87 .07
% Change in state unemployment -0.35 0.22 -1.62 .055 *
% Change in national unemployment -5.83 2.11 -2.75 .004 *
Presidential visit 0.27 0.56 0.05 .31 *
Model 2 (c)
Constant -0.32 0.17 -1.94 .058
% Change in state unemployment -0.33 0.19 -1.71 .047 *
% Change in national unemployment -5.83 2.11 -2.77 .004 *
* One-tailed test of statistical significance because
the hypothesis predicts the direction of impact.
(a.) Two-stage least squares results, with Huber-White robust SEs
and clustered on state. n = 250. Lag of state
unemployment and a dummy variable for states directly affected
by Katrina (Mississippi, Louisiana) are used as instrument.
(b.) n = 250, F = 6.63, probability of F = .0003, [R.sup.2] = .03
(c.) n = 250, F = 5.39, probability of F = .008, [R.sup.2] = .03,
based upon a regression that clusters on state and uses
Huber-White robust SEs.
Source:SurveyUSA monthly tracking polls, August 2005-January 2006.