An analysis of the Olympic sponsorship effect on consumer brand choice in the carbonated soft drink market using household scanner data.
Cho, Sungho ; Lee, Minyong ; Yoon, Taeyeon 等
Introduction
Sponsorship as a form of commercial activity is clearly
differentiated from philanthropic sponsorship (Meenaghan, 1991). First,
a sponsorship program requires the sponsor to deliver a contribution, in
cash or in kind, to the sport organization. Second, the sponsored
activity is not a part of the sponsoring company's own commercial
functions. Finally, the sponsor expects a commercial return for its
investments. Based on these elements, Meenaghan (1991) defined
commercial sponsorship as "an investment, in cash or in kind, in an
activity, in return for access to the exploitable commercial potential
associated with that activity." (p.36)
Basically, this perspective accentuates the mechanism of
sponsorship as a process of value transaction, such as product and
service bartering, direct financial support, or indirect investment for
some marketing initiatives. That is, unlike philanthropic donations,
strategic commercial sponsorship of athletic events seeks to fulfill
marketing objectives in exchange for giving cash or non-cash resources
to sporting events. To be specific, sponsors cite various commercial
reasons for sponsorship: increased brand awareness (Javalgi, Taylor,
Gross, & Lampman, 1994), stronger brand identification (Chebat &
Daoud, 2003), image transfer from sporting events to corporate sponsors
(Deane, Smith, & Adam, 2003; Gwinner & Eaton, 1999), building
positive attitudes (Dees, Bennett, & Ferreira, 2010; Lee & Cho,
2009; Roy & Graeff, 2003), and increased sales (Cornwell, Pruitts,
& Clark, 2005).
In recent years, the worldwide sponsorship market has maintained
its rapid and consistent growth as the number of transactions and the
value of sponsorship have significantly increased. According to Cameron
(2009), the worldwide sponsorship market in 2007 is estimated to be over
$37.7 billion. Among all the sponsorship categories, including arts and
other types of events, sport sponsorship is the leading category,
accounting for 84% of worldwide sponsorship expenditure in 2007 (Fenton,
2009). Sport sponsorship has grown exponentially because of its unique
attractiveness to marketers (Aaker, 1996) and due to historical events
such as the Public Health Smoking Act, which made it illegal to
advertise tobacco products in traditional mass media (Kropp, Lavack,
Holden, & Dalakas, 1999). Today, sport sponsorship has become a
dominant industry as a fair number of major sporting events heavily rely
on revenues from sponsorship agreements. In particular, the Olympic
Games are one of the most popular event types in the industry. According
to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 34% of its total revenues
for the 2001-2004 period came from its flagship corporate sponsorship
agreements (i.e., The Olympic Partner program; Papadimitriou &
Apostolopoulou, 2009). Many multinational corporations pursue Olympic
sponsorship in consideration of various marketing benefits, such as
widespread media coverage and exclusivity (Papadimitriou &
Apostolopoulou, 2009) and brand image leveraging (Deane et al., 2003;
Grohs & Reisinger, 2005; Gwinner & Eaton, 1999; Kropp et al.,
1999).
Given the commercial interest and sizable investment associated
with sponsorship, sponsors demand more tangible evidence of benefits
(i.e., financial returns attributable to sponsorship; D'Esopo &
Almquist, 2007; Lough, Irwin, & Short, 2000). For years, various
marketing and financial approaches have been devised and implemented in
the evaluation of sponsorship (Meenaghan, 1991; Thwaites, Manjarrez,
& Kidd, 1998). In spite of these many pioneering efforts,
sponsorship evaluation remains a daunting challenge due to several
inherent problems (Crosby, 2009; Howard & Crompton, 2004).
Primarily, there has been no comprehensive and widely accepted framework
outlining how to make a sponsorship program commercially accountable
(Harvey, 2001). It is also difficult to isolate the pure effect of
sponsorship from other marketing efforts (Brooks, 1994; Thomas, 1996).
In addition, limited access to actual market data has made it difficult
to directly examine the commercial value of sponsorship. According to
Crompton (2004), the ideal measure by which to evaluate sponsorships is
sales--traffic, leads, or sales figures--followed by intent to purchase,
and finally media equivalency and awareness or recall studies. In
addition, a majority of the literature in sponsorship research has
primarily employed consumer-behavioral approaches--for example, media
exposure time (Abratt & Grobler, 1989), awareness, attitude, image
association (Deane et al., 2003; Gwinner & Eaton, 1999; Javalgi et
al., 1994; Kinney & McDaniel, 1996; Kropp et al., 1999; Lee &
Cho, 2009), purchasing intent, and brand consideration (Harvey, Gray,
& Despain, 2006). Although these consumer-oriented inquiries
established valuable theoretical notions and frameworks, they only
suggest proxy values for a sponsorship effect; brand perception, for
example, may not precisely translate to the commercial or financial
value of sponsorship.
Meanwhile, a small number of studies have attempted to assess the
economic value of sponsorships in an indirect way: the Event Study
Analysis that examines the stock prices of sponsoring companies before
and after an initial sponsorship announcement. Using Event Study
Analysis, Mishra and colleagues (1997) found a positive impact of 76
sponsorship announcements, including sport (i.e., in-arena promotion and
Olympics) and miscellaneous events (i.e., exhibits, charities, and
concerts). Farrell and Frame (1997) and Miyazaki and Morgan (2001)
examined sponsorship announcements associated with the 1996 Summer
Olympics and their impact on shareholders' wealth. Cornwell and
colleagues (2005) conducted a similar study that investigated official
sponsorship of major professional sport leagues in the United States.
Although some of these studies found a positive sponsorship effect on
stock price and overall shareholder wealth, the implemented methodology
(Event Study Analysis) was limited in that the direct impact on the
market itself, such as consumers' brand choice and sales, remains
speculative.
In measuring the effects of sponsorship, scholars have paid
relatively little attention to separating the effects of traditional
advertising conduct from sponsorship. For instance, in Harvey (2001),
Next Century Media reported that the click-through rate of sponsored
information on the internet was almost double that of the average
advertising application in an e-Voice interactive audio medium. Although
the study indicated higher efficacy of sponsorship as a marketing
communication vehicle when compared with traditional advertising alone,
the author did not examine whether consumers' perception of a
specific sponsor was indeed connected to their actual brandchoice
behavior. Similarly, the commercial accountability of sponsorship as a
marketing vehicle has not been thoroughly studied for various
methodological and conceptual challenges (Howard & Crompton, 2004).
Despite the methodological and conceptual problems, the current
corporate culture under the economic recession demands an
interdisciplinary effort to develop a comprehensive sponsorship
evaluation framework based on financial concepts, such as Return on
Investment (ROI) (Kitchen, 2010). Although ROI is a financial term, it
has been introduced to the field of marketing as one measure of the
financial accountability of sponsorship campaigns. Recently, marketing
ROIhas become a significant interdisciplinary subject and a bridge
between finance and marketing (Harden & Heyman, 2011; Moeller &
Landry, 2009). ROI can be defined simply as a ratio between the cost of
production of goods or services and the revenue from their sales.
However, a direct application of this definition is somewhat problematic
when used for discovering the commercial value of sponsorship because a
large amount of revenue does not necessarily warrant a profitable
business (Moeller & Landry, 2009). As a result, Moeller and Landry
(2009) expounded a marketing ROI formula that reflects the profitability
of a particular event:
ROI = (VCM x Incremental volume) - Total Cost/Total Cost (1)
where VCM (variable contribution margin) stands for the variable
profit per volume unit (i.e., earned profit per product or service unit
sold). This ROI element can be calculated by subtracting the unit COGS (component cost of goods) and other costs from the unit price of
products or services. Incremental Volume in the equation refers to the
number of units sold in excess of normal sales volume. The formula
suggests how the ROI from a particular sponsorship program can be
estimated to proxy for actual financial returns. After all, the
incremental volume, the number of units sold that can be attributed to
the event, and total cost of the event would be critical determinants of
sponsorship ROI.
Arguably, one of the most controversial issues in calculating
sponsorship ROI would be how to define the scope of measurement (Harden
& Heyman, 2011). Given the vague boundaries among different
marketing initiatives and programs, it is crucial to determine the
extent to which this ROI can be estimated. There are two different but
somewhat related issues involved: the types of marketing initiatives
subject to ROI metrics and the timeline of the analysis. One ROI-metric
question is whether a macrolevel branding cost, such as a sponsorship
right fee, must be included in the ROI metrics. Scholars and
practitioners have designed a hierarchical diagram, the so-called
"funnel-shape" ROI approach, to address this type of issue
(Harden & Heyman, 2011; Lenskold, 2002; Paterson, 2007). The
funnel-shape diagram first lays out all levels of marketing
practices--from marketing programs primarily aimed at capturing
intangible proxy benefits, such as brand awareness, to other programs
that eventually elicit brand choice and sales, such as an on-site
promotion. The funnel then indicates from which point the ROI metrics
would allow the evaluation of a particular investment. In practice,
where to begin the evaluation may significantly affect the outcome of
analysis. Marketers are generally reluctant to take proxy branding costs
into the equation, while financial professionals would more likely want
to expand the scope of the analysis (Harden & Heyman, 2011;
McCafferty, 2007).
For instance, Coca-Cola's marketing department may prefer to
conduct an ROI analysis of the company's Olympic sponsorship
program, limiting its scope to on-site promotions, because this approach
would likely present a better ROI than an all-inclusive analysis that
counts the sponsorship right fee. Marketing practitioners frequently
argue that the financial accountability of proxy branding cost, such as
a sponsorship fee, might not be empirically sustainable (Harden &
Heyman, 2011). Yet, no study has investigated whether an empirical
approximation of sponsorship ROI is plausible.
The second issue related to the scope of ROI measurement is whether
the evaluation should focus on short-term or long-term effects. Studies
have consistently found that promotional events, such as price discounts
or couponing, are likely to have a shortterm effect on sales, while
macro-level brand advertisement would more likely have a lasting effect
(Baghestani, 1991; Chudy, 2008; Mela, Gupta, & Lehmann, 1997). This
proposition suggests that sponsorship might need to be evaluated in
terms of its longterm effect because it can be characterized as a proxy
branding cost aimed at intangible benefits. Nevertheless, no empirical
study has scrutinized whether sponsorship would have measurable
long-term effects that can be separated from short-term effects.
In summary, the evaluation of sponsorship ROI raises two concerns
related to the scope of measurement: whether a sponsorship effect might
be empirically tested at a micro-level and whether sponsorship can be
separately evaluated in terms of short- and long-term effects. These
concerns call for an attempt to measure the impact of sponsorship on
consumers' actual brand choice behavior in response to a particular
sponsorship program and after controlling for other marketing variables,
such as price, discount, and traditional media advertising. This attempt
would suggest a plausible scope of measurement for the evaluation of
sponsorship ROI. Given the absence of empirical evidence that may
directly address these problems, this study aims to examine (a) whether
consumers purchase more of a brand that actively sponsors a major
sporting event, (b) if so, whether the impact of sponsorship upon
consumers' brand choice is statistically significant even after the
model controls for other marketing variables, and (c) whether
sponsorship has a long-term and/or short-term effect on consumers'
brand choice. Our results may ultimately speak to the threshold question
for sponsorship ROI evaluation--that is, whether the ROI metrics may
plausibly be applied to sponsorship evaluation rather than just proxying
for marketing cost, as has been the rule in the field of marketing. To
achieve these inquiries, this study uses a panel dataset (1) that spans
two Olympic Games--the 2006 Torino Winter and 2008 Beijing Summer
Olympics--during which Coca-Cola, a major sponsor of the Olympic Games,
engaged in aggressive marketing campaigns. This study also focuses on
changes in consumers' brand choice within the top name-brand colas,
Coke and Pepsi.
Methodology
Data Management
The original scanner data are from 14,065 households that recorded
their soft drink purchases on a daily basis for about 3 years from
February 2006 to December 2008. (2) The first step of data management
was to extract the data from data on the whole soft drink market.
Because this study exclusively focused on the cola market, we extracted
a subsample of 11,887 households across 15 designated marketing areas
(DMA) that had actually purchased cola at least once during the 3-year
period. (3) The second step was to establish continuity of the data for
the purpose of analysis. A problem with the original scanner data was
that most households would not purchase cola on a daily basis, and as a
result, there could be a significant number of zero values in the data
entries. Such infrequent purchasing made it difficult to locate the
exact moment when the change of brand choice actually happened, if it
does. Therefore, it is necessary to use a more continuous dataset to
track consumers' brand choice, particularly during the Olympic
Games. Therefore, the household data were collapsed to the DMA level and
aggregated from daily to weekly data: The 11,887 households collapsed
into 15 DMAs and, therefore, 2,280 observations for the period (15 DMAs
X 152 weeks).
We match weekly television advertizing expenditure data for each
DMA with the purchasing data above. Television advertising data are
constructed by summing expenditures of local advertising, network
advertising, and syndication advertising. (4)
Explanation of Variables
The name-brand cola market is dominated by only two companies,
Coca-Cola and Pepsi. Assuming that the utility a consumer perceives from
a cola product is identical regardless of brand, it is reasonable to
infer that determinants of consumer brand choice result mainly from
other intangible marketing factors and not from the functional
attributes of the product per se. This study assumes that a brand choice
is determined by three types of factors: (a) promotional efforts by each
company, for example pricing, advertising, and sponsorship; (b)
intra-brand substitution within Coke or Pepsi (i.e., a substitution
effect between new and classic products); and (c) heterogeneity of each
DMA in terms of demographics (e.g., average income and racial
composition).
Based on these three assumptions about the determinants of brand
choice, this study introduces the brand-choice ratio between Coke and
Pepsi as the dependent variable. By using the ratios instead of absolute
quantities, we excluded cumbersome factors that might have affected the
consumption of the product. For instance, if the consumption of Coke
peaks during the summer, estimated sponsorship effects might be somewhat
less reliable because summer Olympic Games are held between July and
October. That is, it might not be conclusive whether the increase in
cola consumption can be attributed to the company's marketing
efforts (i.e., sponsorship) or merely a seasonal fluctuation. Although
such a seasonal effect might be handled using statistical methods such
as introducing dummies, subtle effects still might not be captured.
Another example of an external factor that can be controlled using the
ratio between Coke and Pepsi would be the current economic recession.
Although it would definitely affect the market, filtering out its
effects would be very difficult because we are not sure exactly when it
began. In addition to brand choice, price and advertising expenditures
are also introduced in the form of ratios. The employment of these ratio
terms is also supported by the notion of a "choice of map"
(Elrod, 1988)--rather than a birds-eye view of a broadly defined product
market, this focuses on a submarket where closely competing brands have
saturated a market.
This study focuses on leading classic brands from each
company--Regular Coke, Diet Coke, Regular Pepsi, and Diet Pepsi--which
indeed represent their respective companies as flagship brands. These
four brands account for 34.8% and 69.7% of consumer purchases of the
whole carbonated soft drink and the whole cola soft drink markets,
respectively (See Table 1 and Table 2). To enable analytical
tractability, the study focused on these four brands.
In order to deal with the substitution effect between the four
leading brands of Coke and Pepsi, and other new brands excluded from the
analysis, new cola brands emphasizing dietary-health concerns were also
considered in the study. For instance, two new Coke brands--Caffeine
Free Diet Coca-Cola and Diet Coca-Cola Zero--supposedly substitute for
existing classic Coke brands in the market (i.e., Regular and Diet
Coke), specifically for more health-conscious consumer groups. Given
that a substitution effect is highly probable, the study includes the
prices of four new products in the analysis. First of all, we assumed
that consumers might directly associate these new brands with the
classic products rather than perceive them as distinctively independent
items. As a result, we introduced the price differences between the
classic and new brands of both companies instead of using the absolute
prices of the new products in the model. For instance, the
weighted-average price of two new Coke brands-Caffeine Free Diet
Coca-Cola and Diet Coca-Cola Zero--represents the price of the new
products. Then, the difference between this average price and the
weighted-average prices of two classic brands (i.e., Regular Coke and
Diet Coke) denotes the relative price of new brands introduced in the
model, which can then be used to evaluate the existence of a
substitution effect of new brands. Likewise, Caffeine Free Diet Pepsi and Caffeine Free Pepsi are constructed in the same way.
In addition, various promotional pricing strategies, such as
coupons, shopper cards, and buy-one-get-one-free programs, would
presumably influence consumers' brand choice. This study attempted
to control for these effects by using the prices actually paid by
consumers at the point of sales after accounting for all promotional
discounts. For instance, assuming that the retail unit price for a
2-liter bottle of Coke Classic is $2.00, if there is a
buy-one-get-one-free promotion, the unit price applied to the model
becomes $1.00 per bottle, which is the amount the consumer actually
paid.
It is also true that demographic features of each DMA--such as
household income, education level of female head, employment of male
head, and household composition--might create a different pattern of
product consumption in each DMA. For instance, the Houston DMA and the
Boston DMA show a substantial difference (more than 2.5 times) in their
brand choice, which is measured by the purchase ratio, and
notwithstanding their equivalent pricing strategies and similar
advertising expenditures. (5) Unfortunately, it is hardly possible to
consider all these potential demographic variables altogether. This
study seeks to address this possible heterogeneity problem by
introducing DMA dummies that proxy for the combined demographic variable
set. (6)
Coke, but not Pepsi, is one of the major official sponsors of the
Olympic Games, and the data period encompasses two Olympic Games: Torino
and Beijing. Sponsorship effects are examined by tracking the change in
consumers' brand choice ratios before, during, and after the
Olympic Games. As mentioned before, there is still not agreement about
where to separate short-term effects of sponsorship from long-term ones.
For our analysis, the short-term effect was defined as an increased
brand-choice ratio during the Olympic Games after controlling for other
factors. On the other hand, the long-term effect, if one exists, would
maintain a higher brand-choice ratio after the Games are over, just as
traditional advertising may have a lasting effect. Here we defined a
long-term effect as an increased brand-choice ratio after the Olympic
Games after controlling for other factors. Dummy variables, designating
the time periods during and after the Olympic Games, were employed to
estimate each of these effects.
Panel Model
The data for our analysis were repeated observations across the
same DMAs for about 3 years (i.e., panel data). For concreteness, the
time period is per week, from February 2006 to December 2008 (T = 152),
and there was an i for each of 15 DMAs (N = 15). So, this study applied
models for long panel data with several time periods over relatively few
DMAs. Whereas short panel models focus on unobserved heterogeneity, long
panel models are concerned with the temporal element of the error
process ([u.sub.it]) to explore more efficient generalized least-squares
(GLS) estimation. (7) Consider a general long panel model below:
[y.sub.it] = [[X'.sub.it][beta] + [u.sub.it], i = l,..., N, t
= 1, ..., T (2)
where [y.sub.it] is a dependent variable, is [X.sub.it] a vector of
explanatory variables, [beta] represents a vector for coefficients to be
estimated, and is an error term. Because T is large relative to N it is
necessary to specify a model that can correct for any serial correlation
in the error term. This study assumed AR(1) serial correlation with a
constant correlation coefficient; that is, [[rho].sub.i] = [rho] for all
i in (3). (8) In addition, given the small N, it was tractable to relax
the assumption that is independent over i. A general form for the error
term can be expressed in (3):
[u.sub.it] = [rho][u.sub.i,t-l] + [[epsilon].sub.it] (3)
where [rho] is a coefficient that allows for AR(1) serial
correlation, and [[epsilon].sub.it] is serially uncorrelated but can be
correlated over i with (Corr([[epsilon].sub.it], [[epsilon].sub.iS]) =
[[sigma].sub.ij]. Accordingly, for long panel data, the feasible GLS
model can be considered under different assumptions on the error
process. (9) It is generally possible to consider three different
assumptions about the error process: (a) contemporaneous correlations
allow correlation over DMAs (E([u.sub.it][u.sub.jt]) =
([[sigma].sub.ij]); (b) serial allow for an AR(1) error process ([rho]
[not equal to] 0); and (c) heteroskedasticity that allows different
variance across DMAs E([u.sup.2.sub.it) = [[sigma].sub.i.sub.2]). This
study tested these three assumptions, and then, on the basis of test
results, suggested the richest feasible GLS model in terms of the
assumed error process.
On the other hand, the GLS models give the best linear unbiased
estimators if the error process is correctly specified. If misspecified,
these estimators are generally inconsistent. In this case, the ordinary
least-squares (OLS) model with panel-corrected standard errors gave
consistent estimators in spite of its efficiency loss. This study also
estimated the OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors and
compared the estimation results from both models to check the robustness
of our results.
Results and Conclusion
Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 shows that the top four brands among 905 brands in the
sample dominated the carbonated soft drink market during the 3-year
period, occupying a total of 34.8% of the market. Also, in the cola
market, the four leading products aggregately maintained a dominant
position, with 69.7% of market share among 39 cola brands (see Table 2).
The brand-choice ratio, representing brand choice of Coke relative to
Pepsi, was calculated as the ratio of the purchased quantities of the
Coke and Pepsi brands (i.e., Regular Coke, Diet Coke, Regular Pepsi, and
Diet Pepsi). In general, consumers in the sample preferred Coke brands
to Pepsi brands, yielding a brand-choice ratio of 1.35 over the total
market sampled. Still, the ratio varied by period and DMA, with a low of
0.30 for the second week of June 2006 in the Detroit DMA and with a high
of 9.66 for the last week of December 2007 in the Atlanta DMA (SD =
1.02).
Table 3 describes the primary explanatory variables which were
expected to determine the brand choice, along with respective averages
and standard deviations. (10) In accordance with the brand-choice ratio,
price and advertising expenditures were also analyzed in terms of
ratios. For instance, 1.10, the average value of the relative price of
Coke (P_Ratio), indicated that consumers in the sample on average paid
1.10 times more for Coke than Pepsi. Coke spent a total of $114 million
on advertising for its two leading brands in 15 DMA regions during the
3-year period. Hence, compared with the $44 million that Pepsi spent for
its two leading brands, Coke expended over 2.5 times more on
advertising. The study introduced this ratio of advertising expenditures
( In_AD_Ratio) in natural logarithm form to transform the distribution
of the raw ratios into a normal distribution. (11)
The graphs in Figure 1 depict scattered data and the locally
weighted scatterplot smoothing estimators (LOWESS) for two primary
determinants--price and advertising--in relation to brand-choice ratios.
(12) The negatively sloped price ratio in the first graph is reasonable
because consumers chose Coke more frequently as the relative price of
the product decreased. The LOWESS estimator in the second graph shows
positive curvature. That is, as Coke spent more on advertising relative
to Pepsi, consumers purchased more Coke brands--that is, there was a
greater frequency of brand choice. Meanwhile, the slope of the second
LOWESS graph shows an abrupt upturn at one point. This may indicate that
the advertising effect on the brand-choice increases when the gap
between the advertising expenditures of Coke and Pepsi exceeds some
threshold point. Alternatively, assuming a linear relationship between
brand-choice ratios and the log of the advertising expenditure ratios,
the upturn in the LOWESS slope in the second graph would indicate that
some unaccounted factors must be coming into play. These unknown factors
are probably interrelated with the advertising expenditures but manifest
only when Coke spends significantly more on advertising than Pepsi does.
Figure 2 indicates that such large gaps between the advertising
expenditures of Coke and Pepsi indeed existed during both Olympic
periods. Actually, the In_AD_Ratio was estimated to jump on average from
1.32 to 3.52 during the Olympic Games, and the brand-choice ratio also
increased from 1.55 to 2.00. As a result, one could presume that, in
addition to the advertising effects, Olympic sponsorship effects might
be lifting the second LOWESS estimator in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Following the four leading brands in Table 2 are Caffeine Free Diet
Coca-Cola, Caffeine Free Diet Pepsi, Diet Coca-Cola Zero, and Caffeine
Free Regular Pepsi. These new products are expected to substitute for
the four leading brands of both companies. Therefore, the pricing
strategies of these new products might have a direct impact on the
brand-choice ratio of the four leading brands. While Pepsi did not
significantly differentiate the pricing strategies for its new products,
Coke set relatively higher prices on its new products (see Table 3).
Consequently, it is expected that Pepsi's new products might have
more substitution impact on its leading classic brands than new Coke
products might have on its classic brands.
Lastly, two dummy variables were included in the model to analyze
the short-term (Oly_Short) and long-term (Oly_Long) effect of Olympic
sponsorship. Another dummy interacted the short-term effect and the
natural logarithm of the advertising expenditure ratio (In_AD_Ratio).
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the advertising expenditure of Coke
greatly increased during the Olympic Games, but its effects on brand
choice, both short-term and long-term, are not explicitly supported.
(13)
Test Results and Model Specification
To explore the feasible GLS model with the best fitted error
process for the data, this study implemented three tests for three
assumptions: (a) contemporaneous correlation, (b) serial correlation,
and (c) heteroskedasticity. (14) Table 4 names and summarizes results
for tests of these three assumptions. The null hypotheses for the first
and third assumptions--that is, there is no contemporaneous correlation
and there is homoskedasticity--were rejected at the 1% significance
level, while the null hypothesis for the second assumption was not
rejected. Given the result, this study estimated the feasible GLS model
with an error process that assumes contemporaneous correlation,
heteroskedasticity, and no serial correlation.
In addition, an OLS model with panel-corrected standard errors,
which also allow contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity
across DMAs, was estimated together with the feasible GLS model. If
there is a considerable difference between the estimates from these two
models, the reliability of the feasible GLS model might come into
question.
Estimation Results
Table 5 summarizes the estimates of the coefficients, standard
errors, and z-statistics for the two models mentioned above: (a) the
feasible GLS model that assumes contemporaneous correlation and
heteroskedasticity and (b) the OLS model with panel-corrected standard
errors. For ease of presentation, the estimation results for the DMA
dummies are not provided in Table 5. (15) The estimates from both models
were fairly similar, with the feasible GLS generally showing smaller
standard errors.
The signs on the P_Ratio were both negative, as expected, and
statistically significant at the 5% level. The marginal effect of the
relative price of Coke (or the price-ratio) was -1.56 in the GLS model
and -1.93 in the OLS model. Brand loyalty based on particular product
characteristics would constrain these coefficients at absolute levels
less than -1.00, reflecting that the change in relative quantity would
be less than the change in relative price. Compared with this standard,
these numbers seem to be relatively large. This result may support a
fundamental assumption of this study: Substantive differences in
functional attributes do not drive brand choice to a greater degree than
marketing variables. At the least, it suggests that product attributes,
such as taste or composition of ingredients, might not be the primary
factors eliciting brand choice. Therefore, intangible properties
associated with the product that are not based on experience with the
product--but are based on perceptions influenced by marketing factors,
such as advertising or sponsorship--may be determinative.
The estimated coefficients for the prices of new cola brands
presented signs that might suggest a substitution effect. For example,
the estimate 0.67863 means that, if the price of new Coke products
increased by 10% relative to that of Regular Coke and Diet Coke,
consumers' brand choice of classic products also would increase by
approximately 6.8%, in terms of the brand-choice ratio. The relatively
higher prices of new brands may deter consumers from the consumption of
the new products relative to the classic products. Meanwhile, the price
difference between new and classic Coke brands was statistically
significant at the 5% level; the same does not hold for the price
difference between Pepsi brands.
Next, this study investigated the estimation results for the four
pivotal variables that provide information about the relationship
between advertising/sponsorship and brand choice. First, the signs of
three estimates--In_AD_Ratio, Oly_Short, and Oly_Long--showed positive
effects of advertising and sponsorship on consumers' brand choice.
But the long-term effect of sponsorship (Oly_Long) was not statistically
significant in either model. An interesting result came from the
positive sign on the interactive term, In_AD_Oly, which presumably
suggests some synergistic effect arising from advertising and
sponsorship. The advertising effect increased during the Olympic period;
thus, this additional effect, represented by In_AD_Olycould be
interpreted as a kind of sponsorship effect. Therefore, the short-term
sponsorship effect could be calculated as the sum of the pure effect
from the estimates of Oly_Short and the synergistic effect from
increased advertising effects. The short-term sponsorship effect can be
measured on the basis of the estimation results of the GLS model, as in
Table 6. The synergistic effect was computed by comparing the two
marginal effects of In_AD_Ratio, one estimated during the Olympic period
and one outside of the Olympic period. In the GLS model, Coke's
Olympic sponsorship increased the brand-choice ratio (Coke:Pepsi) of the
product by 0.438 during the Olympic period. This figure represents the
short-term sponsorship effect on the brand-choice ratio, consisting of
the pure effect from the estimate of Oly_Short (0.319) and the
synergistic effect from increased advertising effects (0.119)--that is,
the advertising effect during the Olympics (0.143) minus the effect
outside the Olympics (0.024). The interactive term, In_AD_Oly, was not
statistically significant at the 10% level in either model.
In sum, the estimation results from the GLS and OLS models show
that: (a) consumer's brand choice between Coke and Pepsi largely
depends on the firm's promotional strategies, such as pricing,
advertising, and sponsorship, and may not depend on functional
attributes such as taste; (b) an interactive effect of advertising and
sponsorship was observed but was not supported as statistically
significant by the models; and (c) after controlling for advertising
effects, there was still a short-term sponsorship effect on consumer
brand choice, but a long-term effect was not statistically supported in
either of the models, despite the expected positive signs.
It is noteworthy that our results only support existence of a
short-term effect. Indeed, it has been found that a long-term effect for
advertising might not easily be captured econometrically, even if it may
exist. While some scholars claim that a proxy branding effort such as
sponsorship presumably has a long-term effect on sales (Baghestani,
1991; Cain, 2010; Chudy, 2008; Mela, Gupta, & Lehmann, 1997),
studies have questioned the measurability of any long-term advertising
effect (Dekimpe & Hanssens, 1999; Clarke, 1976). Givon and Horsky
(1990) found that advertising's carryover effect is not greater
than the purchase reinforcement effect in the evolution of market share.
Clarke (1976) surveyed the literature that examined lasting effects of
advertising on sales and concluded that the cumulative advertising
effect on sales would likely last only several months rather than years.
Even though a long-term effect from sponsorship as advertising has been
widely maintained, it might not be empirically captured unless a more
comprehensive macro-level analysis is employed. Alternatively, this
absence of a long-term effect might be due to the short span of the
panel data. Because the household panel data began from the Torino
Winter Games period, it is impossible to extrapolate the long-term
effect of sponsorship with respect to the whole 3-year span. Therefore,
the 5-month span before and after the Beijing Summer Games was used to
analyze the long-term effect. This may not be long enough to manifest a
long-term effect, if one exists.
In general, the results support that an evaluation of ROI for
Coca-Cola's Olympic Games sponsorship is empirically attainable,
even though only a short-term effect has been evidenced. Because
Coca-Cola's Olympic Games sponsorship had a statistically
significant effect on consumer brand choice during the event period, one
could calculate the variable Incremental Volume in ROI equation (1) by
converting the short-term effect--presented as a brand-choice ratio term
in Table 6--into a sales volume term, using information about the entire
market for Coca-Cola and Pepsi, if available. In addition, information
about total advertising expenditures by Coca-Cola and Pepsi during the
Olympic periods and Coca-Cola's Olympic sponsorship fee would make
it possible to derive the Total Cost term in ROI equation (1). Then,
adding net unit profit information from Coca-Cola would define the VCM
variable in equation (1). Thus, with all of the elements, evaluation of
ROI for Coca-Cola's Olympic sponsorship is a matter of simple
calculation.
Conclusion
This study sought evidence for sponsorship effects on consumer
brand choice to determine whether sponsorship ROI can be empirically
achievable. By focusing on a vigorous Olympic sponsorship program, and
utilizing long panel household scanner data, we examined the actual
market responses to the efforts of sponsorship engagement--that is,
consumer brand choice during and after Olympic Games periods. By
introducing dummies during the Olympic Games for the short-term and
after the Olympic Games for the long-term, Olympic sponsorship effects
were extracted. In developing the long panel model, we used various ways
to separate the sponsorship effect from other factors expected to impact
consumer brand choice: using the ratio terms; introducing other
promotional variables, such as price and advertising, as explanatory
variables; and considering heterogeneity of DMAs and any substitution
effects from new brands. In addition, for the feasible GLS model, this
study tested three assumptions on the error process. Then, the GLS
model--with contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticit, chosen
based on test results--was run, along with an OLS model with
panel-corrected errors to check for robustness of estimation results.
Results from the models show that, advertising effects apart, a
sponsorship effect on consumer purchasing behavior actually exists,
although it seems limited to a short-term effect--that is, limited to
the duration of the sponsored event itself. Moreover, this short-term
effect may be decomposed into a pure effect from sponsorship, after
other marketing variables are controlled, as consumers purchase more
sponsored products during a sports event than they otherwise would. It
also captured an indirect effect from sponsorship, as sponsorship
increases the effectiveness of a sponsor's traditional advertising
efforts during the sponsored event.
Identifying a sponsorship effect has implications for event
organizers and potential sponsors. Organizers seeking sponsorship fees
may be asked to submit empirical evidence of a positive sponsorship
effect. Potential sponsors may also turn to empirical evidence of a
positive effect before deciding to sponsor an event. A positive
sponsorship effect means that strategic action has the intended effect
on sales volume of sponsored products. This implies a financial return
attributable to sponsorship. This investigation demonstrated that
sponsorship effect can be empirically captured by using panel data. Its
results show that the elements necessary for ROI calculations can be
practically produced. That is, for sport sponsorship for the major soft
drink brand, using this study's results along with full market
information would enable sponsorship ROI calculations to be conducted.
Thus, an analyst could use ROI to conclude whether the event sponsorship
yields net financial gains.
Although only a short-term effect was statistically significant,
our empirical result at least established a baseline foundation that
could be used for ROI calculation in sponsorship. It is still possible
that evaluation of a firm's sponsorship based solely on the
short-term effect could be flawed--whereas if a long-term effect exists,
this could tip the balance to a positive ROI. The timeline within which
ROI is calculated, remains at the discretion of the analyst and
available dataset. Further breakthroughs in modeling and econometric identification of a long-term sponsorship effect could lead to more
complete ROI evaluation for sponsors.
This investigation has several limitations. For tractability we
primarily examined only four leading brands of two dominant companies in
the market, since both Pepsi and Coca-Cola have been diversifying their
soda brands remarkably in recent years. Focusing on the small number of
leading brands this study may not explicate the complicated multivariate
dynamics present in the market. Most of all, it only investigated the
sponsorship dynamics in the cola market with its very unique
characteristics. Consumption of cola is presumed to be more dependent on
marketing factors rather than the functional values associated with the
product, such as taste. Our analysis of sponsorship effects heavily
depended on the particular characteristics of the cola market and the
functional substitutability of the products. The implications may not be
generalizable to other products that are more likely associated with
functional values. The 15 DMAs from which the data were originally
extracted may not represent the entire U.S. cola market. In addition,
the aggregation of the individual household data to establish the DMA
clusters makes it impossible to consider heterogeneity across
households. Finally, the models may fail to explore the long-term effect
because of the limited span of the dataset. This result could be
different if the same analyses were done with longer panel data.
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Endnotes
(1) Our thanks go to the Food Marketing Policy Center at the
University of Connecticut for Nielsen Homescan Data and corresponding
advertising data.
(2) Households in the sample might not be representative of the
U.S. population as a whole and might not record their purchases
accurately. However, Einav, Leibtag, and Nevo (2008) recently submitted
a report on the credibility of the Nielsen Homescan data with the
conclusive com ment: "The overall accuracy of self-reported data by
Homescan panelists seems to be in line with other commonly used
(government-collected) economic datasets" (p. 3).
(3) A DMA is a group of counties that form an exclusive geographic
area for which the local market television stations hold a dominance of
total hours viewed. In total, there are 207 DMAs for the entire U.S. and
the data for our analysis cover 15 of the largest DMAs (i.e., Atlanta,
Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Hartford-Springfield, Houston,
Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco,
Seattle, and Washington D.C.), accounting for around 38% of total DMA
markets by population (Trade Dimension, 2009). For a detailed
description of how Nielsen collects Homescan Data, refer to Nielsen
(2009, pp. 5-9).
(4) In order to investigate advertising effects on viewers'
behavioral response, many of the studies apply audience measurement
systems, called Nielsen ratings, from a Nielsen advertising dataset
(e.g., Kanazawa & Funk, 2001; Szczypka et al., 2003). However, the
level of our analysis is no longer each viewer (i.e., at the
household-level) is now at the DMA-level. Thus, this study directly
employs advertising expenditures, rather than Nielsen ratings, to fit
the aggregated DMA-level dataset.
(5) Although the price ratio and the advertising expenditure ratio
of these DMAs are 1.05 versus 1.08 and 37.7 versus 35.8, the
brand-choice ratio is 1.39 versus 3.27.
(6) Cameron and Trivedi (2009) suggest that individual effects from
heterogeneity may be incorporated into explanatory variables as
dummy-variable regressors when there are relatively few individuals
relative to the number of time periods in long panel datasets.
(7) As explained before, this unobserved heterogeneity is no longer
an issue in a long panel model because that can be largely handled by
including dummy variables.
(8) For panel data, it is often the case that the error correlation
declines as the time difference increases. The assumption of AR(1) makes
it possible to consider this dampening in the error process (Cameron
& Trivedi, 2009, p. 249). That is, in the error form in (3), AR(1)
implies that [[rho].sup.ts] = [[rho].sub.[absolute value t-s]], where t
and s are different time periods.
(9) The feasible GLS estimation replaces the error variance matrix
assumed in the GLS estimation by the estimated error variance. For a
detailed discussion, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
(10) For simplicity of presentation, 14 dummy variables for 15 DMAs
are left out of Table 3.
(11) Advertising expenditures for both Coca-Cola and Pepsi have
about 1.7 times greater standard deviations than their mean values--a
large degree of variation, as shown in Figure 2. The ratio constructed
with these expenditures has, as a result, a significantly skewed
distribution. After taking a logarithm, skewness and kurtosis dropped
from 8.47 to 0.15 and from 107.7 to 2.6.
(12) The LOWESS, as a variation of the local linear estimator, is
generally used as an alternative curve-fitting approach that uses
nonparametric methods to fit a local relationship between a y variable
and an x variable. For details, refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2009, pp.
65-67).
(13) In Figure 2, outside of the Olympic period, Coca-Cola's
advertising expenditure jumped in the last week of January in 2007 and
2008 due to promotional activities around the Super Bowl. However,
Pepsi's advertising expenditure also increased remarkably in these
weeks.
(14) We chose these tests for their robustness among a class of
tests for each assumption. For example, while the Baltagi-Wu test is
also widely accepted as a test for serial correlation because of its
optimality, it is known that the Wooldridge test is more robust because
it is based on fewer assumptions. The Modified Wald test is also free of
the normality assumption.
(15) In both models, almost all of the 14 dummies show
statistically significant estimates at the 5% level. That means that
heterogeneity clearly exists across DMAs.
Sungho Cho [1], Minyong Lee [2], Taeyeon Yoon [3], and Charles
Rhodes [3]
[1] Bowling Green State University
[2] Valparaiso University
[3] University of Connecticut
Sungho Cho is an assistant professor at Bowling Green State
University. His research interests are multivariate analyses of
sponsorship effects and the use of survey evidence in trademark
litigation.
Minyong Lee is a full time instructor at Valparaiso University. His
research interests include financial analyses of sport industry
dynamics.
Taeyeon Yoon is a doctoral candidate at the University of
Connecticut. His main research interest is the estimation of econometric
models of micro-level data.
Charles Rhodes is a doctoral candidate at the University of
Connecticut. His research interests include analyses of marketing
variables using household-level panel data.
Table 1. Consumer Expenditures by (Top) Name Brands in the
Carbonated Soft-Drink Market
Name brand Consumer expenditure ($) Market ratio (%)
Regular Coke 42,526,882 10.2
Diet Coke 41,388,538 9.9
Regular Pepsi 34,776,880 8.3
Diet Pepsi 27,253,624 6.5
Caffeine Free Diet Coke 14,944,160 3.6
Regular Dr Pepper 11,303,720 2.7
Caffeine Free Diet Pepsi 10,524,412 2.5
Regular Sprite 9,786,360 2.3
Regular Mountain Dew 9,663,018 2.3
Diet Dr Pepper 8,590,807 2.1
Total 419,012,932 100.0
Table 2. Consumer Expenditures by Top Name Brands in the Cola Market
Name brand Consumer Market
expenditure ($) ratio (%)
Regular Coke 42,526,882 20.3
Diet Coke 41,388,538 19.8
Caffeine Free Diet 14,944,160 7.1
Coca-Cola
Diet Coca-Cola 6,224,377 3.0
Zero
Regular Coca-Cola 2,925,017 1.4
Cherry
Coca-Cola (total) 117,261,294 56.0
Name brand Name brand Consumer Market
expenditure ($) ratio (%)
Regular Coke Regular Pepsi 34,776,880 16.6
Diet Coke Diet Pepsi 27,253,624 13.0
Caffeine Free Diet Caffeine Free 10,524,412 5.0
Coca-Cola Diet Pepsi
Diet Coca-Cola Caffeine Free 5,078,599 2.4
Zero Regular Pepsi
Regular Coca-Cola Diet Wild Cherry 3,042,300 1.5
Cherry Pepsi
Coca-Cola (total) Pepsi Cola (total) 92,224,253 44.0
Table 3. Description of Explanatory Variables
Variable Description Average
(SD)
P_Ratio the relative price of Coca-Cola 1.10
: calculated as the ratio of the (0.14)
price of Coca-Cola to Pepsi
PD_Coke the price of new Coca-Cola brands 0.17
: calculated as the price difference (0.09)
between classic Coca-Cola brands
and new Coca-Cola brands
PD_Pepsi the price of new Pepsi brands 0.04
: calculated as the price difference (0.10)
between classic Pepsi brands
and new Pepsi brands
In_AD-Ratio the relative advertising expenditure 1.42
of Coca-Cola
: natural logarithm of the ratio of (2.51)
Coca-Cola advertising expenditures
to Pepsi advertising expenditures
Oly_Short the short-term effect of Olympic
sponsorship
: = 1 if the Olympic Games held
during that week ; 0 otherwise
Oly_Long the long-term effect of Olympic
sponsorship
: = 1 after the Beijing Summer
Olympic Games; 0 otherwise
Oly_AD the interactive term
: multiplication of by
Table 4. The Results of Tests on the Error Process
Error process Contemporaneous Serial Heteroskedasticity
correlation correlation
Test name Breusch-Pagan Wooldridge Modified
LM Test * Test ** Wald Test ***
Null hypothesis E([u.sub.it] p = 0 E([u.sup.2.
([H.sub.0]) [u.sub.jt]) = 0 sub.it]) = [sigma]2
Test statistic chi2(105) = F(1, 14) = chi2 (15) =
158.040 0.074 2897.48
(Pr. > chi2 = (Pr. > F = (Pr. > chi2 =
0.0006) 0.7889) 0.0000)
Note. * see Breusch and Pagan (1980); ** see Greene (2000, p. 598);
*** see Wooldridge (2002, pp. 274-276).
Table 5. Estimation Results of the Feasible GLS Model and the
OLS Model
Feasible GLS
Coefficient Standard z-statistic
error
P_Ratio -1.55691 0.091 -17.18 **
In_AD_Ratio 0.01787 0.004 4.24 **
PD_Coke 0.67863 0.156 4.34 **
PD_Pepsi -0.11654 0.109 -1.07
Oly_Short 0.31936 0.084 3.78 **
Oly_Long 0.01757 0.031 0.56
In_AD_Only 0.02228 0.021 1.02
OLS
Coefficient Standard z-statistic
error
P_Ratio -1.92906 0.136 -14.19 **
In_AD_Ratio 0.01716 0.007 2.34 **
PD_Coke 0.89011 0.232 3.79 **
PD_Pepsi -0.11610 0.166 -0.70
Oly_Short 0.23177 0.141 1.65 *
Oly_Long 0.04096 0.053 0.77
In_AD_Only 0.04940 0.036 1.36
Note. * the estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level;
** the estimate is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Table 6. Calculation of the Short-Term Sponsorship Effect
Estimates Average of Marginal Sponsorship
In_AD_Ratio Effect of effect
In_AD_Ratio
Not 0.0179 1.318 0.0179 x 0.319
during (ln_AD_Ratio) 1.318 (Oly_Short)
= 0.024 + (0.143-0.024)
During 0.0179 3.519 0.041 x = 0.438
+ 0.023
the = 0.041 3.519
Olympics (ln_AD_Ratio = 0.143
+ Oly_AD)