The hope statistic as an alternative measure of competitive balance.
Kaplan, Alan ; Nadeau, John ; O'Reilly, Norm 等
Introduction
Considerable research has been undertaken to address questions
relating to competitive balance (CB) in professional team sports. More
specifically, research has been aimed at:
1. Defining CB
2. Measuring CB at different points in time in different leagues
3. Investigating whether CB is a desirable characteristic of a
professional sports league
4. Offering suggestions as to ways to promote or discourage CB.
We believe that these questions have been addressed due to a widely
held belief that CB may have a meaningful impact on team revenues and
profits, as well as having an influence on fan interest.
Fan Welfare and the Need for Competitive Balance
It is not axiomatic that CB promotes fan welfare; having said that,
Rottenberg (1956; 2000) argued that competitors must be of approximately
equal "size" (i.e., ability) to be successful. Contests
between poorly matched teams would eventually lose fan interest.
Zimbalist (2002) similarly suggests that the notion of CB being
important derives from an assumption that fans have a strong preference
for uncertainty of outcomes. The argument is that an increase in CB will
increase the uncertainty of outcomes and stimulate fan interest. Many of
the theoretical advances in CB theory have stemmed from this uncertainty
of outcomes hypothesis (UOH), which often assumes that equal weight is
placed on each game--from an expansion franchise's first game in
the league to an established and competitive team's final game
before postseason play.
A more recent definition proposed by the authors of The
Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Report on Baseball Economics (Levin et.
al., 2000) states that "proper CB will not exist until every
well-run club has a regularly recurring hope of reaching postseason
play" (p. 5). We argue that this definition of CB is not entirely
consistent with the UOH; this difference is important when it comes to
making prescriptive suggestions to enhance CB down the line. Lee and
Fort (2008) make a similar statement.
Based on the statistics constructed to measure it, the UOH is often
thought of as a continuous variable occupying a spectrum from low to
high. In contrast, we think of the hope of reaching postseason play as a
binary variable. Although baseball fans are not presumed to be
homogeneous in their beliefs and expectations, we believe that, if a
team falls out of contention, its fans will lose interest. Similarly, if
a team is in contention, its fans will maintain their interest and their
welfare will be increased. We argue that hope can be effectively modeled
as a binary, rather than a continuous variable. In this respect, our
work is distinct from other work in the field. While recognizing the
value of the UOH definition, we believe that the hope of postseason play
definition, at least as stated here, is reflective of a fan's
perception of CB. O'Reilly et al. (2008) present empirical support
for this argument. With that in mind, we developed a new metric of CB,
one that captures the hope of postseason play.
Competitive Balance: Theory and Alternative Measures
Competitive Balance Theory
Previous empirical research has studied the level of CB in
different leagues at different times, along with the relationship
between these measures and some proxy for consumer welfare (usually
attendance). The results are inconsistent and the metrics are many.
These differences of opinion abound both due to a lack of a clear
definition of CB and an inability to completely measure whatever we
decide CB is meant to measure. Humphreys (2002), and more recently Fort
(2006), spend some time defining and justifying a variety of measures of
CB. These measures include an adjusted or relative standard deviation of
wins percentage, the HHI, Humphrey's CBR, Lorenz curves, Gini
coefficients, analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistics, and the use of
the number of championship seasons. These common metrics of CB (and
others) have recently been categorized into one or more of three
groupings (Lee & Fort, 2008): game performance, single-season
performance, and multi-season performance.
Some of the above measures look at game performance, others at
full-season performance and still others at multi-season performance.
None of them look directly at single or multi-season performance in
terms of whether or not fans think that their team has the potential for
postseason play. In contrast, Whitney (1988) and Lee and Fort (2008) do
try to reflect this consideration in their definitions for CB. In both
cases, the CB definition is based on how far out the best non-playoff
team was from a playoff spot at season's end. Lee and Fort (2008)
compared their measure--that is, to other measures of CB that reflect
single game and multi-season measures--in terms of which measure is best
related to league attendance. They find that their measure is better
related to league attendance than any of the others.
Developing the Hope Statistic
We hypothesize that the hope of postseason play drives fan welfare
and that fan welfare can be maintained or increased, even if the
fan's team does not make the playoffs and as long as it is
relatively close. Unlike with the UOH, fan welfare is not necessarily
negatively affected by a dominant team as long as each fan's team
has a chance of postseason play. Accordingly, the availability of
multiple playoff spots--compared with just one spot--is reflected in our
measure of CB, unlike other measures. Finally, while we think that
multi-season performance is important to hope, we believe within-season
performance is important as well. More specifically, if a club is in the
hunt until late in the season, fans will have continued hope--at least
until the club falls out of contention; this is compared with a club
that falls out of contention early on and never returns to being a
contender.
On this basis, we chose to measure hope for the fan by how
"far out" a team was from a playoff position. Instead of using
a statistic based on wins and losses at the season's end, or the
number of championships, we have chosen games out of a playoff spot as
our indicator of hope, and we chose to measure this statistic as of both
the middle of and the end of the regular season (MOS and EOS). While
Whitney (1988) and Lee and Fort (2008) also use games out of a playoff
spot, or games behind lead (GBL), they only measure the GBL at the EOS
and for the best team to not make the playoffs rather than all the teams
that did not make the playoffs. Yet, in any particular season, there may
be one team or several that were close to making the playoffs. We feel
that a CB measure reflecting this distinction will more effectively
capture the essence of CB. Unlike prior efforts in the literature that
use GBL, our measure is intended to capture this information.
Based on O'Reilly and colleagues (2008), we chose 5.5 games
behind a playoff position as the point at which fans turn from having
hope to not having hope of postseason play in MLB. Briefly,
O'Reilly and colleagues (2008) reviewed a listing of trades made by
MLB teams at or around the trading deadline over a period of years; they
determined how far out of a playoff position a team had to be before
team management traded their present-value talent away. Teams were
identified as trading away present value if the salaries of the players
they traded away were higher than the salaries of the players that they
received in return. This methodology was validated by comparing the
current level of ability of the players traded away in comparison to the
current level of ability of players received in the trade.
The authors then argued that, if management lost hope (i.e., traded
away their present value), there were several reasons to assume that
fans would lose hope at the same time. First, the act of trading away
present-value talent could serve as a signal to fans that management did
not believe that the team would compete that season. Second, since
management and fans could equally see the performance of the team up
until that point in time, it is reasonable to assume that if one group
(management) decided that the team was not going to compete for a
playoff spot, the other group would come to a similar conclusion.
Finally, the trading away of better current talent for noncurrent talent
would further reduce the chance of competing for postseason play and,
consequently, further reduce expectations on the part of fans.
While the trading deadline is usually around the middle of a
season, we chose to measure our statistic as both the middle of the year
and the end of the regular season. We chose the middle of the season
since our metric is based on decisions made by management around the
midseason point. In addition, fan expectations/hope for the second half
of the season, and the potential for post season play, will depend upon
what has occurred through the first half of the season. Alternatively,
the final team standings are intuitively important to most fans when it
comes time to renew or otherwise buy their season tickets--by far the
largest source of gate revenue for most teams. Whether fans gave up hope
prior to the end of the season and/or have an absence of hope going into
the following season, the point is that fans whose teams are
sufficiently far removed from contention at some point will not have a
reasonable hope of postseason play--be it for that year or the next or
beyond.
We then accorded a value of 1 to teams that finished 5.5 games or
less out of a playoff spot, and a value of 0 to teams that finished more
than 5.5 games out of a playoff spot. We label this binary variable GBL
for games behind lead. We argue that it makes little difference to most
fans if their team is 10, versus 20, games out of contention. Still, it
is reasonable to suppose that some fans will maintain interest even if
the team's management has traded away present value, as long as the
team is not too far out of contention and assuming that some fans will
maintain hope when their team is 10 games out, but not when the team is
20 games out, of contention.
An alternative to a binary statistic is a continuous
variable--perhaps based on a logarithmic scale in which the most
important changes in fan welfare occur when a team's performance
falls from just in contention to just out of contention, and in which
changes in fan welfare are minimal when a team falls from 15 games out
of a playoff spot to 20 games out. While recognizing the potential value
to such a statistic, we see no way to model it so as to ensure that the
true value associated with the dispersion of wins and losses is properly
captured.
While recognizing the contributions of others to this literature,
we do feel strongly that a standard deviation statistic, or any
statistic based on an exponential scale, will give undue weight to
observations that do not deserve much weight-that is, teams that are 20
games out of the playoffs compared with those that finish 15 games out.
Arguably, our decision to use a binary instead of a continuous
variable was the most contentious aspect of this paper, based on
comments that we have received. It was suggested that by not using a
continuous variable we ignore/throw out valuable information. We
certainly agree that a continuous variable can take on a broader
spectrum of values than a binary variable, but if we cannot accurately
value that information, we may do more harm than good.
The binary statistic developed by O'Reilly and colleagues
(2008) did reflect the hope of postseason play based on a measurable
indicator (i.e., management's decision to trade away present
value). While conceding that this is not a perfect indicator of fan
hope, we argue that this binary statistic more effectively measures fan
welfare because we can be more confident that it better gauges changes
in fan hope for postseason play.
Our statistic incorporates many of the same features present in
other measures. Like Eckard (2001, 2003) and Humphreys (2002), we
recognize the impact of both single-season and multi-year performance on
CB. Like Hadley and colleagues (2005) and some of those who rely on
Herfindal indexes (e.g., Gerrard, 2004), we use a binary construct.
However, our work is distinguished by our efforts to model the idea of
hope. Based on the above discussion, we have defined our statistic for
CB as:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (1)
where
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
As stated earlier, GBL takes on a value of 1 if team i finishes 5.5
games or less out of a playoff position; otherwise it takes on a value
of 0. [GBL.sub.t,i] is the average of GBL for a particular team i over t
years. We use it to state a particular team's average CB over time.
[GBL.sub.t,i] is the average of GBL for all teams i over t years.
[GBL.sub.N,i] is the average of GBL for N teams in a league in a
particular season t. [GBL.sub.N] is the average [GBL.sub.N,i] for the
league over t years, and [GBL.sub.t] is a measure of the dispersion of
hope among different teams over time.
For further clarity, we have simulated results for a four-team
league over a 3-year period, using 8.0 GBL as our inflexion point. We
could have just as easily used the 5.5 GBL provided in this paper for
our empirical study, but we chose 8.0 GBL as this was the point used in
our sensitivity analysis (discussed later in the paper).
We ran four simulations. Each simulation corresponded to a
different level of CB. In our first simulation, fans of two out of four
teams had hope in each of the 4 years, but it was the same fans (i.e.,
teams). Similarly, in our second simulation, fans of two out of four
teams had hope in each of the 4 years, but the fans/teams that had hope
were mixed up from year to year. In our third simulation, only four
teams had hope in all 3 years combined--an average of 1.33 per year--and
it was the same team almost all the time. This simulation corresponded
to the lowest level of hope for fans. Finally, in our fourth simulation,
three out of four teams had hope every year, and the fans/teams that had
hope were mixed up from year to year. This simulation corresponded to
the highest level of hope for fans. Our results follow:
Simulation 1 2 out of 4 teams in each Hope Statistic: 1.34
year, but the same teams
Simulation 2 2 out of 4 teams in each Hope Statistic: 3.00
year, and all mixed up
Simulation 3 1.33 out of 4 teams in each Hope Statistic: 0.82
year, but the same teams
Simulation 4 3 out of 4 teams in each Hope Statistic: 5.20
year, and all mixed up
These results, ranging from a low of 0.82 to a high of 5.20, give
the reader a feel for the meaning of the different values of the Hope
Statistic, which will be used as a guide for interpreting the results
found later in the paper. We have presented details for Simulations 1
and 2 in Tables 1 and 2 of the paper for the purposes of further
exposition.
The theoretical range of the Hope Statistic ranges from a low of
{(1/N)/highest possible standard deviation}, which occurs when no team
other than the winner has hope of making the playoffs, to a high of
{(N/N)/0 = infinity}, when all teams have hope of making the playoffs
all the time. While the Hope Statistic does not have a neat range from
0-1, as do some of the other statistics current in the literature--and
we cannot figure out how to adjust it to have such a range--the Hope
Statistic does have the benefit of a scale (presented in our simulations
from 0.82 to 5.20) that is easy to understand in real life terms.
In addition, it was important to allow for meaningful comparisons
between values of the Hope Statistic and values of other statistics
current in the literature. Accordingly, when we present our results
later in the paper, we normalize the results for each of the statistics
measured in such a way as to allow for easy comparisons.
The Hope Statistic inherently accounts for both the number of teams
in a league and the number of playoff positions available. Leagues with
fewer teams and more playoff positions, relative to other leagues, will
and should have lower values of the Hope Statistic (i.e., fans of more
teams will have hope that their team will make the postseason). We want
to compare leagues on this basis. Adjusting the statistic depending on
the number of teams per league and/or the number of playoff spots per
league would result in a less meaningful statistic.
Hope in Major League Baseball: An Empirical Look
We measure CB over time, using both of our Hope Statistics, as well
as others current in the literature. To do so, we have used 108 years
worth of data for MLB through the 2008 season. This data set was chosen
for its completeness, its availability, and for its depth (i.e., large
population size). In addition, since this data set has been regularly
studied by others (see our literature review) comparisons are easier and
arguably more meaningful. (1)
Measuring CB Over Time
We first calculated the value of the Hope Statistic and three other
statistics at EOS and presented results in 10-year bands starting with
the 1901 season, and ending with the 2008 season, where the last band
was limited to 8 years. (2) For example, the 1910s refers to the years
from 1911 through 1920, inclusively. The alternative statistics chosen
for comparison purposes are a relative standard deviation--used, for
example, by Scully (1989) and Quirk and Fort (1997)--the CB Ratio
statistic developed by Humphreys (2002) and used in subsequent studies
(Lee & Fort, 2008), and an HHI of League Championships (used by
Gerrard, 2004, and others). The results for the MOS Hope Statistic
values are presented in the next subsection of the paper. We felt that
it made more sense to compare the EOS Hope Statistic to other statistics
current in the literature since all of the other statistics are measured
as of the EOS.
These three alternatives were chosen to reflect recent standards in
the literature. More specifically, the relative standard deviation
statistic reflects an attempt to recognize CB for game-by-game, and
possibly for in-season, performance as a function of the UOH. While
Humphreys' (2002) CBR statistic also reflects in-season performance
as a function of the UOH, it additionally incorporates a multiyear
component. Finally, the HHI metric is a binary (not continuous)
statistic that measures CB based on number of championships per team per
period. Notably, we did not choose to work with the GBL measures
developed by Whitney (1988) or Lee and Fort (2008). Results are
presented in Table 3. In this paper, we decided to compare our metric to
those that reflect a substantially different definition for CB. Future
research should compare our metric to those of Whitney (1988) or Lee and
Fort (2008).
Values for the Hope Statistic ranged from a low of 0.64 to a high
of 1.94. Put in the context of the simulations that we ran with four
teams and three seasons, a value of 0.64 would correspond to
approximately one third of the teams having hope in any one season, and
it would be mostly the same teams from year to year. Intuitively, this
seems to be a very low level of CB. Alternatively, a value of 1.94 might
be akin to about half of the teams having hope in any one season with
some of the teams being competitive (i.e., having hope) year in and year
out, and a fair mixture of other teams being competitive on a
semi-regular basis. Even this latter result falls far short of the
Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics declaration
that every team should have hope every year.
We want to briefly note the decades during which the Hope Statistic
reaches its maximum and, intuitively, the possible reasons for this.
The first decade of the 20th Century saw a league structure and
hierarchy in the AL that was not to be repeated at any other time in the
20th Century for either league. The AL was founded in 1900 and, while
some of the franchises were new, several were well and, possibly to some
extent, equally financed. Some baseball historians feel that the AL
Commissioner during this period reigned as the most powerful individual
in baseball history, ruling on ownership changes, imposing standards on
owners, and controlling both the flow of free agents in particular, and
player's rights in general (see Thorn & Palmer, 1989, p. 16).
The absence of a franchise in New York during the 1900s might also have
contributed to the general CB of the league. While the above story does
not prove that CB would have been unusually high, it is certainly a
viable argument. Having said this, of the four statistics measured, only
the results for the Hope Statistic show a particularly high level of CB
in the AL during the first decade of the 20th Century.
In the National League, the value of the Hope Statistic is
generally highest in the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, in the 1990s and
2000s. No such pattern exists with respect to the other measures--the
minor exception being the CBR in the National League during this period.
This is highly intuitive in that from 1969 onwards, and increasingly so,
the number of teams eligible to make the postseason increased from 2
teams out of 16 total in the 1968 season to 8 teams out of 30 total at
the current time. In addition to more teams actually making the
playoffs, there were more teams that were close to making the playoffs.
The other measures of CB failed to recognize this change in the
game--the number of teams allowed into the postseason--not because the
data used in the analysis was flawed, or because the chosen statistic
did not accurately measure what it was intended to measure; rather, the
other measures of CB failed to recognize this change in the game because
they were not supposed to recognize it. Hope of postseason play was
simply not the definition of CB used to guide the development of the
other measures.
In Table 4, we clarify this observation by normalizing the results
to allow for easier comparisons. More specifically, the decade during
which CB was best achieved was given a value of 1.0 for each statistic,
and the other decades were given a value as a percentage based on that
decade's result in comparison to the best decade. For example, the
Hope Statistic achieved its peak in the 1980s in the National League
with a value of 1.94. In the 1950s, the Hope Statistic took on a value
of 0.88 in the National League. The normalized value in Table 4 for the
statistic in the 1950s for the National League was 0.45 (0.88/1.94).
At first glance, it appears that the CBR statistic, especially for
the National League, rates the 1980s through the 2000s just as highly
(if not more highly) in terms of CB as does the Hope Statistic. However,
when you compare the 28-year period from 1981 through 2008 to the
80-year period before it, the Hope Statistic showed the higher jump in
value.
Those papers that have studied this subject have often tried to
link other changes in the game, such as the advent of television or free
agency as seminal moments in the move towards or away from CB. While
these factors have undoubtedly had a meaningful part to play in the
piece, we would suggest that the value of the Hope Statistic, normalized
or otherwise, supports the contention that the single greatest
contributor to CB over the years has been the decision to increase the
number of playoff positions relative to the number of teams in the
league.
Measuring Hope at MOS vs. EOS
The data for the MOS Hope Statistics were gathered from
http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/. Won-Loss records were gathered
as of July 1st of each year, with the exception of the 1981
strike-shortened season in which case records were taken as of June
11th.
Using the same time period and the same 10 or multi-year bands as
we did in the prior subsection of the paper, we calculated the value for
the MOS Hope Statistics. Results are presented in Table 5 for both the
EOS and MOS Hope Statistics.
We thought that the values for the Hope Statistic would be higher
for the MOS than for the EOS stats. Teams that are several GBL, but less
than 5.5 GBL at the MOS, might double their GBL by season's end.
This argument assumes that teams will repeat their first half
performance in the second half of the season, everything else being
equal. In reality, this assumption is unproven. Some form of mean
reversion might occur. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, it is the
possible that good teams will get better in the second half of the
season due to mid-season trade acquisitions. Meanwhile, poorer teams
will get worse as they trade away good present value at mid-season and
replace that talent with less costly, perhaps younger and likely
less-able, talent. In any case, our results showed quite clearly that CB
was greater at the MOS than at the EOS for each and every 10-year band
in both leagues.
Our primary purpose in calculating the MOS values for the Hope
Statistic was to compare them to the EOS values over the time bands that
we had defined. We ranked the EOS stats from high to low for all of the
10 year bands and for each league, and then we similarly ranked the MOS
stats from high to low for the same time periods. So, for example, the
1980s saw the second highest value for the EOS Hope Statistic in the AL
amongst all the time bands. Comparatively, the 1980s saw the highest
value for the MOS Hope Statistic in the AL amongst all the time bands.
At the other end, the 1950s saw the lowest value for the EOS Hope
Statistic in the AL amongst all the time bands and the second lowest
value for the MOS Hope Statistic amongst all the time bands. From these
and the other ordinal rankings, derived from the data in Table 5, we
argue that, during periods when the EOS Hope Statistic was relatively
high or low in comparison to other times, the MOS Hope Statistic was
similarly high or low. All in all, measuring the Hope Statistic at MOS
in comparison to EOS did not greatly affect our conclusions regarding
when CB has been higher and when it has been lower.
Discussion
Like other papers before it, this paper is limited in that we have
not proven that CB, or even fan welfare itself, is valued by
professional team sports leagues. We also have not provided a conclusive definition of CB, and our definition for CB may not be accurately
reflected in the model that we have developed. However, in response to
the last of these concerns, while O'Reilly and colleagues (2008)
suggested that fans would lose Hope if their team was 5.5 or more games
behind a playoff position, that research also suggested that fans were
not necessarily a homogeneous group maintaining identical expectations.
Consequently, we also calculated the EOS Hope Statistic based on an 8.0
game break point--at or above which fans would lose hope, and below
which fans would have hope. In Table 6 we present comparative findings
for both the AL and NL over the 108 year period for these two Hope
Statistics. Our purpose was to determine if the different cut-off point
(i.e., 8 games instead of 5.5 games) resulted in a different trend for
CB. Based on O'Reilly and colleagues (2008), we chose 8.0 games as
an alternative cut-off point because it was meaningfully different from
the optimal point (5.5 games) but not so different as to be irrelevant.
By observation, while the Hope Statistic using the 8 game cut-off was
higher in all decades than the corresponding Hope Statistic using the
5.5 game cut-off, the overall trend of CB, compared across decades, was
similar using both cut-offs. Our conclusion is that, while the overall
level of CB will rise if the cut-off is increased, we have no reason to
believe that the decades during which CB is highest or lowest will
change.
More generally, we see no way to determine a theoretical
"natural" cut-off point where most fans will lose hope.
Rather, we think that this is an empirical question and needs to be
addressed based on evidence as presented by, for example, O'Reilly
and colleagues (2008).
In this paper, we have extended the literature on CB by suggesting
a goal of hope of postseason play. Determining an effective measure of
fan welfare has, up to this time in the literature, been both difficult
and divisive. And while this definition does not end the debate, we hope
that it furthers the discussion. We then developed a measure of CB that
intuitively matches up with the goal that we think drives fan interest.
We think that the values associated with this measure are very
intuitive--based in part on the examples in our simulations--and that
this applicability may allow us to better understand what is and what is
not CB.
We have also introduced the idea that CB might be best measured as
of different points in the season, not just at season's end. The
question, still unanswered, is when a fan is sensitive to changes in CB.
Arguably, a fan is sensitive at various points in time, including MOS
and EOS. While we have proven little with our decision to measure CB as
of MOS, we have at least created a useful database for future use and
reference and possibly given others something to think about.
There are several directions for further research that come to
mind. While survey methodology has its attendant shortcomings, there may
be value in attempting to survey professional sports team owners or
governors as to their perceptions regarding whether CB is desired--if
so, to what extent it is desired--and lastly, which of the measures used
in the literature best reflects their perception of CB. Given the small
number of owners and governors, a face-to-face interview process might
be a better idea, yielding richer and more credible results than a
survey while still being a tractable and time-efficient methodology.
Other studies have commonly tried to link a definition of CB with
league attendance or other proxies of fan welfare or shareholder wealth.
That can likewise be done with this measure. However, unlike most of
these other studies, the Hope Statistic can be adapted to reflect CB on
a team-by-team basis, and an effort can be made to link CB with
individual team attendance over time. It may be that league wide
conclusions related to the value of CB do not hold true at the team
level.
Having said this, even in the absence of further study, we feel
that there are practical implications to our current research.
Assuming that increasing CB does further the goal(s) of the firm,
we argue that prescriptions for increasing CB should be based on whether
they increase the hope of postseason play. Increasing the number of
playoff teams as a percentage of the total number of teams is a very
important policy position that comes out of our work; that is, compared
to being just one of many suggestions that others have made. This
difference in emphasis is important. More generally, if our measure of
CB better reflects sensitivity in fan interest, then we can use this
measure as a guideline when prescribing changes in the structure of the
game, the contracting process, and property rights issues, among others,
so as to truly maximize fan interest.
References
Eckard, E.W. (2001). Baseball's blue ribbon economic report:
Solutions in search of a problem. Journal of Sports Economics, 2,
213-227. Eckard, E.W. (2003). The anova-based competitive balance
measure: A defense. Journal of Sports Economics, 4, 74-80.
El-Hodiri, M., & Quirk, J. (1971). An economic model of a
professional sports league. Journal of Political Economy, 79, 1302-1319.
Fort, R. (2006). Competitive balance in North American professional
sports. In J. Fizel (Ed.), Handbook of Sports Economics Research (pp.
190-206). New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc..
Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (1995). Cross-subsidization, incentives,
and outcomes in professional team sports leagues. Journal of Economic
Literature, 33, 1265-1299.
Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (2004). Owner objectives and competitive
balance. Journal of Sports Economics, 5, 20-32.
Gerrard, B. (2004). Still up for grabs? Maintaining the sporting
and financial viability of european club soccer. In R. Fort, & J.
Fizel, (Eds.), International sports economics comparisons. (pp. 107-122)
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Hadley, L., Ciecka, J., & Krautmann, A. C. (2005). Competitive
balance in the aftermath of the 1994 players' strike. Journal of
Sports Economics, 6, 379-389.
Humphreys, B. R. (2002). Alternative measures of competitive
balance in sports leagues. Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 133-148.
Lee, Y. H., & Fort, R. (2008). Attendance and the
uncertainty-of-outcome hypothesis in baseball. Review of Industrial
Organization, 33, 281-295.
Levin, R. C., Mitchell, G. J., Volcker, P. A., & Will, G. F.
(2000). The report of the independent members of the commissioner's
blue ribbon panel on baseball economics. New York: Major League
Baseball.
MOS data retrieved from the World Wide Web from June 2010 through
to November 13th, 2010 at http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/.
O'Reilly, N., Kaplan, A., Rahinel R., & Nadeau, J. (2008).
If you can't win, why should I buy a ticket? Hope, fan welfare, and
competitive balance. International Journal of Sport Finance, 3, 106-118.
O'Reilly, N., & Nadeau, J. (2006). Revenue generation in
professional sport: A diagnostic analysis. International Journal of
Sport Management and Marketing, 1, 311-330.
Quirk, J., & Fort, R. (1997). Pay dirt: The business of
professional team sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rottenberg, S. (1956). The baseball players' labor market.
Journal of Political Economy, 64, 242-258.
Rottenberg, S. (2000). Resource allocation and income distribution
in professional teams sports. Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 11-20.
Schmidt, M. B. (2001). Competition in Major League Baseball: The
impact of expansion. Applied Economic Letters, 8, 21-26.
Schmidt, M. B., & Berri, D. J. (2001). Competitive balance and
attendance: The case of Major League Baseball. Journal of Sports
Economics, 2, 145-167.
Scully, G. W. (1989). The business of Major League Baseball.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thorn, J., & Palmer, P. (1989). Total baseball. New York:
Warner Books.
Whitney, J. D., (1988). Winning games versus winning championships:
The economics of fan interest and team performance. Economic Inquiry,
26, 703-724.
Zimbalist, A. S. (2002). Competitive balance in sports leagues: An
introduction. Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 111-121.
Endnotes
(1) Comparisons with results of other studies, even those which use
the same dataset, are still limited due to differences in the data after
cleaning. Several adjustments were made to reflect imperfect data. Data
was collected in 10-year bands, a process followed by several other
researchers (e.g., Humphreys, 2002). Franchises were used instead of
teams. Franchises that were not in place for all 10 years of a band were
excluded from the data for the analysis of that band. Consequently, any
calculations involving variance or standard deviation are defined using
a sample statistic, rather than a population statistic. Data from years
with work stoppages was included. Data was organized by league to
reflect the method used in other studies. Of note, it is not clear why
data was separated by league in other studies. It seems reasonable to
presume that CB is not meaningfully different by league. This assertion
rests on the assumption that the market for labor talent and franchise
property rights is not meaningfully different by league. In fact, the
three largest markets in the U.S. are allocated one National League and
one American League franchise each, generally supporting our assertion.
(2) The time span of each band was chosen to be comparable to the
bands used by prior researchers. A shorter time span might have been
chosen to reflect turnover in Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs),
but CBAs have only been in place for about 40% of our overall time span.
We chose a 7-year band at the end to make the results of our other 10
bands of 10 years, each comparable to the results of Humphreys (2002).
Authors' Notes
We wish to recognize the contributions of several anonymous
referees whose suggestions were incorporated into this version of the
paper, along with research assistants Michael Emrich and Alexander
Scott.
Alan Kaplan [1], John Nadeau [2], and Norm O'Reilly [3]
[1] Ryerson University
[2] Nipissing University
[3] University of Ottawa
Alan Kaplan is an associate professor of finance at the Ted Rogers School of Management. His areas of research interest include ethical
issues in finance, corporate finance, and sport finance.
John Nadeau is an associate professor of marketing at the School of
Business. His research interests include consumer behavior, the
application of images, tourism marketing, sport marketing, and sport
finance.
Norm O'Reilly is an associate professor of sport business in
the School of Human Kinetics. His research interests include both sport
finance and sport marketing.
Table 1: Hope Statistic for a 4-team league over 3 years;
same order of finish each year
Team Year 1
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i]
A 91 71 0 1
B 84 78 7 1
C 77 85 14 0
D 72 90 19 0
Totals 324 324
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.5
[GBL.sub.t,i]
Team Year 2
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i]
A 91 71 0 1
B 86 76 5 1
C 83 79 8 1
D 64 98 27 0
Totals 324 324
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.75
.37
Team Year 3
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i] [GBL.sub.t,i]
A 91 71 0 1 1.00
B 82 80 9 0 0.67
C 78 84 13 0 0.33
D 73 89 18 0 0.00
Totals 324 324 [GBL.sub.i,j]
= .5
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.25 [GBL.sub.i,j]
= .5
Hope 1.34
Table 2: Hope Statistic for a 4-team league over 3 years;
different order of finish each year
Team Year 1
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i]
A 91 71 0 1
B 84 78 7 1
C 77 85 14 0
D 72 90 19 0
Totals 324 324
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.5
[GBL.sub.t,i]
Team Year 2
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i]
A 64 98 27 0
B 86 76 5 1
C 83 79 8 1
D 91 71 0 1
Totals 324 324
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.75
.17
Team Year 3
Wins Losses GBL [GBL.sub.i] [GBL.sub.t,i]
A 78 84 13 0 0.33
B 82 80 9 0 0.67
C 91 71 0 1 0.67
D 73 89 18 0 0.33
Totals 324 324 [GBL.sub.t,i]
= .5
[GBL.sub.N,i] 0.25 [GBL.sub.t,i]
= .5
Hope 3.00
Table 3. Statistics for CB: MLB from 1901 to 2008
Years 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s
AL
[Rel..sub.L] 1.75 1.86 1.61 1.88 1.65 1.66
CBR 0.63 0.84 0.71 0.43 0.71 0.59
HHI 0.26 0.30 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.66
Hope 1.86 1.62 0.85 0.73 0.94 0.64
NL
[Rel..sub.L] 2.18 1.57 1.63 1.63 1.70 1.47
CBR 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.73
HHI 0.36 0.24 0.30 0.26 0.28 0.34
Hope 0.75 1.22 1.18 1.15 0.8 0.88
Years 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
AL
[Rel..sub.L] 1.61 1.67 1.51 1.61 1.52
CBR 0.73 0.67 0.86 0.82 0.63
HHI 0.27 0.38 0.25 0.43 0.55
Hope 0.98 1.11 1.82 1.58 1.52
NL
[Rel..sub.L] 1.65 1.54 1.43 1.66 1.29
CBR 0.66 0.72 0.99 0.82 0.82
HHI 0.22 0.39 0.23 0.47 0.40
Hope 1.23 1.08 1.94 1.18 1.19
Notes. AL = American League; NL = National League; Higher numbers
indicate increasing CB for all measures except that there is an
inverse relationship between CB and HHI.
Table 4. Normalized statistics for competitive balance: MLB
from 1901 to 2008
Years 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s
AL
Rel. [sigma]L 0.93 0.99 0.86 1.00 0.88 0.89
CBR 0.73 0.98 0.82 0.50 0.82 0.68
HHI 0.94 0.82 0.56 0.68 0.61 0.37
Hope 1.00 0.87 0.46 0.39 0.51 0.34
NL
Rel.[sigma]L 1.00 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.67
CBR 0.66 0.48 0.62 0.70 0.76 0.73
HHI 0.63 0.95 0.76 0.87 0.81 0.67
Hope 0.39 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.41 0.45
Years 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
AL
Rel.. [sigma]L 0.86 0.89 0.81 0.86 0.81
CBR 0.85 0.78 1.00 0.95 0.73
HHI 0.92 0.65 1.00 0.57 0.44
Hope 0.52 0.60 0.98 0.85 0.82
NL
Rel. [sigma]L 0.70 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.59
CBR 0.67 0.72 1.00 0.82 0.82
HHI 1.04 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.57
Hope 0.64 0.56 1.00 0.61 0.62
Notes. AL = American League; NL = National League;
Higher numbers indicate increasing CB for all measures
except that there is an inverse relationship between
CB and HHI.
Table 5. Hope Statistics for end of season and mid-season;
MLB from 1901-2008
Years 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s
AL
Hope EOS 1.86 1.62 0.85 0.73 0.94 0.64
Hope MOS 1.93 2.54 1.32 1.18 1.14 1.17
NL
Hope EOS 0.75 1.22 1.18 1.15 0.8 0.88
Hope MOS 0.97 1.62 1.46 1.29 0.9 1.71
Years 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
AL
Hope EOS 0.98 1.11 1.82 1.58 1.52
Hope MOS 1.48 1.48 3.33 2.28 1.79
NL
Hope EOS 1.23 1.08 1.94 1.18 1.19
Hope MOS 1.75 1.62 2.88 2.02 2.11
Notes. AL = American League; NL=National League; EOS = End
of Season, MOS = Middle of Season
Table 6. Hope Statistics for two different cut-off points;
MLB from 1901-2008
Years 1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s
AL
Hope 5.5g 1.86 1.62 0.85 0.73 0.94 0.64
Hope 8g 1.99 2.15 1.04 0.78 1.01 0.73
NL
Hope 5.5g 0.75 1.22 1.18 1.15 0.80 0.88
Hope 8g 0.78 1.31 1.37 1.18 0.86 1.03
Years 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
AL
Hope 5.5g 0.98 1.11 1.82 1.58 1.52
Hope 8g 1.12 1.31 2.37 1.95 1.62
NL
Hope 5.5g 1.23 1.08 1.94 1.18 1.19
Hope 8g 1.49 1.22 2.72 1.37 1.59
Notes. AL = American League; NL = National League