Erlich blasts media on Iraq war.
Hellinger, Daniel
Reality has a way of interfering with the best of propaganda,"
says Reese Erlich, co-author of Target Iraq: What the Media Didn't
Tell You. Erlich spoke at Webster University on April 15.
A veteran of the legendary, muckraking San Francisco-based Ramparts
Magazine, for 35 years Erlich has contributed reports to "The
World" (Public Radio International), Common Ground Radio, the St.
Petersburg Times and the Dallas Morning News.
His public radio documentary, "Children of War: Fighting,
Dying, Surviving," hosted by Charlayne Hunter-Gault, won the 2002
prize for best in-depth reporting (broadcast) from the Society of
Professional Journalists, Northern California. In 2001, he produced a
one-hour public radio documentary, "The Struggle for Iran,"
and in 2002, he produced a two-hour documentary, "The Russia
Project," both hosted by Walter Cronkite.
Erlich visited Iraq in September 2002 on assignment for the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and the San Francisco Chronicle.
The trip was organized by his co-author, Norman Solomon, founder of the
liberal Institute for Public Accuracy. Along for the excursion was actor
Sean Penn, who contributed an Afterward to Target Iraq.
The book says that a pliant media allowed itself to be used in
selling the invasion of Iraq--not that Erlich has much respect for
Saddam Hussein. The opening chapter depicts Hussein's rule as a
totalitarian regime with little respect for journalists, even anti-war
reporters, such as Solomon and Erlich, or for Penn. Fear and
intimidation kept many Iraqis from speaking openly, but in private
conversations a more complex picture of Iraqi opinion emerged.
Despite the suffering caused by the Baath regime, Erlich and
Solomon contend that the destruction wrought by the first Gulf War
(1991) and the impact of subsequent economic sanctions left the Iraqi
people with little respect for America. The media largely ignored the
perspective of ordinary Iraqis in the build-up to the war. The invasion
of Iraq, they predicted, would inflict even greater harm and generate
greater bitterness.
Was their prediction accurate? On the one hand, the strategic
nature of the bombing, the relatively quick defeat of Iraqi forces and
collapse of urban resistance to the invasion spared Iraq the full impact
of American firepower. And, the Iraqi troops did not burn oil fields or
unleash weapons of mass destruction. To some degree, then, the direct
damage to the Iraqi infrastructure was not as great as predicted in
Target Iraq.
On the other hand, just as Erlich and Solomon predicted, Iraqis did
not greet their "liberation" with celebration. Looting and
lawlessness have inflicted great harm, and already many Iraqis are
pressing for a quick exit of American troops, just as Erlich and Solomon
anticipated.
In addition, the civilian casualties were not slight. Erlich
pointed out in his Webster talk that because of hundreds of reporters in
the field, an investment of tens of million dollars in information
technology and round-the-clock reporting with military experts, finding
accounts of Iraqi casualties in the mainstream media was virtually
impossible.
Once the war was won, reporters seemed to lose interest in claims
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or was harboring terrorists.
Now, the war is presented as a humanitarian exercise to replace tyranny
with democracy. "No one wants to go back and look at all the
mistaken information reported during the war because it is politically
inconvenient," Erlich says.
One of the most egregious errors occurred when network anchors and
analysts passed along with little skepticism military claims of having
discovered a likely chemical weapons cache that later turned out to be
nothing more than agricultural supplies. "Did anyone stop to ask
whether it was logical that agricultural chemicals would be found at a
depot located close to an important agricultural area?
Instead, the news media emphasized the proximity of the depot to a
military base. Of course, it turned out later that the mysterious
barrels contained materials for farming," Erlich says.
Erlich predicts that eventually American military or intelligence
agencies will claim to have discovered "evidence" of weapons
of mass destruction, mostly likely in the form of documents. Given the
uncritical repetition of spurious evidence in the war, Erlich
anticipates that most of the media will fail to put the claims under
serious scrutiny. (Indeed, on April 21, less than a week after
Erlich's talk, a front-page story by Judith Miller in The New York Times justified administration charges based solely on information from
anonymous military investigators.)
Erlich acknowledges that the media did not march in lockstep to
war. Before the war, there was substantial debate about the wisdom of
going to war because of three factors: disagreements among American
elites, including officials associated with the administration of George
Bush I; the opposition of several important European allies; and the
successful mobilization of popular anti-war sentiment, which could not
be completely ignored.
Once the American attack was launched, critical assessment of its
purposes disappeared, especially in the electronic media, and political
debate was muted. "Once you go to war the parameters narrow. You
get (quotes from) former officers, Navy Seals, and Green Berets,"
Erlich says. The extensive use of retired military officers resulted not
only in bias but also in a shift from political and diplomatic issues to
a focus on the fighting.
Although the anti-war movement was too large to be ignored, it did
not receive fair coverage from the media. A good example, Erlich says,
are the "human shields," peace activists who voluntarily went
to Iraq to station themselves at key elements of Iraq's civilian
infrastructure. Their stories became of interest only when the activists
clashed with Hussein's attempts to place them at military sites or
under the control of Republican Guards.
With the war over, some of the divisions over Mideast policy began
to surface once again as the administration began to threaten Syria,
Erlich says. Once again the media were allowing themselves to be spun by
Donald Rumsfeld's agenda-setters. However, divisions within the
administration, especially between the Pentagon and the State
Department, meant that there was room for debate.
Erlich believes that journalists operating on their own produced
much better coverage than did "embedded" reporters. These
embedded journalists and their cameras could literally show only one
side of war--the view from their side of the battle lines. He criticized
the firing of Peter Arnett by MSNBC and National Geographic, noting that
Western reporters had no compunctions about openly identifying with U.S.
objectives during the war. He contended. that even critical journalists
find themselves self-censoring reports rather than jeopardizing their
jobs or chances of advancing careers.
As a freelancer, Erlich must earn his living on selling stories to
editors. The necessity of selling each story piecemeal might have an
even more telling impact than the pressures experienced by attached
reporters. Does he ever find himself self-censoring his own work?
"Sure, all reporters (would admit they) do, if they're
honest about it. It's better to get out a piece of a story than do
nothing at all."
Erilch finds himself reformulating stories to fit the requirements
of different outlets. "You take the same information, repackage it
as many times as you can. That's necessary to make a living but
also reflects the receptiveness of media in different countries.
Canadian, Australian and British outlets tend to be more open than
American ones."
The presence of reporters operating independently of military units
produced tensions with the military, and perhaps more deadly
consequences, too. Erlich believes the artillery shelling of Al
Jazeera's headquarters in Baghdad on April 8 was probably
deliberate because the news outlet had provided the building's
coordinates to the Pentagon to prevent a mistake.
Similarly, the shelling on the same day of the Palestine (Marriott)
Hotel, which was filled with un-embedded Western reporters, was probably
deliberate, judging from the video and first-hand reports.
Erlich predicts that the coming period will be difficult' for
the U.S. occupation. However repressive the old regime was, it offered
free healthcare and education, which are likely to be regarded as
matters for the market and private sectors in the new Iraq molded by the
occupation authorities.
In contrast to the other Gulf states, women in Iraq enjoyed much
greater freedom, including educational and professional opportunities.
If conservative Islamists take control of key areas, women will suffer
the most.
Dan Hellinger is professor of political science at Webster
University.