Nicholas Adams: Habermas and Theology.
Walter, Gregory A.
Nicholas Adams
Habermas and Theology.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2006.
Pp. 278.
US$75.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-521-86266-0); US$29.99 (paper
ISBN-13: 978-0-521-68114-8).
Members of religious traditions need to argue fruitfully in public
with each other and with those who are non-religious. Since Jurgen
Habermas articulates one valuable position in support of public
argumentation in his theory of communicative action, many Christian
theologians have with some justice adopted Habermas' views.
Observing this phenomenon, Habermas does not think that Christian
theology would abandon its commitments and tasks if it were recast in
the terms of his theory (189-200). Adams agrees with Habermas: he claims
that adopting Habermas' theory amounts to the destruction of
Christian theology as such since Habermas' views of reason,
reflection, and communication displace any tradition-bound
argumentation. Adams argues that post-metaphysical theologians can
successfully engage in public activity without abandoning their
traditions, meeting the challenge that Habermas provides by articulating
the practice of 'scriptural reasoning.' Any scholar concerned
with public discourse and the role of tradition in it should consider
this book. Christian thinkers would especially benefit; Adams challenges
those who follow Habermas to take instances of public argumentation
seriously as he shows how the practice of scriptural reasoning could
function as an alternative to Habermas' thheory of communicative
action Theologians and philosophers alike should attend to this work,
though Adams largely aims his essay at Christian theologians.
In order to focus attention on specific traditions and their
practices, Adams explicates Habermas' readings of religion and
theology. Philosophers ought to heed Adams' careful identification
of what Habermas considers Christian theology to be. According to Adams,
Habermas never intended to be a theologian (200). Much theological
writing on Habermas exists, but this book sets itself apart by its
attention to his claims about theology and by showing the limited range
of modern theologians that Habermas has in mind. In the end, Habermas
identifies religion with metaphysical thinking and tradition with
self-authenticating authority rather than the authority achieved by
consensus.
Adams focuses on a practice of public argumentation rather than a
theory about its possibility, since he contends that one cannot theorize its grounds. He points out that there is a ground for public
argumentation but, drawing on Schelling's critique of Hegel, he
contends that it is impossible in principle to specify that ground
(201). For him, one does not need to ask if thinking is possible in
order to think. Despite the importance of Habermas' theory of
argumentation in the public sphere, Adams holds that Habermas attempts
to prove too much, and just so rules out the kinds of practices that
members of traditions can use in order to argue successfully (224-6). If
the ground of public argumentation could be given, Adams would have to
face what it made possible and what it did not.
Arguing that Habermas proves too much does not mitigate his
suspicion of tradition and narrative, so Adams still needs to address
the difference between narrative and argument. The focus of Adams'
concern in the third and seventh chapters is the positive use of
traditions in public by their members. He takes up the position of the
theologian John Milbank in order to consider narrative in the tenth
chapter. Milbank champions the role of specific narratives and
traditions, since he considers public argumentation in the manner of
Habermas and others to be completely bankrupt. There are, according to
Milbank, only traditions; since no apparent ground for public
argumentation can be articulated, all traditions are in some way
incommensurable. Habermas' position puts a premium on argumentation
and sees narrative as something that can only be criticized. For him,
narrative is the supreme form of tradition and self-guaranteed
authority. Narrative belongs to 'world disclosure' and
argument to 'problem-solving' according to Habermas. Adams
concludes that the unavailability of a ground for argumentation does not
mean that it does not exist or that we cannot articulate it. For Adams,
that argumentation is possible should be enough, and therefore the
distinction between 'world disclosure' and 'problem
solving' can be blurred. Such a position only needs the observation
that argumentation occurs and is sometimes successful.
None of Adams's criticism implies that Habermas should be
ignored. 'It seems to me that [Habermas'] theological
colleagues have rightly grasped that something like Habermas'
theory of communicative action is vitally needed. There needs to be some
way for members of traditions to be intelligible to their neighbors
...' (200). Adams proposes scriptural reasoning as this way. This
is a practice undertaken by members of religious traditions to read each
other's authoritative texts and interpret them with each other. No
further conditions are required for scriptural reasoning than that the
members be committed to reading together as members of their traditions.
He devotes the last chapter to a description and defense of scriptural
reasoning as an alternative to Habermas.
Adams' argument depends upon the extant but inaccessible
ground of public reason in order to clear space for his attention to
practices. But this also seems to allow him to address critical distance
from within traditions. When Habermas articulates the distance that a
person experiences upon reflection on tradition, experiencing the
failure of a tradition, or some such other crisis, Adams articulates
that this distance can be undertaken on theological grounds. Adams
thinks a similar form of critical distance accompanies the Christian
claim that no society properly embodies the Kingdom of God. No Christian
can identify the two and therefore must maintain a critical distance
from any given society, comparing it to the Kingdom of God (85-90).
Critical distance might also be expressed by theological consideration
of the otherness of God; this otherness could call all human claims into
question. Adams argues that the self-criticism available to Christian
theology can suffice for the sort of criticism that Habermas desires.
This is a very interesting claim but it deserves more explication and
warrant.
Adams has a fine account of Habermas and a firm grasp of the issues
facing contemporary theology. His attention to theology, narrative, and
argumentation as well as practices, combines many of the strengths of
theological traditions. Scriptural reasoning seems to function as a way
to engage across religious traditions. Can this commendable practice be
adapted to other circumstances or fields? Can jurists read their
authoritative texts together? Is scriptural reasoning only possible for
monotheistic traditions? As a specific, historically situated practice,
it is no failing to say no to the first and yes to the last questions.
For Adams' proposal to have the fruit he wishes it to bear, other
practices that engage non-religious traditions need to be imagined.
Nevertheless, Adams has written a book worthy of attention and response.
Gregory A. Walter
St. Olaf College
