首页    期刊浏览 2024年12月14日 星期六
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Network security increase by using extended validation secure socket layer certificates for avoiding the phishing threats.
  • 作者:Tabusca, Alexandru ; Enaceanu, Alexandru
  • 期刊名称:Annals of DAAAM & Proceedings
  • 印刷版ISSN:1726-9679
  • 出版年度:2009
  • 期号:January
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:DAAAM International Vienna
  • 摘要:Phishing is the term for the operation of cheating network users to provide private information for identity or business theft. This issue is one of the most important threats today for both consumers and businesses depending on the IT infrastructure. During the last five years phishing has been growing rapidly, with an estimate citation of approximately 8 million daily phishing attempts all over the world (O'Donnell, 2009).
  • 关键词:Computer networks;Data security;Identity theft;Information networks;Phishing

Network security increase by using extended validation secure socket layer certificates for avoiding the phishing threats.


Tabusca, Alexandru ; Enaceanu, Alexandru


1. INTRODUCTION

Phishing is the term for the operation of cheating network users to provide private information for identity or business theft. This issue is one of the most important threats today for both consumers and businesses depending on the IT infrastructure. During the last five years phishing has been growing rapidly, with an estimate citation of approximately 8 million daily phishing attempts all over the world (O'Donnell, 2009).

The international organization of APWG--Anti-Phishing Working Group--has reported that during the second half of 2008 the number of phishing attacks reported to them grew with more than 20 percent related to the figures of the first half of the year, from 47342 to 56969 (Aaron & Rasmussen, 2009).

2. PHISHING ATTACK MODELS

There are five different types of generally accepted phishing attacks. The first, and most widely used during the second half of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, is the so-called "spear phishing". It is a type of precisely targeted phishing attack; while the common phishing attacks are not discriminating network surfers the spear phishing attack targets known users of a special company, a bank or another financial institution usually.

The second type of such an attack is business services phishing. During the last year there have also been confirmed reports of two large-scale phishing attacks on the well known facebook.com socializing portal and on Yahoo.com email accounts users. Another great name of the industry that was subject to such an attack was Google; Google Ad Words users have received emails with requests for account updates, an operation redirected to a fake Ad Words interface that managed to get hold of an undisclosed number of credit card information, mostly from small and medium companies heavily relying on online advertising for attracting web traffic.

Another type of phishing attack is the so-called crisis-phishing. It is a newly arrived model and is based mostly on the fear and instability induced by the economic crisis. Phishing emails coming from a large financial institution announcing that it has recently acquired the target victim's local bank or favorite retail store seem quite in order nowadays. The large number of real mergers and acquisition activity taking place on the market today creates such an atmosphere of confusion for consumers that they are now more than ever inclined to take into account such messages. Unfortunately, phishing attacks are thriving in this type of situation.

The fourth type of phishing is in fact a mixed-model--the phishing/malware danger. To increase the odds of success some attacks combine phishing with malware for a blended attack model. A potential victim receives a phishing e-card through an e-mail that seems to be legit. By clicking on the link inside the e-mail to receive the card, the individual is taken to a fake web location which automatically downloads a Trojan application to the victim's computer; another widely used method is to show the victim a message that indicates the need for a download of updated software, an update needed before the victim's computer can view the card. When the victim downloads the software, it is in fact a key-logger or another security breaching application which has already been granted access and rights by the innocent user-victim.

The last, and latest, phishing attack type is based on the explosive increase in mobile phone use. Posing as a real financial institution the phishing message is using the old SMS as an alternative to e-mail in order to attempt to gain access to private and confidential information. Also known as "smishing" --from the crossing of SMS and Phishing terms--the typical message tells the mobile phone user that for example the person's bank account has been compromised or his credit card has been rendered out of service; the victim is sent to call a real phone number or access a fake website to re-enable the use of the account or credit card and once on the site or through an automated phone system, the potential victim is guided to leave its account data or card and PIN numbers.

During the 2008 year and the first quarter of 2009 there are available figures to show that despite the IT security industry's effort to reduce the phishing threat the number of such attacks is still very high and seems to be rising again. Even if the big players of the ISP field have managed to reduce the threat of the best known and most persistent phishing groups we are still in constant danger due to the new and more sophisticated methods employed by the wrongdoers--Fig.1.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

3. ROMANIA'S PHISHING ENVIRONMENT

In order to help the Romanian IT environment track the latest local phishing issues, during the first quarter of 2009 we have developed a web application that works like a classic web crawler, targeted at a list of defined domains, and able to automatically retrieve phishing attacks related data from the online reports posted regularly by five of the most important names of the IT security field: Symantec, McAfee, BitDefender, RSA and APWG. The application is called RSBPA (Romanian Security Bulletin--PhishingAttacks) for the time being and is still under development, with a future path designed to engulf two more components: for compiling virus spread information and for testing the security degree available for a certain web client accessing the application online.

Based on the compilation of these different data reported by the five sources nominated before we can produce a weekly report containing phishing attacks details strictly restricted to Romania.

During 2007 Romania experienced only 10 serious phishing attacks and in 2008 there were already 30 such attacks (Cosoi, 2009)--an increase of 3 times related to the previous year. Up to the month of June 2009--during the January-May period of time--there were already 126 nation-wide phishing attacks, most of them being spear phishing attacks targeted at some of the largest banks in the country and on the top three mobile communications providers. Such a number can be used for projecting a whole-year number of attacks for 2009, a number around 276 attacks. These numbers show an awesome increase of about 10 times the number of attacks in 2008.

In order to understand Romania's position on the world map of phishing attacks, one of the output reports of the RSBPA is a pie-chart graphic showing Romania's percentage of attacks, relative to the worldwide number of attacks reported by the above mentioned security companies during the relevant period of time.

Taking into account the compiled data and reanalyzing it through the RSB-PA algorithms we have also obtained an estimate of the May 2009 attacks even before the public posting of these figures by the RSB-PA "source sites". The top ten countries attacked by phishing schemes in May 2009 have the US in front with Great Britain second, followed at a great distance by Italy. The US and UK have the largest shares with 59 and 13 percent of the worldwide attacks, Italy and Romania follow with 5 and 2 percent, then we have Canada, Holland, Spain and India with 2 percent and the last one, Australia, with 1 percent; 12 percent are divided among the rest of the world.

We have to underline that these reports are not traditional ones--there is no direct oversight of the everyday attacks; we take into account all the reports from the five trusted sources mentioned above and we obtain the figures only for Romania by applying different algorithms that take into account the statistics for the previous twelve months, the number of visitors that each of the five source have during the week previous to the one of the report, the number of citations of the source website during the last twelve months and the degree of data matching between all five sources.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

4. ANTI-PHISHING BEST PRACTICES: EV-SSL

Taking into consideration that most attacks rely on directing the users to a fake website we consider that the best option for avoiding the threat is the use of a special certificate for the accessed website. We recommend a step further than the simple use of https protocol or the implementation of SSL: the use of EV-SSL. This technology combines the versatility and encryption capabilities of the SSL with the possibility of certifying the website as legitimate with the help of a security certificate issued by a trusted CA--Certification Authority.

Despite the heavy use of encryption and secure technologies EV-SSL has another big plus from the user's point of view: it is very simple to see it in action (Kasten, 2008). All major web browsers have now the built in capability of detecting and using the EV-SSL certificates and distinguish its use by displaying a distinctive green bar in the background of the web address accessed by the user and by displaying next to the secure locker sign a text that is toggling between the name of the CA and of the client's company or name.

Despite the advanced capabilities to copy legitimate websites, without the user's EV-SSL Certificate there is no way to display its name on the address bar because the information shown there is outside of webpage control; one cannot obtain somebody else's legitimate EV-SSL Certificates because of the very rigorous and stringent authentication process.

5. CONCLUSION

Besides implementing the EV-SSL, the IT companies and the online businesses should continue to educate the 21st century society on safe network use and practices.

We should spread the information on how to recognize the signs of phishing: misspellings--a lot less common now, generic salutation formulae instead of personalized ones, urgent deadlines for acting in a certain manner, account status threats, requests for personal data and information or fake domain names and links. We should also educate users to recognize a valid and secure site before providing personal or sensitive information to a webpage:

--check that the URL starts with HTTPS

--looking for the green bar of the EV-SSL

--click the secure locker to the certificate of the website

Education is a key component of building the trust necessary to overcome phishing fears. By implementing up-to-date security solutions on a website a company can capitalize on this trust and gain a real and tangible benefit from investing into secure development of its network presence.

6. REFERENCES

Aaron, G & Rasmussen, R. (2009). Global Phishing Survey: Trends and Domain Name Use in 2H2008, Available from: http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishin gSurvey2H2008.pdf Accessed: 2009-06-09

Cosoi, C. (2008). Prevenirea pericolelor IT si non-IT (securitate)--Preventing IT and non-IT threats (security), Available from: http://www.calendar evenimente.ro/ detalii.php?ev=6088 Accessed: 2009-06-07

Kasten, C. (2008). My EV SSL Journey, Available from: http://www.solo-technology.com/blog/2008/08/21/ my-firstev-ssl-journey Accessed: 2009-06-09

O'Donnell, M. (2009). Counterfeiting & Spear Phishing Growth Scams Of 2009, Available from: http://www.infonews.co.nz/ news.cfm?l=1&t=164&id=3397 1 Accessed: 2009-06-10

Rivner, U. (2009). RSA Online Fraud Report May 2009, Available from: http://www.rsa.com/solutions/ consumer_authentication/intelreport/FRARPT_DS_0509.pdf Accessed: 2009-06-10
联系我们|关于我们|网站声明
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有