Rural and urban labour processes: a comparative analysis of Australian and Canadian development.
Jacques Ferland ; Christopher Wright
Introduction
"MODERN ENVIRONMENTS and experiences," as Marshall Berman aptly stated, "cut across all boundaries of geography and
ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and ideology." (1)
It should not be forgotten, however, that people form distinct societies
and that past generations of Australian and Canadian peoples have not
simply lived and worked in replicas of major industrial centres such as
the British Midlands or the American Midwest. The main difficulty in
comparing how Australian and Canadian workers have been socialized to
and disciplined by conditions of capitalist production, arises from the
perennial issue of first determining what can be considered
representative work settings in both countries. Addressing this issue is
anything but a simple matter, for as David Harvey contends, it pertains
to "one of the more startling schisms in our intellectual heritage
concerning conceptions of time and space." (2)
Traditionally, labour process analysis has been guided by a social
theory of progress which downplays, and often disregards, spatial
realities (that is, being a woodsman, a rural labourer, a mill town
worker, an urban factory employee) to emphasize temporality (that is,
becoming a skilled craft worker, a semi-skilled operative, a de-skilled
industrial wage-earner). In seeking to outline how work has evolved in
the capitalist economic system, the traditional labour process
perspective has reduced people's many and shifting spatial
realities (city, countryside and wilderness, metropolis and hinterland,
region and nation, core and periphery) and largely rendered "space
a contingent rather than fundamental aspect to human action." (3)
By concentrating upon how management converts men's and
women's potential for work into actual work effort, labour process
writers have further focused our attention on the more manageable work
settings of well-circumscribed, closely monitored units of production.
For writers such as Braverman, Edwards, and Burawoy, and analysis of the
capitalist labour process to a large extent entailed a depiction of the
development of the US factory system as a general phenomenon. (4)
A perspective in which space is "treated as the dead, the
fixed, the undialectical, the immobile," however, is likely to
mirror the social alienation of the countless men and women whose work
experience was characterized by transitoriness, ephemerality, and
fragmentation. (5) In tracing the many paths of commodity production in
Australia and in Canada, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
one is struck by the varied, changing, and contrasting ways and means by
which human activity was set to work as labour power. In many cases such
labour processes are simply too diverse and fragmented to be bound and
contained by evolutionary landmarks such as the heyday of
"craft-based production," the "factory regime," or
the "era of scientific management." While such typologies of
labour process development capture trends and tendencies in certain
segments of working life, they also seem an evasion of reality, an
intellectual construct of selected, but disconnected fragments of the
social processes by which nature has been transformed to fulfil human
needs.
This paper seeks to confront some of these limitations by
highlighting the diversity of labour processes experienced by Australian
and Canadian workers during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The
paper begins by outlining the context of economic development in the two
countries and their place in the broader international economy. We then
go on to examine the nature of work and employment, firstly in rural and
then urban environments. A key argument of this paper is that a
comparative analysis of labour processes in Canada and Australia
highlights the need to examine the varied experiences of workers in
different spatial contexts. Such a view we believe contrasts with
traditional labour process accounts which have tended to over-emphasize
the generality of formalized systems of managerial control in modern
urban work settings.
Australia and Canada in the International Economy
Australia and Canada have occupied mostly marginal, yet
substantially different places within the world economy. From the 1870s
until after World War I, both countries were largely located at the
margin of an industrial core "roughly bounded by Chicago and St.
Louis in the west, by Toronto, [Montreal], Glasgow, and Berlin in the
north, by Warsaw, Lodz, and later Budapest in the east, and by Milan,
Barcelona, Richmond, and Louisville in the south." (6) As a
relatively small northern extension of this core, Canada projected three
different faces internationally, while Australia and New Zealand conveyed the more distinctive impression of new pastoral economies whose
people were evolving under a "tyranny of distance." (7)
First, it is true that the southern fringe of central Canada was
"throbbing with manufacturing activity" to the extent that, by
1913, the country ranked third in the world in manufacturing output per
capita, and "by the end of the Second World War ... ranked second
only to the US" in this measure of industrial progress. (8)
Paradoxically however, Canada's metropolitan development failed to
provide adequate employment in the country's oldest provinces, and
the massive exodus of eastern Canada's French and English-speaking
residents to the US resulted in a relatively slow growing industrial
workforce. (9) While the US manufacturing labour force expanded fourfold
during its industrial "drive to maturity" (growing from 1.5
million workers in 1860 to nearly 6 million in 1900), manufacturing
employment in Canada's heartland only doubled during the 40 years
following the National Policy (1879). In comparison to the US,
employment in Canadian secondary industry increased modestly from
400,000 wage-earners in 1891 to around 1 million blue-collar workers in
1929. (10)
Second, as was the case with European "peripheral"
countries, during the closing decades of the 19th century, eastern
Canada's primary export to the world-system was cheap labour.
Hundreds of thousands of Canadian men, women, and children found their
guiding light in the US rather than in Toronto, Hamilton, or even
Montreal. At the same time, central and western Canada attracted their
share of Europe's "proletarian globe-hopping" so that, in
spite of the massive expatriation of English-speaking Maritimers and of
seventh-and eighth-generation Acadians and French Canadians, the average
net migration for the whole country surpassed Australia's average
of 65,000 people per year between 1901 and 1910. (11) By this time,
Canada's third and more widely perceived image, of a resource-based
economy mythically portrayed in virgin landscapes bridged by
transcontinental railways, was finally paying dividends in muscle power
for both hinterland expansion and heartland development. The country
became even more addicted to staple export, and while the independent
commodity production characteristic of much old staple production during
the 19th century persisted in wheat-growing, fishing, and some logging,
modern wage labour relations spread to mines, ranches, meat-packing
plants, pulp and paper mills, and aluminium towns. (12) As a result of
this industrial landscape of contrasting realities (a growing but
increasingly clustered industrial core, a versatile but depopulating
eastern periphery, and successively booming and busting staple-producing
hinterlands), it was Canada's paradoxical position to become a
"mature branch-plant society," and to serve both as
"quasimetropolitan nation" and the "economic
hinterland" of the US. (13)
By comparison, Australia's situation was simultaneously more
peripheral to the industrial core and lacked any comparable
out-migration of its working population. It was, however, even more
reliant than Canada upon the export of primary produce, and its economic
development was more closely tied to the needs of British finance and
industry. Australia's dependent relationship with Britain retarded
industrialization. Income earned through the export of wool, coal, and
minerals was used to pay for British manufactured imports. As a result,
manufacturing industry in the Australian colonies during the later 19th
century was limited to the production of simple consumer products
(clothing, food, and drink), building materials, and some metal
fabrication particularly in the servicing and repair of agricultural
machinery. Reflecting the weaker nature of industrialization, while
Australia's manufacturing workforce grew at a somewhat faster rate
than Canada's, it did so from a far lower base. In 1891,
approximately 180,000 were employed in Australian manufacturing,
expanding to 490,000 by 1929. (14) Despite the growth of secondary
industry during the early decades of the 20th century, the Australian
economy continued to rely upon primary production. Not only did
Australia's rural industries of the 1930s provide nearly a quarter
of male employment, but they also contributed three-fifths of national
production and three-quarters of export income. Like other primary
producing settler economies, such as Argentina, Australians built upon
this resource base to achieve greater urbanization, to improve
production infrastructure and communication, and gradually to overcome
the dependence on imported goods. Nevertheless, the limits to
industrialization posed by prior colonial relations, geographic
distance, and the limited size and scale of domestic markets reinforced
Australia's "semi-industrial" status. (15)
There were also important differences between Canada and Australia
in terms of the ethnic composition of the workforce and the extent and
nature of collective worker organization. In contrast to Canada's
fluid, ethnically-fragmented and "border-hopping" labour
force, Australia's population remained dominantly British. The
Australian workforce therefore lacked any equivalent
regionally-entrenched minority group such as the French Canadians,
included few Mediterranean immigrants in comparison to countries such as
Argentina, had a small aboriginal population compared to South Africa,
and a declining number of Chinese and Kanaka workers at the very edge of
the world's greatest pool of cheap labour. Such an ethnically
homogenous population was the product of a deliberate policy of
exclusion instituted by colonial and later Federal governments and
backed by labour's fear of "cheaper" foreign workers under-cutting existing wages and conditions, as well as more general
racist views throughout Australian society. Australian legislators
therefore sought to avoid the kind of massive influx of people which
brought over two million new citizens from varied ethnic backgrounds to
Canada between 1903 and 1912. (16)
Australian workers also appeared more widely unionized than their
Canadian counterparts. Such differences were most pronounced in
industries such as shearing, meat slaughtering, coal and mineral mining,
railways, and maritime and road transport where workers extended trade
unionism beyond traditional craft bounds. Despite a major set-back
during the 1890s depression, union membership recovered strongly during
the early decades of the 20th century, buoyed in part by the legal
recognition granted to unions under compulsory state industrial
arbitration. Whereas the unionization rate in Canada roughly followed
American trends, dropping for example to about 11 or 12 per cent of the
non-agricultural workforce in the mid-1920s, Australia's union
membership expanded from 8 per cent in 1891, to 25 per cent in 1911, and
to about 42 per cent throughout the 1920s. (17) While Australian rural
workers such as shearers, meat-workers, and miners, engaged in
collective bargaining with employers over wages and work effort, and
often succeeded in enforcing more negotiated outcomes, similar practices
were often lacking amongst Canada's agricultural workforce. (18)
The concept of a "semi-proletariat," equally applicable to the
class experience of small farm-holders, agro-forest workers, sojourning
immigrants and many "frontier" labourers, might be a more
accurate way of characterising the material practices and petit
bourgeois aspirations of a significant stratum of Canadian agricultural
workers. Canada's uneven development and especially its regional
underdevelopment implied that, "rather than having been absorbed by
wage labour relations," numerous independent commodity producers
were "perpetuated as a class in ever more marginalised and
economically dependent forms." (19)
How then can Australia's and Canada's respective
positions in the international economy meaningfully inform labour
process analysis? With respect to the nature of industrial work, neither
country fared well in marketing producer and consumer goods to the rest
of the world; both Australian and Canadian industry remained principally
focused upon the production of basic and intermediate goods (food,
shelter, clothing, etc.) for domestic consumption. (20) Of course,
capitalist promoters and politicians did induce several rounds of
"import-substitution" by sheltering local manufacturing
through tariff protection and other forms of industry assistance. (21)
But out-migration in late-19th century Canada and limited immigration prior to the 1950s in Australia's case, seriously hindered any
possibility of matching the economies of scale of American, British, and
German mass production. In spite of the emphasis on "heavy"
industries in both countries' economic and labour histories, the
fact remains that "light" industries -- always more
statistically fragmented than "iron and steel products" and
"transport equipment" -- long dominated as sources of
employment and value added. (22)
Both countries' peripheral location to the industrial core
thus serves to accentuate the significance of human consumption of
nature's economy. By physical definition, the labour process
encompasses all human activity, or labour, set to work as labour power
on any given object and by whichever means along the path of commodity
production. (23) Basic commodities such as food, textiles, clothing,
footwear, printed matter, furniture, building materials, and housing
were not just made in the city, as is often suggested in the historical
literature. More accurately, they were made by all those who devoted
time and energy to commodify value stored in nature: as members of the
agricultural and non-agricultural workforce, as "resource
proletariat," "industrial proletariat," and
transportation workers, as "common," seasonal and transient
labourers, and as waged and unwaged individuals. However classified by
social scientists and reconstructed by historians, basic commodity
production began away from the city, with the human exploitation of
"autonomous ecological processes." (24) Accordingly, and more
typically for Australia and Canada than for the US, labour process
developments extended well beyond the urban/metropolitan stages of
commodity production to the physical labour of men and women whose role
was to extract value from nature's economy, as well as to preserve,
partly process, and convey this stored value within the bounds of denser
human communities. (25)
The complexity of extracting value from nature's economy
resulted in a wide range of work settings in Australian and Canadian
rural society. Instead of toiling in a systematically-controlled
environment, workers in agriculture, mining, fishing, and forestry were
exposed to a variety of elemental forces, where accidents and fatalities
were a common occurrence. (26) Rural workers were further expected to
cope with sharply fluctuating business cycles and the seasonality of
nature's economy. Responses included the adoption of pluralistic
work patterns in fishing, (27) transient labour in logging, (28)
shearing and slaughtering, (29) and brief, but hectic periods of work in
harvesting and gathering. (30) Unlike the urban factory employee, these
rural workers' experience of "industrial time" was often
dictated not so much by the punching clock or the steam whistle, as by
ecological processes beyond human control.
The case of boot and shoe making provides a good example of the
linkages between rural labour and urban manufacturing, as well as the
varied nature of such rural labour processes. Contrary to common belief,
urban shoe factories did not produce consumer goods; more accurately,
they cut, assembled, designed, and fashioned pieces of leather whose
production had been initiated several months before in less populated
rural settings. (31) Such leather production involved a range of rural
occupations: hunters and slaughtermen, who provided the skins and hides;
bark peelers employed to extract tanbark to cure the leather; and
tannery workers who oversaw the tanning process. While such work
differed greatly from the technical wonders so often celebrated in
contemporary descriptions of urban industrial shoe production, the fact
remains that all these work settings formed integral dimensions of the
commodity-producing system that yielded leather footwear well into the
20th century. To view bark peelers, slaughtermen and hunters, and
tannery hands, alongside urban shoe makers, as having all been involved
in the same societal contribution, represents a necessary step toward
perceiving basic commodity production for what it has generally been
historically: a process of destructive creation. Nor were such rural
linkages unique to Canadian manufacturing. For example, in Australia
during the 1910s and 1920s, as Melbourne shoe workers assembled pieces
of leather with modern machinery supplied by the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation, Australian hunters were involved in a trade that garnered
up to a million and a half kangaroo skins per year, chiefly exported to
the US for "high-grade athletic and sporting shoes" and
"women's high-grade walking shoes." At the same time,
Australia's slaughtermen contributed millions of sheepskins and up
to two million cattlehides annually, most of which were earmarked for
the domestic and overseas production of shoe soles, stays, facings, and
linings. (32)
In sharp contrast to the minute division of labour in modern shoe
factories, the processing of hides into leather was gauged in weeks and
months. However, rural tanneries were not simply "forest
factories." The physical layout of the bark and hide mills,
leaches, sweat vaults, tan vats, drying turret, and rolling loft, as
well as the man-made hydrographic network of dams, canals, and flumes,
are probably better regarded as a peripheral industrial plant designed
to harness nature's energy and bio-chemistry on a grand scale. (33)
While contemporary observers perceived the essence of industrialization
in terms of the dramatic increases in productivity (easily witnessed in
the work tempo of factory hands), the output of such rural industries
was equally profound. In spite of the months required to transform heavy
hides into leather, a single rural tannery could turn out a year's
supply of sole leather for several large, urban boot and shoe factories.
(34)
Indeed, boot and shoe manufacture required the mass consumption of
the forest well before anyone could contemplate the possibility of mass
producing footwear. Growing demand for leather boots and shoes resulted
in increasing demands on rural resources. As one observer in the
Catskill mountains of New York noted in 1840:
In every hemlock forest, on every falling stream, and accompanying
the interior settlements in every direction, may be seen tanneries of
the largest structure, giving employment to the wood-cutter, the
bark-peeler, the teamster, and the wheelwright; and under the consuming
fires of their never-glutted `leeches'[sic], the forests of hemlock
are rapidly giving place for the plough of the husbandman ... (35)
The need for large volumes of tanbark resulted in the employment of
large numbers of bark-peelers. (36) During the latter half of the 19th
century the scale of such harvesting was significant. Throughout the
borderlands territory of upstate New York, central and eastern Maine,
western New Brunswick, and southeastern Quebec, between two and three
million hemlock trees were "extracted" annually in order to
make thicker and harder boot and shoe soles. (37) The labour process of
bark peeling was based upon hard manual labour in extreme conditions.
Bark peelers in Appalachia and the Adirondacks worked in hot and humid
conditions and were tormented by clouds of biting insects. To counter
the insect threat, workers covered themselves with hemlock pitch, or
"slime." As one Maine woodsman stated:
Peeling wood was miserable, damn miserable. All the flies, heat,
pitch, everything you touch sticks to you ... I'd get out of my
pants and stand them in the corner. You didn't hang them up, you
just stood them. Get into them in the morning, it was like shoving your
feet into two stove pipes. Pitch was so thick you couldn't wash it
off, and no use of trying. You wore the same pants till the legs broke
-- or you got done peeling. (38)
Bark-peeling was commonly carried out by a four-man crew, which was
often driven at a furious pace by the leader of the gang in order to
earn their twenty dollars per month. By relying on the muscle power of
men and beasts, on the common axe and other simple manual tools, the
work of stripping bark was slow and labour-intensive. With an average
daily productivity of "about three-fourths of a cord, peeled and
piled, to a man" by the late 19th century, around 25,000 would have
been needed to peel 3 million trees during a single month in the
borderlands of northeastern North America. (39) The employer's
command over these workers' capacity to perform under such strain,
was exercised through the application of strict contractual
specifications, the agency of the sub-contractor and the land surveyor,
and the influx of ill-informed, destitute, cheap labour whose
"captivity" stemmed from the conventional practice of
withholding wage earnings until the season was over. (40) Many of these
workers were young, unattached rural labourers -- French Canadians, New
Brunswickers, and Prince Edward Islanders, who came in droves from the
eastern Canadian periphery to work at bark-peeling in the Maine
wilderness. (41)
The other essential ingredients in leather production were skins
and hides. Unlike bark stripping, the slaughterman's killing
techniques were often socially-constructed as a trade worthy of respect.
In his highly imaginative depiction of Argentinian pampa society,
Ezequiel Martinez Estrada captures the cattle executioner's
"art" by drawing a historical parallel between slaughtering
and surgery:
To flay, to scarify, and to disjoint the cow was a complicated
occupation; the hand rapidly became practiced at using the knife like a
bistoury along the tissues to separate the fat, the meat, and the bone.
Among the professionals, the delicate art of minimal movements was
admired -- the anatomical dexterity of the blow. (42)
An extensive literature exists on the development of the American
meatpacking industry. The introduction of chain production in hog
slaughtering in the 1840s in Cincinnati, highlights the beginnings of
increased mechanization of the industry. (43) Such a disassembly line
was later adapted to beef production and the Midwestern industrial
heartland gradually lost its pre-eminence as new meatpacking plants
emerged in Denver, Omaha, Sioux City, Wichita, and elsewhere. Despite a
lag of several decades, a similar pattern of work organization developed
in the Canadian meat industry. Toronto butchers witnessed continuous hog
slaughtering operations in 1874 and chain production was adapted to the
city's cattle killing techniques during the 1880s and 1890s. The
last decade of the 19th century marked the beginning of the large,
efficient meat packer era throughout most of the nation with modern
western plants opening in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, Edmonton,
Calgary, and Vancouver. By the early 1920s, following the construction
of several other western plants, the Canadian meatpacking industry
reached its point of maturity as its workers hobbled through long
periods of productive overcapacity. (44)
Though it remains unclear whether the numerous unskilled positions
thus created in Canadian meat packing were filled by successive
hierarchies of European immigrants and women, the peculiar value-system
of an industry wherein hourly wages could vary from 15 to 50 cents in a
"typical crew of cattle butchers and helpers" most likely
applies in Canada as it did in the US. As Commons explained, skill had
been managerially-constructed "to fit the anatomy." The
highest-paid, "50-cent men" in 1904 were hide flayers whose
dexterous knife-handling under very intense conditions of work ensured a
profitable commodification of hides and skins destined for leather
production. Their skill was not acknowledged on the basis of what they
made but arose from their ability to avoid inflicting damage to raw
material while at work on a killing crew. In a corporate world where
meat was said to pay for cows and steers and profits came in the forms
of hides, tallow, sinews, bones, glands, and casings, the flayer could
still be valued for his surgical attributes. Such high paid workers,
however, were a minority. The chain system of slaughtering had not
merely suppressed the slaughtermen's control over their pace of
work but provided capital with a rationale to devalue almost every
specialized task in the performance of which workers were expected to
behave like butchers: hacking, cutting, stripping, sawing, breaking,
ripping, and trimming. (45)
Moreover, the North American picture contrasted significantly with
developments in the Australian meat industry. The fact that the
Australian "knights of the steel" somehow succeeded in
prolonging their epoch into the 1930s offers a revealing testimony to
the importance of place in understanding labour process development. As
Evan Willis has highlighted, the sheepskins and frozen meat exported
from Australia were produced by itinerant "tradesmen, who had
served a three year apprenticeship" and who followed "the
seasonal `killing season' around New Zealand and Australia, as
sheep and lambs attained their peak condition." These peripatetic
wage-earners all practiced "solo slaughtering" and only worked
in the company of union members at a work pace decreed by their union.
Similar solo slaughtering practices prevailed in urban abattoirs and in
beef freezing plants. In Australia, it was not until the Great
Depression that the large multinational meat exporting companies
attempted to apply the chain production system. While introduced by
employers to break the power of the union, collective worker
organization continued to be an important constraint upon the power of
employers to speed-up production, and many local abattoirs and beef
packing plants continued to rely on the solo slaughtering techniques of
skilled cattle butchers. (46)
The third stage of basic leather production, the tanning of skins
and hides, had also gained an unenviable reputation as uncongenial work.
In the Australian colonies, tanneries were at the forefront of the
so-called noxious trades, providing fluctuating employment and extremely
poor working conditions. (47) The tasks of unhairing and fleshing hides,
only partially mechanised late in the 19th century, still called upon
the "stout, hard and vigorous arms" of the beam hands whose
peculiar knives and work benches long symbolized the trade. Scraping
hides resulted in cuts and abrasions which became easily infected. (48)
As one historian noted of the hazards of tannery work:
`Wet work' involved coming into contact with any number of
caustic chemicals, heaving piles of heavy hides over wooden
`horses,' bending and scraping flesh and hair, often still infested
with the remains of worms or other parasites ... `Dry work' --
sorting, hanging, buffing, or rolling leather -- was a bit more pleasant
but by no means easy. It often meant breathing large amounts of leather
dust. Some jobs, like rolling, were extremely dangerous, and many a
roller had suffered the unpleasant experience of watching and feeling a
finger crushed beneath the shiny, metal roller that swung back and forth
across the leather. (49)
Despite some evidence of growing solidarity among French- and
English-Canadian tannery hands during the first decade of the 20th
century, in general such workers were weakly organized and hence
vulnerable to exploitation. (50) Following World War I, tanning was
depicted in North America as a business which thrived on a rapid labour
turnover, a stepping stone for the most recent immigrants. As one trade
observer candidly noted:
[T]he new immigrant, not knowing the language nor the conditions,
has found employment in leather factories because better labor did not
want it. He has, as an individual and as a class, worked in this trade
only so long as he can accustom himself to the conditions of the
country, the language, and has secured a little cash to go ahead on.
(51)
Within the course of a few journeys from one source of employment
to another, a migrating tannery hand later recalled how individual
workers could become "suckers" who were "thoroughly
servile towards the boss"; how these same "beamsters"
might also steal the fruits of another person's work; and how
bosses were "at liberty to put the wages as low as they
liked." (52)
Clearly, such work differed from the stereotype of factory-based
shoe production in major urban centres. In describing the work processes
involved in basic leather production, one is struck by the simple nature
of workplace control; the hard, manual nature of the work; the poor
working conditions; and the relative lack of collective worker
organization. Beyond the growing mechanization of certain sections of
the meat slaughtering industry, there was little use of the more
sophisticated managerial controls so often cited in labour process
analyses. Nor were these work settings atypical of other areas of rural
work. In both countries, hard physical labour, more than labour-saving
machinery and sophisticated human control techniques, characterized the
plight of most rural hands who carried forth the preliminary stages of
"destructive creation." Indeed, such hard physical labour and
authoritarian control was a feature of other unorganized primary
industries such as the cattle, pearling, and sugar cane industries of
Australia's northern regions. (53) Where there were differences,
these typically concerned the ability of particular workers to organize
collectively and challenge managerial authority. Australia's
coal-miners, sheep shearers, and meat-workers provided examples of such
working-class organization. We will return to possible reasons for such
variations.
Urban Labour and the Limitations of Modern Labour Management
A major theme of labour process literature has been the rise of
modern manufacturing industry and parallel changes in the management of
production and labour during the first half of the 20th century. For
many writers this period has been viewed as a turning-point in the
nature of capitalist employment, symbolized by the rise of large
bureaucratic corporations, increased market concentration, and
formalized attempts by employers to increase their control over labour.
(54) The main focus of such studies has been the manufacturing sector of
the US, which in many ways pioneered the development of modern
management practice. A major limitation of such analyses, however, has
been the lack of broader international studies of management strategy.
(55) In this second half of our analysis of labour process developments
in Canada and Australia, we focus on the manufacturing sectors of both
countries and examine changes in the nature of management control.
Rather than replicating the "US model," both Canadian, and to
a greater extent Australian industry, differed both in the timing and
extent of modern labour management practice. Such comparative analysis
serves to re-emphasize the lack of a single, universal model of labour
process development and the importance of institutional and economic
factors in explaining national and regional differences.
In examining the development of manufacturing in Canada and
Australia, one is struck by a number of similarities as well as some
important differences. By the turn of the century, both countries had
diverse manufacturing operations, but such industries were largely based
upon the production of basic commodities for small, protected domestic
markets. (56) During the first two decades of the century, both Canadian
and Australian manufacturing underwent significant development, as new,
more capital-intensive industries were established. Key examples
included the production of steel, chemicals, electrical goods and
automobiles, by large, often foreign-owned companies. Tariff protection
assisted this process, as foreign manufacturers set up local operations.
The industrial structure of both countries also became increasingly
concentrated. (57)
Canada and Australia also exhibited differences, however, in the
path and shape of industrialization. While both countries clearly lagged
behind the example of leading industrial nations such as the US,
Canada's geographical proximity to the industrial heartland
resulted in closer parallels to the US than was the case in Australia.
Canadian workers were increasingly exposed and habituated to US
manufacturing practices and human control techniques. Eastern Canadians
found employment in some of the largest textile mills and shoe factories
of North America. In 1900, French Canadians accounted for one-third of
the work force in the New England textile industry, while providing as
many as 60 per cent of the workers in the cotton mills of New Hampshire,
70 per cent in those of Maine. (58) From the early days of Yankee
involvement in the New Brunswick sawmill boom, the spill over of
American capital into Canada continued its progression, growing from
1,024 "[US-]controlled and affiliated companies" in 1929, and
to more than 1,350 companies in 1934. (59) US corporations such as
Singer, Swift, International Harvester, and Goodyear not only carried
more advanced technology but also "helped to introduce new methods
of managing labour that fell upon the receptive ears of indigenous
Canadian capital." (60) While a similar process of US and UK
multinational penetration occurred in Australian industry during the
1920s, the extent of such influence appears far less pervasive.
Canadian and Australian manufacturers also differed in other areas.
While the growth of Canadian secondary industry involved the
establishment of a range of industry-specific towns and cities across
Ontario and Quebec, in Australia, manufacturing was concentrated much
more within the urban capitals of Sydney and Melbourne. (61) As noted
earlier, differences were also apparent in terms of the ethnic
composition of the workforce and the role of the state. Canadian
employers and those who managed US branch-plants could gain access to
far larger labour pools of Italian, eastern European, and Scandinavian
immigrants than their Australian counterparts, and some employers
developed strategies which sought to play off different ethnic groups
against one another. (62) In addition, despite a common history of
state-sponsored tariff protection and other forms of industry
assistance, in Australia, the introduction of compulsory state
industrial arbitration greatly assisted higher levels of trade union
membership and forced employers to abide by minimum wages and working
conditions as set down in industrial awards. By contrast, in Canada, the
state's role in industrial relations remained less ambiguous and
revolved solely around the disciplining of militant labour and active
support for employers in strike-breaking. (63)
Given such contexts, how then did Canadian and Australian
manufacturers manage their workforces? Once again there are some marked
similarities. From the 1880s onwards, employers in both countries had
begun to sub-divide and specialize their work processes, relying less
upon the craft knowledge and skill of their employees. Such trends were
most pronounced in industries such as clothing, footwear, and
agricultural machinery manufacture, as employers sought to break the
power of craft workers and employ cheaper, semi-skilled labour. While
some employers sought to increase their control over the labour process
through increased mechanization, others chose to hive off production to
sub-contractors or outworkers. Employers were influenced in their choice
of production strategies by the availability of cheaper labour, the type
of product, prevailing technologies, as well as factory legislation and
union-wage pressures. (64) Such developments, however, were varied in
their impact and often cyclical in nature. Indeed, in many instances
workers retained significant job control. (65)
During the 1910s and 1920s, the establishment of new industries and
larger enterprises resulted in the extension of managerial attempts to
control production. In newer industries such as steel, automobile,
electrical goods, rubber tire, and armaments manufacture, employers were
guided by models of quantity production and systematic management
developed in the US. (66) The automobile industry was at the forefront
of this trend. US automobile firms were key institutions in the
worldwide dissemination of modern manufacturing and management
practices. Manufacturers such as Ford and General Motors established
Australian and Canadian assembly plants which employed the most
up-to-date thinking on shop layout, routing, the use of specialized
machinery, and new methods of production flow and material handling
(most notably the moving assembly line). (67)
Developments in quantity production also resulted in increased
employer interest in more formalized techniques of labour control such
as payment by results (PBR) and scientific management. While PBR
promised a closer link between employee effort and wages paid,
scientific management promised a complete system of labour control based
upon a detailed analysis of job tasks and the time taken to complete
them. (68) Such techniques received extensive publicity in both Canada
and Australia during the inter-war period and were seen as essential
features of modern manufacturing. Once again, it was the foreign firms
that were the pace-setters. Beyond the auto companies, Canadian and
Australian subsidiaries of US firms such as General Electric,
Westinghouse, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and Standard Telephones and
Cables, were leaders in the workplace application of scientific
management. (69) Such a process was supplemented by a range of
management consultants and efficiency experts which actively
disseminated these techniques within both Canadian and Australian
industry. (70)
Beyond the control of the production process, during the inter-war
period many larger Canadian and Australian employers also developed
corporate welfare programs. "Welfarism" sought to gain
employee loyalty through demonstrations of employer benevolence, in much
the same way that entrepreneurs emphasized their paternal role within
the small firm. Examples might include the provision of superior
amenities, encouragement of social and recreational activities,
educational programs, company newsletters, profit-sharing schemes,
sickness and accident benefits, or company provided services and
housing. Publicly, managers emphasized that welfarism, far from being a
philanthropic gesture, made good business sense. A contented and healthy
workforce, it was argued, was also a more productive one. (71) The
paternalist attitudes of employers, however, also seemed to play a major
role in the adoption of welfarism. This was most pronounced amongst
employers of largely female workforces. Managers of these firms commonly
emphasized their role as "father" figures and advocated
welfarism in order to promote a "family spirit" and increase
workforce co-operation. (72)
Canadian and Australian employers also developed strategies to
head-off the threat of labour unrest and unionization. Beyond the simple
victimization of trade unionists and black-lists, some employers
developed more sophisticated techniques. The introduction of social and
sporting clubs, and of magazines and newsletters often aimed at
engendering a company spirit amongst the workforce in preference to
external affiliations. More directly, a worker's participation in
profit-sharing schemes and provident funds was commonly conditional upon
the maintenance of industrial harmony. In the Canadian steel industry
for example, employee benefit societies, pension and insurance schemes
were introduced to reduce labour dissent. The industry leader in this
regard, Hamilton's Dominion Foundries and Steel, introduced a
profit-sharing scheme that proved pivotal in it attempts to undermine
union organization. (73) In a similar vein, some employers sought to
lessen industrial conflict through the introduction of joint
consultative arrangements. In Australia, the British war-time example of
Whitley councils (joint management-employee committees) was widely
publicized and advocated as a remedy to industrial conflict and low
productivity. (74) In Canada similar examples of joint consultation
appeared in companies such as Bell Telephone, Imperial Oil, and
International Harvester (75) Some employers also appealed to loyalist
elements within their workforce in order to under-cut trade union
organization. Typically, this involved management organizing such loyal
elements in direct competition to external trade unions. Such
"company unionism" not only simplified bargaining arrangements
but also promised more moderate and quiescent labour relations. (76)
Toward the end of World War I, increasing labour militancy in both
countries appears to have increased employer interest in welfarism and
worker representation schemes. (77)
Despite the academic emphasis such formal techniques of labour
control have received, however, in both the Canadian and Austrialian
settings the extent of such formal controls should not be over-stated.
For example, the workplace impact of scientific management appeared
highly variable in both countries during these years and amounted to far
from a universal form of labour control. Australian examples of
full-blown Taylorism including time study and related wage incentives
were relatively rare prior to the World War II. Even in Canadian
industry where such reforms were perhaps more pervasive, as Heron notes,
employers were highly pragmatic in their adoption of such techniques.
(78) Similarly, despite widespread publicity, welfarism and joint
consultation programs were generally limited to a minority of larger
enterprises and varied widely in their impact and longevity. For
example, a 1931 survey of Australian labour management innovators found
only 76 firms with formal welfare schemes, the majority of which were
large employers in the retail and clothing industries. While a greater
number of Canadian employers appear to have followed the path of welfare
capitalism, these firms were far from typical. For example, one 1926
survey of 300 large Ontario enterprises found only 49 firms with formal
pension or retirement plans. (79) As a result, while advocates in both
Canada and Australia were active in seeking to disseminate the message
of modern labour management, their success was limited. There were a
number of reasons for this.
First, in both countries, the development of more modern
manufacturing techniques was limited by the size of domestic and local
markets and the continued numerical dominance of small firms. While
tariff protection attracted larger, foreign manufacturers to establish
local operations, protection also helped smaller manufacturers to
compete against cheaper, imported manufactured goods. The extent of
small-scale manufacturing in Canada and Australia was pronounced in
comparison to US industry. Hence, while the average number of
wage-earners per establishment in US manufacturing in 1929 was 41.9, in
Canada it was 25.3, and in Australia only 15.6. (80) In many of these
small firms manufacturing remained relatively unsophisticated. In the
Australian context, while industry journals advocated the use of new
machine tools and repetition methods of production, engineering firms
were slow to take up such technological advances and continued to base
production upon a batch or jobbing basis. (81) Such limits to
mechanization extended across a variety of other industries such as food
processing, clothing, wood products, furniture, and other basic
commodities which accounted for the majority of manufacturing
employment. (82) Indeed, the survival of apprenticeship in many parts of
Australian industry reflected continued employer demand for skilled
tradesmen and the limited impact of mass production methods outside of
newer industries such as automobile and steel manufacture. (83)
Such small employers also had little need for systematic forms of
labour control. In many small manufacturing establishments, the simple
personal controls of the owner-manager or foreman/supervisor proved more
than adequate. As US writers such as Richard Edwards have argued, such
simple control was based upon a combination of bullying, compulsion, and
authoritarian rule -- the driving method of supervision. (84)
Supervisors maintained a close surveillance on worker behaviour and
instituted a strict discipline aimed at minimizing time-wasting and
other unproductive behaviour. Nor was such "simple control"
limited to the small manufacturers. Indeed, even within the most modern
automobile and steel factories, despite the growth of systematic control
over the timing, quantity, and costs of production, Australian and
Canadian employers continued to rely upon the simple, personal control
of foremen and supervisors in maintaining employee discipline and
ensuring workers attained output standards. (85) In the Australian steel
industry for example, mechanization was supplemented by the shopfloor
rule of the foreman, many of whom would scream abuse at workers or apply
arbitrary penalties in an effort to increase production. (86) Indeed, in
a number of instances larger employers dispensed with formal controls
such as scientific management in favour of such simple and less costly
personal controls. (87)
Second, the lack of labour market pressures on employers during
this period also undermined the rationale for greater formalization of
employment. In the Australian case, high levels of unemployment ensured
a constant supply of labour and the threat of dismissal remained a
powerful motivator of employee performance. While some companies engaged
employment officers and kept rudimentary employment records, informalism
prevailed in most establishments. (88) In the Canadian context, a
similar pattern was evident. While a tighter labour market during World
War I led some Canadian employers to formalize their employment and
labour management practices, high levels of unemployment and declining
industrial militancy during the 1930s led many to wind back their
personnel and welfare programs. (89) In the period prior to World War
II, high levels of unemployment and seasonal instability in many
industries ensured the effectiveness of a policy of harsh-works
discipline. (90)
Third, the dissemination of such formal practices also proved
problematic. This was particularly apparent in the Australian case,
where geographical distance from the industrial heartland of the US,
Britain, and Europe limited the spread of modern management practice.
The effect of distance was pronounced during World War I. Unlike
Canadian industry, which, pushed by the demand for munitions production,
underwent significant modernization, the war had little direct impact on
Australian industry which was further isolated during these years. (91)
During the 1920s and 1930s, despite the example of multinational
subsidiaries and the advocacy of management literature and government
bodies extolling the virtues of welfarism and scientific management,
Australian manufacturers lacked the expertise to implement such
techniques. While in Canada the professionalization of welfare work
closely followed the US precedent, in Australia the lag was far greater.
(92) Despite the role of management consultants and efficiency experts
in both countries, it was not until World War II that a truly
international management consultancy industry provided the necessary
transmission belts for the worldwide spread of scientific management
techniques. (93)
Fourth, while a variety of literature has emphasized the link
between labour militancy and the adoption by employers of formal labour
strategies such as welfarism and joint consultation, many employers in
both countries chose to resist organized labour through more simple and
direct strategies. In the Australian case for example, despite state
advocacy for joint consultation via Whitley Councils, employers
demonstrated little interest in such bodies. (94) While compulsory state
arbitration forced employers to recognize trade unions in the
determination of industrial awards, at the workplace level, employers
continued to rely upon simple techniques of victimization of union
representatives, black-lists, and strike-breaking. In the years prior to
World War II, high levels of unemployment and the active intervention of
state and federal governments in assisting employers to break strikes,
underlined the efficacy of such simple anti-unionism in many industries.
(95) A similar, if not more extreme pattern, appears to have emerged in
Canadian industry, where the lack of any legal right to collective
bargaining ensured the dominance of management prerogative, and perhaps
weakened the necessity for elaborate techniques of union avoidance.
Added to the above factors, workforce resistance also played a role
in limiting the use of formal management practices in particular work
settings. In the Australian case, labour resistance was particularly
apparent amongst the metal trades, where strong workplace organization
and direct action commonly thwarted attempts by employers to rationalize
production and introduce PBR schemes and scientific management. (96)
While there is evidence of semi-skilled workers in other industries in
both Canada and Australia striking against employer attempts to speed-up
work or cut bonus payments, the extent to which such resistance
succeeded in thwarting management is unclear. (97) Certainly, higher
trade union density and the legal recognition of trade unions under
compulsory arbitration would suggest labour resistance may have had a
greater impact on management action in Australia than was the case in
Canada. Conversely, the importance significant sections of the
Australian labour movement accorded to arbitration and political reform,
also resulted in weak workplace organization in many areas of the
Australian workforce. (98)
Conclusions: The Labour Process in Comparative Perspective
A key aim of this discussion has been to broaden labour process
analysis and highlight the importance of different spatial realities at
particular points in time. While much of the labour process literature
has been concerned with describing changes in the nature of managerial
control within advanced industrial economies, a comparative analysis of
Australia and Canada during the late 19th and early 20th centuries
emphasizes not only differences in the extent and timing of such
systematic controls, but also the critical importance of rural
industries in the transformation of natural resources into finished
commodities. In contrast to the vision of industrial modernity portrayed
by many labour process writers, workers in rural Canada and Australia
encountered a work environment dominated by hard manual labour, harsh
working conditions, authoritarian relations, and limited opportunities
for collective action. Similarly within the urban context, despite the
emphasis within management literature for the more formalized techniques
of corporate welfarism and scientific management, the vast majority of
Australian and Canadian factory workers experienced a far simpler regime
of rigid discipline enforced by coercive supervisors and backed by the
constant fear of dismissal.
Despite such similarities, the organization of work and employment
in Australian and Canadian industry also differed in several respects.
While Canadian and Australian employers were clearly less effected by
the US model of formalized management control, the extent of application
of such techniques appeared greater in Canada than Australia. Moreover,
in both the rural and urban contexts, Australian workers demonstrated a
greater propensity to form trade unions and in a number of cases
successfully challenged employers. By contrast, Canadian workers,
particularly in rural industries, were less organized and hence far more
vulnerable to abuses of employer power. What explains these variations?
As we have emphasized throughout, a critical explanatory factor has to
be the role of place and location. Australia's isolation and
greater geographical distance from the industrial heartland, not only
hindered the spread of new managerial ideas and technologies, it also
critically affected the size and make-up of the working population as
well as placing limits upon the size of the domestic market. While
sections of the Australian working class were far better organized than
Canadian workers, it should not be forgotten that such organization was
based upon active policies of exclusion of both women and workers of
other ethnic and racial backgrounds. Differences were also apparent at
an institutional level. Despite its short-comings, state arbitration did
provide Australian labour with certain basic legal rights as well as an
award structure through which minimum wages and working conditions could
be disseminated. By contrast, Canadian labour faced a state apparatus
more clearly tied to the interests of business and more willing to
intervene to support those interests.
(1) M. Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (New York 1982),
15.
(2) D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, MA 1990), 205.
(3) Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 205.
(4) Principal examples of the labour process perspective include H.
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the
Twentieth Century (London 1974); R. Edwards, Contested Terrain: The
Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (New York 1979)
and M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labour Process
Under Monopoly Capitalism (Chicago 1979). For a review of the labour
process literature see P. Thompson, The Nature of Work: An Introduction
to Debates on the Labour Process (2nd. edn., London 1989). Australian
and Canadian overviews are provided by G. Patmore, Australian Labour
History (Melbourne 1991), ch. 5 and C. Heron. and R. Storey, On the Job.
Confronting the Labour Process in Canada (Montreal 1986).
(5) Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, 10 and 205.
(6) D. Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace,
the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge, MA 1989),
70. Montgomery's inclusion of Toronto and exclusion of Montreal
does not accurately reflect the northen boundaries of North
America's industrial core.
(7) This expression is drawn from G. Blainey, The Tyranny of
Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia's History (Melbourne 1966).
(8) D. Kerr, "The Emergence of the Industrial Heartland, c.
1750-1950," in L.D. McCann, ed., Heartland and Hinterland. A
Geography of Canada (2nd edn., Scarborough 1987), 89; A. Maizels,
Industrial Growth and World Trade (Cambridge 1963), 31 (our emphasis).
(9) For different overviews of this phenomenon, see: Y. Lavoie,
L'emigration des Canadiens aux Etats-Unis avant 1930: mesure du
phenomene (Quebec 1979); R. Vicero, "The Immigration of French
Canadians to New England, 1840-1900; A Georgraphical Analysis," PhD
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1968; Y. Roby, Les Franco-Americains de
la Nouvelle-Angleterre, 1776-1929 (Sillery, 1990); B. Ramirez, On the
Move: French Canadians and the Italian Migrants in the North Atlantic
Economy, 1871-1914 (Toronto 1991); A. Brookes, "Out-Migration from
the Maritime Provinces, 1860-1900: Some Preliminary
Considerations," in P.A. Buckner and D. Frank, eds., Atlantic
Canada After Confederation. The Acadiensis Reader: Volume Two
(Fredericton 1985); G. Wynn, "New England's Outpost in the
Nineteenth Century" and M. Conrad, "Chronicles of the Exodus:
Myths and Realities of Maritime Canadians in the United States,
1870-1930," in S. Hornsby, Victor A. Konrad and James J. Herlan,
eds., The Northeastern Borderlands: Four Centuries of Interaction
(Fredericton 1989).
(10) Data on the United States labour force drawn from S. Brier,
ed., Who Built America? Working People & the Nation's Economy,
Politics, Culture & Society. Volume Two: From the Gilded Age to the
Present (New York 1992), 12. Data on Canada's workforce drawn from
McCann, Heartland and Hinterland, 16 and 91.
(11) As noted by Montgomery in Fall of the House of Labor, Frank
Thistlethwaite should be credited for the expression "proletarian
globe-hopping" in his influential study, "Migration from
Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in XI
Congres international des sciences historiques. Rapports (Stockholm
1960), 32-60. Comparative data on net migration in Australia and in
Canada are drawn from: M. Waters, Strikes in Australia: A Sociological
Analysis of Industrial Conflict (Sydney 1982) and McCann, Heartland and
Hinterland, 48.
(12) W. Clement, "A Political Economy of Resources: Debates
and Directions in Canada," Australian-Canadian Studies, 4 (1986),
51-64; G.W. Bertram, "Economic Growth in Canadian Industry,
1870-1915: The Staple Model," in W.T. Easterbrook and M.H. Watkins,
Approaches to Canadian Economic History (Toronto 1967), 74-98.
(13) McCann, Heartland and Hinterland, 39; W. Clement, Class, Power
and Property. Essays on Canadian Society (Toronto 1983), ch. 3; G.
Williams, Not For Export: Toward a Political Economy of Canada's
Arrested Industrialization (Toronto 1983), ch. 1.
(14) P. Cochrane, Industrialization and Dependence:
Australia's Road to Economic Development, 1870-1939 (St.Lucia
1980), 3-6; Waters, Strikes, 91-6; E. Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic
Development in Australia (2nd edn., Melbourne 1979), 162-3; G. Withers,
A. Endres and L. Perry, "Labour," in W. Vamplew, ed.,
Australians: Historical Statistics (Sydney 1987), 149.
(15) Waters, Strikes, 115; C. Forster, Industrial Development in
Australia, 1920-1930 (Canberra 1964), 104; N. Butlin, "Some
Perspectives of Australian Economic Development, 1890-1965," in C.
Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century
(Sydney 1970), 312; The world trade economist Alford Maizels divided
countries into "industrial," "semi-industrial," and
"non-industrial" economies on the basis of the value of
manufacturing output per capita and the proportion of finished goods
they exported, see Maizels, Industrial Growth.
(16) M. Willard, History of the White Australia Policy (Melbourne
1967); W. Forsayth, "The Australian Population Problem," in G.
Wood, ed., Australia. Its Resources and Development (New York 1947),
39-51; Patmore, Australian Labour History, 184-99; Waters, Strikes,
71-2, 77-9, 96-7, 100, 105, 107, 109 and 119-20. Figures on Canadian
immigration drawn from B. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: The Rise and
Reconstitution of Canadian labour, 1800-1980 (Toronto 1983), 142.
(17) Details of the rise of the so-called `new unions' and the
effect of arbitration are outlined in Patmore, Australian Labour
History, 56-65 and 120-6 and Waters, Strikes, 98 and 120-3. For Canadian
unionism see B. Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 149, 189-90.
(18) Such collective bargaining was often institutionalized via
Australia's compulsory industrial arbitration system. For examples
of collective bargaining see E. Willis, "Trade Union Reaction to
Technological Change: The Introduction of the Chain System of
Slaughtering in the Meat Export Industry," Prometheus, 3 (1985),
51-70; K. Tsokhas, "The Shearing Labour Process, 1900-1914,"
Labour History, 59 (1990), 87-103; J. Hagan and C. Fisher, "Piece
Work and Some of its Consequences in the Printing and Coal Mining
Industries in Australia, 1850-1930," Labour History, 25 (1973),
19-39.
(19) B. Fairley, C. Leys and J. Sacouman, eds., Restructuring and
Resistance. Perspective from Atlantic Canada (Toronto 1990), 11. For
other empirical and theoretical perspectives on the petit bourgeois
aspirations of workers "captivated by the agricultural dream,"
see J. Parr, "Hired Men: Ontario Agricultural Wage Labour in
Historical Perspective," Labour/Le Travail, 15 (1985), 91-103; R.
Sacouman, "Semi-Proletarianization and Rural Underdevelopment in
the Maritimes," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 17
(1980); F. Albert, Immigrant Odyssey. A French-Canadian Habitant in New
England (Orono 1991); G. Burrill and I. McKay, People, Resources, and
Power (Fredericton 1987).
(20) In 1955, Australia's and Canada's export of finished
manufactures accounted respectively for 6 and 11 per cent of their total
exports. Comparative data for other industrial countries are: Japan (64
per cent), Italy (47 per cent), Federal Germany (65 per cent), Sweden
(33 per cent), the United States (48 per cent), Great Britain (62 per
cent), and France (38 per cent). Figures drawn from Maizels, Industrial
Growth, 59 and 64.
(21) Williams, Not For Export, ch. 2; G. Linge, "The Forging
of an Industrial Nation: Manufacturing in Australia 1788-1913," in
J. Powell and M. Williams, eds., Australian Space, Australian Time:
Geographical Perspectives (Melbourne 1975); and G. Linge, Industrial
Awakening: A Geography of Australian Manufacturing 1788-1890 (Canberra
1979).
(22) Industries involved in the production of basic consumer goods
constituted about 64 per cent of total manufacturing employment in
Canada and about 60 per cent in Australia during the 1920s and 1930s.
Canadian manufacturing industries associated with the basic necessities
of daily life -- exclusive of wood products, fuel, and shelter --
accounted for about 40 per cent of manufacturing value added in the
first 4 decades of the 20th century. Similar to the forest-related
industries (wood products, paper products, and "printing,
publishing, and allied industries"), the "heavier" metal
industries ranked far behind at about 20 per cent of manufacturing value
added. See Bertram, "Economic Growth in Canadian Industry,"
86-7 and Withers et al., Labour, 149.
(23) The labour process has been defined very differently by
various authors. Patmore, for example, argues the "essential
question of labour process analysis is how management transforms the
potential for work (labour power) into work effort (labour)." By
contrast, Harvey seeks to expand the conceptual boundaries of labour
process analysis when he states that it entails "in the first
instance, some mix of repression, habituation, co-option and
cooperation, all of which have to be organized not only within the
workplace but throughout society at large." For their part, Heron
and Storey choose to emphasize the physical nature of the labour process
referring to work as "a process whereby flesh-and-blood human
beings actively transform raw materials into finished products or
perform vital services within a complex social setting." See
Patmore, Australian Labour History, 131; Harvey, Condition of
Postmodernity, 123; Heron and Storey, On the Job.
(24) W. Cronan, Nature's Metropolis. Chicago and the Great
West (New York 1991), 149.
(25) For a masterful example of "the linkages between the
commodities of our economy and the resources of our ecosystem" see
Cronan, Nature's Metropolis.
(26) To our knowledge, there exists no Australian or Canadian study
comparing industrial accidents in urban and rural, or heartland and
hinterland contexts, perhaps because statistics in industries such as
railways, transportation, and the building trades are difficult to
disaggregate. Nevertheless, despite high accident and fatality rates in
certain sections of manufacturing, rural and outdoor workplaces were a
source of constant danger. Principal examples included hypothermia,
drowning, forest fires, heat strokes, and mine collapse. In 1904, for
example, about 80 percent of Canada's non-fatal work-related
accidents and 55 percent of its work-related fatalities occurred in
railway and general transportation, lumbering, mining, woodworking,
agriculture, fishing, and among the unspecified occupations of unskilled
labourers. See, Robert Babcock, "The Hartz-Lipset Thesis
Reconsidered: The problem of industrial accidents in the United States
and Canada," paper presented at the biennial conference of the
Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, November 1993,
4-5.
(27) M. MacDonald and P. Connelly, "Class and Gender in Nova
Scotia Fishing Communities," in Restructuring and Resistance from
Atlantic Canada, 152-70.
(28) Ian Radforth, Bushworkers and Bosses. Logging in Northern
Ontario 1900-1980 (Toronto 1987) and R. Rajala, "The Forest as
Factory: Technological Change and Worker Control in the West Coast
Logging Industry, 1880-1930," Labour/Le Travail, 32 (1993), 73-104.
(29) Willis, "Trade Union Reaction"; Tsokhas, "The
Shearing Labour Process."
(30) While it is often argued that the introduction of grain
reapers and harvesters greatly lowered seasonal farm labour
requirements, it is important to note that with the advent of mass
consumerism, an increasing variety of fruits and vegetables had to be
harvested or gathered. In Canada, see for example, M. Conrad,
"Apple Blossom Time in the Annapolis Valley, 1880-1937,"
Acadiensis, 9 (1980), 14-39; T. Murphy, "Potato Capitalism: McCain
and Industrial Farming in New Brunswick," in Burrill and McKay,
eds., People, Resources, and Power, 19-29; M. Bunce and M. Troughton,
eds., The Pressures of Change in Rural Canada (Toronto 1984); G.
Haythorne and L. March, Land and Labour. A Social Survey of Agriculture
and the Farm Labour Market in Central Canada (Toronto 1941); J. Thompson
and A. Seager, "Workers, Growers, and Monopolists: The `Lobor
Problem' in the Alberta Beet Sugar Industry During the 1930s,"
Labour/Le Travailleur, 3 (1978), 153-74. The itinerant and casual nature
of agricultural labouring in Australia is also outlined in C. Fox,
Working Australia (Sydney 1991), 36-7.
(31) The historiographical legacy of research on boot and shoe
making perfectly illustrates the "intellectual schism" between
conceptions of time and space. Almost invariably, scholars have
projected the urban shoe factory as a model of the early transition to
industrial capitalism while neglecting to look at its backward linkages
in the countryside, at the periphery, and in the wilderness. Knowledge,
thus circumscribed, is essentially temporal as it matters little whether
the impact of the industry's universal machinery and division of
labour is felt in Boston, Lynn, Montreal, Toronto, Melbourne, or Sydney.
Relevant works include: G. Kealey, Toronto Workers Respond to Industrial
Capitalism (Toronto 1980); A. Dawley, Class and Community: The
Industrial Revolution in Lynn (Cambridge 1974); M. Blewett, Men, Women,
and Work: Class, Gender, and Protest in the New England Shoe Industry 1780-1910 (Chicago 1988); R. Frances, The Politics of Work. Gender and
Labour in Victoria 1880-1939 (Melbourne 1993); M. Bluteau et al., Les
cordonniers: artisans du cuir (Montreal 1980).
(32) J. Arnold, Hides and Skins (London 1925), 262 (table 6),
303-5, 372 (table 12), 414-7 and 513-8.
(33) For details of tannery work see G. Zahavi, Workers, Managers
and Welfare Capitalism: The Shoeworkers and Tanners of Endicott Johnson,
1890-1950 (Urbana 1988); P. Welsh, Tanning in the United States to 1850.
A Brief History (Washington 1964); M. Atkinson, Hinckley Township or
Grand Lake Stream Plantation (Newburyport 1921); J. Dupont and J.
Mathieu, eds., Les metiers du cuir (Quebec 1981); R. Labelle, Tanneurs
et tanneries du Bas Saint-Laurent (1900-1930) (Ottawa 1974).
(34) Statement based on research in progress in the state of Maine
and the province of Quebec.
(35) F. Hunt, The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review,
Vol. 3 (New York 1840), 142-3.
(36) For details of the bark peeling process see B. McMartin,
Hides, Hemlocks and Adirondack History (Utica 1992), 45-7; R. Milliken
and R. Rogers, Forest for the Trees. A History of the Baskahegan Company
(np 1983), 37-40; W. Arcouette, "Souvenances de Roxton Falls,"
Roxton Falls au fil des ans (Roxton Falls 1992), 23; State of Maine,
Tenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Labor and Statistics 1896 (Augusta
1897), 72-6. More accurate sources are found in legal publications such
as: State of Maine, Washington County, Sup. Jud. Court, January Term,
1884, "John K. Ames vs. Fayette Shaw et al.,"
"Declaration," "Report of Evidence," and
"Judge's Charge."
(37) Estimates for upstate New York are derived from McMartin,
Hides, Hemlocks and Adirondack History (Utica 1992), 106. Estimates for
Maine are derived from personal research in Maine manuscript census and
local newspapers. Contrary to common belief, the "tanbark"
period did not simply give way to mineral or synthetic substitutes on
the eve of the 20th century. The heavy leather industry migrated to
central Ontario, northern Michigan, and Wisconsin where it increasingly
imported tannin extracts derived from similar stripping operations at
the periphery of the world economy.
(38) Quoted in Milliken and Rogers, Forest for the Trees, 39.
(39) State of Maine, Tenth Annual Report, 74.
(40) "John K. Ames vs. Fayette Shaw et al.,"
"Declaration," and "Report of Evidence." The role of
the surveyor is documented in Maine Special Collection, Prentiss and
Carlisle Papers (Bills), 1870s-1892, several volumes.
(41) With the exception of a few manuscript nominal census records,
(when the bark peelers worked in the vicinity of a tanning community),
the evidence is entirely from local newspapers but sufficiently
recurrent to assume a migratory trend, especially among French-speaking
Canadians.
(42) E. Estrada, X-Ray of the Pampa (London 1971), 365.
(43) For a recent publication and overview of the literature, see
J. Skaggs, Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and Meatpacking in the United
States 1607-1983 (College Station 1986). Quotation from M. Yeager,
Competition and Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat
Packing Industry (Greenwich 1981), 9.
(44) J. Rennies, ed., The Growth and Development of Canada's
Meat Packing Industry (Islington 1969), 1-46.
(45) J. Commons, "Labor conditions in meat packing and the
recent strike," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 19 (1904), 1-32.
The top wage-earning tier of the slaughtering crew studied by Commons in
1904 comprised eleven "50-cent men" (flayers and splitters),
two and one-half "45-cent men" (back flayers), and two and
one-half "40-cent men" (rumper flayers). Well over half of the
workforce earned between 15 and 18 cents and the crew's average
earning was 21 cents.
(46) Willis, "Trade Union Reaction," 53-4, 60, 65. For
details of the continued shopfloor strength of Australian meat-workers
and their union see K. Walker, Australian Industrial Relations Systems
(Melbourne 1970), 260-7. During the 1940s, meat-workers in combination
with steel-workers, coal miners, and waterfront workers, were a major
source of industrial militancy, see T. Sheridan, Division of Labour:
Industrial Relations in the Chifley Years, 1945-1949 (Melbourne 1989),
117-24 and D. Blackmur, Strikes: Causes, Conduct and Consequences
(Sydney 1993), 38-109.
(47) S. Fitzgerald, Rising Damp: Sydney 1870-90 (Melbourne 1987),
88, 153-4, 213. See also Department of National Development, The
Structure and Capacity of Australian Manufacturing Industries (Melbourne
1950), 378-86.
(48) Atkinson, Hinckley Township, 58.
(49) Zahavi, Workers, Managers and Welfare Capitalism, 78.
(50) J. Ferland, "Solidarity and Estrangement among Canadian
Leather Workers: Sole Leather Tanning at Grand Lake Stream, Maine,
1871-1880," paper presented at the Australia-Canadian Labour
History Conference, University of Sydney, December 1988.
(51) United Shoe Machinery Corporation Archives, Folio A,
"Hide and Leather Working Machinery," unpublished manuscript,
11-2.
(52) Quotations from Butler's Journal (Fredericton):
"Among the Hills," November 1899, and "My first summer at
Jackson Brook, Maine," June 1900.
(53) If anything, these industries provided even more extreme
examples of harsh rural work. The employment of indentured and
indigenous labour often meant employers in these industries instituted
inhuman working conditions for little if any remuneration. See for
example Fox, Working Australia, 45; D. May, From Bush to Station:
Aboriginal Labour in the North Queensland Pastoral Industry, 1861-1897
(Townsville 1983); K. Saunders, Workers in Bondage: The Origins and
Bases of Unfree Labour in Queensland, 1824-1916 (St. Lucia 1982).
(54) See for example Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital; D.
Clawson, Bureaucracy and the Labor Process: The Transformation of US
Industry, 1860-1920 (New York 1980).
(55) Important exceptions include: C. Littler, The Development of
the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies (London 1982); H. Gospel and
C. Littler, eds., Managerial Strategies and Industrial Relations: An
Historical and Comparative Study (Aldershot 1983); S. Tolliday and J.
Zeitlin, eds., The Power to Manage? Employers and Industrial Relations
in Comparative-Historical Perspective (London 1991).
(56) Williams, Not For Export; Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic
Development, 162-3.
(57) C. Heron, "The New Factory Regime and Workers'
Struggles in Canada, 1890-1940," paper presented at the
Australia-Canadian Labour History Conference, University of Sydney,
December 1988, 6; C. Forster, Industrial Development in Australia,
1920-1930 (Canberra 1964), 37-57, 118-22; C. Haddon-Cave, "Trends
in the Concentration of Operations of Australian Secondary Industries,
1923-1943," Economic Record, (June 1945), 65-78.
(58) R. Chodos and E. Hamovitch, Quebec and the American Dream
(Toronto 1991), 86.
(59) H. Marshall, F. Southard, and K. Taylor, Canadian-American
Industry. A Study in International Investment (Toronto 1976); R. Naylor,
The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914, 2 vols. (Toronto 1976); M.
Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business
Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 (Cambridge, MA 1970); W. Clement,
Continental Corporate Power: Economic Elite Linkages Between Canada and
the United States (Toronto 1977).
(60) Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 140.
(61) Heron notes the geographical concentration of individual
industries in Canada, for example, shoe-making (Quebec City and
Montreal), clothing (Montreal and Toronto), steel and metal fabrication
(Hamilton), automobile manufacture (Windsor and Oshawa), rubber goods
(Kitchener), and electrical components (Peterborough), see Heron,
"New Factory Regime," 9. By contrast, in Australia, Sydney and
Melbourne dominated as manufacturing centres, with only the steel,
paper, and some food processing industries located in more regional
areas, see J. Camm and J. McQuilton, eds., Australians: An Historical
Atlas (Sydney 1987), 127.
(62) See for example: D. Avery, `Dangerous Foreigners':
European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932
(Toronto 1979); B. Ramirez and M. Del Balso, The Italians of Montreal:
From Sojourning to Settlement, 1900-1921 (Montreal 1980); B. Ramirez, On
the Move; C. Heron, Working in Steel: The Early Years in Canada,
1883-1935 (Toronto 1988); V. Lindstrom-Best, Defiant Sisters: A Social
History of Finnish Immigrant Women in Canada (Toronto 1988).
(63) The "legalisation" of Canadian industrial relations
did not occur until the implementation of the Wartime Labour Relations
Regulations (PC 1003) in 1944. Up until this time Canadian employers
lacked any legal compulsion to bargain with trade unions in good faith.
See J. Fudge, "Voluntarism, Compulsion and the
`Transformation' of Canadian Labour Law During World War II,"
in G. Kealey and G. Patmore, eds., Canadian and Australian Labour
History: Towards A Comparative Perspective (Sydney 1990), 81-100. In
Australia, state and federal governments also played a crucial role in
supporting employers during significant industrial campaigns in the
1890s, 1917 and 1928-9, see Waters, Strikes, 124, 126-7.
(64) Heron and Storey, On the Job, 9; E. Fry, "Outwork in the
Eighties: An Examination of Outwork in the Infant Industries of the
Eastern Australian Colonies, c. 1880-90," University Studies in
History and Politics, 2 (1956), 77-93; Frances, The Politics of Work,
chs. 1 and 2.
(65) For details of such craft control in the Canadian context see
Palmer, Working-Class Experience, 60-135. For Australian examples see
Patmore, Australian Labour History, 56-8 and N. Butlin, "Collective
Bargaining in the Sydney Printing Industry, 1880-1900," Economic
Record, 23 (1947), 206-26.
(66) For an Australian perspective on the new industries and
management control see C. Wright, "The Formative Years of
Management Control at the Newcastle Steelworks, 1913-1924," Labour
History, 55 (1988), 55-7 and G. Patmore, "American Hustling
Methods' -- The Lithgow Small Arms Factory 1912-1922," Labour
History, 67, 1994. For the US influence in Canada see Marshall et al.,
Canadian-American Industry and Heron, "New Factory Regime,"
15.
(67) For details of the international impact of the US automotive
industry see D. Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory
System in the US 1880-1920 (Madison 1975), 23-5 and E. Layton, "The
Diffusion of Scientific Management and Mass Production From the US in
the Twentieth Century," XIVth International Congress of the History
of Science (Tokyo 1974), 380-1. The early years of the Australian auto
industry are detailed in Forster, Industrial Development, 38-47 and
Sutterby, "Workers and the Rise of Mass Production: Holden's
in the 1920s and 1930s," BA (Hons) thesis, School of Social
Sciences, Flinders University, 1981. For details on the Canadian auto
industry and labour control see J. Manley, "Communists and Auto
Workers: The Struggle for Industrial Unionism in the Canadian Automobile
Industry, 1925-36," Labour/Le Travail, 17 (1986), 107-11.
(68) F. Taylor, Scientific Management (New York 1947), 46-60; C.
Littler, "Understanding Taylorism," British Journal of
Sociology, 29 (1978), 189-92; M. Rose, Industrial Behaviour: Theoretical
Development Since Taylor (Harmondsworth 1978), 31-41.
(69) For examples of scientific management in Canada see M.
McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919-39," Canadian
Historical Review, 71 (1990), 63-4 and G. Lowe, "The Rise of Modern
Management in Canada," Canadian Dimension, 14 (1979), 35-6.
Australian examples of scientific management are outlined in Patmore,
Australian Labour History, 148 and C. Wright, The Management of Labour:
A History of Australian Employers (Melbourne 1995), ch. 1.
(70) One of the leading exponents of scientific management during
the inter-war period was the French-born American, Charles Bedaux. For
details on the impact of the Bedaux consultancy during this period see
S. Kreis, "The Diffusion of Scientific Management: The Bedaux
Company in America and Britain, 1926-1945," in D. Nelson, ed., A
Mental Revolution: Scientific Management Since Taylor (Colombus 1992),
156-74; C. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist
Societies (Aldershot 1986), 105-15; and C. Wright, "The Management
Consultant and the Introduction of Scientific Management in Australian
Industry," in M. Bray and D. Kelly, eds., Issues and Trends in
Australian Industrial Relations (Sydney 1989), 229, 232.
(71) Advisory Council of Science and Industry, Industrial
Co-operation in Australia (Melbourne 1920), 6.
(72) For Australian examples see G. Reekie, "'Humanising
Industry': Paternalism, Welfarism and Labour Control in
Sydney's Big Stores, 1890-1930," Labour History, 53 (1987),
1-19 and "Making Little Things in a Big Way," Australasian
Manufacturer (AM), 20 April 1935, 158, 168. For a Canadian example see
J. Sangster, "The Softball Solution: Female Workers, Male Managers
and the Operation of Paternalism at Westclox, 1923-60," Labour/Le
Travail, 32 (1993), 167-99. The link between welfarism and workforce
gender has also been noted in the US context, see S. Jacoby, Employing
Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions and the Transformation of Work in American
Industry, 1900-1945 (New York 1985), 51-2.
(73) R. Storey, "Unionization Versus Corporate Welfare: The
`Dofasco Way,"' Labour/Le Travailleur, 12 (1983), 7-42.
(74) Patmore, Australian Labour History, 147, 150; P. Russell,
"The Response of Management Policy to the Industrial Conditions of
the Later World War One and Reconstruction Era, 1917-1921," BEC
Hons. thesis, Department of Industrial Relations, University of Sydney,
1985, 32-45.
(75) Lowe, "Rise of Modern Management," 33-4; B. Scott,
"A Place in the Sun: the Industrial Council at Massey-Harris,
1919-29," Labour/Le Travailleur, 1 (1976). For details of state
advocacy for joint consultation in Australia see Patmore, Australian
Labour History, 147.
(76) For examples of Australian company unionism see Patmore,
Australian Labour History, 149; Patmore, "'American Hustling
Methods,"' and Wright, "The Formative Years of Management
Control," 64-7. The links between joint consultation and company
unionism are emphasized from a Canadian perspective in McCallum,
"Corporate Welfarism," 57-61.
(77) Government and management interest in such schemes increased
markedly in Australia and Canada following the 1917 New South Wales General Strike and the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. See Patmore,
Australian Labour History, 146-50, and McCallum, "Corporate
Welfarism," 46-7 and 59.
(78) Wright, Management of Labour, ch. 1; Heron, "New Factory
Regime," 22. Interestingly, the limits of scientific management as
shopfloor practice have also been highlighted in the US context, see, D.
Nelson, "Scientific Management and the Workplace, 1920-1935,"
in S. Jacoby, ed., Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives on American Employers (New York 1991), 74-89.
(79) F. Mauldon, "Cooperation and Welfare in Industry,"
in D. Copland, ed., "An Economic Survey of Australia," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November
1931, 184-7; Lowe, "Rise of Modern Management," 32-3, 38;
McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism," 53; Sangster, "Softball
Solution," 171.
(80) Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 24 (1931).
Canadian and US figures from Heron, "New Factory Regime,"
19-20.
(81) T. Sheridan, Mindful Militants: the Amalgamated Engineering
Union in Australia 1920-1970 (Melbourne 1975), 86-7.
(82) F. Mauldon, Mechanisation in Australian Industries (Hobart
1938).
(83) J. Shields, "Capital, Craft Unions and Metal Trades
Apprenticeship in NSW Prior to World War II," in D. Cottle, ed.,
Capital Essays (Kensington 1984), 13-5; Sheridan, Mindful Militants,
102-9; S. Cockfield, "Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace
Relations: Metal Industry Developments in the 1920s," Journal of
Industrial Relations, 35 (1993), 26-33; 25 Commonwealth Arbitration
Reports (CAR) 364 and 28 CAR 923;J.Shields, "Skill Reclaimed: Craft
Work, Craft Unions and the Survival of Apprenticeship in New South
Wales, 1860-1914," PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1990, 412-6.
(84) Edwards, Contested Terrain, 52-4.
(85) Sutterby, "Workers and the Rise of Mass Production,"
79-80; Wright, "The Formative Years," 56-7. Patmore's
study of the Lithgow Small Arms Factory also highlights how batch
production and the simple control of the foreman prevailed over more
modern techniques of flow production and time study, see Patmore,
"American Hustling Methods."
(86) Anon., "Steelworker 1928," BHP Journal, 2 1978,
54-5.
(87) The practical limitations of scientific management were
pronounced amongst firms engaged in batch production. McCallum cites the
example of the Knechtel Furniture Company in Hanover, Ontario which
dispensed with its scientific management system after two years of
experimentation, see McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism," 63.
(88) P. Cochrane, "Anatomy of a Steel Works: The Australian
Iron and Steel Company Port Kembla, 1935-1939," Labour History, 57
(1989), 67-8; R. Tierney, "The Australian Automotive Industry,
1939-1965: A Sociological Study of Some Aspects of State Intervention,
Managerial Control and Trade Union Organization," PhD thesis,
Macquarie University, 1991, 85-6. The casual nature of employment was
also prominent in stevedoring, see Walker, Australian Industrial
Relations Systems, 372.
(89) McCallum notes for example, that by 1937 the chief means of
labour recruitment for most Canadian employers remained the arbitrary
selection of workers at the factory gate, see McCallum, "Corporate
Welfarism," 65.
(90) Cochrane, "Anatomy of a Steelworks," 68-9; C.
Wright, "Management Strategies of Control over Labour at the BHP
Newcastle Steelworks, 1915-1924," BEC (Hons) thesis, University of
Sydney, 1985, 32 and 78.
(91) The impact of World War I in modernizing Canadian
manufacturing is noted by Heron, "New Factory Regime," 18. For
the Australian experience see Boehm, Twentieth Century Economic
Development, 164-5.
(92) An Employment Managers' Association was formed in Toronto
in 1919 modelled closely on a similar US body. By contrast it was not
until 1943 that a similar professional body of personnel and welfare
officers was formed in Australia. See Lowe, "Rise of Modern
Management," 32; McCallum, "Corporate Welfarism," 47; and
C. Wright, "Employment, Selection and Training Procedures in
Australian Manufacturing, 1940-1960," Journal of Industrial
Relations, 33 (1991), 178-95.
(93) A study by Laloux found 28 companies in Canada and 17 in
Australia using the Bedaux system in the late 1930s. This compared with
500 companies in the US, 225 in Britain, and 144 in France. See P.
Laloux, Le Systeme Bedaux Calcul Des Salaires (Paris 1951), 11, quoted
in Littler, Development of the Labour Process, 113. For details on the
post World War II dissemination of scientific management in Australia
see Wright, "The Management Consultant."
(94) Patmore, Australian Labour History, 149-50.
(95) Examples of victimization, black-lists, and anti-unionism were
common in the steel, clothing, and pastoral industries, see Cochrane,
"Anatomy of a Steelworks," 69-70, 77; Wright, "The
Formative Years," 69; Frances, The Politics of Work, 86, 96-8 and
Tsokhas, "The Shearing Labour Process," 94. For details of the
state's role in disciplining labour see Waters, Strikes, 124,
126-7.
(96) Sheridan, Mindful Militants, 54, 103-5 and K. Tsokhas,
"Work Practices, Technological Change and Sheet Metal Workers,
1929-1970," Prometheus, 7 (1989), 225-38.
(97) For examples of labour disputation over scientific management
practices in Canadian industry see McCallum, "Corporate
Welfarism," 63-4 and Manley, "Communists and Auto
Workers," 117-8.
(98) Australian workplace trade union organization remained highly
variable during this period, see M. Rimmer and P. Sutcliffe, "The
Origins of Australian Workshop Organisation, 1918 to 1950," Journal
of Industrial Relations, 23 (1981), 216-39.