Parmenides.
White, David Gordon
Heidegger, Martin. Parmenides. Translated by A. Schuwer and R.
Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992. xv + 170 pp.
$29.95--This work is a translation of volume 54 of the Heidegger
Gesamtausgabe. The original German volume is the text of a lecture
course given from 1942 to 1943 at Freiburg and amended by Heidegger
before its publication in 1982. The translators provide a brief Foreword
with background and examples illustrating their principles of
translation. The translation itself is well done, accurate, and clear.
The organization of this volume is complex, and is explained
briefly in an editor's afterword. The work is divided into an
Introduction and two parts. Each part is divided into sections and each
section includes "recapitulations." In these summaries
Heidegger repeats the main points of the section, but he often develops
ideas unanalyzed in the section proper. Depending on one's
sympathies with Heidegger's project, the repetition in these
portions of the work will be found either tiresome or usefully
reinforcing.
The title of the Introduction indicates that Heidegger is offering
a meditation (Besinnung) on Parmenides' poem. The meditation begins
with a reflection on lines 22-32 of the first part, particularly
Parmenides' reference to "the goddess." Heidegger rejects
the prevailing view, that this use of deity is only a mythic prelude to
"abstract" (Heidegger's word) philosophizing. Instead,
Heidegger asserts that when Parmenides appeals to the goddess, he refers
to truth: "|the truth'--itself--is the goddess" (p. 5).
This identification sanctions Heidegger's development of a
four-part series of "directives" based on the primacy of the
notion of truth in Parmenides' poem. Part 1 of the lecture series
is devoted to the first three directives: truth is concealment;
unconcealedness "indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment
and is in conflict with it" (p. 26); unconcealedness refers to a
realm of "oppositions" in which truth stands. The brief Part 2
concerns the fourth directive: the open space of the clearing of Being.
In neither of these parts does Heidegger analyze the sections of the
poem generally thought to contain its most philosophically important
themes, the Way of Truth and the Way of Seeming.
Since it is axiomatic for Heidegger that truth is historical and
that philosophy and poetry are frequently allied pursuits, the ways in
which Heidegger develops the four directives range far and wide: the
figures treated include Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Descartes,
Leibniz, Anaximander, Nietzsche, Burckhardt, Schelling, Homer, Hesiod,
Theogonis, Kierkegaard, Grimm, Livy, Spengler, Fichte, Pindar,
Schopenhauer, Holderlin, Herder, Sophocles, and Rilke. Heidegger's
approach to this diversity of subjects depends, in large measure, on
deriving meanings from a number of Greek words consonant with his
reading of the history of truth (and a fortiori, the history of
philosophy and poetry). As a result, the reader must be prepared for
many of Heidegger's etymological reflections.
The central themes concerning truth advanced in this volume have
already appeared in a number of texts published around or after the time
these lectures were given. Heidegger frequently illuminates phenomena
unconsidered in these works, however, or adds detail to figures or
notions he has already examined. We find an instance of the latter in
the remarks on the myth of Er in the Republic (pp. 97-9), and of the
former in an incisive treatment of handwriting and the leveling effect of technology's way of expediting handwriting--for example,
"the typewriter makes everyone look the same" (p. 81).
In view of the current interest in Heidegger's connections
with the Nazis, one may wonder whether these lectures add to our
awareness of how Heidegger saw the wartime situation in the land of
"poets and thinkers" (a phrase Heidegger uses several times).
Heidegger generally ignores current events, here and elsewhere; but
toward the end of the final lecture, he says that "a moment of
history is approaching, whose uniqueness is by no means determined
simply, or at all, on the basis of the current situation of the world
and of our own history in it" (p. 162). This may be a veiled
allusion to Germany's position in World War II, but Heidegger then
adds that what is at stake in this regard are only "beings";
the decisive question is, "How are beings supposed to be saved and
secured . . . if the essence of Being is undecided, unquestioned, and
even forgotten?" (p. 162).
On the whole, this work is a useful supplement for understanding
Heidegger's desire to question "the meaning of Being."