Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 85, No. 1, March 2007.

Abell, Catherine ; Dilworth, John ; Ney, Alyssa 等

Pictorial Realism, CATHARINE ABELL

In this paper the author proposes a number of criteria for the adequacy of an account of pictorial realism. Such an account must: explain the epistemic significance of realistic pictures; explain why accuracy and detail are salient to realism; be consistent with an accurate account of depiction; and explain the features of pictorial realism. She identifies six features of pictorial realism. She then proposes an account of realism as a measure of the information pictures provide about how their objects would look, were one to see them. This account meets the criteria which she has identified and is superior to alternative accounts of realism.

In Support of Content Theories of Art, JOHN DILWORTH

A content theory of art would identify an artwork with the meaningful or representational content of some concrete artistic vehicle, such as the intentional, expressive, stylistic, and subject matter-related content embodied in, or resulting from, acts of intentional artistic expression by artists. Perhaps surprisingly, the resultant view that an artwork is nothing but content seems to have been without theoretical defenders until very recently, leaving a significant theoretical gap in the literature.

In this paper Dilworth presents some basic arguments in defence of such a view, including the following. Content views of linguistic communication are ubiquitous, so why should they not be applicable in artistic cases as well? Also, propositional accounts of language involve two kinds of content (the proposition expressed by a sentence, plus the worldly state of affairs it represents), both of which kinds can be used in explaining artworks. In addition, the differing modal properties of artworks and concrete artefacts can be used to show that artworks could not be, or include, such physical artefacts.

Physicalism and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties, ALYSSA NEY

This paper examines recent arguments by Rae Langton and David Lewis intended to prove Humility: the thesis that we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. Ney argues that at best, these arguments are internally incoherent. They at once presuppose a strong version of physicalism according to which physical science is in a position to give a complete list of the fundamental properties of reality, and at the same time various metaphysical principles which in actuality challenge the completeness of the list of properties given by science. Although these arguments are unsound, their consideration enables us to draw important conclusions regarding the tension between the metaphysician's practice of positing intrinsic properties that give colour to the world, and the scientific attempt at giving a complete account of all phenomena.

The Co-Instantiation Thesis, ANN WHITTLE

The co-instantiation thesis is pivotal to a significant solution to the problem of causal exclusion. But this thesis has been subject to some powerful objections. In this paper, Ann Whittle argues that these difficulties arise because the thesis lacks the necessary metaphysical framework in which its claims should be interpreted and understood. Once this framework is in place, we see that the co-instantiation thesis can answer its critics. The result is a rehabilitated co-instantiation solution to the troubling problem of causal exclusion. But questions remain concerning the viability of certain of its applications.

Causes and Probability-Raisers of Processes, SUNGHO CHOI

Schaffer proposes a new account of probabilistic causation that synthesizes the probability-raising and process-linkage views on causation. The driving idea of Schaffer's account is that, although an effect does not invariably depend on its cause, a process linked to the effect does. In this paper, however, Choi will advance counterexamples to Schaffer's account and then demonstrate that Schaffer's possible responses to them do not work. Finally, he will argue that his counterexamples suggest that the driving idea of Schaffer's account is misdirected.

Computational Modeling vs. Computational Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter to the Philosophy of Mind?, GUALTIERO PICCININI

According to pancomputationalism, everything is a computing system. In this paper, the author distinguishes between different varieties of pancomputationalism. He finds that although some varieties are more plausible than others, only the strongest variety is relevant to the philosophy of mind, but only the most trivial varieties are true. As a side effect of this exercise, he offers a clarified distinction between computational modeling and computational explanation.

Descriptions: Predicates or Quantifiers?, BERIT BROGAARD

In this paper the author revisits the main arguments for a predicate analysis of descriptions in order to determine whether they do in fact undermine Russell's theory. He argues that while the arguments without doubt provide powerful evidence against Russell's original theory it is far from clear that they tell against a quantificational account of descriptions.

Remembering Without Knowing, SVEN BERNECKER

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.