Government incentives directed towards foreign direct investment: a case of Central and Eastern Europe/Uzsienio investiciju intensyvinimo priemoniu taikymo rytu ir Centrineje Europoje analize.
Ginevicius, Romualdas ; Simelyte, Agne
Introduction
The rapid growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in many
developing and transition countries suggests that inward FDI has come to
play a more significant role than it did some decades ago. This economic
evolution has been accompanied by a political shift in the perception of
FDI: an overwhelming part of the developing countries and countries in
transition have abandoned the Marxian and post-Marxian paradigm, which
demonised FDI, and adopted friendly political behaviour towards foreign
investors (Pradham 2008). Most countries have introduced FDI attraction
incentives. The primary aim of these incentives is to create a friendly
business environment where foreign investors feel comfortable with the
legal and financial framework of the country and have the potential to
reap profit from economically viable businesses. The gradual increase in
foreign investment values since the 1980s has encouraged governments to
take measures to attract FDI. In many cases, governments compete to
attract foreign investors. The attraction of foreign direct investments
is often underlined as a precondition for a successful economic venue by
most governments of less developed countries (Zilinske 2010). Therefore,
as the number of developing countries increases, competition for FDI
tends to spread as well. The incentive measures make it possible for
international companies to integrate into the local market, to expand
production by using local labour, land and capital. However, foreign
direct investment is becoming a "battleground" for new markets
even in some developed countries. Developed countries are also seeking
to attract more FDI. This is particularly visible in the
capital-intensive industries. Incentives increase the flow of incoming
FDI and maximize their return on a host country and foreign investors.
To meet the operational needs of investors, the government often seeks
to improve internal infrastructure of the country.
Before making a decision on foreign investment, investors compare
countries among themselves. Foreign investors seek a predictable
business environment in which they can make rapid decisions. A
favourable business environment usually includes a sufficiently stable
economy and a stable political system. Although scientists believe that
FDI inflows usually depend on fiscal stimulus the retrospective
empirical analysis has shown that fiscal incentives increase corporate
profits and inward FDI (Goolsbee 1997; Peters, Fisher 2004; Rosenboim et
al. 2008; Miyagiwa, Ohno 2008; Havranek, Irsova 2010). A properly
selected investment measure promotes the injection of FDI and stimulates
the growth of a host country's economy.
At present, information development agencies (further--IDA) become
more and more popular. The main objectives of IDAs are to create an
attractive image of the country's global market by providing
information to investors about the country. A positive image of a
country created by IDA is usually directed towards a sensitive public
sector, which requires the injection of investment. However, the
efficiency is only visible in attraction of FDI in supported business
sectors (Wells, Wint 2000). In different regions governments have
different promotion mechanisms because incentives are often defined in
multi-lateral or bilateral agreements. On the other hand, these
agreements usually restrict access to the local intensification
measures. Economic zones like the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN affect FDI
intensity promotion among its member countries. However, not all
countries comply with international agreements and the intensification
of measures (Mah, Tamulaitis 2000). After joining the EU zone, Central
and Eastern European countries became more attractive to the investors
from the EU (Tamosiuniene et al. 2007).
The aim of the article is to determine the major factors of FDI
which are the most influenced by government incentives in Central and
Eastern Europe. The article answers the question what direction
governments choose to take to increase the FDI intensity. For
methodological purposes, the paper is divided into three parts. The
first part explores scientific literature on FDI incentives. The second
characterizes the main determinants of the inflows of FDI. Finally, the
last part describes the empirical analysis of FDI intensity.
2. Theoretical review of FDI incentives
2.1. Role of government incentives on FDI flows
It is difficult to establish the definitions of investment
incentives and disincentives as these concepts vary according to the
context in which they are used. Economists Peter and Fisher (2004)
highlight that the boundaries of business incentives are not always
clear. Thus, the disincentive in one region can be regarded as an
incentive in a different area of a business or a branch. In literature,
investment incentives are defined as, for example, "support"
(Morisset, Andrews-Johnson 2008; Well, Wint 2000),
"incentives," "initiative" as well as
"promotion". However, these concepts can only partially be
used as synonyms. Promotion is understood as an indirect factor in
determining the attraction of investments into one country. According to
Wells and Wint (2000), promotion is activity spreading information about
an investment-friendly climate or attempting to create a positive image
of the country and provide investment services to potential investors,
which can be defined as non-financial investment incentives. A more
flexible concept allows more insight into the various investment
incentives. This approach includes measures, which can at least
indirectly determine the future profitability of investments and the
potential risks that may affect investors' plans. In addition,
indirect incentive measures benefit to economic factors, such as market
size, competitive advantage, relative price stability, and
socio-political factors. In general, an incentive is understood as any
government measure designed to influence an investment decision, or have
the effect of increasing the profit, even if these measures do not make
direct influence. The measures of investment cover investment incentives
as well as disincentives. According to academic literature, incentives
can be classified into fiscal (such as accelerated depreciation,
preferential tax rates, and tax exemption and tax credits, including the
measures relating to social security contributions and investment
reserves); financial measures (such as grants, preferential loans and
loan guarantees); non-financial measures (such as promotion, information
providing agencies, infrastructure-related assistance, preferential
government contracts the provision of certain services, and the
establishment of free-trade, enterprise and technology zones).
Disincentives include trade-related investment measures, which have
disincentive effects, and other disincentives and conditions linked to
incentive awards. At the same time foreign investment incentives are
ambiguous. In addition, some scientists believe that business incentives
should be banned (Burstein, Rolnick 1995). Many scientists pay major
attention to fiscal measures, which are estimated controversially
(Goolsbee 1997; Head et al. 1999; Morisset, Pirnia 2000; Hubert, Pain
2002; Peters, Fisher 2004; Adomoniene, Trifonova 2007; Rosenboim et al.
2008). Specific changes in tax system are based on the broader
incentives, reduced tax rates or eliminating certain cases, as well as
the settlement of debts. Generally, fiscal measures are designed to
encourage investment in various business sectors. Fiscal incentives
include narrower policy goals: promotion of regional development,
R&D, development, investment, the business sector problem. Pirnia
and Morisset (2001) note that the fiscal measures may have both:
positive and negative impacts on a country. However, these researchers
doubt about the effectiveness of such measures to attract FDI. Even if
the application of fiscal incentives attracts FDI, the reduced tax rate
of multinational companies (further--MNCs) may bring exceptional losses
to the state budget. Therefore, according to Peters and Fisher (2004) it
can be argued that fiscal measures would encourage economic growth.
Rosenboim (2008), in contrast to some scientists (Pirnia, Morisset 2001;
Peters, Fisher 2004), believes that the most significant incentives are
grants because they have the long-term affect on MNCs decisions to make
investments. Fiscal and financial incentives offered to foreign
investors may do more harm than good by giving rise to costly
"bidding wars" (Ruane 2008). Thus, fiscal and financial
measures may cause only short-term positive effect in attracting FDI as
MNCs tend to "move" their capital and select business-friendly
environment. Saggi (1999) notes that MNCs invest in a country, which
provides various forms of incentives: (for example, tax incentives, such
as lower taxes on foreign investors, financial incentives, such as
grants and confessional loans to multinational corporations, as well as
other incentives, such as market needs and monopoly rights). It can not
be said that the subsidy has a positive influence on the development of
economy. In some countries, the subsidies of MNCs distort the
competitiveness of country's business. Nevertheless, future
revenues depend on the productivity in a host country and the efficiency
of the FDI inflows. Information on the level of productivity may be
available either to a host country or the MNCs. Symmetric information
plays a major role in the process of choosing an optimal set of
incentives. When there is complete information on the reliability of a
foreign company as well as on the efficiency of a host country, the
specific type of incentive (grant or a tax relief) is of little
importance to both the country and the MNCs. However, the lack of
information on productivity, the mix of grant and tax relief are
important and has the major impact on the MNCs' and the
country's decision. In that case, a government fears that a foreign
company will exploit a one-time grant, will terminate its investment and
leave a country within a short time span. On the other hand, a
government may fear that a substantial tax relief will lead to
exaggerated benefits for the MNCs when profits are high. Hence, a
foreign company that invests in a project may worry that a host country
will not fulfil future commitments for a tax relief (Ginevicius,
Tvaronaviciene 2004). In this case, a foreign company is already
'bound' to a country by the sunk costs, and switching to
another site is not relevant (Rutkauskas et al. 2008). Therefore, under
risk aversion and increasing risk, the MNCs prefer a one-time grant,
whereas countries prefer tax relief to subsidy.
2.2. Determinants of FDI and Models of Incentives
FDI, its determinants and its effects have been extensively
studied. FDI can be beneficial to a host country. For example, it
includes knowledge and technology transfer to domestic firms, labour
force, productivity spillovers, enhanced competition and improved access
for exports, notably to the source country, as well as provides a
significant non debt-creating source of foreign financing. Two channels
by which FDIs lead to a higher productivity of a host country have been
clearly identified in literature: the competition channel and the
knowledge and technology spillovers channel (Ruane 2008). Hence, large
foreign companies can--and often do--abuse their dominant market
positions, sometimes coax concessions from country governments in return
for locating investment there, and aggressively use transfer pricing in
order to minimize their tax obligations (Demekas et al. 2007). Usually,
MNCs select a country for more favourable tax incentives on business
creation and market openness. For example, Vernon used the H-O
(Heckscher-Ohlin) model as a base in order to develop his model of a
product cycle, which explains the foreign activities of MNCs. According
to the widely known OLI (ownership, location, internalisation)
framework, firm-specific factors concern competitive advantages in a
multinational corporation and commercial benefits in an intra-firm
relationship (as against an arm's-length relationship, e.g.,
between an exporting company and an importing counterpart). Singh and
Jun (1995) conclude that a broad consensus on the major determinants of
FDI has been elusive. Lately, Dunning (2008) has identified four types
of motives behind the FDI activities of MNCs. These motives are
resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking (Table 1).
Hence, whether a country has higher wages or other advantages--lower
productivity, competitive wage rates that prevail in a country ensure
that every country will specialize in the good having a comparative
advantage (Bernatonyte, Normantiene 2007).
The asset-seeking FDI is the most recent motive for FDI to be
identified. It refers to a strategy that aims to access and exploit
technological assets in overseas countries. The assets--seeking MNCs
focus on the availability of a skilled labour, research institutes, and
a large supply of a graduated labour (Cegyte, Miecinskiene 2009;
Dumludag 2009). Later academic literature states that MNCs are being
attracted by newly introduced liberal FDI regimes in a host country. As
a result, the liberalisation of FDI regulations may be characterised by
diminishing returns. However, developing countries, which are not taking
part in market liberalization process, are likely to suffer the negative
effects of restrictive policies on FDI inflows. Hence, a liberal FDI
regime does little more than enabling MNCs to invest in a host country.
It is a completely different question whether FDI will actually be
forthcoming as a result of FDI liberalisation (Fig. 1). In addition,
privatisation goes along with trade liberalisation and competition
policies (Demekas et al. 2007).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
2.3. Models of FDI incentives
In addition, a number of models have been developed for examining
FDI incentives and their efficiencies. Barros and Cabral (2000) examined
the influence of the size of a country and its unemployment rate on the
incentives given to MNCs. According to their model, subsidy competition
may lead to an optimal FDI location, whereas a policy of no subsidy may
distort it. Two reasons can support this proposition. First, the
competition among countries compels them to commit to improving their
respective infrastructure and macroeconomic system. Secondly,
competition can bring an optimal allocation of FDI to those countries,
which benefit more from FDI incentives (Ruane 2008). Kaplan et al.
(2003) studied the influence of information on the optimal mix of a
fixed grant and a tax relief that is offered to MNCs. They showed that
in equilibrium, competing countries tend to use grants as the main tool
to attract FDI. Many studies directed to FDI incentives analyze fiscal
incentives. Pirnia and Morisset (2001) examined the costs of fiscal
incentives. They found that even if tax incentives were quite effective
in increasing investment flows, the costs would outweigh the benefits.
Hubert and Pain (2002) make a point that fiscal incentives may also be
used as strategic instruments if agglomeration economies mean that the
entry of individual forms is subsequently matched to other countries.
Thus, the temporary advantages gained by the first mover may have a
permanent impact on further investment. Equally, unilateral abolition of
incentives can result in significant costs (Head et al. 1999). Peters
and Fisher (2004) emphasized the main reasons that cause difficulties
for a state in gaining revenue through a typical incentive package.
According to their studies, incentives are more likely to influence the
location of investment among closely matched local areas (such as
neighbouring cities) than among states. For that reason, it is obvious
that the cities, which use incentives, may benefit fiscally from
beggaring their neighbours, but states will often end up paying the
costs.
Thus, only two different government incentive policies towards FDI
have been successfully established. The first one is the Irish model
which is based on the export strategy. Ireland is unusual in the extent
to which it has consistently promoted export-platform inward investment
into the manufacturing sector for over four decades. Irish policy makers
adopted a sophisticated system of selectivity for influencing the
pattern of MNC investment. Hence, Ireland has benefited from the
increased scale of a global FDI by introducing a more fiscally- and
financially-welcoming environment than other countries in Europe.
Ireland has benefited from Vernon's product cycle in becoming a
low-cost manufacturing base within Europe for maturing US enterprises,
which were already exporting new products to the growing European
market. In such an environment Ireland has been an attractive base with
its original tax-holiday incentives designed to make it an export
platform (Rugraff 2008).
The second FDI model has been successfully established by the
following countries: Taiwan, Korea and China (TKC model). The TKC and
the Irish models promote an exportled strategy by opening a country for
FDI. The Irish model has created friendlier environment than the TKC
model. The TKC model involves more constraints for MNCs. In conformity
with cultural differences, TKC model was directed to promote national
priorities and the emergence of competitive indigenous firms. China has
become an attractive location for FDI because of its rapidly growing
domestic market and as a low-cost export platform. Capital market
liberalisation and extension into China are likely to raise exports of
domestic firms and to reduce FDI in favour of inward licensing. Contrary
to TKC, India has introduced more flexible FDI incentives. Following
Ireland, India has switched from a protectionist regime to a more open
one. Indian patterns of inward FDI reflect this diversity
(Balasubramanyam, Mahambare 2003).
Central European countries have been successful in attracting FDI
since the middle of the 1990s, but they have failed to create
spillovers' effects from MNCs' activity. The lack of
spillovers effects can be attributed, to a large extent, to the adoption
of the Irish model to Central and Eastern European countries. In Central
Europe this model has had numerous positive effects, such as the
creation of foreign-owned firms in the high-technology industries, the
integration of the countries into the world trade, and the creation of a
new comparative advantage. The transfer of technology can trigger and
speed up economic development. Newly introduced technologies facilitate
the production of goods, increase the volume of export and improve
efficiency of manufacturing. MNCs possess the bulk of patents worldwide
(Seckute, Tvaronavicius 2007). Most of the world's R&D takes
place within MNCs. Moreover, MNCs possess many of the technologies that
are pivotal to an economic and industrial development (Buckley, Ruane
2006). The state's absence in the guidance of FDI in Central Europe
has given MNCs a total freedom in the organisation of their activity.
MNCs have taken various advantages that they were offered, such as the
opportunity to buy the best privatised firms or to develop the intensity
of intra-MNC trade-without being obliged to develop the interaction with
a local environment in order to contribute to the creation of
competitive indigenous firms. According to Bernatonyte and Normantiene
(2007), trade in differentiated products is most likely to take place
between countries with similar markets.
Notwithstanding the successful beginning of the attraction of FDI,
Central and Eastern European countries (further CEEC) have not created
successful FDI incentive mechanisms. On the whole, CEEC have opened
their economies and attracted FDI through privatisation process.
Privatization-related FDI inflows can be high in volume, but they are
lumpy and time-bound (Tvaronaviciene, Kalasinskaite 2005). It
represented the bulk of FDI in Central and Eastern European economies in
the early years of transition. Anyway, the privatization process is
already essentially completed in many of these economies. Hence, the
ability of these countries to attract a non-privatization-related FDI is
increasingly becoming a focus of policymakers. Since CEEC sustain
nationalism, these countries are more closely related to the TKC model
than to the Irish one. However, many studies refer to economic
fundamentals and political stability as the primary determinants of
FDIs, with FDI incentives being a consideration only at the margin
(Ruane 2008). Morisset and Pirnia (2001) conclude that "incentives
will generally neither make up for serious deficiencies in the
investment environment nor generate the desired externalities. The most
serious investors are often unaware of the full range of incentives on
offer when they invest". Of course, Central and Eastern European
countries have managed to pass just two stages of an FDI incentive
policy. The first stage--liberalizing trade and opening economies--has
been successfully implemented in almost all countries. After the
transition from the planned economy to the liberalized one, Central and
Eastern European countries have attracted large amounts of FDI.
3. Research methodology and data
The survey covers the intensity of FDI among twelve countries
during the period of 2000-2009. The study is based on the
Eurostat's data. The countries of this study are the following:
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. During the empirical
study some difficulties and ambiguities of the intensity and
determinants of FDI were discovered. For that reason, some data was also
used from UNSTAD and OECD. In addition, seven main determinants were
chosen for the examination of the structural relationship of the
determinant and intensity of FDI. The host country's per-capita
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP growth rate were chosen as the
measures of a host market's attractiveness and size. The market
size and growth of a host country are the most determinant factors
governing inward FDI (Bennell 1997; Dunning 1977; Lim 2008;
Tvaronaviciene et al. 2008). This statement is supported by many
empirical studies (Jun, Singh 1996; Root, Ahmed 1979; Schneider, Frey
1985; Tvaronaviciene, Tvaronavicius 2006). Tvaronaviciene and Grybaite
(2007) found that GDP per-capita of a host country is an important
factor determining FDI. The difference between the size of GDP and its
growth rate is most commonly used in literature as a proxy of market
attractiveness. Clegg (1995) argues that the former one is more likely
to be associated with a new investment while the latter one is more
relevant to expansionary FDI. The hypothesis of the growth of FDI
maintains that a rapidly growing market provides relatively better
opportunities for making profits than the markets that grow slowly or do
not grow at all. Although, Torrisi et al. (2008) identified that market
size and growth are the critical determinants of FDI in CEEC, their
analysis of empirical studies provided quite controversial results.
Torrisi et al. (2008) highlighted that the market size was the most
important factor in attracting FDI. In contrast to Torrisi et al.
(2008), Holland and Pain (1998) did not find any importance of market
size for attracting FDI. Other studies, however, have found a negative
relationship between GDP growth and per capita FDI flows to developing
countries (Wint, Williams 2002; Lim 2008; Tvaronaviciene, Kalasinskaite
2005). Accordingly, these studies were agnostic in respect of
expectations for change in GDP growth rate (Lim 2008). Not to mention
that, foreign trade reflects openness on inward FDI (Degutis,
Tvaronaviciene 2006).
According to the classical theories of FDI, labour costs are one
the most important determinants of FDI. Some proving remarks are
possible to discover in academic literature. As Torrisi et al. (2008)
noticed, wages were a primary decisive factor for Lankes and Venables
(1997) while Althzinger (1999) maintains that wages are only a secondary
determinant. Some scholars focus on wage differences between the host
and home countries, and claim that wage differences are the most
significant determinants of FDI in CEEC. Even more, Benacek et al.
(2000) states that higher labour costs have a negative effect on higher
FDI inflows. However, Mervelede and Choors (2004) maintain that relative
unit labour costs were significant only if their importance was allowed
to increase over time (Torrisi et al. 2008). Another determining factor
is emphasized in classical literature is market openness, which is
expressed as export and import ratio in the host country. Thus, market
openness as significant determinant emphasized by Torrisi et al. (2008)
and Lim (2008). Degutis and Tvaronaviciene (2006) emphasize wage rate
and labour productivity as determining factors of FDI. Another
independent variable is inflation. It is defined as a risk factor which
limits FDI flows into the host country. However, empirical literature
provides even more risk factors. For example, such factors as government
stability, internal and external conflict, corruption, ethnic tension
and law and order, democratic accountability of government and quality
of bureaucracy were highly significant determinants of FDI (Holland,
Pain 1998; Torrisi et al. 2008). Anyway, risk factors are to be found as
stimulating factors of FDI inflows (Brada et al. 2006). Previous FDI
flows, as an independent variable, stand as a factor determining a
friendly business environment (Demekas et al. 2007).
3.1. Model and variables
A model was designed according to the empirical literature. A
dependent factor is the intensity of FDI, which is expressed in a
relationship to a market growth, labour costs, market openness,
inflation and friendly business environment. The survey examines twelve
countries over the period of 2000-2009. Here is assumed that the
dependable variable is the ratio of FDI intensity. FDI depends on market
growth, labour costs, market openness, inflation and previous FDI flows.
y ([FDI.sub.intensity]) = f(Market growth; Labour costs; Market
openness; Inflation; FDI flows). y([FDI.sub.intensity, it]) = x +
[[beta].sub.1]([Market growth.sub.it]) + [[beta].sub.2]([Labour
costs.sub.it]) + [[beta].sub.2]([Market openness.sub.it]) +
[[beta].sub.2]([Inflation.sub.it]) + [[beta].sub.2]([FDI flows.sub.it])
+ [[epsilon].sub.it], (2)
where i--number of countries to be observed i = 1.... 12, t =
2000.... 2009.
Market growth is measured as a growth rate of GDP volume change in
the previous year in percentage. Labour costs are marked as a labour
cost index, which is expressed as the changes of total labour costs of
previous year in percentage. Market openness is determined as average
value of import and export divided by GDP (in percent). Inflation is
characterized as an annual average rate of change in Harmonized Indices
of Consumer Prices (HICPs). Previous FDI flows that determine friendly
business environment are measured like FDI flows as a share of GDP (in
percentage) during previous period. &it is an error, which occurred
during the measurig period.
3.2. Results
Finally, the analysis provides interesting results (Table 2). As
the determinant of FDI intensity, the market growth is negatively
unimportant in almost all countries. A strong relationship between the
market openness and the intensity of FDI is positively important in
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, and Slovenia. Thus, a
positive relationship between market openness and FDI intensity implies
that the countries, which wish to attract more FDI, should increase
their trade. However, labour costs as well as market openness have a
strong positive impact on Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and
Slovenia. The strongest negative impact of labour costs can be found in
Romania. Hence, FDI intensity increases because of a cheap labour force.
Another reason is that countries provide more unskilled than qualified
and experienced labour force. Surprisingly, inflation has a strong
positive impact in four of twelve countries only. However, this factor
should not be taken as the least important one. For example, Latvia
highly depends on inflation rate, which in this case stands for economic
stability.
Hence, inflation has a strong negative impact on Romania, Slovenia.
It also has a weak positive impact on Poland and Bulgaria. Inflation has
weak negative impact on Hungary's FDI intensity. The previous FDI
flows that stand as a friendly business environment have strong positive
impact on Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Malta and, especially, on Cyprus.
It is obvious that a strong positive impact of relationship between
market openness and FDI intensity is natural in small economies. For
that reason, CEEC that seek to improve FDI intensity level are supposed
to increase the level of market liberalization. Actually, market
liberalization creates friendly business environment, which is proven by
the empirical analysis. According to the results of Table 3, the
relationship of FDI intensity between market openness and previous FDI
flows has a strong positive impact all over Central and Eastern Europe.
However, in some countries, such as Latvia, market openness has a
weakly positive impact on FDI intensity, while the most important
factors are labour costs and inflation. Thus, it is possible to state
that Latvia's FDI intensity depends on the most sensitive and
unstable factors. Therefore, economic stability has the major impact on
FDI intensity. However, Poland is not strongly affected by any of these
independent variables that might be explained by the dependence of FDI
intensity on indirect determinants of FDI. Another explanation for
Poland's phenomenon is that the FDI intensity is not so sensitive
to analysing factors because of highly liberalised market as well as a
developed friendly business environment.
Hence, the rate of relationship between FDI intensity and market
growth has a strong negative effect on Estonia and Cyprus only.
Referring to the negative association between the rate of market growth
and FDI intensity, the study reveals that a decrease in market growth
will lead to the increase of the FDI intensity. The market is growing
very fast in Estonia and Cyprus, which means that a number of local
companies are growing too. If competitiveness is high, labour costs will
rise in a very short time. Thus, foreign investors would not be
interested in Estonia and Cyprus if these countries were not competitive
in labour costs market. Furthermore, Estonia has a possibility to
improve its labour policies and increase FDI intensity. The changes of
labour policies may attract more investors, which require a qualified
and experienced labour force. In the case of Cyprus, the government
should introduce liberalised trade policies since the rate of
relationship between FDI intensity and market openness is strong
positive. This fact leads to a conclusion that the increase in market
openness influences the increase in FDI intensity. In some cases, for
example, in the case of Malta, FDI intensity depends on previous FDI
flows only. It suggests that the policies, which improve friendly
business environment, are welcome. The FDI intensity of Romania highly
depends on the following four factors: market openness, labour costs,
inflation, and previous FDI flows. It suggests that a country has no
incentive policy targeted at the increase of FDI flows.
According to this study, Romania has serious problems of economic
stability. Moreover, some policies regarding the labour costs and
inflation should be introduced. In Lithuania, the positive association
is between independent factors and dependent factors. Hence, the
increase of labour costs, market openness and inflation has a positive
affect on the increase of FDI intensity. However, that should be taken
as a requirement to liberalise market and to introduce policies
regarding a qualified labour force and economic stability.
A strong positive connection between inflation and FDI intensity
points to products the prices of which are very low while
competitiveness in market is very high. For that reason, foreign
investors tend to face some difficulties in entering the market. The
alternative solution might be to decrease bureaucracy and to simplify
the procedures in a starting business. Thus, market openness is still
the most important determinant of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe. For
that reason, all countries of this region should introduce more
effective policies of trade stimulation.
The statistical data of this study is presented in Table 3. The
standard deviation of FDI intensity is not large. For example, the
standard deviation of FDI intensity is almost two times lower than its
mean value. It can be concluded that the FDI intensity of every country
varies over its specific characteristics.
The market growth also varies over the region according to
country's characteristics. The mean value of market growth is close
to that of FDI intensity, while the standard deviation is higher for
market growth. The difference between mean and median of all variables
is also not very significant. Labour costs show the highest standard
deviation, while market openness shows the lowest standard deviation.
According to the minimum and maximum values of independent variables, it
is noticeable that inflation has the highest difference between values
of minimum and maximum, which means that inflation, varies from country
to country. The variables of market growth and market openness have
similar mean and median values. However, the standard deviation of
market growth and market openness is significantly different. The mean
and median value is close to one another, but the standard deviation is
relatively high in respect of the mean value. The maximum value of FDI
intensity is three times higher than the minimum one, while the maximum
of FDI flows is eight times higher than the minimum of FDI flows. The
standard deviation is slightly higher in the case of labour cost than
that in the case of inflation. It leads to the assumption that labour
costs and inflation are tightly related. However, the variation of
independent variables is significant across the region.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
According to Fig. 2, FDI intensity varies significantly over time
in Central and Eastern Europe. The highest fluctuation is typical of
Malta. Other countries of this study have a more stable FDI intensity.
Thus, many of them have a very low FDI intensity. For example, Lithuania
and Latvia have attracted the lowest volume of FDI over the last ten
years. However, some countries, such as Bulgaria and Estonia, have
increased FDI intensity over the past four years only. According to this
survey, FDI intensity significantly depends on the policies adopted by
the government.
4. Concluding remarks
This article explores government incentives towards FDI in two
ways. First, scientific literature explores direct major incentives,
which influence the determinants of FDI. Thus, according to academic
literature, the major incentive affecting FDI inflows involves more
fiscal than financial incentives. Tax deductions are the most
significant influencing factor on attracting FDI. However, some
scientists emphasize indirect incentives such as information agencies,
infrastructure and country's marketing. Anyway, determinants of FDI
affected by indirect incentives are difficult to measure. Due to the
fact that measuring influence of indirect incentives is always doubtful
and some ambiguities tend to rise, the article explores solely the
influence of direct factors, which are affecting FDI flows.
The second direction to which the article expands the existing
literature is the analysis of exogenous determinants of FDI (size,
location, economic stability, inflation). Due to the fact that
policymakers set policies in regard to competitors, two different models
of FDI promotion were analysed. The first one, the Irish model, refers
to market liberalization and welcoming environment for FDI. However, the
second one is more conservative, because the TKC model has strict rules
for foreign investment. The TKC model, as opposed to the Irish model,
pays attention to cultural heritage and natural nature.
Due to the fact that Central and Eastern European countries behave
conservatively and post-communist outlook is alive, the
Taiwan-Korean-Chinese model is more suitable for introducing FDI
promotional policies.
The third part covers the empirical analysis, which was based on
exogenous variables. The major variables that affect the increase of FDI
intensity are market openness and a friendly business environment. Thus,
according to the empirical analysis, most countries of Central and
Eastern Europe must introduce a more effective policy of market
liberalisation. Still, Latvia and Lithuania strongly depend on labour
costs, which mean that these two countries tend to attract investors
that seek cheap and unskilled labour. To continue attracting sizable FDI
inflows, countries that are closer to their "potential" should
strive to go beyond the policy norms prevailing in the region.
doi: 10.3846/16111699.2011.599415
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Romualdas Ginevicius (1), Agne Simelyte (2)
Department of Economics and Management of Enterprises, Vilnius
Gediminas Technical University, Sauletekio al. 11, LT-10223 Vilnius,
Lithuania E-mails: (1)
[email protected]; (2)
[email protected] (corresponding author)
Received 23 March 2011; accepted 20 June 2011
Romualdas GINEVICIUS. Professor, Dr Habil, Head of the Department
of Enterprise Economics and Management, construction engineer and
economist. The author of more than 350 research papers and over 20
scientific books; Editor-in-Chief of the "Journal of Business
Economics and Management" (located in ISI database "Web of
Science") and the journal "Business: Theory and
Practice". Research interests: organization theory, complex
quantitative evaluation of social processes and phenomena.
Agne SIMELYTE. PhD student in Business and Administration at
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, Faculty of Business Management,
Department of Economics and Management of Enterprises. Research
interests: foreign direct investments, government policy, incentives
toward FDI.
Table 1. Selected Host Country Determinants of FDI
(Source: Nunnemkamp 2003)
Selected Host Country Determinants of FDI
Overall policy framework:
* Economic and political stability;
* Rules regarding entry and operations of MNCs;
* Bi- and multilateral agreements on FDI;
* Privatisation policy.
Business Facilitation:
* Administrative procedures;
* FDI promotion (e.g. facilitation services);
* FDI incentives (subsidies).
Economic determinants
Relating to Resource Relating to Relating to
seeking--FDI Market-seeking FDI Efficiency-seeking FDI
Raw materials Market size Productivity-adjusted
labour costs
Complementary factors Market growth Sufficiently skilled
of production (labour) labour
Physical infrastructure Regional integration Business-related
services
Trade policy
Table 2. The Estimation of Relationship between
Independent Variables and FDI Intensity
Country Market growth Labour costs Market openness
Bulgaria -0.1355 0.4699 0.5701
Czech 0.0999 0.1452 0.5753
Republic
Estonia -0.5414 0.4882 -0.4417
Cyprus -0.6188 0.3229 0.7445
Latvia -0.0795 0.6844 0.3519
Poland -0.0259 -0.0731 0.3199
Lithuania -0.061 0.6959 0.6643
Malta 0.1112 -0.1384 0.2314
Romania -0.0904 -0.7311 0.6715
Slovakia 0.3585 0.7143 0.4963
Slovenia -0.2626 -0.5320 0.7418
Hungary 0.1786 -0.0112 0.1362
Country Inflation FDI flows
Bulgaria 0.3776 0.5232
Czech -0.0913 -0.4789
Republic
Estonia 0.5089 0.6435
Cyprus -0.4904 0.8986
Latvia 0.8212 0.5714
Poland 0.1156 0.3288
Lithuania 0.6039 0.1589
Malta -0.081 -0.7065
Romania -0.7425 0.7204
Slovakia -0.041 0.3137
Slovenia -0.6624 0.3825
Hungary -0.0650 0.4563
Table 3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Correlation
Intensity 4.0 3.7 1.27 2.4 6.2 --
Market growth 4.6 4.6 1.6 1.1 6.44 -0.19597
Labour costs 10.2 10.5 2.3 7.2 13.4 0.19529
Market openness 13.4 13.3 0.77 12.5 14.8 0.6078
Inflation 5.3 4.8 2.25 2.35 9.2 -0.1613
FDI flows 1.6 1.5 0.89 0.55 3.15 0.7227