Computers and pay.
Green, Francis ; Felstead, Alan ; Gallie, Duncan 等
This paper describes the diffusion of computer use among jobs in
Britain, and shows that the technology is having notable effects on the
labour market. By 2006 three in four jobs entailed job-holders using
computers, while for two in four jobs computer use was essential.
Computing skills have a significant impact on pay but, in 2006, much of
this effect is interactive with what we term 'influence
skills'. The average effect of a unit increase in the Computing
Skills index (which ranges from 0 to 4) is to raise pay by an estimated
5.3 per cent and 6.0 per cent for men and women respectively, For men
there is an additional 19.2 per cent boost to pay in establishments
where at least three quarters of workers are working with computers,
compared to establishments where no one uses computers. These effects
are greater for those people in jobs with above-average influence skills
requirements. Our estimates allow for education, a large number of other
generic skills and other conventional controls, which makes them more
robust to the critique that they are overestimates because they might
suffer from omitted skill bias. IV estimates show only small differences
from the OLS estimates. We also find that the direct and interactive
effects of computer skills and influence skills have risen over the
decade, indicating increased scarcity.
Keywords: Pay; wages; computing skills; generic skills; information
technology
JEL Classifications: J31; 033
Introduction
Although it is widely claimed that the introduction of information
technologies has transformed the nature of employment in the modern era,
understanding of how computers have been affecting the lives of workers
is far from comprehensive. In this paper we present some new evidence
about the growth of computer usage at work. We also investigate the link
between computer skills and pay in Britain, which is one of several
contentious issues among social scientists attempting to understand the
growth of economic inequality.
The past ten years have witnessed a major expansion in the use of
ICT in organisations. Investment in computer software reached 2 per cent
of GDP in 2002 after a 5-year period of rapid growth (Abramovsky and
Griffith, 2007) and an accelerated expansion of overall ICT investment
from 13 billion [pounds sterling] in 1992 to more than 35 billion
[pounds sterling] in 2000 (National Statistics, 2007). Even so, the
spread of ICT amongst the UK population was far from complete by 2005,
with one in four 16-74 year olds professing not even basic computing
skills, according to official European Union data; digital access
remains differentiated along lines of age and education (Demunter, 2005,
2006).
Recent evidence has shown that the impact of ICT investment on UK
productivity is substantial, and that ICT played the dominant role in
explaining productivity growth in the 1990s (Crespi et al., 2007; Oulton
and Srinivasan, 2005). In the US, the productivity boom since the
mid-1990s is strongly linked to ICT investment (Draca et al., 2006).
Studies also find that the effects of new ICT projects are especially
high in the long term, because of their complementarity with investments
in organisational change (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000). With these
impacts from such a pervasive and fast-growing new technology, it would
seem quite plausible that the required skills should, for a time at
least, be scarce, given that access to acquiring the skills is
constrained and costly. If the labour market value of the skills is high
enough, technology may become part of the process through which income
gaps are widened and the low-skilled excluded from rising affluence as a
consequence of the 'digital divide'. The rising demand for
computer skills contributes to the increased demand for highly qualified
workers (Green et al., 2003); and, beyond schooling, if access to
acquiring computing skills is adversely distributed (whether by
institutional constraints, age, or ability) then the technology becomes
a route towards inequality. It is in part for these reasons that
computer skills training has been embedded in the school curriculum, and
in the life-long learning agenda, and is now a major focus for European
Union initiatives. It has long been recognised that computer usage, even
at quite simple levels, is associated with higher pay. Raw calculations
show that, in 2006, on average computer users (for the moment
undifferentiated, see below) earned 63 per cent more than non-computer
users. But much of this gap is evidently associated with other
characteristics--chiefly, prior education--rather than computer skills
as such. It is important to try to discover how much (if at all)
computing skills have a causal effect on pay, once other factors have
been isolated and controlled for. A 'large' impact calls for
renewed efforts to support computer skills training, for both
egalitarian and efficiency reasons. If the impact is low or nonexistent,
policymakers had best look to other factors behind rising inequality,
such as inadequate general education or reduced protection for low-paid
workers. Yet labour economists have so far failed to come up with a
consensual assessment of the computer's effect. While Krueger
(1993), in a seminal paper on the 1980s US labour market, proposed that
a pay premium of between 10 and 15 per cent for computer use could
explain a substantial part of the rising return to schooling--and while
others have confirmed the pay premium in the US and elsewhere--an
influential opposing group has held that the computing pay premium is
merely a reflection of unobserved ability which would have led computer
users to receive higher pay anyway, irrespective of the technology. Put
another way, the critique is that the computer revolution affected those
workers who were already being paid more by virtue of their occupational
or industrial status or of some latent but enduring individual quality.
Reconfirmation and extension of Krueger's US evidence has come
from a number of studies which range over methods, time and place.
Methods vary according to the extent to which they are able to control
for the many other characteristics of jobs that could affect both pay
and the likelihood of using computers. Three approaches can be used. One
can include a large number of job characteristics in an attempt to
control for observed heterogeneity. However, this approach is rare,
owing to lack of data. One can, alternatively, use instrumental
variables to control for the endogeneity of computer usage. Finally,
some studies use limited panel data to try to eliminate potential biases
attributable to unobserved but fixed heterogeneous characteristics. In
the US Goss and Phillips (2002) find support for a substantial computer
skills premium, but their data do not allow extensive controls for
either personal or job characteristics. Dunne et al. (2004) find an
impact at firm level from investment in computers on wages. There is
confirmation also in Canada (Pabilonia and Zoghi, 2005) where controls
for fixed effects reduce the estimated computer pay premium for current
computer usage to an insignificant amount, but still leave a substantial
premium (13 per cent) for computer users that have had average prior
experience with computers. For Australia, Borland et al. (2004) find a
substantial premium, but the earnings effect is found to be specified
better by the number and level of computer skills than by a simple
computer use dummy variable. Studies in some developing countries are
also supportive (e.g. Ng, 2006, for Shanghai, Liu et al., 2004, for
Taiwan).
In Britain, several studies find that there is a substantive pay
premium for computer users. Arabsheibani et al. (2004), using 1980s data
from the British Social Attitudes Survey, found large returns (22-26 per
cent), rising to a surprising 37 per cent when seemingly taking account
of selection. Arabsheibani and Marin (2006), however, using the 5th
sweep of the National Child Development Study (NCDS) in 1991, report
lower estimates ranging from 7-17 per cent. Both these studies use
rather old data, which throw little light on recent changes since
computers have become pervasive in British jobs (see below), and the
authors appear unaware of the existence of more recent data and studies.
More pertinent to recent developments is the analysis of Dolton and
Makepeace (2004), which makes use of both the 5th (1991) and 6th (2000)
waves of the NCDS; they find that during the 1990s there was a computer
use premium for women of between 10 and 12 per cent, and for men of
between 9 and 13 per cent. Hildreth (2001) finds that e-mail usage
carried with it a premium in 1998, but also suggests that much of the
premium may be associated with unobserved complementary skills which
only some managers choose to use. Finally, Green (1998) and Dickerson
and Green (2004), using data from the 1997 and 2001 Skills Surveys, find
substantial effects from using computers at different levels. A
distinctive finding of the latter studies, which include controls for a
large number of job-related variables and use pseudo-panel techniques,
is that more sophisticated computer usage brings higher returns, as one
might expect. In 2001 the premium ranged from 8-21 per cent depending on
the level of computer use.
Set against these confirmatory studies implying a substantial
premium are those which claim to show that the premium for computer
skills is zero. Frequently cited is the somewhat derisive study by
Dinardo and Pischke (1997) which reasoned against Krueger's
findings as follows. Using early German data they find that using
pencils (or other simple and widely used tools) is associated with a pay
differential similar to that for computer use; and, since it is
implausible to infer that the skill to use pencils causes pay to rise
by, say, 13 per cent (they ascribe the appearance of this gap to
unobserved skills), they prefer to believe the same must be true of
computers. Unfortunately for this analysis, however, the list of job
characteristics is quite attenuated, so they were unable to investigate
whether a more comprehensive data set on jobs would have allowed them to
eliminate the pencils premium but not the computer premium (see
Dickerson and Green, 2004, who show precisely this effect in Britain).
We therefore consider the 'pencils' critique to be
unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, the point remains that exclusion of
complementary skills from analyses is a pervasive potential source of
bias, usually over-estimation, in the coefficients attached to
individual skills which, if ignored, can lead to false inferences about
the role of computers in generating inequality. Handel (2007) shows
that, after including measures of seven detailed job tasks and
pre-computing-revolution occupational and industry mean wages in his
regressions, the impact of using a pc or terminal in the US in 1991 is
very much reduced and in one specification rendered altogether
insignificant. An alternative approach is to try to measure computer
skills directly. Direct assessment data on computer skills are not
currently available for this purpose. Borghans and ter Weel (2004) use
some indirect, self-assessment measures of skill available in the 1997
Skills Survey (Ashton et al., 1999), and find that the self-assessment
measure of computer skill is not related to pay once computer use is
controlled for; however, they do not consider the downward bias
resulting from the probable considerable measurement error related to
self-assessment.
Of some interest are panel studies which with conventional
estimators claim to eliminate the biases associated with unobserved
personal or job characteristics. Entorff and Kramarz (1997) find, using
French data, that fixed effects estimates show much smaller and
statistically insignificant pay premia associated with immediate take-up
of computers, but report that there is a return of approximately 1 per
cent per year of experience using computers. At that rate, it would not
take long for the impact of computers to be noticeable. Kuku et al.
(2007), also using panel data, come to the conclusion that there is no
pay premium in Russia. Also claiming to eliminate fixed-effects bias, a
twins-based study in the US (Krashinsky, 2004) finds a statistically
insignificant pay premium of 7 per cent. There are, however, reasons to
be cautious about the preference for conventional panel fixed-effects
estimates. First, the panel estimates generally rely on relatively crude
dynamic assumptions, often assuming that computers' boost to wages
(if it exists) should be instantaneous. However, it seems much more
plausible to assume that computing skills take time to acquire, and
Entorff and Kramarz's finding confirms this. Second, the possible
biases from dynamic misspecification are compounded by the danger of
large measurement errors. In the Entorff and Kramarz panel, for example,
the date at which computers started to be used is imputed by use of an
untested recall question in the third year of the panel. In
Krashinsky's twins sample the problem is confounded by a small
sample size (381 twin pairs, with an unreported number of cases of
between-twin differences in computer usage). The standard errors are
unsurprisingly high, making it easy to accept a null hypothesis that
computers have no effect. If, however, the null hypothesis were that the
effect is much higher (e.g. the 10 per cent of Krueger's study--why
not?) this also could not be rejected, even though the author reports
that the impact of computers 'disappeared' (Krashinsky, 2004,
p. 88). Third, Dolton and Makepeace (2004) find that conventional panel
fixed-effect estimators can be flawed by assuming that the impact of
computers is homogeneous across groups of computer users and across
time. They found different premia among male computer users according to
when they started using computers. Fourth, fixed-effects estimators can
be downward biased if wages are downwardly rigid, or if computer users
are still indirectly paying the cost of acquiring computer skills at
around the time that their use of computers is being measured. For these
reasons, panel estimates should not necessarily be preferred, in this
case, over cross-section estimates that can include a wide range of job
characteristics or can otherwise satisfactorily allow for the
endogeneity of computer usage.
We have described, so far, what studies have shown about the impact
of computers on pay, and found a conflicting story, where estimates
range from near zero to very substantial and the implausibly large. The
variation across time and place is relevant because there is no reason
to expect universally valid findings. Thus, even if Entorff and
Kramarz's findings are accepted in full, there is little reason to
expect that the valuation of computer skills in France during the 1980s
can be a satisfactory basis for analysing the altogether different
British labour market twenty years later. Similarly, Spitz-Oener (2007)
finds that, revisiting similar but more recent German data to that which
generated the 'pencils effect' rebuttal of the computer wage
premium, the computer use premium remains robust while the pencils
effect had disappeared. The findings in Britain generally indicate that
there has been a positive pay premium, yet neither is its magnitude
established (which pertains to the issue of whether computers have
directly affected the pay distribution), nor whether there is a tendency
for computer skills premia to decline as the supply becomes more
widespread. Much of the literature in all countries has been handicapped
by poor data, in which employees are recorded to be either computer
users or non-users, rarely complemented by information on the type of
usage, and normally lacking measures of the intensity or level of usage
(and hence of the required skills). In most cases, few or no other
generic skills are measured and controlled for. Occasionally,
researchers have resorted to self-assessment of skills (Borland et al.,
2004, and Liu et al., 2004), which can easily be compounded by
personality traits.
Finally, the conclusion that ICT's impact on productivity is
complementary to investments in organisational change (e.g. Crespi et
al., 2007) is not reflected so far in these studies of computers and
pay. Yet there is reason to expect such a connection, in that
higher-level skills at managerial and professional levels will be
associated with being able to bring about organisational change to
generate efficient usages of ICT investments. Organisational changes, we
know, have tended to be both skill-biased and effort-biased (Caroli and
van Reenen, 2001; Green 2004); and ICT investments interact in their
impact on productivity with the proportion of graduates at industry
level (Bloom et al., 2005). One might also expect the computer skill
premium to be complementary to other skills associated with the ability
to bring about organisational change.
The literature therefore leaves unsettled a number of issues about
the potential role of computers in determining pay in Britain's
labour market. This paper will address the questions:
i) As investment in information technologies has proceeded apace,
what have been the changes in the prevalence of computer users, and to
the level and intensity of computer usage? Which groups have been
gearing up the most to using computers at work?
ii) What are the best estimates of how much computer skills are
affecting pay in Britain in recent years, and how is the premium
changing over time as competence with IT gradually spreads across the
population? Are computing skills becoming like driving skills: imperfect but ubiquitous, with little additional scarcity value in the labour
market?
iii) Is there any evidence that computer skills are complementary
to other scarce generic skills, especially those that might be expected
to be associated with the ability to bring about efficient
organisational change?
2. Data
Consistent historical and recent data on the deployment of computer
skills at work are available from a series of individual surveys that
run from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) in 1986,
through the Employment in Britain of 1992, and then the 1997, 2001 and
2006 Skills Surveys. The 1997 Skills Survey was designed in part to
deliver some detailed knowledge about the importance of a wide range of
activities carried out at work. These data were collected by adapting
the methods of job analysis for the purposes of social survey. The
outcome of this approach was that it enabled the measurement of the
usage of several generic skills, including computing skills. The 2001
and 2006 Skills Surveys are partial repeats of the questionnaire used in
1997, and in particular provide a consistent series of data on computing
and the other generic skills.
These surveys targeted the population of 20-60 year-olds in
employment (or, in the case of 2006, ages 20-65), using clustered random
sampling methods. Achieved samples were all closely nationally
representative as judged by comparison with Labour Force Survey
benchmarks. (1) In addition, the 2006 survey included over-sampling
surveys of Wales, Scotland and the East Midlands, and for the first time
included a sample of people in employment in Northern Ireland. This
paper focuses only on employees in Britain, and in the trend analyses
just on those aged 20 to 60. All analyses incorporate both a design
weight that takes account of clustering, household size, and
oversampling, and a non-response weight to take account of a slightly
higher non-response rate from males than from females. Data was
collected using face-to-face interviews, conducted in people's
homes. Full details of methods can be obtained from Gallie et al.
(1998), Ashton et al. (1999), and Felstead et al. (2002; 2007).
The general principle which underpins the 'job
requirements' approach to skills analysis is the strategy of asking
respondents consistent questions about the activities involved in their
jobs. Indicators of these activities are then treated as measures of the
skills being deployed. The utilisation of computer skills is measured in
a number of ways. The simplest indicator is 'Participation'
which derives from the (binary) answers to the question 'does your
own job involve use of computerised or automated equipment?'.
Though this indicator fails to capture the importance and level of
sophistication with which computers are used, the data are available on
a consistent basis back to 1986. A second indicator is derived from a
question designed to elucidate whether and how far computing skills are
central to the job: 'how important is using a computer, PC, or
other types of computerised equipment?'. We refer to this as the
'centrality' of computer use. Answers were on a 5-point scale
ranging from 'not at all important/does not apply' to
'essential'. A third indicator captures the level at which
computers are used. Respondents are asked to place the way they use
computers on one of four levels, ranging from
'straightforward' to 'advanced', with examples being
given to anchor each level. Fourth, respondents were also asked, from
2001 onwards, to report the centrality of internet usage. Fifth,
respondents reported the proportion of employees in their workplace that
used computers.
The Skills Surveys also measure several other generic skills that
are used in many different kinds of jobs, in a consistent way from 1997
through 2006. Exploratory factor analyses were used to guide reduction
of over 40 items, each measured on a 5-point importance scale, to twelve
theoretically-based skills domain indicators. Rather than compute factor
scores, items were grouped as suggested by the factor analysis, and
additive indices were generated to create the variables measuring the
utilisation of skill in each of the twelve domains. Additive indices
have the benefit of being more easily interpreted in relation to the
original item scales, while factor scores contain weighted contributions
for all 40 items, albeit with only small weights from the large majority
of items not included in each skill domain (Felstead et al., 2007). In
this paper we focus in particular on a skill domain--'influence
skills'--that we believe is likely to be associated with the
successful and effective introduction and deployment of ICT in
workplaces. As argued in studies of ICT's impact on productivity,
the effect of ICT is likely to be greatest when combined with good work
organisation. It follows that computing skills should be complementary
to other generic skills in their effects on productivity. In particular,
we hypothesise that this requires employees both to assess the potential
benefits to be gained from successful ICT use and to be able to persuade
and influence and educate others in the workplace. Influence skills in
our data are derived from the items capturing the importance of:
persuading or influencing others; instructing, training or teaching
people; making speeches or presentations; writing long reports;
analysing complex problems in depth; and planning the activities of
others. (2) These items have an acceptable Cronbach's alpha statistic of 0.84. We standardise the resulting index, which we simply
term Influence Skills, (3) so that the range is from 0 to 4, where 4
would result if the response to all items was 'essential', 0
if all responses were 'not at all important/does not apply'.
(4)
3. The growth and distribution of computing and influence skills in
Britain
Figure 1 and table 1 show the remarkable invasion of computers into
the British workplace over the past twenty years. Taking first the
simple measure of 'participation', the proportion of employees
using computers by this definition has nearly doubled since 1986, and
appears to be heading towards a plateau of just over three quarters of
the employee workforce. Over the same period there was a similarly
growing proportion of computer-intensive workplaces where at least half
the employees are reported to be using computers or automated equipment.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The mere use of a computer, however, is a very loose indication of
the skills being deployed, since computers can vary greatly in their
importance for the job and in the level at which they are used. Figure 1
also plots the 'centrality' of computer use to jobs. The
proportion of those answering at the top of the scale
('essential') rose from 33-49 per cent between 1997 and 2006.
In addition to computers being 'essential' for half of British
employees, another quarter of employees rated them as 'fairly
important' or 'very important' in 2006.
Our figures for 2006 can be compared with estimates from the recent
'Community Survey on ICT usage in households and by
individuals', according to which 74 per cent of employees use
computers, internet or e-commerce (Demunter, 2005), comparable with the
Skills Survey figure for participation. Moreover, the Community survey
documents that 49 per cent of employed persons in the UK were using
computers 'in their normal routine' (Demunter, 2006). This UK
figure, which is close to the European Union average, (5) is comparable
with the Skills Survey figure for centrality. The expanded computer use
might have been expected to dilute usage, with progressively lower-level
users adopting the technology at easier levels. The third series shows
that this did not happen. The proportion of employees who use computers
at a 'high' level--either 'complex' or
'advanced' usage--rose from 16 to 23 per cent over 1997 to
2006. Taken as a proportion of computer users only, the increase was
from 24 per cent in 1997 to 28 per cent in 2006. Examples of
'complex' use were: using a computer for analysing information
or design, including use of computer aided design or statistical
analysis packages; an example of 'advanced' use was using
computer syntax and/or formulae for programming. Through this time,
therefore, not only were more and more employees being joined up to the
digital revolution, the preponderance were progressively being called on
to exercise higher-level computing skills. Finally, figure 1 also
documents the very rapid recent expansion of internet usage at work. The
proportion of jobs where internet usage was essential rose from 14-28
per cent just in the short period from 2001-6.
Table 1 shows something of how computing skills are distributed
among the population of employees in Britain. There are relatively small
differences between men and women as regards the participation in
computer use, though in the past participation used to be greater for
women. Now, computing is regarded as 'essential' in 48 and 51
per cent of the jobs done by men and women respectively. There is a much
larger difference, however, when it comes to the level of computer
usage: the proportions using computers at 'complex' or
'advanced' levels is 28 per cent for men, compared with 17 per
cent for women, a differential that has been maintained throughout the
decade of rapid ICT expansion. (6) As expected, younger employees are
more likely to have computer skills than older workers, though the
differences in participation between young and old have narrowed in
recent years.
If computer skills affect labour market prospects, it is of some
interest to see how those from different educational background vary in
their use of computing skills. The differences are unsurprising but
stark. In terms of participation, the figure for those with degrees is
71 per cent, compared with just 20 per cent for those holding no
qualifications, a gap of 51 percentage points. The absolute differences
have been widening over the decade: back in 1997 the equivalent gap was
only 40 percentage points. There is also a very large difference in 2006
between educational groups regarding the use of computers at
'high' levels: 42 per cent for graduates, compared for example
with 19 per cent for those with just A-level or equivalent.
Table 1 also documents the changes and the distribution of
influence skills. Between 1997 and 2001, the Influence Skills index rose
from 1.81 to 2.06, a rise of about one quarter of its 1997 standard
deviation. This rise is statistically significant (p = 0.000). An
alternative way of describing this change (not shown in the table) is to
compute the proportion of jobs for which Influence Skills is at least 3,
(which is equivalent to the items being on average at least 'very
important' in the job). This proportion rose from 17 per cent in
1997 to 23 per cent in 2006. The increase is especially high among
managers (34-44 per cent), and among associate professional occupations
(23-31 per cent). Thus, influence skills, which we hypothesise to be
complementary to the skills needed for the efficient deployment of ICT
in workplaces, are rising, and not just because of the generally
increasing prevalence of managers and professionals in workplaces.
Finally, table 1 also documents that influence skills are,
unsurprisingly, very much more widely deployed in the jobs of the highly
educated compared with those in lower educational groups; though note
that influence skills are growing even in the lower educated groups.
4. The returns to computing and influence skills
Section 3 has documented that the past decade has been a period of
rapid deployment of computer skills in workplaces, and has also noted a
more modest but still significant increase in the use of influence
skills. Moreover, the deployment of both types of skill has been found
to be strongly positively related to education level. With such a
profound change in workplaces, along with the obvious costs and
constraints associated with the acquisition of these skills, it would
not be surprising if bottlenecks occur and that the possession of
computing skills (and possibly influence skills) acquires scarcity
quasi-rents and/or permanent returns in the labour market.
In this section, the aim is to investigate the effect that computer
skills have on hourly pay, over and above the normal returns to the
education that may have contributed to acquiring computing skills. We do
this by estimating standard earnings equations including schooling and a
quadratic term in work experience, and other conventional controls, and
supplementing these with our measures of computing skills. We also
investigate whether, and if so how much, any impact of computing skills
is effected through the simultaneous deployment of influence skills, as
hypothesised above. We do this by interacting the Influence Skills index
with our measures of computing skills.
Tables 2 and 3 show our findings in respect of men and women based
on the 2006 Skills Survey data. We restrict the analysis to employees
only. In each case column (1) is a benchmark earnings regression giving
returns to schooling of approximately 6 per cent and 8 per cent for
males and females respectively.
Column (2) introduces computing skills. For this purpose we have
averaged the indices of computing centrality and of computing level to
form a single index (termed simply 'Computing Skills') that
ranges from 0 to 4. (7) Justification for this procedure is that the two
constituent indices, though conceptually distinct, are closely
correlated ([rho] = 0.78), and can each be seen as proxies for a latent
variable measuring the computing skills needed to perform a job. (8) A
one-unit change in the Computing Skills index amounts to 89 per cent and
95 per cent of the standard deviations within the male and female
samples respectively. As can be seen, there is a substantial and
significant return to Computer Skills, the estimated coefficient for the
impact of Computer Skills on log pay being 0.146. This implies, for
example, that a job requiring use of computer-aided design skills would
pay 7.9 per cent (= 0.5 x 100 x [e.sup.0146]-1) more than a job
requiring the use of word-processing or spreadsheet skills, assuming
that computers were equally important in the two jobs, and that the
job-holders had the same amount of education and experience.
It is quite possible, however, that this estimate is upward-biased
through omission of other skills domains also not captured fully by the
controls for education and work experience. One way to attempt to obtain
an unbiased estimate is through instrumenting Computing Skills. We
utilise for this purpose variables capturing whether there have been
recent changes in the workplace. Four relevant variables are included,
each as 0/1 dummies: whether in the past five years the workplace has
introduced new computing equipment, whether it has introduced new
communications technology equipment, whether it has introduced other new
equipment, and whether the number of employees has been reduced. We
maintain that it is plausible that these variables may affect whether
computers are being used in a job, but that they would not necessarily
have significant direct effects on pay. Both for men and for women,
these instruments pass the Hansen J test which allows us to accept the
hypothesis that the variables do not directly affect pay; the
instruments also strongly identify the deployment of computing skills.
For the purpose of the IV estimations, the samples are of necessity
restricted to those employees who had been in the same job for the
previous five years. (9) As can be seen in column (3) of both tables,
the estimated impact of computing skills is a little higher than the OLS
estimate in the case of males, and only marginally lower in the case of
females. (10) There is, therefore, some support for the view that
computing skills are earning a true independent return in the labour
market.
In column (4) we investigate whether part of the impact of
computing skills is complementary to influence skills which, as
hypothesised, may improve the effective use of computers in jobs. We
also include our indicator of the intensiveness of computer use in the
workplace as a whole. The hypothesis here is that influence skills may
interact both with individual computer use and with workplace computer
intensity. Our estimates show that the effect of a unit increase in
Computer Skills per se on log pay is much reduced though still
significant (at 0.063 for men, 0.032 for women). Influence Skills on its
own appears to have no significant association with pay. There is,
however, a significant interactive effect from Computer Skills and
Influence Skills for both men and women, supporting our hypothesis of
complementarity. At the mean of Influence Skills, the additional
interactive effect on log pay of a unit rise in Computing Skills is
0.037 for men and 0.042 for women.
Moreover, influence skills are complementary also to workplace
computing intensity: for both men and women, the Influence Skills index
raises pay by an additional significant amount in
high-computer-intensive workplaces (where at least three quarters of
employees are working with computers or automated equipment), but not in
workplaces that are less intensive in computer use. A one point increase
in Influence Skills (11) yields an additional 10 per cent pay premium
for men, and 4 per cent for women, in the high-computer-intensive
workplaces.
In column (5) we examine how far these estimates are robust to the
inclusion of the twelve other generic skills indicators available in the
Skills Survey data. This exercise pursues further the possibility,
already examined in one way through the IV estimates of column (3), that
the estimates of computing skills are biased by the omission of other
correlated skills which are rewarded in their own right and may have
little to do with technology. As can be seen, inclusion of very many
skills domains reduces the point estimate of most coefficients including
that of computing skills on its own which becomes statistically
insignificant. At the mean value of Influence Skills, the combined
direct and interactive effect on pay of a one unit rise in computing
skills is significant (p = 0.000) and amounts to 5.3 per cent for men
and 6.0 per cent for women. Moreover, for women there remains a
substantive and significant interaction with Influence Skills. In the
case of men, there is an additional significant interactive effect from
Influence Skills in high-computer-intensive workplaces. (12)
The next question we wished to investigate is whether the computing
skills premium has been changing over time. A rising premium would be an
indication of scarcity in the face of the rapidly rising deployment of
computing skills documented in Section 3. On the other hand, one might
expect that, as familiarity with computers spreads through the
population, the link with pay would be reduced.
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates for men and women of the returns
to computing and influence on a consistent basis in each of the three
Skills Survey years: 1997, 2001 and 2006. Each regression includes all
available controls, including those of multiple other generic skills
domains. Workplace computer intensity, however, is excluded as this
question was not asked in 1997.
Both tables show an increasing extent to which Computer Skills and
Influence Skills interact to affect pay. While in 2006 the interaction
is substantial and significant (as found in tables 2 and 3), the
estimated coefficient is smaller and insignificant in 2001, and in 1997
carries a small negative but insignificant estimate. In parallel, the
estimates of the direct effects of Computer Skills and Influence Skills
decrease over time. On average, the overall impact of Computer Skills on
pay has increased over the period. Evaluated at the mean level of
Influence Skills for the whole decade (2.03 for men, 1.89 for women) the
direct and interactive effect of a unit increase in Computing Skills on
pay is estimated to have risen from 5.0 per cent in 1997 to 7.2 per cent
in 2006 for men, and from 4.4 per cent in 1997 to 7.7 per cent in 2006
for women. For those men and women in jobs with above average Influence
Skills, the Computer Skills premium rose faster than for those in jobs
that use below-average Influence Skills.
It thus transpires that the interaction between computing and
influence skills is a very recent phenomenon. There is indeed some
evidence that the rapid diffusion of ICT in British workplaces over the
past decade is placing an increasing premium on those who have been able
to acquire the skills to utilise the new technologies; but it is
predominantly those jobs that also deploy high levels of influence
skills (where, we have reasoned, the technologies are likely to be used
more effectively) that are now being rewarded with a scarcity premium
for computing skills.
Conclusion
If all computers did to jobs were to put keyboards under the
fingers of clever people who previously grasped pens and were always
highly paid, there would be no need to worry about any effects of scarce
computer skills on inequality. If, however, computer skills are costly
to acquire but the expense is least, and access greatest, for
better-educated and more advantaged groups in society, then the computer
revolution can be seen as materially affecting the wage structure and as
a potential source of greater inequality.
Our findings are consistent with the view that the diffusion of
computing technology through the British economy is having notable
effects on the labour market. There has been a remarkable rise in the
proportions of jobs participating in the use of computers, to the extent
that in 2006 three in four jobs entailed job-holders using computers,
while for two in four jobs computer use was 'essential'. At
the same time, the level of computer use, far from being diluted by an
influx of users facing only basic skills requirements, has risen.
Computing skills requirements are, unsurprisingly, much higher for those
with more education behind them. Moreover, there is no sign of any
narrowing in the computer skills gap, and indeed the gap appears to be
widening. For example, the 'centrality' of computing--the
proportions for whom computers are essential--increased over 1997-2006
by 17 percentage points for those educated to degree level, but by only
6 percentage points for those with no qualifications.
We have found that computing skills have a significant impact on
pay but, in 2006, much of this effect is interactive with influence
skills which we have argued to be complementary to computing skills in
their effects on performance. Influence skills, which the data show
cluster together in jobs, involve persuading or influencing others,
instructing, training or teaching people, making speeches or
presentations, writing long reports, analysing complex problems in
depth, and planning the activities of others. Our best estimate of the
average combined direct and interactive effect of a unit increase in the
Computing Skills index (which ranges from 0 to 4) is that this raises
pay, after allowing for many other skills and conventional controls, by
5.3 per cent and 6.0 per cent for men and women respectively. To place
this in the context of a concrete example, a job where a computer was
described as 'very important' and was used for computer-aided
design, would pay 16 per cent more than an otherwise identical job that
required no computer use at any level. However, the effects are greater
than for those people in jobs with above-average Influence Skills
requirements. Moreover, for those people with average Influence Skills
there is an additional boost to pay in establishments where at least
three quarters of workers are working with computers, compared to
establishments where no one uses computers: this boost amounts to an
estimated 19.2 per cent for men and 7.9 per cent for women, though the
latter is not quite significant at conventional levels. All these
estimates are arrived at after allowing for a large number of other
generic skills and other conventional controls, which makes them more
robust to the critique that they are overestimates because they might
suffer from omitted skill bias. Our IV estimates also show only small
differences from the OLS estimates. Nevertheless, it remains possible
that our computer use measures are proxying other unobserved real
pay-determining factors which would not be affected by computer skills
training. The direct and interactive effect of Computer Skills and
Influence Skills has risen somewhat over the decade, indicating
increased scarcity. It is notable, however, that in earlier years the
impact of computing skills on pay was more direct and depended far less
or not at all on the use of influence skills. It is only recently that
the complementarity has become evident. A possible interpretation one
might put upon this late manifestation of complementarity is that there
is a long and uncertain lag in the process through which managers and
others learn how to deploy ICT technologies effectively, and that this
learning process occurs at the same time as the technology is developing
and new applications are conceived. (13) Whereas, a decade ago, computer
skills were valuable generally, in recent years computer skills have
become especially productive in jobs where influence skills are also
important, and less so in jobs that entail little use of influence
skills and where computer applications have become more routine.
Whatever the explanation, our findings indicate that the complementarity
is only now beginning to emerge after a decade of high investment.
The implied increased scarcity of computing skills, evident in our
findings, provides general support for policies to broaden the stock of
computing skills in the population; the findings also reinforce the need
to ensure adequate supplies of people with what we have termed
'influence skills'.
Showing that computing skills affect pay is a necessary but
insufficient foundation for any argument that ICT raises inequality. Our
findings do not establish, one way or another, that the rise of ICT has
had a notable effect on inequality compared to some hypothetical counterfactual alternative world. As can be observed from tables 2 and
3, part of the return to education is tied up with the impact of the
higher computing and influence skills associated with it--the estimated
return coming down from 0.061 to 0.035 for men, and from 0.076 to 0.048
for women, once both Computing skills and Influence skills are allowed
for. In 1997, however, the effect on the schooling coefficient of
including Computing and Influence Skills is of similar magnitude to the
effect in 2006--suggesting that, despite the increasing premium on
computing skills and its concentration in high education groups, any
impact on changes in the overall pay/education structure is small.
However, since differential schooling is only part of the explanation
for wage inequality, a thorough investigation of the impact of computing
on wage inequality would need to be much more comprehensive, and has not
been part of our objectives in this paper. Since wage inequality began
to increase in the late 1970s, before the computer revolution became
widespread in the workplace, it seems unlikely that computers on their
own could ever be a major part of the explanation of past rises in
inequality. Nevertheless, the rising importance of computers, and the
increasing concentration on higher education groups which we have
documented here, implies that computing skills could, if these trends
were to persist and the digital skills gap to widen still further, play
an increasing role in accounting for pay dispersion in the coming years.
(14)
Appendix: Descriptive statistics
Table A1. Means of dependent and independent variables in
tables 2 and 3
Males Females
Log hourly pay 2.39 2.16
Years of education 12.98 12.93
Work experience (yrs) 23.82 23.68
Work experience/100 7.21 7.05
Computing skills 2.09 2.09
Influence skills 2.08 2.00
Proportion (pr) of workers
using computers in establishment:
1/4 <= pr <= 3/4 0.25 0.22
pr > 3/4 0.51 0.56
Table A2. Means of dependent and independent variables
in table 4 and 5
Males Female
1997 2001 2006 1997 2001 2006
Log hourly pay 1.97 2.18 2.39 1.71 1.93 2.17
computing skills 1.78 2.06 2.18 1.72 1.98 2.14
Influence skills 1.93 2.00 2.10 1.71 1.81 2.02
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NOTES
(1) Green et al. (2000) show that the sampling methods used in
SCELI yielded a near-representative sample for Britain, while the other
four surveys were representative by design.
(2) In addition to influence skills, the other skill domains are
labelled: literacy, number, physical, technical know-how, planning,
client communication, horizontal communication, problem-solving,
checking, aesthetic, emotional.
(3) We use title case when we wish to refer specifically to the
index, and lower case when we refer to the underlying concept of
influence skills.
(4) Influence Skills should be distinguished here from autonomy
(which encompasses influence over one's own work). We also include
autonomy as a control in the regressions below.
(5) Unfortunately the EU surveys are only of recent vintage and do
not provide a historical perspective.
(6) There are especially sharp differences among women according to
their status as part-time or full-time workers (Felstead et al., 2007).
(7) Thus, 4 indicates computers are essential and used at an
advanced level, while at the other extreme 0 indicates computers are not
used at all in the job.
(8) In practice, treating the indices separately did not lead to
better-performing earnings functions.
(9) If not in work five years previously, respondents reported
about the past four years or, successively, three years.
(10) For direct comparability, the OLS estimates for the identical
sample used in the IV estimates were 0.144 (0.010) for males and 0.114
(0.010) for females.
(11) Equivalent to 98 per cent and 96 per cent of the standard
deviation for men and for women respectively.
(12) It could be argued that computing skills might also complement
other generic skills. We have checked that the pattern of results shown
here does not alter when computing skills are interacted with all other
generic skills indicators and with autonomy. Moreover, the large
majority of these other interactions are statistically insignificant; we
prefer to exclude them from the analyses here, rather than just include
the few that turn out ad hoc to be significant.
(13) Changing applications on the internet are documented in
Felstead et al. (2007, p. 101).
(14) This paper has been narrowly materialistic in focussing on the
effects of computers on pay. The impact on other variables related to
worker well-being, including job autonomy and job satisfaction, are to
be the focus of subsequent research.
Francis Green, * Alan Felstead, ** Duncan Gallie *** and Ying Zhou
***
* Kent University, e-mail:
[email protected] ** Cardiff
University. *** Nuffield College, Oxford University. The 2006 Skills
Survey on which this paper is partially based was supported by grants
from the Economic and Social Research Council, the Department for
Education and Skills; the Department for Trade and Industry, the
Learning and Skills Council, the Sector Skills Development Agency,
Scottish Enterprise, Futureskills Wales, Highlands and Islands
Enterprise, East Midlands Development Agency, and the Department for
Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland. The analysis reported here is
our responsibility alone and cannot be attributed to any of these
sponsoring organisations or their representatives. Data from other
surveys used are all available at the UK Data Archive.
Table 1. Computing and influence skills, 1997-2006
Centrality Level of Influence
of computing skills (c)
computing (b)
(a)
All employees 1997 33.1 16.1 1.815
2001 41.1 18.0 1.917
2006 49.3 22.6 2.062
Men 1997 29.9 19.9 1.91
2001 40.0 22.4 2.005
2006 47.6 28.2 2.106
Women 1997 36.7 11.8 1.71
2001 42.4 12.9 1.817
2006 51.1 16.8 2.017
Age 20-40 1997 35.1 17.9 1.786
2001 44.2 21.5 1.942
2006 50.8 26.2 2.055
Age 41-60 1997 30.4 13.6 1.856
2001 37.5 13.8 1.888
2006 47.6 18.7 2.071
Education level
No qualifications 1997 13.5 2.5 1.19
2001 15.4 4.6 1.322
2006 20.0 3.8 1.412
NVQ 1 or 1997 22.0 8.5 1.523
equivalent 2001 25.7 4.5 1.501
2006 30.9 10.7 1.546
GCSE grade C 1997 34.8 10.2 1.643
or equivalent 2001 42.1 13.3 1.677
2006 47.4 13.5 1.807
A level or 1997 38.3 19.9 1.879
equivalent 2001 41.4 19.5 1.882
2006 42.9 18.7 1.998
Professional or 1997 37.6 26.7 2.458
vocational 2001 48.7 24.5 2.334
degree 2006 61.6 31.0 2.475
Bachelor's 1997 53.3 38.4 2.585
degree level 2001 60.8 33.7 2.584
or above 2006 70.5 42.4 2.605
Notes: Figures are for employees in England, Wales and Scotland, aged
20-60; excludes those working in private households or
extra-territorial organisations. (a) Percentage reporting use of PC or
other types of computerised equipment to be 'essential' in their job.
(b) Percentage reporting that they use computers at a 'complex' or
'advanced' level. Examples of 'complex' use were: using a computer for
analysing information or design, including use of computer aided design
or statistical analysis packages; an example of 'advanced' use was
using computer syntax and/or formulae for programming. (c) Index
derived from six closely correlated items; see text.
Table 2. The impact of computing and influence skills on hourly pay of
men, 2006
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
Years of 0.061 0.044 0.038
education (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.007)**
Work experience (yrs) 0.041 0.037 0.034
(0.003)** (0.003)** (0.006)**
Work experience squared/100 -0.068 -0.059 -0.053
(0.007)** (0.006)** (0.010)-
Computing skills 0.146 0.187
(0.008)** (0.034)**
Influence skills
(Computing skills) times
(Influence skills)
Proportion (pr) of workers using computers in
establishment:
1/4 <= pr <= 3/4
pr > 3/4
(Influence skills)
times (1/4 <= pr <= 3/4)
(Influence skills)
times (pr > 3/4)
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO NO NO
Observations 2641 2641 1534
R-squared 0.31 0.42
(4) (5)
OLS OLS
Years of 0.035 0.030
education (0.004)** (0.004)**
Work experience (yrs) 0.029 0.029
(0.003)** (0.003)**
Work experience squared/100 -0.045 -0.047
(0.006)** (0.006)**
Computing skills 0.063 0.026
(0.017)** (0.018)
Influence skills 0.011 0.032
(0.021) (0.025)
(Computing skills) times 0.018 0.013
(Influence skills) (0.009)* (0.009)
Proportion (pr) of workers using computers in
establishment:
1/4 <= pr <= 3/4 0.024 0.038
(0.043) (0.042)
pr > 3/4 -0.102 -0.096
(0.054)+ (0.051)+
(Influence skills) 0.006 -0.000
times (1/4 <= pr <= 3/4) (0.025) (0.023)
(Influence skills) 0.094 0.084
times (pr > 3/4) (0.029)** (0.027)**
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO YES
Observations 2641 2641
R-squared 0.47 0.51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10 per
cent; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent.
Weighted regressions. The dependent variable is log hourly pay. All
regressions contain standard controls for workplace size, part-time
status, public/private sector, permanent/temporary contract status,
whether male or female dominated occupation, industry and region.
Column (4) includes also twelve further generic skills indicators
including a measure of autonomy computed from the job requirements
data (see Felstead et al., 2007). Column (3) is run for those who were
in the same job either three, four or five years previously.
Instruments used for IV estimates: whether in past 5 years workplace
has introduced new computing equipment, whether introduced new
communications technology equipment, whether introduced other new
equipment; and whether workplace has downsized. Anderson canonical
correlation LR statistic to test for underidentification test: 153.172,
[chi square](4) (P-value = 0.0000); Cragg-Donald F statistic for weak
identification: 39.220; Hansen J test statistic for overidentification
of all instruments: 0.310, [chi square] (3) P-value = 0.9581.
Table 3. The impact of computing and influence skills on hourly pay
of women, 2006
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
Years of education 0.076 0.064 0.071
(0.004) ** (0.004) ** (0.006) **
Work experience (yrs) 0.029 0.027 0.028
(0.003) ** (0.003) ** (0.004) **
Work experience squared /100 -0.046 -0.043 -0.044
(0.005) ** (0.005) ** (0.007) **
Computing skills 0.109 0.098
(0.008) ** (0.035) **
Influence skills
(Computing skills) times
(Influence skills)
Proportion (pr) of workers using computers
in establishment:
1/4 <= pr <= 3/4
pr > 3/4
(Influence skills)
times (1/4 <= pr <= 3/4)
(Influence skills)
times (pr > 3/4)
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO NO NO
Observations 2852 2852 1652
R-squared 0.41 0.47
(4) (5)
OLS OLS
Years of education 0.048 0.043
(0.004) ** (0.004) **
Work experience (yrs) 0.020 0.020
(0.002) ** (0.002) **
Work experience squared /100 -0.029 -0.03
(0.005) ** (0.005) **
Computing skills 0.032 0.018
(0.014) * (0.015)
Influence skills 0.018 0.040
(0.018) (0.023) +
(Computing skills) times 0.021 0.021
(Influence skills) (0.008) * (0.008) *
Proportion (pr) of workers using computers
in establishment:
1/4 <= pr <= 3/4 -0.006 0.003
(0.041) (0.040)
pr > 3/4 0.009 0.010
-0.042 -0.042
(Influence skills) 0.021 0.018
times (1/4 <= pr <= 3/4) (0.023) (0.023)
(Influence skills) 0.041 0.038
times (pr > 3/4) (0.024) + (0.023)
OTHER SKILLS INDICES NO YES
Observations 2852 2852
R-squared 0.54 0.56
Notes: See table 1. For column (3) Anderson canonical correlation LR
statistic to test for underidentification test: 141.106, [chi square]
(4) (P-value 0.0000); Cragg-Donald F statistic for weak identification:
35.935; Hansen J test statistic for overidentification of all
instruments: 2.004, [chi square] (3) P-value = 0.5716.
Table 4. Returns to computing and influence skills over
time for men
1997 2001 2006
Computing skills 0.077 0.038 0.021
(0.022) ** (0.017) * -0.015
Influence skills 0.129 0.121 0.077
(0.030) ** (0.027) ** (0.022) **
(Computing skills)
times (influence skills) -0.013 0.013 0.025
-0.010 -0.009 (0.007) **
Observations 978 1811 2525
R-squared 0.49 0.45 0.49
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10 per
cent; * significant at 5 per cent; ** significant at 1 per cent.
Weighted regressions; all years refer to population of GB aged 20-60.
The dependent variable is log hourly pay. All regressions include
schooling and a quadratic in work experience and contain standard
controls for workplace size, part-time status, public/private sector,
permanent/temporary contract status, whether male or female
dominated occupation, industry, region and ten further generic skills
indicators including a measure of autonomy computed from the job
requirements data (see Felstead et al., 2007).
Table 5. Returns to computing and influence skills over time for women
1997 2001 2006
Computing skills 0.050 0.053 0.027
(0.017)** (0.015)** (0.014)+
Influence skills 0.125 0.119 0.085
(0.025)** (0.021)** (0.022)**
(Computing skills)
times (influence skills) -0.003 0.003 0.026
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)**
Observations 967 1816 2770
R-squared 0.60 0.50 0.53
Notes: See table 4.