Prospects for the UK economy.
Kirby, Simon ; Barrell, Ray ; Whitworth, Rachel 等
The production of this forecast is supported by the
Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, the
Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of
the NiGEM users group.
Introduction
The performance of the UK economy has deteriorated markedly since
autumn 2010. The volatility of output due to the adverse weather
experienced last winter masks the underlying weakness in the UK economy.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) preliminary estimate of GDP
suggests the underlying level of output has been flat since the third
quarter of 2010. We expect the economy to grow from the second quarter
of this year onwards, as we can see from figure 1, but we continue to
expect this growth to be relatively weak. We expect GDP growth of 1.4
per cent per annum this year; rising to 2 per cent in 2012.
Economic recovery is defined as a period over which the negative
output gap is reduced, which happens when GDP growth is above its trend
(or potential) rate. On this basis the UK economy cannot be said to be
currently in a recovery phase of the economic cycle. We do not expect
the UK to grow more rapidly than the trend rate of 2.1 per cent per
annum until 2013. In that year the level of GDP should finally recover
the pre-recession peak seen in the first quarter of 2008. Output growth
will be weak in part clue to the scale of the fiscal contraction that is
underway and it is difficult to see how it will strengthen significantly
in the short term.
This year and next we expect there to be little contribution from
domestic demand to overall GDP growth. Economic expansion is expected to
be driven by net trade. Over the period 2011-13 we expect it to make its
largest and most sustained contribution to GDP growth since at least
1960 (see figure 2). However, this contribution is not the result of
exceptional export volume growth. As figure 2 shows, contributions to
growth from exports volumes are similar to those seen following
sterling's exit from the ERM and consequent depreciation. The net
trade contribution is strong because the demand for imports from within
the UK is exceptionally weak. The onset of the government's plan
for fiscal consolidation, the impact of increasing commodity prices and
the ending of the stock cycle are all expected to reduce growth in the
demand for imports. In addition the domestically-focused sectors of the
UK economy competing with imports are likely to have received a boost
from price-competitiveness due to the depreciation of the sterling
effective exchange rate since mid-2007.
Consumer spending is likely to decline by 0.6 per cent this year
and this is the major factor behind the weakness in domestic demand
growth. Real personal disposable income is expected to decline by 1.3
per cent in 2011 following the 0.8 per cent fall last year, and this can
be expected to put significant downward pressure on consumer spending.
Households face a number of structural pressures that have implications
for household incomes. These are mainly to do with the impacts of the
economic crisis and oil price increases. The aggregate effect of fiscal
consolidation on household incomes is likely to have little lasting
effect as taxes would have had to be raised at some time in the future
to pay down the debt stock.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
The financial crisis induced a re-pricing of risk, implying a
higher cost of capital for investment. We expect to see two interrelated
outcomes from this, the shift to a lower equilibrium capital stock
implying lower equilibrium real incomes and also an increase in
capital's share of income. In addition, the sharp rise in
unemployment is likely to reduce potential output via the labour market
scar from the experience of unemployment (see Bell and Blanchflower,
2010). As Barrell and Kirby (2011) discussed, overall these effects are
expected to have reduced real output, and hence incomes, by around 4 per
cent. In addition the permanent increase in the oil price of close to
$40 since our October 2010 forecast should result in a permanent loss of
real incomes of around I per cent. Around half of this will come from a
reduction in capacity output because of the increase in oil input
prices. The rest of the effect comes through the terms of trade, given
that a rise in oil prices redistributes incomes from consumers to
producers. The terms of trade since the end of 2007 have proved to be
relatively stable, as export prices have increased in line with import
prices (table A4), despite the depreciation of sterling.
As noted in our January forecast, oil prices were expected to be
$18 a barrel higher than in our October 2010 forecast, adding around 0.7
percentage points to the rate of consumer price inflation in 2011. The
recent turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East has pushed the price
of oil even higher, by an additional $18 a barrel. The further increase
in oil prices is expected to increase the rate of inflation this year by
an additional 0.4 percentage points this year and a similar amount next
year. We expect the rate of CPI inflation to rise towards 5 per cent in
the second half of the year as the effect of rising oil prices feeds
through into consumer prices (figure 3). (1) There is an additional
effect of the increase in the standard rate of VAT. The ONS has
estimated that the immediate pass-through has been around 0.76
percentage points, similar to the figure implied by the Bank of
England's Agents" Summary of Business Conditions. Clearly,
even in the absence of the VAT increase, inflation in the UK is expected
to have persisted above target throughout the year.
The current state of the economy--weak GDP growth and increasing
rates of inflation--poses a dilemma for the MPC. In the longer term, if
underlying real interest rates are 3 per cent and the inflation target
is 2 per cent, we should expect to see nominal interest rates of around
5 per cent, and hence we should expect rates to rise at some point as
the economy recovers. The current stance of monetary policy is loose and
tightening does need to commence, especially given the current rate of
inflation. It is likely that, in the absence of fiscal tightening on the
scale planned for this year, the MPC would have already increased rates.
We would suggest that fiscal policy is too tight and monetary policy too
loose. However, it would he wrong to suggest that the effects on output
of looser fiscal policy would be completely offset by those from tighter
monetary policy. The effect of fiscal policy on output feeds through
more quickly than do changes in monetary policy, and a rebalancing would
strengthen growth in the short term. The looseness of monetary policy
raises the risks to future inflation rather than impacts on the current
level, but in current conditions we would not expect to see a rapid
tightening.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Market expectations for interest rates have moved markedly since
our January 2011 forecast was completed. Yield curves imply that the MPC
will raise interest rates just twice this year and in our forecast we
have followed that pattern. As figure 4 shows, the Government liability
yield curve implies these increases will occur in September and December
of this year. Figure 4 also highlights how market expectations have
moved since the summer of 2010. One of the main concerns for the MPC
seems to be the risk of inflation expectations shifting, diminishing the
effectiveness of monetary policy. While household inflation expectations
for twelve months ahead have continued to rise, they are not out of line
with actual inflation, as we can see from figure 5. Certainly the
regular pay component of Average Weekly Earnings (a measure of
underlying pay pressures) suggests that nominal wages increased by 2.2
per cent per annum in the three months to February, suggesting that real
wages are still falling. As figure A1 shows, this weakness in wage
growth is in both the private and public sectors. But concerns with
regard to the anchor on inflation expectations should not be entirely
dismissed. As we show in Box A, a drift of 1 per cent in inflation
expectations for one year will feed into wage bargains and raise
inflation by about 0.25 percentage points in that year even if the Bank
of England reacts.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
Fiscal policy has changed little since our January forecast. This
year's Budget introduced a plethora of discretionary policy
decisions. However, the overall effect is expected to be fiscally
neutral. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) continues to expect
the main target of the Chancellor's Fiscal Mandate to be met. The
OBR has revised its forecast for the balance on the current budget from
a surplus of 0.3 to a deficit of 0.2 per cent of GDP. Such revisions are
well within the margins of forecast error, but almost all this downward
revision is cyclical rather than structural and hence it suggests that
the Chancellor's primary fiscal target is still likely to be met.
(2) In contrast, with the overall plan unchanged, we continue to expect
the Chancellor to miss his target, as we expect tax revenues to be
structurally weaker than does the OBR.
Prices and earnings
The annual rate of CPI inflation has continued to deviate from
target, reaching 4.4 per cent in February 2011. Throughout 2010 the rate
of CPI inflation was more than 1 percentage point above the 2 per cent
target rate. Since January, however, inflation has been 2 percentage
points or more above target. Even in the absence of the increase in the
standard rate of VAT, the rate of inflation would have been more than 1
percentage point above target. Oil price movements since the start of
the year suggest inflation will continue to rise in the short term.
The ONS attributes upward pressure in the latest CPI figures to
housing and household services as well as vehicle purchases, and notably
pump prices which rose by 2.7 per cent between February and March
reaching record levels of 1.32 [pounds sterling] per litre for petrol
and 1.38 [pounds sterling] per litre for diesel. Clearly rising fuel
costs reflect the increased price of oil, which has been a contributory
factor underlying inflationary pressures globally over the past year,
and has fed into UK inflation through import price inflation and input
costs. We estimate the world oil price to be $23 per barrel above our
October 2010 forecast in the first quarter of 2011. The average of Brent
Crude and Dubai prices recorded over 63 [pounds sterling] per barrel for
both February and March, representing an increase of 7.26 [pounds
sterling] from December. Inflationary pressures from oil prices are set
to continue in the near future. Our forecast for the world oil price,
which reflects information from futures markets, suggests that the oil
price will rise by a further 20 per cent this quarter. However, such
rates of growth are not expected to persist into next year, suggesting
the strong contribution from oil prices is only temporary.
Box A. The drifting anchor
Inflation expectations play an important role in wage setting both
in NiGEM and in the world. We presume that labour markets equate
supply and demand, and that real wages are set in relation to
long-run factors mediated by unemployment and productivity, but
that in the short term expectations of and outturns for inflation
affect the dynamics of adjustment to the equilibrium. Our wage
equations are based on those in Barrell and Duty (2003) and can be
described as Layard-Nickell bargaining equations. They are normally
operated under model consistent rational expectations where
bargainers expect the outcome they will observe, but it is possible
to endogenously shock that expectation, drifting it away from the
rational expectations level. We have undertaken a simple experiment
where expected inflation endogenously increases by I percentage
point for one year and then becomes rational again. This feeds into
the wage bargain and raises wages. This will in turn reduce
employment and output as the increase in wages is not justified by
the underlying equilibrium. The Bank of England is presumed to know
all this will happen and will immediately raise policy rates to
help offset it. Exchange rates are forward looking in the
experiment and hence sterling jumps up marginally.
Figure A plots the paths for output, inflation and the policy rate
in our experiment. After an exchange rate induced minor fall,
inflation rises by up to a 1/4 of a percentage point as a result of
the I percentage point drift in the anchor. The effect is held in
check in part by the rise in interest rates (if they were constant
the effect would be noticeably higher). Output weakens because of
the increase in interest rates and the exchange rate.
[FIGURE A OMITTED]
Earnings growth remains subdued in the UK. Annual earnings growth
for total pay moderated to 2 per cent in the three months to February,
following 2.3 per cent for the previous three-month period ending in
January. Excluding bonuses provides us with a measure of underlying wage
growth. On this basis wage growth was 2.2 per cent per annum in the
three months to February, representing a more modest decline than for
total pay. The difference between the two measures can largely be
explained by the sharp contraction in bonus payments in the public
sector.
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
Annual growth in total earnings was 1.3 per cent in February, which
is far below the 4.4 per cent annual growth of the CPI, and even further
below the 5.3 per cent growth of the RPI. Figure 6 plots growth in real
average weekly earnings on a monthly basis, deflated by the CPI and RPI,
respectively. The sudden upward surge in real average earnings growth in
the RPI measure in 2008-9 reflects a drop in RPI inflation over a period
of several months due to falling housing costs associated with reduced
mortgage interest payments following reductions in Bank Rate by the MPC,
as well as house price depreciation. However since mid-2009 both
measures of real earnings have been falling steadily. As Holland et al.
(2010) note, downwards pressure on real pay growth has been a key factor
in softening the impact of the recession on unemployment. We expect both
real consumer and producer wages to continue to fall this year.
Demand
Domestic demand growth was robust throughout most of 2010,
recording quarterly growth rates of around 0.8 to 1 per cent, but the
fourth quarter recorded almost no growth. We can decompose the growth of
domestic demand into contributions from each of its components, as shown
for the third and fourth quarters of 2010 in figure 7, and it is clear
that the comparatively strong growth in domestic demand in the third
quarter of 2010 was driven by gross fixed investment and the change in
inventories, with small negative contributions from consumer spending
and government consumption expenditure. The weakness of demand growth in
the final quarter of that year was due to a sharp fall in gross fixed
investment and a further decline in consumer spending. As figure 7
shows, the continued strength of the contribution from the change in
inventories prevented overall domestic demand from contracting in the
final quarter of last year. In addition, government consumption made a
positive, albeit small, contribution to demand growth in that quarter.
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
We have incorporated data revisions for government consumption in
2010 into our latest forecast. The OBR left the outlook for the level of
government consumption unchanged. We have followed this approach in our
forecast. Given the outturns for 2010, this implies a modest increase in
real government consumption in the first quarter of this year, but this
is not expected to persist. Rather, with the implementation of real cuts
in departmental current expenditures, we expect year-on-year government
consumption to fall from the second quarter of this year onwards, with
the annual rate of decline averaging 1 1/2 per cent over the next five
years.
Export volumes growth has surged at the start of this year. Goods
export volumes grew by a quarterly rate of 4.1 per cent in the three
months to February. Folk)wing the sharp fall in export volumes over the
period 2008 to 2009 as most advanced economies entered recession and
global trade collapsed, goods export volumes have almost recovered to
the level last seen in the third quarter of 2008. However, they are
still currently 1 per cent below their recent peak in the second quarter
of 2008.
The recovery in export growth has been dominated by demand from
outside the European Union, as figure 8 illustrates. Although exports to
both EU and non-EU groups of countries have been recovering since 2009,
for EU demand this recovery still represents a gradual approach to the
pre-recession level, whereas non-EU demand surpassed its pre-recession
level in June 2010 and has been strong ever since. Over this period
there was a fall in exports to EU countries, which are now 4.1 per cent
below pre-recession level. The narrowing of the UK trade deficit for
goods and services last month resulted from non-EU exports more than
compensating for weak EU exports.
Much of the external demand from non-EU countries for UK goods and
services has been from the US and this has occurred despite the sharp
contraction in US import volumes at the end of last year. Exports of
goods to non-EU countries rose by 3.2 billion [pounds sterling]
(seasonally adjusted) over the period from December to February
inclusive, and the US accounted for 23.3 per cent of that increase. The
October 2010 issue of the Review noted that this shift in market
structure towards trade with non-EU economies is likely to be permanent,
as output in many of these (particularly non-OECD) economies does not
appear to be scarred by the crisis. The latest data confirms this. We
expect around 7 per cent growth in export volumes this year, dropping
back somewhat over the medium term.
The sterling effective exchange rate has depreciated by around 20
per cent between mid-2007 and the end of 2010. We would expect this to
produce a significant boost to export volumes due to gains in price
competitiveness. However, UK exporters seem to have taken the
opportunity to widen their profit margins rather than expand sales. Over
the course of the financial crisis this could well have been a rational
response to liquidity concerns and uncertain future demand. However,
throughout 2010 the pattern of boosting profit margins has been
maintained. This is clear from the fact that the gains in price
competitiveness have been significantly less than the depreciation of
sterling. Such boosts to profit margins could be behind the surge in the
manufacturing sector's net rate of return on capital at the end of
last year. This figure increased to 10.4 per cent, the highest rate of
return enjoyed by the sector since the first quarter of 2008. We do not
expect the widening in profit margins at the expense of volume growth to
continue. Rather, we assume markets broadly work and that the
depreciation of sterling will lead to relatively robust export volumes
growth. Figure 9 plots growth in UK export volumes against growth in
import demand in UK export markets, and illustrates that, historically,
growth in UK export markets is slightly higher than growth in exports,
indicating a gradual loss of market share. Over the next few years we
expect some of the recent loss in market share beyond general
developments in UK export markets to be regained.
[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]
Household sector
Throughout 2008 and 2009 real disposable income growth remained
robust despite the recession, However, in 2010 real disposable incomes
fell by 0.8 per cent, the first annual fall since 1981. In per capita
terms they fell by 1.3 per cent and this is the largest fall since at
least 1972 (figure 10). Employee compensation is the largest component
of household incomes. Real compensation has been declining year-on-year
since 2008. Real disposable incomes have not fallen in line due to the
movement in other components of household income (figure 11). In 2009
cuts in indirect taxes and reductions in net interest payments helped
boost real incomes. Increases in indirect taxes have reduced real income
in 2010 and 2011. Real consumer wages fell by 1.6 per cent between the
third and fourth quarters of 2010 and by 1.3 per cent through 2010 as a
whole. We expect real consumer wages to fall by a further 2.4 per cent
this year as wage growth remains subdued in the face of a weak labour
market. Real disposable incomes are expected to decline sharply, by 1.3
per cent, this year, in part due to the impact of tax increases that
have come into effect in the first half of this year. We do not expect
falls in real incomes to persist. As the rate of inflation eases back
and productivity growth in the UK in general recovers, real wages are
expected to grow by around 1 3/4-2 1/2 per cent per annum over the
period 2012-15. Real incomes are expected to grow at around 2-3 per cent
per annum. However, future tax increases in order to ensure the deficit
reduction target of the Chancellor's Fiscal Mandate pose a downside
risk to our forecast for real disposable income growth. We expect the
level of real disposable incomes to reach their recent peak, seen in the
final quarter of 2008, in 2013.
[FIGURE 10 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]
The average quarterly growth rate in the volume of retail sales in
the decade prior to the recession was 0.9 per cent. At the start of this
year retail sales growth was significantly weaker than this. In the
three months to Marcia the volumes of retail sales grew by just 0.3 per
cent from the three months to December 2010. The rate of growth in the
first quarter of the year should include some rebound in sales after the
negative effect of the adverse weather at the end of last year, implying
the underlying growth rate is even weaker.
Retail sales only account for around one third of consumer spending
in the UK. Figure 12 illustrates quarterly percentage changes in
consumer spending and total retail sales volumes since 2000. Growth in
consumer spending as a whole has been similar but slightly less volatile
than growth in retail sales, although this relationship has broken down
somewhat over the course of the recession, where consumption plummeted
by 1.6 per cent in the final quarter of 2008. The 2 per cent decline in
retail sales volumes at the start of 2010 did not have an overly strong
impact on consumption, which declined by just 0.2 per cent. But consumer
spending has remained weak since, recording a 0.3 per cent decline in
the final quarter of 2010. Our forecast is for consumer spending to fall
by 0.6 per cent this year, due to a further fall in real incomes. We
expect consumer spending to grow from 201.2 onwards at an accelerating
pace, in line with the recovery to real disposable income growth.
[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]
The household saving rate was broadly unchanged between the third
and fourth quarters of 2010, reaching 5.4 per cent for the latter. This
is significantly higher than the pre-recession rates of household saving
which tended to lie in the 2-3 per cent range. It is possible that: we
have seen a rise in precautionary saving in response to the perception
of a more uncertain future. We expect the saving rate to fall to around
5 per cent in the first half of 2011, from 5.5 per cent in the second
half of 2010, as households try to minimise any impacts on their
standards of living from the fall in real personal disposable income.
But from the second half of this year we expect the average propensity
to save to begin to rise. We expect the saving rate to continue to rise
towards 7 3/4 per cent by 2015. This is in part a response to the
weakness in the housing market as households may no longer be able to
rely on growth in house prices as the key contributor to boosting
household wealth.
The March 2011 Housing Market Survey from the Royal Institute of
Chartered Surveyors confirms that weakness in the housing market has
continued into the start of 2011. Both new buyer enquiries and new
vendor instructions remain restrained, while the Halifax and Nationwide
house price indices suggest house price growth in the first quarter of
this year continued to be subdued. Our preferred measure of house prices
is the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG)
mix-adjusted index. This measure has yet to record declines in nominal
house prices. The Halifax and Nationwide indices lead the DCLG,
suggesting the DCLG measure of house prices will report nominal annual
falls in its level over the coming months.
We expect the housing market to remain weak over the coming three
years, and expect nominal house prices to decline by 0.3 per cent on
last year's figure. We expect nominal house prices to fall by 1 per
cent in 2012. From 2014 onwards our projection shows house prices rising
in nominal terms. In real terms, however, the picture is significantly
weaker. We expect real house prices to fall by 4.5 per cent in 2011 and
by an average of 1 1/2 per cent per annum over the subsequent four
years. In the medium term, as inflation returns to its 2 per cent
target, our forecast is for real house prices to level off at around 20
per cent below their peak in the first quarter of 2008. Real house price
growth will be held back as interest rates are expected to rise in the
future and loans are expected to be less freely available than before
the crisis (see Barrell, Kirby and Whitworth in this Review).
[FIGURE 13 OMITTED]
One noticeable feature of the housing market in this recession, in
comparison to the recession of the early 1990s, is that the rate of
mortgage arrears has increased relatively moderately. Figure 13 plots
the percentage of total outstanding mortgages more than six months in
arrears. At the peak, the percentage of households defaulting on their
mortgage obligations was just over a third of the peak in 1992. Interest
rates were very high in 1992 and the difference in arrears is
attributable to the Bank of England's response to the crisis. The
figure shows that mortgage arrears had begun to rise in 2008 but soon
after the Bank began to make aggressive cuts to the policy rate, the
increase in mortgage arrears began to stall and even fall slightly as
Bank Rate remained at 0.5 per cent. Decreases in Bank Rate feed through
into mortgage contracts, making servicing debt obligations more
affordable for households (see figure AS). The Bank of England's
Credit Conditions Survey suggests that mortgage arrears have risen in
the first quarter of this year and that lenders expect the rate of
mortgage arrears to continue to rise in the second quarter. If these
survey results are born out in the data then it will be of particular
concern, especially given that this is occurring before mortgage rates
have even begun to rise. It is quite probable that we will see further
increases in the rate of mortgage arrears as interest rates rise to more
'normal' levels over the course of the next five years.
Supply conditions
Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors experienced sharp
falls in their capital expenditures over the period 2008-9. By the end
of 2009 the volume of manufacturing investment had fallen by 30.9 per
cent from the level seen in the first quarter of 2008. Non-manufacturing
capital expenditures declined by 23 per cent over the same period. The
volume of both manufacturing and non-manufacturing capital expenditures
began to grow in 2010. Even so, the average level of manufacturing
investment in 201.0 was 5.1 per cent below the level in 2009. The sharp
fall in manufacturing investment in 2009 is most likely due to the sharp
fall in exports as global trade collapsed. One of the key drivers of
investment decisions is future demand and it is unsurprising that
capital expenditures experienced such a sharp fall.
Conditions for business investment are improving. The gains in
price competitiveness for the UK's external sector should raise the
demand for capital investment in the manufacturing sector. In addition,
the recent increase in the net rate of return on capital in the
manufacturing sector should also stimulate investment. Nonmanufacturing
investment should also continue to expand. Real interest rates are
currently negative, lower than at any point since the late 1970s. The
price of investment goods continues to grow at a lower rate than general
price inflation. In addition, large firms have significant amounts of
cash on their balance sheets. Such factors should lead to a significant
surge in business investment. However, major risks to the outlook for
demand remain. Uncertainties about the spillover from sovereign debt
crises in the Euro Area, and the rise in oil prices, are probably
causing some hesitancy on the part of firms when it comes to capital
expenditure plans. We should also note that there is a significant
amount of spare capacity in the UK at the moment. Manufacturing output
is still around 8.4 per cent below the pre-recession peak in the first
quarter of 2008. Clearly, there is capacity available to meet any
pick-up in demand, despite responses to the CBI's Industrial Trends
survey and the Bank of England's Agents' Summary of Business
Conditions, which both suggest limited spare capacity in the production
sector. In addition, the permanent increase hi the user cost of capital
implies a downward shift in the equilibrium capital-output ratio in the
UK (Haugh, Olivaud and Turner, 2009). Additionally, the lack of
corporate insolvencies means that less of the UK's capital stock
was permanently lost than in previous recessions. We expect business
investment to increase by 6 1/2 per cent per annum this year, before
rising by between 4 1/2-5 per cent per annum between 2012 and 2015.
Unemployment fell back at the start of 2011, but the monthly labour
market statistics are quite volatile. We expect unemployment to rise
this year due to a decline in demand for employees, as employers raise
their labour input through hours worked rather than the number of their
employees. The three months ending in January 2011 saw 1.4 per cent
growth in total employment on the same three months of the previous
year, which represented the recessionary trough in employment. This
increase is almost entirely due to growing employment in part-time
positions, which saw a year-on-year increase of 3.3 per cent for the
same three months, whereas full-time employment increased by only 0.6
per cent. The demographic dynamics behind this change are also notable,
as there was a far greater increase in employment among men (1.9 per
cent) than among women (0.7 per cent). In particular, there was a large
increase in men employed in part-time positions (6.5 per cent). There
was also an increase in women in part-time positions, but more
significantly the amount of women in full-time employment actually
declined over this period.
[FIGURE 14 OMITTED]
Total employment in the UK is now only 1.4 per cent below its
recent peak, seen in the second quarter of 2008. Figure 14 plots the
progress made in employment relative to the recessions of the 1980s and
1990s. We expect employment to recover to its pre-recession levels in
the third quarter of 2013, which is one/two years faster than following
the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. This is likely to
happen despite job losses due to the government's fiscal
consolidation plans over the next few years. The relative strength of
employment in this recession reflects the response of real wages
discussed above.
As shown in figure 15, labour productivity, as measured by output
per worker and output per hours worked, has not yet recovered to its
pre-recession peak. Productivity fell sharply over the course of the
recession, and falls in labour productivity in a period of declining
demand imply that labour hoarding has been taking place. In the US, this
has not occurred, and contrarily labour productivity has actually risen.
Labour hoarding imposes a cost on the economy in terms of input costs to
firms. The response of real product wages in the UK, in comparison to
the US, explains why this hoarding was able to take place; the relative
flexibility in UK real wages has enabled firms to lower input costs and
retain some part of their work forces. Average hours worked also fell
over the course of recession, but not in line with demand. The reduction
in employee working hours is another mode by which firms have been able
to retain employees, which is confirmed by the rise in part-time
employment as against full-time employment as discussed above. We expect
productivity growth, measured by both output per worker and output per
hour worked, to be weak over the coming few years, and the pre-recession
peak for each will be reached in 2013.
[FIGURE 15 OMITTED]
Productivity in the manufacturing sector, on the other hand, has
been robust. Output per manufacturing job recorded annualised growth
rates of 6.1 per cent through the first half of 2010 and this rose to
7.5 per cent through the second half. Output per hour in the sector has
recorded annualised growth rates ranging between 3.4 and 5.5 per cent
over 2010, which is still robust but somewhat less than the alternative
measure of productivity. This suggests that increases in labour input in
the manufacturing sector have arisen through increased hours worked
rather than increases in the number of jobs.
Public finances
The recent Budget contained a significant number of policy
announcements but, unsurprisingly, was broadly fiscally neutral. The
Chancellor announced a number of tax changes. The most significant was
the reform of fuel duties, offset by an increase in the supplementary
charge on the oil and gas sector. (3) The Chancellor expects the reform
of fuel duty to cost the Exchequer around 2 billion [pounds sterling]
per annum in 2011-12. The delayed implementation of the increase in line
with the RPI means that the cost is expected to fall to 1.6 billion
[pounds sterling] in 2012-.13 and then rise to 1.7 billion [pounds
sterling] in 2013-14 and 2.1 billion [pounds sterling] in each of fiscal
years 2014-15 and 2015-16. The revenue gains from the supplementary
charge are expected to be between 1.8 billion [pounds sterling] and 2.2
billion [pounds sterling] over the next five fiscal years. Given the
OBR's oil price projection, this shift in tax is permanent over the
next five years. The reduction in the main rate of corporation tax is
welcome, helping to reduce the cost of capital faced by firms. However,
the effect of a further 1 percentage point reduction in the rate of
corporation tax on top of last June's plans will have only a modest
effect. Lost revenues will amount to around 1 billion [pounds sterling]
per annum by 2014-15. The Chancellor has turned to measures to limit tax
avoidance and evasion to ensure the fiscal neutrality of his Budget.
These measures are expected to raise additional revenues of around 1.3
billion [pounds sterling] by 2015-16. We must wait and see if outturns
match what the Chancellor expects.
We assume that the expenditure plans for resource departmental
expenditures in current and capital terms are broadly met over the
course of the current Spending Review period (2011-12 to 2014-15). The
other components of spending are endogenously determined in our global
econometric model NiGEM. These are broadly unchanged in comparison to
our January forecast, as are Government bond yields in the UK. Higher
rates of inflation in the second half of this year will raise the level
of expenditure on social security payments from next fiscal year onwards
by around 2-3 billion [pounds sterling] per annum. Tax receipts are also
endogenously determined with our model NiGEM. They grow in line with the
tax base, adjusting tax rates due to announced policy changes. Indirect
tax receipts are expected to be around 4 billion [pounds sterling] lower
than in our January forecast in each year from 2011-12. Around half of
this is due to weaker than expected tax receipts from last year that we
assume will persist. The additional 2 billion [pounds sterling]
reduction is due to announced policy changes, in particular the
introduction of the fair fuel stabiliser. Taxes on incomes are weaker
going forward than we previously projected, despite a boost to tax
revenues from taxes paid by the oil and gas sector, due to the increase
in the supplementary charge and higher oil prices. In particular, we
expect weaker direct taxes from households, in part because of the
negative effect of high oil prices on the economy, but also because we
have assumed some of the weakness in the effective tax take on household
incomes at the end of last year persists.
These changes, in aggregate, are relatively modest. From 2011-12
onwards the deficit on the current budget is expected to be around 1/2
per cent of GDP larger in each fiscal year than previously projected.
(4) Given that the forecast for net investment is little changed, our
forecast for public sector net borrowing has also increased by around
1/2 per cent of GDP in each fiscal year. 'The OBR has revised its
projections by a similar amount to 2015-16, and now expects a deficit on
the current budget of 0.2 per cent of GDP, rather than a surplus of 0.3
per cent of GDP. The OBR has assumed that the adjustments to the
forecast are cyclical. As such the OBR expects the surplus on the
cyclically-adjusted current budget to remain at just under 1 per cent of
GDP. On the basis of our forecast we do not expect the Chancellor to hit
his fiscal target of a balanced cyclically adjusted budget in five
years' time. But the benefit of the new fiscal framework is that
the Chancellor has time to respond. Indeed this benefit would have
allowed the Chancellor to have temporarily boosted demand in this Budget
through targeted temporary tax cuts. We do not think that missing the
fiscal target by a small margin would affect 'confidence' and
we would not advocate any further tightening over the next couple of
years.
Accumulation
When national saving is below the level of investment in an
economy, finance from abroad is required and is observed in the form of
a current account deficit. This gives no indication as to whether the
level of investment is too high or low; it simply highlights the fact
that national saving is not high enough to fund investment. The figures
presented in table A9 show saving and investment, as a per cent of GDP,
on a sectoral basis and gross of depreciation.
Gross fixed investment was the equivalent of 14.9 per cent of GDP
in 2010. If we assume a depreciation rate of 5 per cent and that
potential growth is around 2.1 per cent per annum over the medium term,
then this scale of investment is enough to maintain the capital--output
ratio at 2.1. In the few years prior to the onset of the financial
crisis the UK capital-output ratio was around this figure. In 2009 it
rose to 2.3, but this was due to a fall in the denominator. Investment
below 1.4.9 per cent of GDP will bring the capital-output ratio down
more sharply. We expect to see investment, as a share of GDP, weaken
over the next few years before rising back to 14.9 per cent in 2015 and
hence the capital output ratio will fall. The softening in investment is
due. in part, to government investment falling back to around 1.3 per
cent of GDP from 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2010, as current government
spending plans suggest. ]'he implication of this is that we see
little support for an investment 'boom' beyond the pace of
growth presented in table A6. If the depreciation rate, potential growth
or the desired capital-output ratio proves to be higher, then the rate
of growth in gross fixed investment will need to be even more robust
than we currently project.
If the investment needs of the UK are to be met domestically then
saving in the UK is too low. The simultaneous financial retrenchment of
the household and government sectors of the economy are expected to
increase national saving from 12.4 per cent of GDP in 2010 to almost 16
per cent of GDP in 2015. Given that capital consumption is the
equivalent of 10 per cent of GDP in the UK, net national saving is
expected to increase to a more modest level, rising from 0.8 per cent of
GDP in 2009 to 5 per cent by 2015. In order to maintain national wealth
constant as a ratio to income, net national saving would have to stay
around this level permanently. However, the level of national wealth is
probably too low for the UK's needs, especially those associated
with retirement. Saving in excess of investment is needed in countries
with ageing populations, such as the UK. Failing to increase the rate of
saving without reform of future pension commitments will pose future
fiscal problems on an increasing scale. The government appears to
recognise problems with regard to future pension commitments. The
consultation on pension reform includes a suggestion to uprate state
pension ages automatically in line with rising life expectancy. Such a
move would help to ease the fiscal burden from the expected future
increases in life expectancy (see Department for Work and Pensions,
2011).
The medium term
Our estimate of the trend rate of GDP growth in the UK over the
medium term is around 2.1 per cent per annum. This is significantly
below the trend rate of growth of around 2.6 per cent in the ten years
prior to 2008. Trend growth is determined by capital and labour inputs
and growth in total factor productivity, which in turn is determined by
factor input augmenting technical progress. We assume the re-pricing of
risk that has raised the user cost of capital is permanent, implying a
period of capital shallowing over the medium term. Labour force growth
is expected to moderate over the medium term mainly due to a slowdown in
the net inward migration (see Barrell et al., 2009). Statements by
government suggest that limiting migration is one of the
government's current aims. If successful, this could well reduce
the trend rate of growth even further. However, given that emigration
and much inward migration (from EU citizens and returning UK citizens),
is beyond the direct control of government, it is possible that net
inward migration will continue to be higher than we assume, raising the
labour force and the trend rate of growth.
The increases in the labour force would have been even lower, but
for the increase in the state pension age for women currently taking
place. The government has announced its intention to raise the state
pension age to 66 over the period 2018-20, effectively bringing forward
this planned increase from 2024 to 2026. The effect of this increase in
the state pension age will make little difference to the forecast
presented in table A10. However, it should raise trend growth for the
period 2020-25. (5) If the current discussion about how best to raise
the state pension age in the future (see Department for Work and
Pensions, 2011) results in a more rapid increase in the state pension
age than currently planned, then we should expect to see the trend rate
of growth raised even further.
We expect above trend growth over the medium term as the UK's
negative output gap of around 4 per cent is closed. It is a gradual
process, in part because the fiscal consolidation programme inhibits
growth over the next five years. We expect GDP growth to be around 0.4
percentage points above trend in the medium term. The medium-term view
for the UK is a shift to a more balanced economy, with more national
saving and less current consumption, as we can see from the return of
the current account to surplus by 2014, the first since 1983. Of course
the UK could experience more rapid growth over the medium term. Stronger
consumer spending growth fuelled by lower saving and possibly rising
debt relative to incomes would close the output gap more rapidly. More
rapid growth would improve the position of the public finances by more
than we project. In addition, consumer spending is tax rich relative to
other components of expenditure, implying an even more rapid reduction
in the structural budget deficit in this scenario. However, lower levels
of household saving may not be wise.
Growth in output could be noticeably more rapid if we were to see
significant increases in housebuilding. This could result from the
effects of the suggestions from reforms to the planning system contained
in the government's Plan for Growth. If this were to result in a
significant expansion of housebuilding then both actual and trend GDP
growth could be higher than forecast. Dow (1998) suggested that a
housebuilding boom was one of the main contributory factors to the first
phase of the UK's recovery from the Great Depression. However,
planning reform is very problematic and there may be immovable objects
holding it back.
Public sector net borrowing is expected to average around 2.6 per
cent of GDP over the period 2016-20, returning borrowing to the level
last seen in 2007. Public sector net debt will fall gradually as a per
cent of GDP. At some point in the future the government will sell its
equity stakes in the nationalised banks. It would be wise to use such
windfalls to reduce government debt if we are to be fair to future
generations and prepare for the next crisis.
DOI: 10.1177/0027950111411373
Appendix--Forecast details
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[FIGURE A8 OMITTED]
[FIGURE A9 OMITTED]
[FIGURE A10 OMITTED]
Table A1. Exchange rates and interest rates
FTSE
UK exchange rates All-share
index
Effective Dollar Euro
2005 = 100
2005 100.00 1.82 1.46 2587.6
2006 100.75 1.84 1.47 3022.6
2007 102.89 2.00 1.46 3306.3
2008 90.69 1.85 1.26 2728.0
2009 81.16 1.57 1.12 2326.0
2010 81.01 1.55 1.17 2818.3
2011 80.55 1.b2 1.14 3098.0
2012 80.74 1.63 1.14 3073.0
2013 81.58 1.62 1.16 3167.4
2014 82.31 1.62 1.17 3303.0
2015 83.07 1.62 1.18 3451.7
2010 Q1 80.05 1.56 1.13 2778.8
2010 Q2 80.40 1.49 1.17 27b5.9
2010 Q3 82.50 1.55 1.20 2744.2
2010 Q4 81.09 1.58 1.16 2984.1
2011 Q1 81.50 1.60 1.17 3085.1
2011 Q2 80.14 1.63 1.13 3116.4
2011 Q3 80.24 1.63 1.13 3099.2
2011 Q4 80.24 1.63 1.13 3091.3
2012 Q1 80.43 1.63 1.14 3079.5
2012 Q2 80.64 1.63 1.14 3064.8
2012 Q3 80.85 1.63 1.14 3063.6
2012 Q4 81.06 1.62 1.15 3084.2
Percentage changes
2005/2004 -1.6 -0.7 -0.9 15.0
2006/2005 0.7 1.3 0.4 16.8
2007/2006 2.1 8.6 -0.4 9.4
2008/2007 -11.9 -7.4 -14.0 -17.5
2009/2008 -10.5 -15.5 -10.6 -14.7
2010/2009 -0.2 -1.2 3.8 21.2
201l/2010 -O.6 4.9 -2.1 9.9
2012/2011 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.8
2013/2012 1.0 -Q.3 1.3 3.1
2014/2013 0.9 -0.2 1.2 4.3
2015/2014 0.9 0.0 1.1 4.5
2010Q4/2009Q1 0.3 -3.3 5.2 11.3
2011Q4/2010Q1 -1.1 3.0 -2.6 3.6
2012Q4/2011Q1 1.0 -0.3 1.2 -0.2
Interest rates
3-month Mortgage 10-year World (a)
rates interest gilts
2005 4.7 6.5 4.4 3.1
2006 4.8 6.5 4.5 4.0
2007 6.0 7.4 5.0 4.6
2008 5.5 6.9 4.5 3.4
2009 1.2 4.0 3.7 1.1
2010 0.7 4.0 3.6 1.0
2011 1.0 4.3 3.7 1.3
2012 1.6 4.8 4.0 2.1
2013 2.5 5.5 4.3 3.0
2014 3.2 5.9 4.5 3.6
2015 3.5 6.l 4.7 4.1
2010 Q1 0.6 4.1 4.1 0.9
2010 Q2 0.7 4.0 3.7 1.0
2010 Q3 0.8 3.9 3.2 1.0
2010 Q4 0.8 3.9 3.3 1.0
2011 Q1 0.8 4.1 3.7 1.0
2011 Q2 0.8 4.1 3.7 1.3
2011 Q3 1.0 4.4 3.7 1.4
2011 Q4 1.2 4.6 3.8 1.5
2012 Q1 1.2 4.6 3.9 1.8
2012 Q2 1.5 4.8 4.0 2.0
2012 Q3 1.7 4.9 4.1 2.3
2012 Q4 1.9 5.1 4.2 2.5
Percentage changes
2005/2004
2006/2005
2007/2006
2008/2007
2009/2008
2010/2009
201l/2010
2012/2011
2013/2012
2014/2013
2015/2014
2010Q4/2009Q1
2011Q4/2010Q1
2012Q4/2011Q1
Interest
rates
Bank
Rate (b)
2005 4.50
2006 5.00
2007 5.50
2008 2.00
2009 0.50
2010 0.50
2011 1.00
2012 2.00
2013 2.75
2014 3.25
2015 3.75
2010 Q1 0.50
2010 Q2 0.50
2010 Q3 0.50
2010 Q4 0.50
2011 Q1 0.50
2011 Q2 0.50
2011 Q3 0.75
2011 Q4 1.00
2012 Q1 1.25
2012 Q2 1.50
2012 Q3 l.75
2012 Q4 2.00
Percentage changes
2005/2004
2006/2005
2007/2006
2008/2007
2009/2008
2010/2009
201l/2010
2012/2011
2013/2012
2014/2013
2015/2014
2010Q4/2009Q1
2011Q4/2010Q1
2012Q4/2011Q1
Notes: We assume chat bilateral exchange rates for the fourth quarter
of this year are the average of the first two weeks of April. We then
assume that bilateral rates remain constant for the final two quarters
of 2011 before moving in-line with the path implied by the backward-
looking uncovered interest rate parity condition based on interest
rate differentials relative to the US. (a) Weighted average of central
bank intervention rates in OECD economies. (b) End of period.
Table A2. Price indices
2006=100
Unit Imports Exports Whole-
labour deflator deflator sale price
costs index (a)
2005 97.7 97.1 97.2 98.5
2006 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007 102.7 100.2 101.6 101.4
2008 105.1 112.1 113.7 105.1
2009 111.2 116.2 116.8 107.7
2010 113.0 121.3 121.9 111.0
2011 113.7 132.0 130.1 114.8
2012 115.5 134.9 131.3 118.8
2013 117.9 135.0 132.2 121.5
2014 120.2 136.6 133.8 123.7
2015 122.2 138.7 135.7 126.0
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.6 3.7 1.0 1.0
2006/2005 2.4 2.9 2.8 1.5
2007/2006 2.7 0.2 1.6 1.4
2008/2007 2.3 12.0 12.0 3.7
2009/2008 5.8 3.6 2.7 2.5
2010/2009 1.6 4.4 4.4 3.0
2011/2010 0.6 8.9 6.7 3.4
2012/2011 1.7 2.2 1.0 3.4
2013/2012 2.0 0.1 0.6 2.3
2014/2013 0.1 1.2 1.3 1.9
2015/2014 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.8
2010Q4/2009Q 10.6 5.6 4.8 3.0
2011Q4/2010Q 10.9 9.6 6.4 4.0
2012Q4/2011Q 12.0 -0.4 -0.2 2.9
GDP
World Consump- deflator
oil price tion (market
($) (b deflator prices)
2005 51.8 97.4 97.0
2006 63.4 100.0 100.0
2007 70.5 102.9 103.0
2008 95.7 106.1 106.1
2009 61.8 107.5 107.6
2010 78.8 112.1 110.7
2011 115.3 117.1 114.2
2012 123.7 119.3 116.0
2013 131.1 121.2 118.1
2014 136.6 123.5 120.3
2015 139.8 126.0 122.6
Percentage changes
2005/2004 44.4 2.4 2.0
2006/2005 22.4 2.7 3.0
2007/2006 11.2 2.9 3.0
2008/2007 35.7 3.1 3.0
2009/2008 -35.4 1.3 1.4
2010/2009 27.6 4.3 2.9
2011/2010 46.3 4.4 3.2
2012/2011 7.2 1.9 1.6
2013/2012 6.0 1.6 1.8
2014/2013 4.2 1.9 1.9
2015/2014 2.4 2.0 1.9
2010Q4/2009Q 13.8 4.6 2.7
2011Q4/2010Q 42.6 4.0 3.0
2012Q4/2011Q 2.7 1.4 1.4
Retail price index
All Excluding Consumer
items mortgage prices
interest index
2005 96.9 97.1 97.7
2006 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007 104.3 103.2 102.3
2008 108.4 107.6 106.0
2009 107.9 109.8 108.3
2010 112.8 115.0 111.9
2011 119.0 121.1 116.9
2012 122.5 123.9 119.1
2013 125.7 126.4 121.1
2014 129.2 129.5 123.4
2015 132.6 132.7 125.8
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.8 2.3 2.1
2006/2005 3.2 2.9 2.3
2007/2006 4.3 3.2 2.3
2008/2007 4.0 4.3 3.6
2009/2008 -0.5 2.0 2.2
2010/2009 4.6 4.8 3.3
2011/2010 5.5 5.3 4.5
2012/2011 3.0 2.3 1.9
2013/2012 2.5 2.1 1.6
2014/2013 2.8 2.4 1.9
2015/2014 2.7 2.5 2.0
2010Q4/2009Q 4.7 4.7 3.4
2011Q4/2010Q 5.4 4.9 4.4
2012Q4/2011Q 2.4 1.8 1.4
Notes: (a) Excluding food, beverages, tobacco and petroleum products.
(b) Per barrel, average of Dubai and Brent spot prices.
Table A3. Gross domestic product and components of expenditure
pounds sterling] billion, 2006 prices
Final consumption
expenditure
Households General
& NPISH (a) gov't
2005 836.6 281.3
2006 852.0 285.2
2007 870.8 288.8
2008 874.5 293.5
2009 846.9 296.3
2010 851.6 298.6
2011 846.3 297.7
2012 851.0 293.9
2013 865.1 288.5
2014 883.1 281.7
2015 903.6 276.9
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.2 2.0
2006/2005 1.8 1.4
2007/2006 2.2 1.3
2008/2007 0.4 1.6
2009/2008 -3.2 1.0
2010/2009 0.6 0.8
2011/2010 -0.6 -0.3
2012/2011 0.6 -1.3
2013/2012 1.7 -1.8
2014/2013 2.1 -14
2015/2014 2.3 -1.7
Decomposition of growth in GDP (d)
2006 1.2 0.3
2005 1.4 0.4
2006 1.2 0.3
2007 1.4 0.3
2008 0.3 0.3
2009 -2.0 0.2
2010 0.4 0.2
2011 -0.4 -0.1
2012 0.4 -0.3
2013 1.0 -0.4
2014 1.3 -0.5
2015 1.4 -0.3
Gross capital Domestic
formation demand
Gross Changes in
fixed investment inventories (b)
2005 213.6 4.6 1336.6
2006 227.2 5.5 1369.9
2007 245.1 7.4 1412.0
2008 232.8 1.4 1402.2
2009 197.0 -14.8 1325.5
2010 203.0 3.5 1356.7
2011 206.3 4.8 1354.9
2012 210.8 4.8 1360.5
2013 218.7 4.8 1377.2
2014 230.3 4.8 1399.9
2015 242.6 4.8 1427.9
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.4 2.1
2006/2005 6.4 2.5
2007/2006 7.8 3.1
2008/2007 -5.0 -0.7
2009/2008 -15.4 -5.5
2010/2009 3.0 2.4
2011/2010 1.6 -0.1
2012/2011 2.2 0.4
2013/2012 3.8 1.2
2014/2013 5.3 1.7
2015/2014 5.4 2.0
Decomposition of growth in GDP (d)
2006 1.1 0.1 2.6
2005 0.4 -0.1 2.2
2006 1.1 0.1 2.6
2007 1.3 0.1 3.2
2008 -0.9 -0.4 -0.7
2009 -2.6 -1.2 -5.6
2010 0.5 1.4 2.4
2011 0.3 0.1 -0.1
2012 0.3 0.0 0.4
2013 0.6 0.0 1.2
2014 0.8 0.0 1.6
2015 0.9 0.0 2.0
Total Total Total
exports (c) final imports (c)
expenditure
2005 340.3 1676.8 384.5
2006 378.0 1747.9 419.6
2007 368.3 1780.3 416.3
2008 372.1 1774.3 411.1
2009 334.6 1660.1 362.0
2010 352.2 1708.9 392.9
2011 376.5 1731.4 398.4
2012 392.6 1753.1 393.8
2013 416.8 1794.0 404.1
2014 443.9 1843.8 420.6
2015 464.3 1892.1 436.4
Percentage changes
2005/2004 7.9 3.2 7.1
2006/2005 11.1 4.2 9.1
2007/2006 -2.6 1.9 -0.8
2008/2007 1.0 -0.3 -1.2
2009/2008 -10.1 -6.4 -11.9
2010/2009 5.3 2.9 8.5
2011/2010 6.9 1.3 1.4
2012/2011 4.3 1.3 -l.1
2013/2012 6.2 2.3 2.6
2014/2013 6.5 2.8 4.1
2015/2014 4.6 2.6 3.8
Decomposition of growth in GDP (d)
2006 2.9 5.5 -2.7
2005 2.0 4.2 -2.0
2006 2.9 5.5 -2.7
2007 -0.7 2.4 0.2
2008 0.3 -0.4 0.4
2009 -2.8 8.4 3.6
2010 1.4 3.8 -2.4
2011 1.8 1.7 -0.4
2012 1.2 1.6 0.3
2013 1.8 3.0 -0.8
2014 1.9 3.6 -1.2
2015 1.4 3.4 -1.1
Net GDP
trade at
market
prices
2005 -44.2 1292.3
2006 -41.5 1328.4
2007 -48.0 1364.0
2008 -39.0 1363.1
2009 -27.4 1296.7
2010 -40.7 1312.9
2011 -21.9 1330.8
2012 -1.2 1357.0
2013 12.7 1388.7
2014 23.3 1423.6
2015 27.8 1457.7
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.2
2006/2005 2.8
2007/2006 2.7
2008/2007 -0.1
2009/2008 -4.9
2010/2009 1.3
2011/2010 1.4
2012/2011 2.0
2013/2012 2.3
2014/2013 2.5
2015/2014 2.4
Decomposition of growth in GDP (d)
2006 0.2 2.8
2005 0.0 2.2
2006 0.2 2.8
2007 -0.5 2.7
2008 0.7 -0.1
2009 0.9 -4.9
2010 -1.0 1.3
2011 1.4 1.4
2012 1.6 2.0
2013 1.0 2.3
2014 0.8 2.5
2015 0.3 2.4
Notes: (a) Non-profit institutions serving households. (b) Including
acquisitions less disposals of valuables and quarterly alignment
adjustment. (c) Includes Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud. (d)
Components may not add up to total GDP growth due to rounding and the
statistical discrepancy included in GDP.
Table A4. External sector
Exports Imports Net
of goods (a) of goods (a) trade in
goods (a)
[pounds sterling] billion, 2006 prices (b)
2005 218.6 289.7 -71.1
2006 243.6 319.9 -76.3
2007 218.5 311.3 -92.8
2008 221.5 305.7 -84.1
2009 194.2 267.3 -73.0
2010 215.1 297.1 -82.0
2011 238.7 304.1 -65.4
2012 249.0 299.8 -50.8
2013 264.3 307.3 -42.9
2014 281.3 320.0 -38.6
2015 293.4 332.1 -38.7
Percentage changes
2005/2004 8.9 7.0
2006/2005 11.5 10.4
2007/2006 -10.3 -2.7
2008/2007 1.4 -1.8
2009/2008 -12.3 -12.6
2010/2009 10.7 11.2
2011/2010 11.0 2.3
2012/2011 4.3 -1.4
2013/2012 6.2 2.5
2014/2013 6.4 4.1
2015/2014 4.3 3.8
Exports Imports Net
of of trade in
services services services
[pounds sterling] billion, 2006 prices (b)
2005 121.7 94.8 27.0
2006 134.4 99.6 34.8
2007 149.8 105.0 44.8
2008 150.6 105.5 45.1
2009 140.4 94.8 45.6
2010 137.2 95.8 41.4
2011 137.7 94.3 43.4
2012 143.6 94.0 49.6
2013 152.5 96.9 55.6
2014 162.6 100.6 61.9
2015 170.9 104.3 66.5
Percentage changes
2005/2004 6.3 7.3
2006/2005 10.4 5.1
2007/2006 11.5 5.4
2008/2007 0.5 0.5
2009/2008 -6.8 -10.2
2010/2009 -2.3 1.1
2011/2010 0.4 -1.6
2012/2011 4.3 -0.3
2013/2012 6.2 3.0
2014/2013 6.6 3.9
2015/2014 5.1 3.7
Export World Terms
price trade (d) of trade (e)
competitiveness
(c)
2006=100
2005 97.9 92.4 100.1
2006 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007 104.1 107.2 101.4
2008 101.2 109.9 101.4
2009 95.1 97.7 100.5
2010 96.8 107.8 100.6
2011 100.0 114.4 98.6
2012 97.5 120.6 97.4
2013 97.2 127.6 97.9
2014 97.1 134.4 98.0
2015 97.0 140.5 97.8
Percentage changes
2005/2004 -2.1 7.7 -2.6
2006/2005 2.1 8.2 -0.1
2007/2006 4.1 7.2 1.4
2008/2007 -2.7 2.6 0.0
2009/2008 -6.1 -11.1 -0.9
2010/2009 1.9 10.3 0.0
2011/2010 3.2 6.2 -2.0
2012/2011 -2.5 5.4 -1.2
2013/2012 -0.3 5.8 0.5
2014/2013 -0.1 5.3 0.1
2015/2014 -0.1 4.5 -0.1
Current
balance
% of GDP
2005 -2.6
2006 -3.4
2007 -2.6
2008 -1.6
2009 -1.7
2010 -2.5
2011 -2.3
2012 -1.1
2013 -0.1
2014 0.6
2015 0.9
Percentage changes
2005/2004
2006/2005
2007/2006
2008/2007
2009/2008
2010/2009
2011/2010
2012/2011
2013/2012
2014/2013
2015/2014
Notes: (a) Includes Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud. (b) Balance
of payments basis. (c) A rise denotes a loss in UK competitiveness.
(d) Weighted by import shares in UK export markets. (e) Ratio of
average value of exports to imports.
Table A5. Household income and expenditure
Average (a) Compen- Total Gross
earnings sation of personal disposable
employees income income
2006=100 [pounds sterling] billion, current prices
2005 95.7 677.5 1081.1 817.6
2006 100.0 713.0 1133.0 853.1
2007 105.0 752.2 1179.8 881.5
2008 106.6 769.2 1230.3 919.5
2009 109.3 774.0 1241.4 942.2
2010 112.7 796.1 1278.7 974.9
2011 115.5 811.9 1318.5 1004.7
2012 118.8 841.6 1370.5 1041.2
2013 122.2 878.7 1429.6 1083.0
2014 125.9 918.4 1498.1 1131.1
2015 129.7 956.1 1570.2 1183.3
Percentage changes
2005/2004 3.6 4.8 5.3 4.5
2006/2005 4.5 5.2 4.8 4.3
2007/2006 5.0 5.5 4.1 3.3
2008/2007 1.5 2.3 4.3 4.3
2009/2008 2.5 0.6 0.9 2.5
2010/2009 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.5
2011/2010 2.S 2.0 3.1 3.1
2012/2011 2.9 3.7 3.9 3.6
2013/2012 2.8 4.4 4.3 4.0
2014/2013 3.0 4.5 4.8 4.4
2015/2014 3.0 4.1 4.8 4.6
Real Final consumption
disposable expenditure
income (b) Total Durable
[pounds sterling] billion, 2006 prices
2005 839.3 836.6 85.8
2006 853.1 852.0 91.7
2007 856.6 870.8 97.9
2008 866.3 874.5 100.8
2009 876.4 846.9 99.9
2010 869.6 851.6 102.9
2011 858.3 846.3 101.1
2012 872.7 851.0 102.4
2013 893.5 865.1 104.8
2014 915.9 883.1 107.2
2015 939.4 903.6 109.6
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.0 2.2 6.3
2006/2005 1.6 1.8 6.9
2007/2006 0.4 2.2 6.7
2008/2007 1.1 0.4 3.0
2009/2008 1.2 -3.2 -0.9
2010/2009 0.8 0.6 2.9
2011/2010 -0.6 -1.7
2012/2011 1.7 0.6 1.3
2013/2012 2.4 1.7 2.4
2014/2013 2.5 2.1 2.3
2015/2014 2.6 2.3 2.2
Saving House Net
ratio (c) prices (d) worth to
income
ratio (e)
per cent 2006=100
2005 3.9 94.1 6.6
2006 3.5 100.0 7.0
2007 2.6 110.9 7.1
2008 2.0 109.9 6.0
2009 6.0 101.3 6.5
2010 5.4 108.7 6.7
2011 5.2 108.5 6.6
2012 6.3 107.4 6.4
2013 7.0 107.0 6.4
2014 7.5 107.7 6.3
2015 7.7 109.4 6.3
Percentage changes
2005/2004 5.5
2006/2005 6.3
2007/2006 10.9
2008/2007 -0.9
2009/2008 -7.8
2010/2009 7.3
2011/2010 -0.3
2012/2011 -1.0
2013/2012 -0.4
2014/2013 0.6
2015/2014 1.6
Notes: (a) Average earnings equals total labour compensation divided
by the number of employees. (b) Deflated by consumers' expenditure
deflator. (c) Includes adjustment for change in net equity of
households in pension funds. (d) Department for Communities and Local
Government, mix-adjusted. (e) Net worth is defined as housing wealth
plus net financial assets.
Table A6. Fixed investment and capital
[pounds sterling] billion, 2006 prices
Gross fixed investment (a)
Business Private General Total
investment housing (b) government
2005 122.1 67.2 23.7 213.6
2006 127.9 73.9 25.4 227.2
2007 144.0 74.1 27.0 245.1
2008 142.4 56.7 33.6 232.8
2009 115.5 41.5 40.0 197.0
2010 118.6 43.8 40.6 203.0
2011 126.2 44.3 35.8 206.3
2012 131.9 46.7 32.2 210.8
2013 138.0 50.3 30.4 218.7
2014 145.0 55.3 30.0 230.3
2015 151.7 60.2 30.7 242.6
Percentage changes
2005/2004 4.5 -4.8 10.9 2.4
2006/2005 4.8 10.0 7.3 6.4
2007/2006 12.5 0.2 6.4 7.8
2008/2007 -1.1 -23.4 24.5 -5.0
2009/2008 -18.9 -26.9 18.9 -15.4
2010/2009 2.6 5.5 1.6 3.0
2011/2010 6.4 1.2 -12.0 1.6
2012/2011 4.5 5.5 -9.9 2.2
2013/2012 4.6 7.8 -5.6 3.8
2014/2013 if 9.8 -1.4 13
2015/2014 4.6 9.0 2.4 5.4
User Corporate
cost profit Capital stock
of share of
capital (%) GDP (%) Private Public (c)
2005 17.1 24.2 2163.9 554.1
2006 16.6 25.0 2219.2 564.1
2007 16.5 25.2 2301.2 577.1
2008 16.1 26.2 2370.7 593.2
2009 14.7 25.0 2401.3 612.2
2010 14.2 23.9 2414.4 632.8
2011 16.3 25.3 2432.0 648.0
2012 16.9 25.8 2454.5 659.2
2013 16.9 26.0 2483.7 668.2
2014 16.7 26.3 2521.5 676.5
2015 16.8 26.7 2567.4 685.3
Percentage changes
2005/2004 2.4 1.9
2006/2005 2.6 1.8
2007/2006 3.7 2.3
2008/2007 3.0 2.8
2009/2008 1.3 3.2
2010/2009 0.5 3.4
2011/2010 0.7 2.4
2012/2011 0.9 1.7
2013/2012 1.2 1.4
2014/2013 1.5 1.2
2015/2014 1.8 1.3
Notes: (a) Fixed investment figures exclude be effect of the transfer
of BFNL nuclear reactors to central government in 2005Q2. (b) Includes
private sector transfer costs A non-produced assets. (c) Including
public sector non-financial corporations.
Table A7. Productivity and the labour market
Thousands
Employment ILO Labour
Employees Total (a) unemployment force(e)
2005 24929 28775 1466 30241
2006 25096 29027 1672 30699
2007 25209 29225 1653 30878
2008 25408 29441 1781 31221
2009 24939 28978 2394 31372
2010 24862 29043 2476 31519
2011 24737 28937 2726 31664
2012 24930 29154 2661 31814
2013 25312 29568 2411 31980
2014 25684 29974 2171 32146
2015 25950 30275 2036 32311
Percentage changes
2005/2004 1.2 I.0 2.9 1.1
2006/2005 0.7 0.9 14.1 1.5
2007/2006 0.5 0.7 -1.2 0.6
2008/2007 0.8 0.7 7.7 1.1
2009/2008 -.8 -1.6 34.5 0.5
2010/2009 -0.3 0.2 3.4 0.5
2011/2010 -0.5 -0.4 10.1 0.5
2012/2011 0.8 0.7 2.4 0.5
2013/2012 1.5 1.4 -9.4 0.5
2014/2013 1.5 1.4 -10.0 0.5
2015/2014 1.0 1.0 -6.2 0.5
Population Productivity Manufac-
of (2006=100) uring
working Per hour
age
2005 37419 97.7 95.4
2006 37708 100.0 100.0
2007 37916 102.0 102.6
2008 38090 101.4 102.4
2009 38236 99.5 98.4
2010 38395 100.4 106.2
2011 38711 101.4 112.8
2012 38935 102.4 118.5
2013 39169 103.2 123.6
2014 39406 104.3 128.1
2015 39638 105.7 132.1
Percentage changes
2005/2004 0.9 1.1 4.6
2006/2005 0.8 2.4 4.9
2007/2006 0.6 1.9 2.6
2008/2007 0.5 -0.5 -0.3
2009/2008 0.4 -1.9 -3.8
2010/2009 0.4 0.8 7.9
2011/2010 0.8 1.1 6.2
2012/2011 0.6 1.0 5.0
2013/2012 0.6 0.8 4.3
2014/2013 0.6 1.1 3.7
2015/2014 0.6 1.4 3.1
Unemployment, %
Claimant ILO unem-
rate ployment
rate
2005 2.7 4.8
2006 3.0 5.4
2007 2.7 5.4
2008 2.8 5.7
2009 4.7 7.6
2010 4.6 7.9
2011 4.9 8.6
2012 4.6 8.4
2013 3.9 7.5
2014 3.2 6.8
2015 2.8 6.3
Percentage changes
2005/2004
2006/2005
2007/2006
2008/2007
2009/2008
2010/2009
2011/2010
2012/2011
2013/2012
2014/2013
2015/2014
Notes: (a) Includes self-employed, government-supported trainees and
unpaid family members. (b) Employment plus ILO unemployment.
Table A8. Public sector financial balance and borrowing requirement
[pounds sterling] billion, fiscal years
2008-9 2009-10
Current receipts: Taxes on income 355.2 338.2
Taxes on expenditure 167.6 169.3
Other current receipts 11.3 11.1
Total 534.1 518.6
(as a% of GDP) 37.3 36.9
Current expenditure: Goods and services 319.0 329.9
Net social benefits paid 172.1 188.3
Debt interest 31.6 31.3
Other current expenditure 43.2 52.4
Total 565.9 601.9
(as a % of GDP) 39.5 42.9
Depreciation 18.7 19.3
Surplus an public sector current budget (a) -50.5 -102.6
(as a % of GDP) -3.5 -7.3
Grass investment 65.7 -70.1
Net investment 47.0 50.8
(as a% of GDP) 3.3 3.6
Total managed expenditure 631.6 672.0
(as a % of GDP) 44.1 47.8
Public sector net borowing 97.5 151.3
(as a% of GDP) 6.8 10.9
Financial transactions -125.1 -37.0
Public sector net cash requirement 222.6 190.4
(as a % of GDP) 15.6 13.6
Public sector net debt (% of GDP) 43.3 52.9
GDP deflator at market prices (2006=100) 106.6 108.4
Money GDP 1433.4 1404.3
Financial balance under Maastricht -4.9 -11.2
(% of GDP) (b)
Gross debt under Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) 52.1 68.1
2010-11 2011-12
Current receipts: Taxes on income 349.5 363.5
Taxes on expenditure 191.1 201.5
Other current receipts 9.9 14.1
Total 550.5 579.1
(as a% of GDP) 371 37.7
Current expenditure: Goods and services 335.4 342.3
Net social benefits paid 196.7 206.6
Debt interest 45.3 51.4
Other current expenditure 54.2 51.0
Total 631.6 651.2
(as a % of GDP) 43.0 42.5
Depreciation 20.5 21.9
Surplus an public sector current budget (a) -101.6 -94.1
(as a % of GDP) -6.9 -6.1
Grass investment 61.3 54.1
Net investment 40.9 312
(as a% of GDP) 2.8 2.1
Total managed expenditure 692.9 705.3
(as a % of GDP) 47.2 46.0
Public sector net borowing 142.4 126.3
(as a% of GDP) 9.7 8.2
Financial transactions 0.7 -7.0
Public sector net cash requirement 141.7 133.3
(as a % of GDP) 9.6 8.7
Public sector net debt (% of GDP) 60.7 67.1
GDP deflator at market prices (2006=100) 111.4 114.8
Money GDP 1469.4 1534.0
Financial balance under Maastricht -10.3 -8.5
(% of GDP) (b)
Gross debt under Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) 76.1 80.8
2012-13 2013-14
Current receipts: Taxes on income 384.4 404.8
Taxes on expenditure 206.4 213.4
Other current receipts 14.6 15.3
Total 605.4 633.4
(as a% of GDP) 38.1 38.2
Current expenditure: Goods and services 344.7 349.1
Net social benefits paid 211.4 214.5
Debt interest 55.4 58.9
Other current expenditure 52.2 53.7
Total 663.7 676.1
(as a % of GDP) 41.8 40.8
Depreciation 22.9 23.9
Surplus an public sector current budget (a) -81.3 -66.5
(as a % of GDP) -5.1 -4.0
Grass investment 51.0 49.7
Net investment 28.1 25.9
(as a% of GDP) 1.8 1.6
Total managed expenditure 714.8 725.9
(as a % of GDP) 45.0 43.8
Public sector net borowing 109.4 92.4
(as a% of GDP) 6.9 5.6
Financial transactions -8.0 -13.0
Public sector net cash requirement 117.4 105.4
(as a % of GDP) 7.4 6.4
Public sector net debt (% of GDP) 72.0 75.1
GDP deflator at market prices (2006=100) 116.5 118.6
Money GDP 1589.1 1657.7
Financial balance under Maastricht -7.2 -5.9
(% of GDP) (b)
Gross debt under Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) 85.0 87.4
2014-15 2015-16
Current receipts: Taxes on income 426.6 449.2
Taxes on expenditure 221.0 230.3
Other current receipts 15.9 16.6
Total 663.5 696.1
(as a% of GDP) 38.3 38.5
Current expenditure: Goods and services 348.2 352.5
Net social benefits paid 222.2 232.9
Debt interest 62.9 67.6
Other current expenditure 55.4 57.2
Total 688.8 710.2
(as a % of GDP) 39.8 39.3
Depreciation 24.9 25.9
Surplus an public sector current budget (a) -50.1 -39.9
(as a % of GDP) -2.9 -2.2
Grass investment 49.7 51.3
Net investment 24.9 25.5
(as a% of GDP) 1.4 1.4
Total managed expenditure 738.5 761.5
(as a % of GDP) 42.7 42.1
Public sector net borowing 75.0 65.4
(as a% of GDP) 4.3 3.6
Financial transactions 6.0 -7.0
Public sector net cash requirement 81.0 72.4
(as a % of GDP) 4.7 4.0
Public sector net debt (% of GDP) 76.6 77.3
GDP deflator at market prices (2006=100) 120.9 123.2
Money GDP 1731.0 1807.2
Financial balance under Maastricht -4.6 -3.7
(% of GDP) (b)
Gross debt under Maastricht (% of GDP) (b) 88.2 88.2
Notes: These data are constructed from seasonally adjusted national
accounts data. This results in differences between the figures here
and unadjusted fiscal year data. Data exclude the impact of financial
sector interventions. (a) Public sector current budget surplus is
total current receipts less total current expenditure and
depreciation. (b) Calendar year.
Table A9. Accumulation
As a percentage of GDP
Households Companies
Saving Invest- Saving Invest-
ment ment
2005 2.7 5.3 12.8 10.1
2006 2.3 5.6 12.0 10.2
2007 1.7 5.8 14.3 10.8
2008 1.3 4.6 15.0 9.8
2009 4.2 3.4 13.9 7.4
2010 3.7 3.4 15.2 8.9
2011 3.6 3.5 14.3 9.2
2012 4.3 3.6 13.3 9.0
2013 4.8 3.9 12.6 8.9
2014 5.1 4.3 12.2 8.9
2015 5.3 4.7 11.8 8.9
General government Whole economy
Saving Invest- Saving Invest-
ment ment
2005 -1.1 1.7 14.5 17.1
2006 -0.2 1.7 14.1 17.5
2007 -0.4 1.6 15.6 18.2
2008 -1.3 2.2 15.0 16.7
2009 -6.3 2.6 11.8 13.5
2010 -6.6 2.5 12.4 14.9
2011 -5.4 2.0 12.4 14.7
2012 -4.5 1.7 13.2 14.3
2013 -3.3 1.5 14.1 14.2
2014 -2.2 1.3 15.1 14.5
2015 -1.4 1.3 15.8 14.9
Finance from abroad Net
Total Net factor national
income (a) saving
2005 2.6 -1.8 3.4
2006 3.4 -0.7 3.0
2007 2.6 -1.5 4.6
2008 1.6 -2.0 4.6
2009 1.7 -1.5 0.8
2010 2.5 -2.2 1.6
2011 2.3 -1.2 1.7
2012 1.1 -1.0 2.4
2013 0.1 -0.6 3.4
2014 -0.6 -0.5 4.3
2015 -0.9 -0.6 5.0
Note: (a) Negative sign indicates a surplus for the UK.
Table A10. Long-term projections
All figures percentage change unless otherwise stated
2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP (market prices) 2.7 0.1 -4.9 1.3
Average earnings 5.0 1.5 2.5 3.2
GDP deflator (market prices) 3.0 3.0 1.4 2.9
Consumer Prices Index 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3
Per capita GDP 2.0 -0.7 -5.5 0.7
Whole economy productivity(a) 1.9 -0.5 -1.9 0.8
Labour input(h) 0.8 0.4 -2.9 0.6
ILO unemployment rate (%) 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.9
Current account (% of GDP) -2.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.5
Total managed expenditure
(% of GDP) 40.8 42.6 47.7 47.5
Public sector net borrowing
(% of GDP) 2.5 4.6 10.8 10.2
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 36.7 39.0 47.8 56.3
Effective exchange rate
(2005=100) 102.9 90.7 81.2 81.0
Bank Rate (%) 5.5 4.7 0.6 0.5
3 month interest rates (%) 6.0 5.5 1.2 0.7
10 year interest rates (%) 5.0 4.5 3.7 3.6
2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP (market prices) 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.5
Average earnings 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.0
GDP deflator (market prices) 3.2 1.6 1.8 1.9
Consumer Prices Index 4.5 1.9 1.6 1.9
Per capita GDP 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.9
Whole economy productivity(a) 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.1
Labour input(h) 0.2 1.1 1.6 1.5
ILO unemployment rate (%) 8.6 8.4 7.5 6.8
Current account (% of GDP) -2.3 -1.1 -0.1 0.6
Total managed expenditure
(% of GDP) 46.2 45.3 44.1 43.0
Public sector net borrowing
(% of GDP) 8.5 7.2 5.9 4.7
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 63.2 69.1 73.2 75.8
Effective exchange rate
(2005=100) 80.6 80.7 81.6 82.3
Bank Rate (%) 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.1
3 month interest rates (%) 1.0 1.6 2.5 3.2
10 year interest rates (%) 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.5
2015 2016-20
GDP (market prices) 2.4 2.5
Average earnings 3.0 3.6
GDP deflator (market prices) 1.9 2.0
Consumer Prices Index 2.0 2.0
Per capita GDP 1.8 1.8
Whole economy productivity(a) 1.4 2.1
Labour input(h) 1.0 0.3
ILO unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.1
Current account (% of GDP) 0.9 0.5
Total managed expenditure
(% of GDP) 42.2 41.6
Public sector net borrowing
(% of GDP) 3.7 2.6
Public sector net debt
(% of GDP) 76.9 75.8
Effective exchange rate
(2005=100) 83.1 85.2
Bank Rate (%) 3.5 4.4
3 month interest rates (%) 3.5 4.5
10 year interest rates (%) 4.7 4.9
Notes: (a) Per hour. (b) Total hours worked.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The forecast was completed using the latest version of the National
Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM). Thanks to Dawn Holland for
helpful comments and suggestions.
The forecast was completed on 27 April 2011.
REFERENCES
Barrell, R. and Dury, K. (2003), 'Asymmetric labour markets in
a converging Europe: do differences matter?', National Institute
Economic Review, 183, pp. 56-65.
Barrell, R., Gottschalk. S., Kirby, S. and Orazgani, A. (2009),
'Projections of migration inflows under alternative scenarios for
the world economy', Department for Communities and Local Government
economics paper no. 3.
Barrell, R. and Kirby, S. (2011), 'Trend output and the output
gap in the UK', National Institute Economic Review, 215, pp.
F63-74.
Bell, D.N.F. and Blanchflower, D. (2010), 'UK unemployment in
the Great Recession', National Institute Economic Review, 214,
October.
Department for Work and Pensions (2011) A state pension for the
21st century, Cm 8053.
Dow, C. (1998), Major Recessions: Britain and the World, 1920-1995,
Oxford University Press.
Haugh, D., Olivaud, P. and Turner, D. (2009), 'The
macroeconomic consequences of banking crises in OECD countries',
OECD Economics Department Working Paper no. 683, Paris, OECD.
Holland, D., Kirby, S. and Whitworth, R. (2010), 'A comparison
of labour market responses to the global downturn', National
Institute Economic Review, 211, pp. F38-42.
NOTES
(1) Figure 3 reports the 80, 85 and 90 per cent confidence
intervals around our forecast for CPI inflation. The bounds are derived
from stochastic simulations using our global econometric model NiGEM.
(2) The main target of the Chancellor's Fiscal Mandate is for
the cyclically adjusted current budget to be in balance in five years
time (currently 2015-16).
(3) The duty on fuel was reduced by 1 penny per litre rather than
increased by the 6 pence per litre that had previously been planned
under the fuel escalator, which will be abolished when the Finance Bill
2011 becomes an Act of Parliament. Instead of the escalator a fair fuel
stabiliser is currently planned. However, this does not mean that
automatic increases in fuel duty have been abolished. Current plans
envisage fuel duties continuing to increase in line with RPI inflation.
Indeed 3 pence of the increase that had been planned for April 2011 was
due to RPI and this has simply been postponed until January 2012. The
fair fuel stabiliser increases fuel duties by RPI plus one penny a litre
when oil prices are low, but by just RPI when oil prices are high. The
Chancellor believes that $75 a barrel represents the point at which
prices transition from low to high and vice versa, To pay for this tax
cut, the Chancellor has raised the supplementary charge on the oil and
gas sector from 20 to 32 per cent. When oil prices fall back, the
Chancellor has stated that the charge would gradually be returned to 20
per cent.
(4) In our projections the rise in the oil price since January
should generally worsen the prospects for the public finances over the
next five years. Model-based analysis suggests that the average effect
is around 0.1 per cent of GDP, but will peak at 2.7 billion [pounds
sterling], or 0.16 per cent of GDP in 2012-13.
(5) Currently the state pension age is to increase to 66 over the
period 2024-6. This is factored into our forecast.
Table 1. Summary of the forecast
Percentage change
2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 1.3
Per capita GDP 2.0 -0.7 -5.5 0.7
CPI Inflation 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3
RPIX Inflation 3.2 4.3 2.0 4.8
RPDI 0.4 1.1 1.2 -0.8
Unemployment, % 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.9
Bank Rate, % 5.5 4.7 0.6 0.5
Long Rates, % 5.0 4.5 3.7 3.6
Effective exchange rate 2.1 -11.9 -10.5 -0.2
Current account as % of GDP -2.6 -1.6 -1.7 -2.5
PSNB as % of GDP (a) 2.3 6.8 10.9 9.7
PSND as % of GDP (a) 36.4 43.3 52.9 60.7
2011 2012 2013 2014
GDP 1.4 2.0 2.3 2.5
Per capita GDP 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.9
CPI Inflation 4.5 1.9 1.6 1.9
RPIX Inflation 5.3 2.3 2.1 2.4
RPDI -1.3 1.7 2.4 2.5
Unemployment, % 8.6 8.4 7.5 6.8
Bank Rate, % 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.1
Long Rates, % 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.5
Effective exchange rate -0.6 0.2 1.0 0.9
Current account as % of GDP -2.3 -1.1 -0.1 0.6
PSNB as % of GDP (a) 8.2 6.9 5.6 4.3
PSND as % of GDP (a) 67.1 72.0 75.1 76.6
2015
GDP 2.4
Per capita GDP 1.8
CPI Inflation 2.0
RPIX Inflation 2.5
RPDI 2.6
Unemployment, % 6.3
Bank Rate, % 3.5
Long Rates, % 4.7
Effective exchange rate 0.9
Current account as % of GDP 0.9
PSNB as % of GDP (a) 3.6
PSND as % of GDP (a) 77.3
Notes: RPDI is real personal disposable income. PSNB is public sector
net borrowing, PSND is public sector net debt.
(a) Fiscal year, excludes the impact of financial sector
interventions.