Ridiculous impingements of normalcy: home fronts, good soldiers, war correspondents.
Wilson, Christopher P.
In a well-known moment from the penultimate section of his Vietnam
memoir Dispatches (1977)--the part of the book entitled, with
mock-professional formality, "Colleagues"--Michael Herr sets
his theme by calling up a virtually iconic representation of the
American war correspondent. He invokes a scene from what elsewhere he
calls his own "personal movie," a series of fantasies partly
taking their cues from World War II combat films:
There's a candle end burning in a corner of the bunker, held to
the
top of a steel helmet by melted wax, the light guttering over a
battered typewriter, and the Old Guy is getting one off:
"Tat-tat-tat, tatta-tatta-tat like your kid or your brother or
your
sweetheart maybe never wanted much for himself never asked for
anything except for what he knew to be his some men have a name for
it and they call it Courage when the great guns are still at last
across Europe what will it matter maybe after all that this one boy
from Cleveland Ohio won't be coming back-a-tat-tat." You
can hear
shellfire landing just outside, a little gravel falls into the
typewriter, but the candle burns on, throwing its faint light over
the bowed head and the few remaining wisps of white hair. Two men,
the Colonel and the Kid, stand by the door watching. "Why,
Sir?"
the Kid asks. "What makes him do it? He could be sitting safe in
London right now." "I don't know, son," the
Colonel says. "Maybe he
figures he's got a job to do, too. Maybe it's because
he's somebody
who really cares...." (187)
As Maggie Gordon and others have observed, scenes like this could
easily have been clipped from an actual film script. Indeed, when I
first encountered this particular passage in the late 1970s, it seemed
so highly stylized that I read it as a parody of the journalistic
tradition in which Herr found himself. With its central figure of the
typewriter-tapping reporter, unquestioningly affirming the purpose of
the "Good War," surrounded by movie types straight out of
central casting--well, it all seemed disastrously out of synch with
Herr's own historical moment. But there was no mistaking the figure
Herr had conjured up: it was Ernie Pyle.
These days, however, I tend to regard my first reaction both as
an incomplete reading of Herr and an oversimplification of the legacy we
might actually find in Pyle's own writings. That is, on the one
hand, as I read Herr's passage now, it seems to me to capture the
particularly vexing predicament of war correspondents, who often must
construct their own sense of (or fantasies about) their professional
"duty" while surrounded by soldiers who have little choice
about enacting theirs. On the other, it is also hard to overlook the
potentially withering critique suggested by Herr's scene: that the
boilerplate dispatch Pyle had made his trademark, the homiletic to the
"normal," small-town, usually Midwestern "boys" just
doing their duty, might simply be a way of downplaying the violence,
psychological chaos, and political meanings of the modern,
technologically-saturated war zone. What would the volunteer spirit of
the Old Guy in Herr's personal movie really say, for example, to or
about troops who had been drafted?--and more to the point, into a war
where, as in Vietnam, there was hardly an unquestioning devotion to the
mission? Moreover, would it really be possible for Pyle's formula
to suit our contemporary era?--a time, after all, not of nation-wide
commitments to total war, but of so-called "limited" conflicts
or "police actions" engaged by professional armies and even
private security forces--and where the signature genre of Pyle's
oeuvre, the letter that weaved its way home from the front, is now but a
satellite dish away?
These are, of course, large questions. But even to begin to
answer some of them, we would do well to revisit Ernie Pyle's World
War II columns, and the literary, rhetorical, and cultural work we might
find there. I want to begin, therefore, by reexamining a legacy I think
we do, in fact, too often treat as "legendary" to the point of
being antique. Then, to explore the relevance of Pyle's approach
for today, I want to turn to the apparently self-conscious reworking of
his idiom in a recent, literary-nonfiction narrative of the Iraq war:
Washington Post correspondent David Finkel's provocative The Good
Soldiers (2009), an account of a U.S. infantry battalion during the
so-called "surge" campaign of 2007 and 2008. Of course, there
might be many reasons for bringing these two journalists' work
together. Primarily, however, I mean to examine the consequences of
their decision to ground their portrait of war within the perimeter of a
putatively "normative," middle-American set of infantrymen. In
addition, however, I would like to follow the lead of the recent
literature, both testimonial and scholarly, that seeks to widen our
perspective on war writing by exploring soldiers' connections and
disconnections with the home front (cf. Operation Homecoming; Buckholtz,
Standing By; Causey). This means both exploring literal descriptions of
home scenes in Pyle and Finkel's work, and unpacking the domestic
vocabularies that go into their decidedly literary construction of
military service as such. To put the matter somewhat abstractly, this
means investigating how the art of these war correspondents both
participates in, and interrogates, the intricate rhetorical and
ideological forging of what is commonly called "political
obligation."
At first, the phrase "political obligation" might seem
to refer exclusively to the philosophical or ideological question
implicit in Herr's movie scene: the question of "why we
fight." In recent years, however, thinkers like Michael Walzer,
Carole Pateman and Robert Westbrook have reopened the social, cultural,
and moral dimensions of this question in vitally new ways. In these
writers' hands, ideas of political obligation often work to patch
together not only the different motivations of those we ask to fight our
wars, but the ways those fighters, and non-combatants at home,
understand the war beyond its more obvious nationalistic, ideological or
strategic rationales. At any given historical moment, of course,
American soldiers do enlist out of a sense of civic duty, or on behalf
of broad philosophical or strategic principles like defending the
nation, extending the cause of freedom, or fighting terrorism. At a more
personal level, however, their reasons for fighting might also be
connected to more mundane matters like career advancement, escaping
trouble at home, or even overcoming the stigma of a criminal record. (1)
But even without such extenuating circumstances, soldiers and civilians
commonly face the task of converting the more abstract, transcendent, or
philosophical rationales of war service into a more colloquial or
cultural register. In short, they seek out something closer to
home--something we call, without disparagement, more
"ordinary."
I say "without disparagement" because this ordinary
register turns out to be especially important, in wartime, for
nation-states that are liberal-democratic. As the thinkers cited above
suggest, the challenge for liberal societies like the U.S. has often
been to construct a framework of political obligation that does not
jeopardize the democratic soldier's belief that he or she is, above
all, a consenting free, rights-bearing citizen. Wartime, in essence,
reverses the traditional liberal social contract: having pledged
"above all, to protect individual life and liberty and advance the
pursuit of private happiness" the nation-state now asks the citizen
to risk his or her life to defend it (Westbrook 29). Indeed, especially
when liberal societies entreat a private citizen to combat foreign
fighters of more authoritarian, illiberal, and religiously-motivated
movements or states, standard propagandizing is often not up to the
task. And as a result, national leaders tend to invoke the idea that
such enemies pose threats to the putatively more open, liberal (or
American) "way of life," thereby enlisting the more ordinary,
improvisational rationales that citizens, soldiers, and even reporters
often use to understand the obligations of military service: likening
war, for example, to defending one's neighborhood or wife or
children. Even military strategy itself can attempt to enlist these
ordinary ways of understanding, thus compelling terms of consent to
shuttle back and forth between war and home fronts in telling ways.
In each of my first two sections in following, therefore, I will
focus on the full battery of ordinary cultural vocabularies that Pyle
and Finkel, respectively, posit as central to political obligation in
their particular moment: Pyle in his post-New Deal renderings of war
production at home and on European battlefronts; Finkel, in depicting a
post-9/11 counterinsurgency campaign in the Middle East. Along the way,
I will also explore how the particular literary forms chosen by these
two war correspondents intersect with their rendering of, and
participation in, the cultural fashioning of political obligation. And
in closing, I will turn to some of the enduring problems that may be
inherent in deploying what we might call the Pyle paradigm, in
"good" wars and not.
(I)
Admittedly, it might surprise some--historians of American
journalism in particular--that Pyle's corpus bears yet another
reexamination. Starting in the 1980s, a new generation of
biographically-based scholarship tried to supplant the popular idea that
Pyle's fame had derived simply from his cracker-barrel,
Hoosier-style philosophizing and uncritical patriotism. Rather,
following up on the insights of Pyle's literary contemporaries like
Randall Jarrell and A.J. Liebling, scholars such as David Randall, David
Nichols, and James Tobin argued that Pyle had forged a democratic
compact with his readers and his soldier subjects through a combination
of testimonial, human-interest journalism, plain-speaking moral realism,
and documentary-like accuracy. (2) Primarily, his new interpreters
argued, Pyle's columns brought together the front and the home
front. As Nichols saw, for example, Pyle not only supplemented the more
typical frontline news coverage that covered dramatic battles (but
usually not individual fighting men themselves); the reporter also
crafted columns that were much like letters from those same men that, if
written by them, could have been censored or very late in arriving home.
(3) Thus Pyle's enormous popularity--he was read in some fourteen
million homes at the height of the war--came to seem as if it ratified
something like a democratic plebiscite. Thus, for instance, Harry
Truman's praise, announcing Pyle's death to the nation:
"No man in this war has so well told the story of American fighting
man as the American fighting men wanted it told" (qtd. in Ritchie
225).
These new scholarly contributions were invaluable--I will rely on
them myself in what follows. And yet, as the somewhat redundant logic of
the Truman epitaph suggests, it remains unclear how much interpretive
space this new scholarship really opened up, distinct from the image
crafted by Pyle's popular iconography and from the enduring
mystique of the so-called Good War. Ironically, the persisting image of
Pyle as a Truman-style regular guy continued to eclipse what much of
what new biographical revelations had actually shown: that he began
World War II with a decidedly more urbane, cosmopolitan outlook than
many of his middle or lower-class soldier-subjects; that he was older
and more literarily-inclined; and he did not share an idealized vision
of the suburban home front to fall back on, that so many of them did.
(His wife, in fact, had been a pacifist going into the war.)
This new scholarship also showed us how, in Ernie Pyle, we
encounter the all-too-rare instance of a journalist whose craft was
elevated to something like a popular art. Apprenticing in aviation and
then travel journalism, Pyle had carefully crafted the persona of a
self-effacing, slightly Chaplinesque little guy pestered by small
inconveniences and yet driven by grand dreams. In turn, he gradually
developed a wartime style that would shift gears between panoramic
vistas of the high, transcendent cause of the war and miniatures of the
mundane realities of the trenches and foxholes: thumbnail biographies of
individual soldiers, profiles of specialized troop divisions,
explanations of everyday combat, all full idiosyncratic details that
reassured home readers of the "continuity of small things"
(Tobin 87) at the front. Additionally, the fact that Pyle's columns
came to appear in Stars and Stripes meant that his soldiers were both
news subjects and news readers: "[w]hile stateside readers read
about the boys overseas, the boys overseas read about
themselves"(Nichols, Ernie's America xiv). As was attested by
his own actual personal movie, William Wellman's Ernie Pyle's
Story of G.I. Joe (1945), Pyle's acceptance among the troops was
probably facilitated by this double-layer of readership. Soldiers knew
him by reputation, read his stories as he wrote them, and looked for
themselves or their comrades in his columns.
Well before Wellman's film, of course, Pyle's columns
fashioned the self-image of a correspondent so intent upon his reporting
duty that it became virtually equivalent to the obligations of the
soldiers he wrote about. In his North African and European war-theatre
columns for Scripps-Howard, he is explicitly dutiful about reciting, and
then enacting, what he interprets as his audience's sense of his
public function. (4) That is, Pyle willingly enlists in a series of
tasks: picturing the war, measuring the morale of the troops (and even
captured Germans), and translating command strategy and foot soldier
experience back to the home front. He will enumerate three things
"you folks at home should know" (61); he breaks the Normandy
and post-Normandy strategy down to Five Phases (328), and then compares
it to building a house. Even military censorship (and his own willing
self-censorship) about specific troop locations and movements, far from
being a hindrance to his efforts, actually contributed to Pyle's
sense of being inside something great, providing a private view of
events otherwise obscured from his audience. Admitting outright to his
readers that he was not always allowed to identify the unit he travelled
with (115), Pyle would tell readers things like "I wish I could
tell you what the password was. You would think it very funny"
(61). Even the mysterious "SOMEWHERE IN ..." dateline, rather
than reflecting his columns' censorship, conveyed the aura of a
writer inside a plan, and unwilling to give any comfort to the enemy.
U.S. audiences (who might learn, in contrast, the street addresses of
individual soldiers from Pyle's columns) were thus culled together
into what Benedict Anderson and others liken to a national reading
community.
The byplay between front and home front, meanwhile, was something
that Pyle not only treated thematically; it was embedded in the
rhetorical "address" of his work, in multiple senses of that
word. For example, Pyle's preferred to use direct address, a
"you" that worked variously to speak to a reader, as an
implicit first person (for Pyle himself), and as a generic term for
troop experience as a whole. He could offer ardent, unabashed
admiration: "God," he wrote after Normandy, "how you
admired those men up there and were sickened for the ones who fell"
(334). Or, he could shift into immediate, subjective immersion:
"It's just that on some nights the air becomes sick and there
is an unspoken contagion of spiritual dread, and you are little boys
again, lost in the dark" (108-9). Moreover, Pyle reinforced
readerly involvement by telling his audiences that
"home"--meaning, usually, a specific regional and domestic
locale with "normal," everyday, household concerns--was what
animated the thoughts of soldiers. The idea, he said, permeated the very
language of the men:
That's the way conversation at the front goes all the time. Ten
minutes hardly ever goes by without some nostalgic reference to
home, how long you've been away, how long before you get back,
what
you'll do first when you hit the States, what your chances are
for
returning before the war is over. (181)
Not surprisingly, letters from Pyle's readers, of all social
ranks, suggested they felt a reciprocal, intimate bond with his column
rather than just a political affiliation with the war's more
idealistic rhetoric. "Ernie's" fans sent him clippings
from home, home remedy medicines, care packages, requests to look in on
their sons, husbands, boyfriends. "To the writers of these
letters," Tobin tells us, "Ernie seemed a ubiquitous spirit
... always within a stone's throw of their beloved soldiers, always
able to peek in their tents to see they were safe" (98).
All that being said, Pyle's evocation of the home front was,
necessarily, a more nuanced, literary balancing act than our current,
largely journalistic approach suggests. For one thing, Pyle looks like
he is invoking individual men's memories in the passage above, but
that's probably not entirely the case. As Westbrook shows (56-7),
the World War II construction of "fighting for the family"
played as much upon dreams troops held of a postwar suburban reward for
their sacrifice (cf. Nichols, Ernie's War 13). Meanwhile, the
exchange with soldiers involved more than a simple assertion of
democratic identification. Take, for starters, Pyle's signature use
of the diminutive "boys." However common a colloquialism of
his moment, the label did anything but simple cultural work; it did not,
for instance, simply masculinize battle or national service. In fact, in
one column, Pyle refers to "the boys" as natural housewives
(74). And that was because the term also worked paternalistically,
reflecting again Pyle's older age, something quite visible in The
Story of G.I. Joe. Even more to the point, as the letters cited above
suggest, the term conveyed affection, as if Pyle was being delegated as
a surrogate provider of the care and oversight that soldiers might have
ideally received at home. Home is not cordoned off by Pyle's
cultural work; it is carried into the front.
Nor could Pyle's broader reconstruction ofpolitical
obligation always be as simple as giving voice to an uncritical,
sentimental nostalgia for home. For one thing, as Elizabeth Samet
incisively writes in regard to the Civil War, to suggest that home is
the central preoccupation of soldiers is to risk leaving the impression
that thoughts of desertion are there as well. To suggest that men missed
home might also be damaging to their own morale. And as I've said,
in a liberal democracy, implying an excessive passion for liberty or
self-determination or even private property (one's home) might,
paradoxically, broach the suggestion that American men were
fundamentally unsuited for military service to a nation-state.
Especially to call up home in, say, its nineteenth-century sentimental
sense, as with Pyle's comparison to housewives, was to risk casting
too strong an aura of dependency on them: a need for domestic care that
might undermine their image of battle-readiness. Pyle was, for instance,
was quite aware of how readers at home--and, intriguingly, allies on the
ground who had seen the German enemy, especially those elite officers
imbued with Nazi propaganda--might ask how American notions of freedom
and personal happiness could make for disciplined soldiering. "They
[Algerian locals who had seen Germans] can't conceive of the
fact," he wrote, "that our strength lies in our freedom"
(68).
The key point, I think, is that our notion of "home"
itself needs a wider scope than even our best scholarship on Pyle
recognizes. For instance, we have long known that Pyle emphasized how
his "boys" were coarsened and professionalized (82), made into
soldier-citizens by war experience itself. But this was because he
wanted, especially, to separate soldiers' loneliness from more
literal associations (that is, home-sickness), and emphasize instead
such feelings of isolation were created by the soldiers' sense that
the home front didn't "really feel" (364) what they were
going through. Though sometimes mistaken for an uncritical jingoist,
Pyle actually sets himself up against the "extreme optimism"
(65) about the war that he sensed at home, saying that soldiers
themselves "can't stomach flag-waving back home" that is
too "gooey" or "mushily patriotic" (205). After a
victory in Tunis, for example, he warned readers even though men were
battle-hardened, the worst was yet to come. ("Don't be
impatient," he warned the home front [288]: building a house takes
time). Then, to capture the often Spartan, miserable, makeshift
existence of the infantryman, Pyle made use of what I have elsewhere
called the "just folks" idioms of early twentieth century
middlebrow literature: the American literary vernacular that, while
seeming to evoke Midwestern or middle-American stateside verities,
actually centered on the dignity of blue and white collar labor. That
is, on reaffirming the discipline of work values. Inflected by masculine
norms, always investing in the fellowship of common labor, "just
folks" vocabularies underscored any individual's
"American" typicality, and then suggested he mostly wanted to
be left alone by governments and parades and excessive emotions. In
short, he wanted to stick his nose to the grindstone, and just to
do--here was the just-folks keyword--his "job."
War therefore coarsened the men, made boys into killers, but in
so doing it brought out this populist quintessence. It was a kind of
reduction to original form brought on by the scarcities that all those
letters from home wanted to redress:
Corp. Richard Kelso ... apprenticed in Belfast as a machinist
... He went to America when he was twenty-five and now he is
forty-five....
... [He] doesn't have to be over here at all ...
He too sleeps on the ground and work sixteen hours a day, and is
happy to do it--for boys who are dying are not three thousand miles
away and abstract; they are ten miles away and very, very real.
(326-327)
[Pfc. Tommy] Clayton has worked at all kinds of things back in that
other world of civilian life. He has been a farmhand, a cook and a
bartender....
When the war is over he wants to go into business for himself
... He'll probably set up a small restaurant in Evansville....
And soldiers like Tommy Clayton go back to [war's horrors],
because they are good soldiers and they have a duty they cannot
define. (344-47)
This scaling down, the acknowledging of the sheer pettiness of
survival at the front--what Pyle called the "ridiculous impingement
of normalcy on a field of battle" (95)--dovetailed with his
evocation of a generic typicality: at the front, men were individuals,
but they were also expressive of the democratic reverence for simple
labor, keeping to oneself, honoring one's duty not in the abstract
but in the local and particular.
This way, the domestic impulse was transposed into a collective
soldier-citizen idiom. On the one hand, pointing to the homey touches in
foxholes, Pyle would write, "I'll bet there's not another
army in the world that fixes itself a 'home away from home' as
quickly as ours does" (74-75). But into that home, Pyle interjects
disciplined work, often the specialization of labor that, linked to men
in battle, breeds fellowship, the binding together of the job. In many
ways, this was a Popular Front in its central iconography, similar to
that invoked in his travel columns. (This is also why the seemingly
volunteerist Pyle actually supported Franklin Roosevelt's idea of
legislation requiring national service [364]). Characteristically, Pyle
used his downshifting of scale, and his capsule biographies, to break
what he called the "great war machine" (318) down into
component parts, much like panels in a Depression-era mural. When held
back from the actual front, for instance, he made a virtue of the
long-standing journalistic strategy of camp following, and profiled the
artillery support groups or ordinance supply units or even flyboys who
supplemented the efforts of their fellow infantrymen. That is, he helped
his audience picture what a particular job was--and, quite tellingly,
Pyle's persona shifted from a "you" to a "we"
to refer variously to himself, to the unit being profiled, and to the
reader at home. This is the very function he attributed to the labor of
war: to bond different divisions together. Spartan scarcity and
collaborative labor brought with them the respite of a kind of
forgetfulness, a loss of oneself in duty. In this re-imagined space,
even killing became a profession (104), a job.
And this built logically, in the sequential lesson plan laid out
for his home front readers, into a final signature of Pyle's work:
his evocation of a war effort behind the front that was actually at it.
Or, more precisely, just behind it. Pyle asked his reader at home to
picture various forms of labor within the war machine because they
doubled as examples of a war production ethos that might be imitated at
home. Take these selections from a column entitled "The
Fixers," which starts by alternately drawing the dividing line with
home and then erasing it. It's worth noticing, as well, how
Pyle's casting mixes differences in age with his fundamental
divide:
SOMEWHERE IN NORMANDY, AUGUST 1, 1944--I know of nothing
in civilian life at home by which you can even remotely compare the
contribution to his country made by the infantry soldier ...
But I've just been with an outfit whose war work is similar
enough to yours that I believe you can see the difference ...
These men are skilled craftsmen. Many of them are above military
age. Back home they made big money. Their jobs here are
fundamentally the same as those of you who work at home work in war
plants....
You have beds and bathrooms. These men sleep on the ground, and
dig a trench for their toilets. (325-26)
Likewise, one of the soldiers who provide rifles for paratroopers
testifies: "'Them old boys at the front I'm sure got my
sympathy. Least we can do is work our fingers off to give them the
stuff'" (320). He becomes a war producer, as if behind the
front. Simple, prosaic, this labor has so allowed him to lose himself
that he has forgotten he is at the front; in other words, he has found a
home there.
(II)
Based on over eighteen months spent with an infantry battalion
(the "2-16" from Fort Riley, Kansas) in the late phases of the
war in Iraq, David Finkel's The Good Soldiers at first seems worlds
apart from Pyle's Good War dispatches--politically,
technologically, aesthetically. And little wonder. Although once again
engaged by a volunteer army, the battle for Iraq was not a total
campaign demanding a national commitment to wartime production on the
home front. Rather, it was framed as a so-called "limited"
counterinsurgency effort that dragged on despite deep skepticism in the
American voting public. (5) The mission also proved quite mutable:
supposedly about Weapons of Mass Destruction (or, some quarters,
responding to 9/11), it morphed into the cause of liberating Iraqis from
the tyranny of Saddam Hussein; then, it morphed again, as I will show,
into providing security for the task of nation-building at which the
war's originators had originally scoffed (cf. Stark). Fighting an
elusive, even nebulous enemy, U.S. soldiers commonly found themselves
surrounded not by a grateful liberated populace, but a world of fear,
distrust, and the charge that they were little more than a force of
military occupation. ("Suspicion in 360 degrees," Finkel calls
it [40].) It turns out, however, that these new historical and political
conditions--including the official and ordinary components with which
political obligation was forged--proved just as vital to Finkel's
story-telling as World War II's had been to Pyle's. Where Pyle
used his stateside experience to construct a redeeming panorama of
homely labor and regenerative national unity in war, Finkel explores the
tensions generated both by the 2-16's visits home and,
paradoxically, their efforts to build safe streets so far away from
those homes. The mission of counterinsurgency enters into their
vocabularies of political obligation, in ways often disastrous for the
men.
In The Good Soldiers we do encounter a different literary form.
Finkel's retrospective, book-length narrative forgoes Pyle's
trademark letter-dispatches for the battery of devices from contemporary
literary journalism: third person omniscience (no Pyle persona here);
the interpolation of individual consciousness into that narrator's
free indirect discourse; powerful telescoping between present and future
time frames. The book is organized around the consciousness of the
2-16's leader, a Montana-born U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel named
Ralph Kauzlarich, whom the soldiers come to call "The Lost
Kauz" (123). With nicknames like that, we not surprisingly
encounter post-Vietnam gaps of credibility and command throughout. Each
of Finkel's chapters is keyed to a specific calendar date, yet
introduced by a windy or obtuse epigraph from President George W. Bush,
so that we can measure its reality, or usually its opposite, on the
ground. In turn, Finkel's back-and-forth shuttling between
Kauzlarich's ambitions and the men's despair allows his story
to foreshadow those elements that, on page one, we are told
"weren't yet" (1) at hand: distrust, injury,
disillusionment, death. The book thus partly refashions its own
journalistic datelining: punctuated by a relentless pulse of injury and
fatality, The Good Soldiers instead becomes the "Death March"
the men's gallows humor predicts (18). Over time, even
Kauzlarich's own struggles become apparent when, like a church
elder, he begins to preach a jeremiad of inevitable death to the younger
generation under his command. (6) The chapter calendar generates a
countdown effect that soon establishes getting home as getting out.
Thus, as well, the implied argument that emerges to challenge the
much-ballyhooed success of the surge strategy (243-245). The real reason
for the only momentary pause in fighting in that year, Finkel argues,
was the arbitrary decision of Muqtada al-Sadr's militia to sit back
and wait for a better time, which ominously begins at the end of The
Good Soldiers (267, 279).
Because of that outcome, some may come to read The Good Soldiers
as an antiwar book. Read that way, Finkel's title might simply seem
an ironic commentary on those public efforts, notably on the political
right, to liken Iraq to World War II: Saddam Hussein to Adolph Hitler,
Al-Qaeda to the opening salvo of "Islamofascism," and so on.
(New wars, as Amy Kaplan has reminded us, often must rewrite old ones.)
But Finkel's goal is, I think, far less polemical. Really, he is
more intent on fragmenting the war what he calls into multiple
"versions" or "realities" (81, 103, 132) that often
track centrifugally from the blast zones of I.E.D.'s and
"lobbed bombs." If, for instance, Kauzlarich's command
comes to seem like a bizarre materialization of Bush's own
psychological denial, the Colonel too is victimized by his superiors.
General David Petraeus, the intellectual godfather of the new
counterinsurgency strategy, actually arrives in person for a
consultation, only to ignore all the bad news (152-56). Finkel,
meanwhile, also uses the men's sworn statements from mission or
patrol disasters to enhance our sense of the fragmentation of the
war's realities. The keyword of Finkel's title, the word
"good" is itself shattered into different meanings: at points
it refers to morally righteous or pure of heart; later, to being merely
proficient at one's job; elsewhere, merely passable. Most of all,
it comes to stand for an inability to process the unimaginable terrors
on the ground ("It's all good," Kauzlarich says
compulsively.)
Meanwhile, Finkel's book cannot help but look over its
shoulder at Pyle's legacy, new historical conditions or its
political intentions notwithstanding. For one thing, not only does
Finkel's writing, like Pyle's, center on putatively typical,
mid-American soldiers from Montana or Wyoming or Ohio; at one point we
hear about a nineteen-year-old fighter who just weeks before had been
"hollering in some Kansas snow" (24-25). We are also tied, as
with Pyle, to an older, paternal consciousness focalized via Kauzlarich
himself. Finkel's choice to center on Kauzlarich itself ends up
smuggling into the book a backward glance, since the Colonel himself
nostalgically defines "real" military work in World War
II's terms of directly engaging the enemy (5). At any point that
Kauzlarich is returned to battle, he sees it as "[m]eaning
restored" (11). This longing also reflects the way The Good
Soldiers itself returns us, as the Pyle paradigm would have it, to the
on-the-ground, immediate perimeter of infantrymen and their hopes and
fears. We might even say that this very perimeter becomes Finkel's
own narrative "good." Whenever we read one of Bush's
grand rationales, for example, or hear about the superficial metrics of
think tanks or the "windshield tour"(141) of a politician, we
are repelled back to the ordinary, to the reality check of the foot
soldier's primary experience. And in addition, now literalizing the
task that Pyle had reconstructed only imaginatively, Finkel takes us
back to he actual home fronts and medical facilities where the wounded
warriors of the 2-16 work on their recuperation alongside their
families.
In short, for all his story's apparent differences, one of
Finkel's primary subjects becomes, once again, the domestic fronts
of political obligation. Finkel follows the men home on leave, visits
hospitals with Kauzlarich, interviews wives separately and in great
detail. In a sequence on the battalion's eighteen-day leaves, we
follow one soldier who goes home and impulsively buys a used truck for
his son, for $17,000; another who marries his girlfriend and spends
$5000 on a quickie honeymoon in Las Vegas; another who, after attending
the memorial service of a fellow platoon member, blows $7000 on a
shopping spree, getting drunk, and patronizing a stripper bar on his
first day home in Ohio. (This is the same soldier whose ultimate
re-enlistment, Finkel observes, only reminds us of the arbitrary cash
bonuses used to keep an overstretched all-volunteer force afloat [264].)
For his own part, Kauzlarich--who has constructed, we are told, his
"very own war" of intricate flow charts and strategies
(232)--finds he cannot communicate anything about it: not only to
Petraeus, but to his own wife, who struggles to remain relentlessly
upbeat despite her frustration and loneliness while raising her kids by
herself at Fort Riley (217).
These very human, personal trials might seem like universal to
the experience of war; in part, they are. But like Pyle before him,
Finkel also works to weave such seemingly transhistorical, philosophical
matters into a more ordinary portrait of ideological and cultural
exchanges specific to his historical moment. Take, for instance, the
moment in The Good Soldiers when we hear about a football team in
Colorado that fastens its attention on one of the injured men from the
2-16. In a gesture of support, the team posts its photograph on the Web,
showing its members all yelling "freedom" as their picture is
snapped. Finkel writes:
That picture was posted [on the Web], too, and to see it was to
think of how the war really had come to stitch the nation together,
from coast to coast and border to border there were thirty thousand
knots of people screaming "freedom" into a camera because
they knew
somebody, or knew somebody who knew somebody, who had been injured
in Iraq. (237)
Now, it might seem that the Web--as if the 2009 counterpart to
Ernie Pyle's fan mail--contributes to a perceived or virtual
community, an imagined national tie with the soldiers in Iraq. And yet,
while these citizens are indeed transposing the cause of freedom to an
ordinary register, Finkel's cautionary phrase "to see it was
to think" is quite telling here. And that is because the entire
thrust of The Good Soldiers, of course, has been to show us the
reality-gap not only between front and home front, but sometimes between
men fighting in the same battalion. What we want to see or think
isn't what we get.
It is important to be clear here. As I've said, American
military personnel do indeed honor the more formal, transcendent
ideological terms of their service commitment; quite often they will
speak, for instance, of defending freedom. The point it simply that,
because of their additional need to refashion their understanding in
more concrete, personal terms, they end up not, in Finkel's
rendering, shepherding "freedom" into Iraq in ways we might
traditionally construe the term. (7) Rather, that cause gets a decidedly
post-9/11 remodeling in the ordinary. As Finkel reports the men's
version, interpolated through a moment when Kauzlarich is looking at his
own family, "'the [ideal] end state in Iraq would be that
Iraqi children can go out on a soccer field and play safely. Parents can
let their kids go out and play, and they don't have a concern in
the world. Just like us'" (15). Freedom thus comes to mean not
political liberty, but freedom from fear, the ability to move about and
feel secure.
Moreover, the men themselves have not invented this rationale
independently; on the contrary, it turns out to have been embedded in
the explicit tactical approach behind the surge itself. Specifically, it
reflects the importing of the so-called "community policing"
anticrime strategy from American streets to counterinsurgency efforts in
Iraq (the so-called "COIN" program). In this policing
strategy, developed in American cities in the late 1970s and 1980s--and
which one can find echoed in the writings of Petraeus, among others--the
war in Iraq could not succeed simply by massive shows of force, nor by
conceiving of counterinsurgency in narrowly military terms. Instead,
under the rubric of nation-building, soldiers were asked to work more
like local aldermen or beat cops, building trust from the Iraqis. More
specifically, like police officers in the community-oriented approach
back home, soldiers were taught to reinforce the existing authority
structures in their locale, solicit cooperating citizens to collaborate
on practical solutions for everyday order, and use that rebuilt trust to
gather more effective intelligence on threats to restoring national
sovereignty (Echoing advice given to police patrol operators in the
U.S., for example, Petraeus's doctrine advised "GET OUT AND
WALK, MOVE MOUNTED, WORK DISMOUNTED.") Giving a soccer ball to
local boys, mentioned repeatedly in The Good Soldiers and photographed
in Petraeus's own writings, became the iconic public image of this
Iraq program (Petraeus; K. Williams; Celeski; Long).
This theory also provides a fuller context for the struggle of
meaning in Kauzlarich's mind. Though Kauzlarich arrives in Iraq
conceiving his mission in World War II terms, we soon see him going
through all the steps that would have been commonplace among police
forces in American cities back home (cf. Kelling and Wilson): community
meetings with the locals in order to listen to their complaints and to
design possible solutions; establishing a local troop presence, much
like a precinct station (49), in an Iraqi neighborhood (here the tactic
is invoked by the acronym COP), partly to gather intelligence there
(32); focusing on the local, social service problems of those
neighborhoods, like trash removal or sewers. (And using cash, it should
be said, to overcome neighborhood resistance; as Petraeus advised,
"money is ammunition" [82]). Early on, Kauzlarich remarks
wistfully that "[t]he great leaders of previous wars may not have
had to do sewers" (68), but soon is on board with the new mission.
And that is because he now sees that the primary aim of such efforts, as
in domestic policing, is to establish a core of trust in Iraqis'
perceptions of the US military presence. Crucially, the idea is to get
Iraqis to recognize his troops' basic "decency" (50). In
other words, the policy is designed to have Iraqis see them as
"good" in an ordinary, personal sense: it is what the
transcendent value of democracy comes to mean. And why, in a starling resonance with the ethos created by Ernie Pyle, normalcy
becomes--however contradictory this may sound--the goal both
complementing and proceeding from the providing of security. It is how
the men hope to make the mission theirs: understandable, closer to
home.
Of course, putting this putative norm of decency into practice,
or extracting it from the demands of military occupation, is another
matter altogether. Kansas and Rustimiyah turn out to have little to say
to each other, as one community meeting on trash removal shows (97-98).
Or take, for instance, Bush's own evocation of an Iraqi mother who
wants, ostensibly, the same thing an American one does, "a chance
for that child to grow up in peace and realize dreams ... to go outside
and play and not fear harm" (220). As humane or incontrovertible as
this mission goal may sound--who can protest the playing of soccer, or
the freedom to be a child?--the severity of the metaphorical reduction
leaves much unanswered. The seemingly universal image actually
substitutes a Rockwellian iconography for more difficult policy
considerations about who decides how such security might be achieved, or
what it has to do with better schools, sovereign economic councils, or
local democratic deliberation. (After the U.S. invasion, Iraqi women
feared going outside, or attending jobs, but not merely because of
random criminal acts. [Cf. Riverbend].) On top of that--leaving aside
that it is an American football team putting its photo on the Web--there
is the matter of sending soccer balls abroad as if the act conveys
cross-cultural understanding: our football, your football.
Moreover, beneath its soft-sell (soccer mom) exterior, the vision
contains the seeds of an Orwellian reversal: freedom now actually
becomes the stepchild of its antithesis, security. This is a
contradiction that puts extraordinary strains upon the soldiers tasked
to implement the mission. True enough, soldier labor is being rewritten,
regenerated, though not as Pyle imagined it: good soldiers are now
defined as community builders, and surely their own desire for decency
is understandable. But given Kauzlarich's own nostalgia for
military meaning, under the new banner of security the desire to be good
soldiers might well revert to its more traditional training. That is, in
the long run, the providing of security can quickly become its own good,
and soldiers could find themselves implicated in a domesticated, yet
still military-bound conception of their work. This turnabout is
reflected, for example, when one soldier goes home and attends a Kansas
State University football game, where an argument breaks out about
whether President Bush is a "good" man (212). Reflecting yet
another dimension of Finkel's keyword, the soldier flashes back
from looking at his own daughters to a day in Iraq, when he protected a
little girl from a man who slapped her for waving at U.S. troops. He had
grabbed the man, threatening him with arrest or death if ever did it
again. "'It felt good to say it,' [the soldier] had said
that day ... 'It felt good to snatch him off the street in front of
people. It felt good to see the fear in his eyes. That felt
good'" (212). Actually seeking out fear now becomes its own
mission, and feeling good becomes one of its justifications. Decency,
unfortunately, at the end of a gun.
As the final turn of the screw, Finkel suggests that home is
actually is not the place the men ever return to, even on those
eighteen-day leaves. It is not only that the mission asks soldiers to
implement "safe streets" like the ones at home they can no
longer feel part of. Moreover, when they return to the U.S. itself, home
is made over into a special place, full of heartfelt performances and
reaffirmed ties and, as I've said, sometimes immoderate spending;
families and soldiers alike try to construct a home that will put them
at peace, temporarily. But when the soldiers go back to Iraq, Finkel
writes, their actual home returns to being a place of mundane details,
loss, getting batteries for the recorded message to be sent out to your
husband. Or, it can be something as ordinary as waffles falling out of a
box onto the kitchen floor:
Here was home in its truest form, when the solider who lived there
was not on the front porch watching a thunderstorm, or proposing,
or passing out on the couch, or buying a truck, but was still in
Iraq. It was what home was like not on the eighteen days that
Kauzlarich would be there, but on the four hundred days he would
not (215).
It is not only, then, that Finkel shows us how versions of the
war at the front or at home become "vastly different and largely
unshared with each other" (216). He also shows how the men of 2-16,
at first empowered but ultimately undermined by their mission of soccer
and security, fight for a home whose normalcy, like the success of the
surge, has long receded behind them. If home was ever a place of
security and freedom to begin with.
(III)
It goes without saying, of course, that my own focus on political
obligation neglects other issues--about the depiction of war's
waste and violence and voyeurism, for example--that are equally
important to war correspondents, and that Ernie Pyle himself took to his
wartime grave. (8) A different kind of examination might well have
emphasized, moreover, the ways in which Pyle or Finkel's focus on a
normative or mid-American masculinity needlessly subordinates the
importance of ethnic or racial or gender diversity in the troops as such
or, say, the complicated roles of masculinity and racism at the point of
COIN's attack in Iraq. Nor does my account of community policing
abroad exhaust the manifold ways in which a neoconservative war abroad
drew upon one at home (Wilson 2010: 161-64). And there is always more to
think about, in regard to the home front. As I have suggested, for
instance, much of Finkel's account certainly bears comparison with
the extraordinary outpouring of recent writings, including blogs, which
have documented the ongoing trials facing today's military
families. What some of this new literature shows us is that repeated and
extended call-ups, state laws that discriminate against the transient
residencies of spouses, and even the contradictions within military
culture itself--which often contorts domesticity into its own kind of
"readiness"--means that the home front is not a locus of the
normal, but a "new normal" (cf. Causey; Buckholtz, Standing
By). This new normal is, in many senses, not Kansas anymore.
For these reasons and others, pigeonholing The Good Soldiers as
simply a debunking of the Pyle paradigm will not do. Indeed, as I have
shown, Pyle himself did much more than sentimentally stitch home and
front together, or always portray a neatly homogeneous nation. Rather,
Pyle's evocation of New Deal iconography, labor-centeredness, and
regional difference sometimes conjured up a pluralistic (albeit
overwhelmingly white) domestic vision to aid the mission. (9)
Conversely, The Good Soldiers suggests that the forging of political
obligation is hardly an antique notion: indeed, may even be more
pressing in modern "police actions" where political and
military leaders toil on despite the absence of citizen consent--more
pressing, and also more vexed. Covertly and often not so covertly,
Finkel's narrative suggests that originally-domestic practices like
community policing may not really be up to the task of managing
intricate matters of sovereignty and order on foreign soil. And The Good
Soldiers explores the costs of asking fighting men (and of course women)
to serve such missions when they cannot correlate their ordinary
understanding of political obligation with their experience at the
front--or how they can be asked to defend a "homeland" when
home itself is such an elusive quantity.
Even acknowledging this telling critique, however--and certainly
because the embedding of war correspondents continues to be debated--we
would also do well to consider the legacy of the Pyle paradigm for
interpreting the political meanings of modern combat. And on this score,
a certain double bind seems apparent: while brilliantly deciphering the
contradictions of political obligation and mission objectives, even
Finkel's narrative encounters limits imposed by the interpretive
perimeter it has assigned itself. For example, Finkel tells us that his
soldiers never really know much of anything about the Iraq whose mission
it was, ostensibly, to save or make secure. We get a brief
crystallization of this argument within the book's sequence about
an Iraqi translator who pleads with the troops to get
otherwise-off-limits medical assistance from the base hospital for a
daughter injured in a car bombing, This request, which soldiers quickly
honor, comes very close to being a microcosm of their mission, and
Finkel's theme of simple human decency: if not making that
child's street safe, the soldiers get a chance to heal her from the
effects of its insecurity. Yet their efforts fall short of actually
coming to know the realities of the translator's life, which Finkel
briefly patches together for his reader (178-84). Despite having that
translator and other Iraqis in their midst, such comradeship in arms fails to displace, Finkel observes, the images that dominate the
men's perceptions of Iraq: "men with prayer beads and women in
black drapes and calves in living rooms and goats on roofs"
(174).
And yet, this is where the double bind takes hold. On the one
hand, the critique above seems entirely valid, suggesting as it does
that "suspicion in 360 degrees" ultimately rebounds back upon
the 2-16's own group consciousness. On the other, it is of course
to this same perimeter that Finkel has overwhelmingly confined his own
narrative; his readers never learn very much of what Iraq needs or
wants, either, and brief forays into the lives of collaborators is not
liable to be enough. (10) Nor does it seem sufficient to suggest that
what the troops cannot perceive is their common humanity with Iraqi
citizens. While falling back on that commonality is again true as far as
it goes, unfortunately it can also end up sounding very much like the
mission philosophy Finkel has otherwise so effectively critiqued. Like
the mission of exhibiting "decency," that is, this utopian
prospect of such unacknowledged kinship sidesteps the difficult
questions of power created, for example, by the effects of the invasion,
or by the role of regional and ethnic difference in Iraq, or how the
those Iraqis being policed would describe the role of national
sovereignty in determining their needs in the first place. And thus,
whether those needs are actually so recognizable to soldiers, to war
correspondents, and thus to stateside readers.
Meanwhile, it turns out even the innovative narrative techniques
Finkel brings to bear on the political meanings of his story reflect the
limits of this material and narrative perimeter. Because Finkel uses
free indirect discourse to fold the 2-16's perspective into his own
narrative voice, for example, the men's cultural perceptions and
rationalizations sometimes prove indistinguishable from his own. From
very early on in the narrative, we hear repeatedly how the men of the
2-16 use the word "Iraq" as a catch-all lament, and a
scapegoat for their own misery and frustrations. And yet, in one of
Finkel's own interpolations, he himself tells us that Iraq leads
the world in "broken promises, too, it could seem" (188). Now,
on the one hand, if "Iraq" in this moment is troop shorthand
for "the mission in Iraq"--well, then perhaps we can unpack the ambiguity about whose judgment we're listening to.
Nevertheless, the potential confusion suggests how the narrative voice
runs the risk of re-playing the cultural myopia that Finkel otherwise
finds so problematic in the 2-16 itself. A similar blurring effect
occurs after Kauzlarich visits one of his wounded soldiers in Bethesda
before returning to Iraq. Finkel writes the Colonel returns "once
again on the front lines of a place where an Iraqi mother wants the same
thing for her children that an American mother wants, a chance for that
child to grow up in peace and to realize dreams ..." (241). Of
course, we are meant to recall George Bush's myopic mantra. (A
reading reinforced by the fact that the next paragraph tells us of
another soldier dead.) But Finkel's own critique reaches a
measurable limit here as well, since the "Iraq" to which
Kauzlarich is returning certainly more than its casting in missionspeak.
Yet it is almost as if it has been vaporized into Kauzlarich's own
lost cause.
Of course, Finkel's double bind here is anything but unique
among war correspondents. But the inertial pull of the Pyle paradigm can
become even more problematic when a correspondent, albeit quite
understandably, gravitates towards a political assessment of soldiering
that takes on a testimonial aura, an honoring of the
"ridiculous" yet compelling "normalcy" of fighters
honoring their political obligation whatever its costs to them
personally. That predicament arises for Finkel, for example, when the
2-16's part of the surge begins to fall apart, a turn captured by
the final sequences of The Good Soldiers. With many of its COIN
accomplishments now in tatters, the battalion sets out again on the very
same convoys that had been so ill-advised to begin with. (In military
terms, we are told the men must now "transition from
Counterinsurgency Operations to High Intensity Combat
Operations"[276]). When disaster strikes one such convoy,
Kauzlarich is forced to perform his duty of debriefing a junior officer
who has witnessed the carnage exacted on his comrades and is struggling
with his guilt about surviving. Kauzlarich tries to calm the soldier
down, mainly by reassuring him that he had performed to all protocols,
and that he had earned his trip home to the U.S. And at first, seemingly
consistent with its aim of narrating different "realities,"
Finkel's narrative cycles around the battalion, and then pauses to
invoke its own titular refrain:
In another part [of the base], a soldier was thinking about
whatever a soldier thinks about after seeing a dog licking up a
puddle of blood that was Winegar's, or Reiher's, or
Hanley's, or
Bennett's, or Miller's, and shooting the dog until it was
dead.
The good soldiers.
They really were. (292)
Again, in this complex moment, Finkel probably intended to remind
us of the multiple, fragmented resonances of his keyword-phrase, and the
bizarre acts that can accompany any soldier's desire (however
misguided) for decency. Nevertheless, it is here, in the surprisingly
un-fragmented return of the word "really," that even this most
sophisticated redrafting of the Pyle paradigm seems to run into
difficult interpretive territory. It is not, as is so frequently argued,
as simple a matter of our need to support the troops whatever we think
of the mission, as much as I myself might agree with that point of view.
Rather, I think, the difficulty of Finkel's qualification is as
follows: if the unifying affirmation of what these soldiers "really
were" means to suggest any equivalence between their fulfilling of
domestic political obligation and the "real" political
meanings of the U.S. presence in Iraq, the contradictions I have
enumerated above--about confusing freedom with security, assessing Iraqi
needs via policing, transposing middle-American "normalcy" to
imagining those needs--might only proliferate. Indeed, those
contradictions are what I take The Good Soldiers itself to document.
To put this more simply, by ultimately affirming his vexed phrase
of the "good soldiers"--a refrain one finds across Ernie
Pyle's writings as well--Finkel no doubt meant to signal his final
indebtedness as a journalist to the infantrymen he covered. In this way
he returns us to Michael Herr's film clip, and the unstated bond
that often is forged between the journalist and the soldiers with whom
he or she travels. A bond that, paradoxically, often only deepens when
the war goes bad. Again, one is tempted to say: fair enough. The Good
Soldiers ends movingly by showing us a full roster of the 2-16, and then
photographs of the battalion members who were killed during the period
depicted in Finkel's book. Like many such photo-arrays in our
post-9/11 world, the silent gallery reminds us of genuine suffering and
sacrifice. And yet, whether a reflection of the bonds that form in the
popular arts of everyday newspaper columns, or in the retrospective
sophistication of narrative nonfiction, the scene above may also remind
us of some of the risks of intertwining one's portrait of political
obligation with the rather different terms of the journalist's own.
In the end, it might simply remind us of the many good reasons why war
correspondents are so often drawn to affirming the "ordinary,"
and the "real," in conditions that nearly always stretch the
meaning of these words.
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Notes
(1.) Finkel reports (120) that in 2006 that 15 percent of the
U.S. Army's recruits were given waivers for past criminal
records.
(2.) See also Nelson. The documentary ethos has been discerned in
Ernie Pyle's Story of G.I. Joe (1945); see Doherty, and Dudley
Nichols.
(3.) Nichols also offers the intriguing speculation that
Pyle's columns often flew under the radar of censors because they
seemed so benign (Ernie's War xiv). Here and in most places
throughout, I will use masculine nouns and pronouns to refer to
soldiers, because Pyle and Finkel focus exclusively on men. In
Pyle's case, I will focus on his European-theatre columns, where he
forged his style.
(4.) For efficiency's sake, I will cite page numbers from
the most complete collection of Pyle's writings, Ernie's War
Readers should note, however, the editing choices discussed by Nichols
in his introduction (xvi), which included leaving out home
addresses.
(5.) Polls tended to suggest antiwar sentiment peaked right
during Finkel's tour with the 2-16; see Kapur.
(6.) See Finkel's account of Kauzlarich's actual
sermonizing, 85. On the jeremiad's generational emphasis, see
Bercovitch.
(7.) Here I am indebted to the superb personal account provided
by Buckholtz's Standing By. See esp. 64 ff. on explaining
"fighting for freedom" to her children.
(8.) See, for instance, Ernie's War 280-81, 283. I also
refer to the unpublished column draft found on Pyle's body, that
addressed the "mass production of death" on the battlefield;
see Tobin 3-4.
(9.) Though Pyle had little of substance to say about cultural or
ethnic difference in his war theatres--just substitute Mexicans for
Arabs, he told his audience in one dispatch, and you will understand the
Tunisian campaign (63)--Pyle might in fact have served as a bridge
figure between Mid-American "normalcy" and a more pluralistic
or urban cultural outlook. Certain scenes in The Story of G.I. Joe, for
instance, suggest that liberating Italy was tantamount to rescuing its
traditional ethnic practices.
(10.) Finkel's focus on a putatively typical U.S.
infantryman in Iraq, likewise, might make us forget that this particular
war featured an enormous number of private security contractors, forces
that contributed to Iraqi distrust and to chaos on the ground (Fainaru;
Tavernise; Glanz and Lehren).
CHRISTOPHER WILSON is Professor of English at Boston College, and
most recently the author of Cop Knowledge: Police Power and Cultural
Narrative in 20th Century America (2000), and Learning to Live with
Crime: American Crime Narrative in the Neoconservative Turn (2010). His
current research is concerned with contemporary narrative journalism. In
past years, Wilson has served on the editorial boards of American
Literature and American Quarterly.