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  • 标题:More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Control Laws.
  • 作者:Shughart, William F., II
  • 期刊名称:Southern Economic Journal
  • 印刷版ISSN:0038-4038
  • 出版年度:1999
  • 期号:January
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Southern Economic Association
  • 摘要:People who call themselves economists without committing a fraud on the profession regard the first law of demand as the first principle of economizing behavior. Confronted with an obvious empirical application of it, neoclassical economists, at least those whom have managed to avoid falling into the everything-is-possible game theory trap, instinctively want to gather data and estimate the magnitude of the theory's prediction. Is the inverse relationship between the price of something and the amount of it individuals choose to consume statistically significant when other relevant factors are held constant? And, if so, how large is the ceteris paribus own-price effect? Although the size and significance of the empirical results might be the subject of considerable econometric debate, no economist worthy of the label would obstinately question the direction of the relationship. When the price of something goes up, less of it will be consumed. The only issue worthy of scholarly controversy is, how much less?
  • 关键词:Book reviews;Books

More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun Control Laws.


Shughart, William F., II


By John R. Lott, Jr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. x, 225. $23.00.

People who call themselves economists without committing a fraud on the profession regard the first law of demand as the first principle of economizing behavior. Confronted with an obvious empirical application of it, neoclassical economists, at least those whom have managed to avoid falling into the everything-is-possible game theory trap, instinctively want to gather data and estimate the magnitude of the theory's prediction. Is the inverse relationship between the price of something and the amount of it individuals choose to consume statistically significant when other relevant factors are held constant? And, if so, how large is the ceteris paribus own-price effect? Although the size and significance of the empirical results might be the subject of considerable econometric debate, no economist worthy of the label would obstinately question the direction of the relationship. When the price of something goes up, less of it will be consumed. The only issue worthy of scholarly controversy is, how much less?

Early last year, John Lott and David Mustard (1997) published a lengthy study, concluding from extensive empirical evidence that criminals respond in ways predicted by models of rational behavior to changes in the cost of committing crimes. Specifically, they examined the impact of so-called non-discretionary (or "shall-issue") gun laws allowing private citizens to carry weapons concealed about their persons. Prior to the enactment of these laws, by now on the books in 31 states altogether (most of which have adopted them since 1985), local law enforcement officials exercised considerable discretion in decisions to issue concealed handgun permits. Shall-issue laws essentially eliminate that discretion, requiring concealed-weapons permits to be granted to all applicants who pay the required fee and meet other minimal qualifications, including age restrictions, absence of a criminal record, and no history of mental illness.

Lott and Mustard, reasoning that making it easier for private citizens to arm themselves would increase criminals' expected costs of confronting their prey (who might or might not be carrying concealed weapons), hypothesized that shall-issue laws would produce reductions in crime rates, especially violent crimes, such as murder, rape, and robbery, where retaliation by a possibly armed victim poses the greatest threat to the perpetrator. Because the hypothesized reductions in violent crime rates in shall-issue states might be offset to some extent by substitution effects leading to increases in nonviolent crimes (e.g., against property) in those same jurisdictions as well as to increases in violent crimes in jurisdictions having more restrictive gun laws as criminals rationally shifted their predatory activities across borders, the overall impact of the change in gun law regimes is an empirical question. Employing a county-level data set consisting of some 54,000 observations (3,000-plus counties over an 18-year time span), Lott and Mustard reported a variety of statistical results supporting the conclusion that criminals respond to shall-issue laws in the ways predicted by the first law of demand.

However, even before the paper was published thanks to the authors posting the manuscript on the Internet and making their data available to anyone who requested it, Lott became the target of a vicious publicity campaign attacking his scholarship and assassinating his character. Enemies of a plain reading of the constitutional guarantee of the right to bear arms accused him of being an intellectually dishonest shill whose research was bought and paid for by progun pressure groups. The basis for this scurrilous charge? Lott is the John M. Olin Visiting Law and Economics Fellow at the University of Chicago, a position funded by the John M. Olin Foundation. Although it is true that the Olin Corporation, which is the source of the Olin family fortune, is a manufacturer of ammunition (but not of guns, as the critics initially claimed), the Olin Foundation is, in the words of its president William E. Simon, "as independent of the Olin Corp. as the Ford Foundation is of the Ford Motor Co." (letter to the editor, Wall Street Journal, September 4, 1996).

The personal (and, to those who know him, completely unfounded) attacks on Lott's integrity were made with such ferocity and in so many media outlets nationwide that one can conclude only that Lott was, with apologies to our gracious First Lady, the target of a vast left-wing conspiracy to discredit his politically incorrect findings. In More Guns, Less Crime, Lott responds to the critics with the same careful attention to detail and with the same willingness to debate the issues on their scientific merits that has characterized his demeanor throughout this tempestuous affair. Confident in his own work and genuinely intellectually curious about the causes of crime and the consequences of gun ownership, Lott has eagerly entered the lion's den to debate the evidence. He has appeared on panels at meetings of the Public Choice Society and the American Economic Association (Bronars and Lott 1998), gone on C-SPAN and National Public Radio, and continued to answer his detractors in print (Lott 1998).

With such a large data set to be mined and with so many factors to be controlled for in estimating the marginal impact of concealed-handgun laws on crime rates, Lott and Mustard's paper triggered a healthy econometric argument that is far from settled. Issues relating to the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of certain observations (Black and Nagin 1998) and to the specification of the regression model (Dezhbakhsh and Rubin 1998) have led some researchers to conclude that shall-issue laws play a less significant role in deterring violent crime than Lott claims. Other researchers have found that although the direct effects of the laws the hypothesized reductions in murder, rape, and robbery rates - appear to be empirically robust, the indirect effects on nonviolent crimes might not be (Bartley and Cohen 1998).

Many of these technical issues are explored in More Guns, Less Crime. However, the book also addresses a wide range of topics related to its main theme, including the demographics of crime and gun ownership, the roles played by arrest rates and conviction rates in deterring criminal activity, the impact of handgun availability on suicide rates and accidental deaths, and the effects of prepurchase waiting periods and background checks on crime rates.

Chapter 1 introduces the analysis. There, Lott recounts some vivid stories illustrating how law-abiding private citizens have successfully fended off criminal attacks by brandishing concealed weapons and reports some statistical evidence placing handgun violence in perspective. Two of the widely accepted "facts" about the relationship between guns and crime are quickly laid to rest. One is that gun accidents make many children the innocent victims of America's gun culture. According to Lott, 1,400 accidental deaths involved guns in 1995. However, only 200 of these accidents involved children less than 14 years of age. Although tragic, this number is far less than the 2,900 children killed in motor vehicle accidents the same year. As a matter of fact, "more children die in bicycle accidents each year than die from all types of firearm accidents" (p. 9). The other truism is that most murderers "know" their victims, implying that easy access to guns often turns simple domestic arguments into deadly encounters. However, as Lott points out, the FBI's definition of "acquaintance" includes fellow gang members as well as the customers of drug pushers, hookers, and cab drivers. I have wanted to shoot a few cabbies myself, but I would not say that I knew any of them.

Some of the book's provocative findings in this regard are that women and blacks seem to gain the most from concealed-weapons laws; that the largest reductions in violent crimes follow the adoption of shall-issue laws in high-crime urban areas, where gun laws tend to be the most restrictive and where opponents fight hardest to keep nondiscretionary concealed-weapons laws off the books; that criminals are dissuaded more by the probability of being arrested than by the probability of being convicted; and that waiting periods and background checks have little, if any, crime-deterring benefits.

In colonial America, all able-bodied men were required to own firearms and risked fines if they failed to muster in response to the tocsin calling the militia to assemble. In late-twentieth-century America, rooted in a hitherto unexamined belief that more guns lead to more crime, political elites lobby tirelessly to disarm law-abiding private citizens. Lott has now tested the conventional wisdom of the instrumental immorality of guns and found it wanting. Given that even the most lavishly funded police force cannot protect every law-abiding citizen against the depredations of those who operate outside the law, increasing the cost to criminals of confronting their victims by allowing the carrying of concealed weapons appears, on Lott's evidence, to be an effective crime-fighting strategy. To the extent that self-defense is a substitute for police defense, of course, we might expect local and federal law enforcement officials to oppose shall-issue laws. Although that substitution effect might help explain some of the hostility to more permissive gun law regimes, it is beyond the scope of More Guns, Less Crime, as is the issue of private gun ownership as a counterweight to government abuses.

More Guns, Less Crime is controversial and thought provoking. One need not agree with all its empirical findings or accept all its conclusions to appreciate the extent to which Lott has raised the level of the debate. Opponents of private gun ownership, who have gotten away with small samples and with the simple analytical demands of the medical journals in which many of their studies have appeared, must meet higher standards of scholarship from now on. More Guns, Less Crime is not the last word on the subject, nor does Lott make it out to be. Anyone who is interested in the important public policy issues it addresses - and who is willing to keep an open mind - will profit from reading it.

References

Bartley, William Alan, and Mark A. Cohen. 1998. The effect of concealed weapons laws: An extreme bound analysis. Economic Inquiry 36(April):258-65.

Black, Dan A., and Daniel S. Nagin. 1998. Do right-to-carry laws deter violent crime? Journal of Legal Studies 27(January):209-19.

Bronars. Stephen G., and John R. Lott, Jr. 1998. Criminal deterrence, geographic spillovers, and the right to carry concealed handguns. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88(May):475-9.

Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, and Paul H. Rubin. 1998. Lives saved or lives lost? The effects of concealed-handgun laws on crime. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 88(May):468-74.

Lott, John R., Jr. 1998. The concealed-handgun debate. Journal of Legal Studies 27(January):221-43.

Lott, John R., Jr., and David B. Mustard. 1997. Crime, deterrence, and right-to-carry concealed handguns. Journal of Legal Studies 26(January):1-68.

William E Shughart II University of Mississippi
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