The impact of Sarbanes-Oxley act on non-U.S. accounting firms.
Hsu, Kathy H.Y. ; Cheek, Ronald G. ; Etheridge, Harlan L. 等
ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes-Oxley (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection) Act of 2002 is the most far reaching legislation to reform
American business practices in recent time. This legislation changes the
business landscape in the U.S. by creating a new oversight body, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, to oversee the corporate
governance, accounting and auditing practices of all publicly held
companies in the U.S. and to implement regulatory requirements for
better corporate governance, accounting, and auditing practices.
Many of these new regulatory changes affect not only U.S.
corporations and the U.S. accounting and auditing professions, but also
have a far reaching impact on all of the non-U.S. corporations that seek
capital in the U.S. security markets as well as those non-U. S.
accounting/ auditing firms that service these foreign entities. While
the intention of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to protect U.S. investors in
general and the legitimacy of an U.S. oversight body to regulate
publicly held companies in the U.S. is not being challenged, some of the
specific requirements within the Act pose challenges for non-U.S.
companies that are also subject to their home country's regulatory
requirements that may be substantially different or in conflict with the
requirements of this new act. Strong opposition also has been expressed
by non-U.S. accounting firms that are fearful that implementation of
this new Act may place them in a disadvantageous position compared to
their U.S. counterparts and change the international market for auditing
services. This study reviews the specific requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that are applicable to non-U.S. accounting firms and
provides insight on how these requirements affect the global accounting
and audit market.
INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 into law. This Act not only is applicable to all companies listed
in the U.S., both domestic and foreign, Section 106 of the Act also
subjects any non-U.S. accounting firms who "prepare or
furnish" an audit report involving U.S. registrants or any foreign
accounting firms whose audit opinion is relied upon by a registered U.S.
accounting firm to be subject to the authority of the Act. This new Act
not only imposes registration requirements with an U.S. oversight body
on foreign accounting/auditing firms, it also redefines many aspects of
accounting and auditing practices for foreign accounting firms that may
or may not be practically feasible or legally possible in their home
countries.
The main areas of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that affect the accounting
profession in general include (1) defining new roles for the corporate
audit committee and its relationship with corporate external auditor in
that auditors will report to and be overseen by a company's audit
committee, not management, and the requirement of audit committees to
pre-approve of all services (both audit and non-audit services) provided
by its auditor, and (2) auditor independence requirements including
audit partner rotation and employment restriction, specification of
consulting services that are "unlawful" if provided to a
publicly held company by its auditor, as well as (3) the requirement
that every audit report attest to the assessment made by management of
the company's internal control structures, including a specific
notation about any significant defects or material noncompliance found.
There are also specific provisions within the Act regarding preservation
of audit or review working papers and the requirement of management
assessment of internal controls.
As the U.S. accounting profession focuses on adapting to this new
era of change, foreign accounting firms have expressed grave concerns
that the new U.S. legislation may create an "unlevel playing
field" that favors U.S. accounting firms over non-U.S. accounting
firms because the non-U.S. firms will now be subject to both their
national oversight board as well as U.S. oversight. Currently, the
negotiation, debates and discussions are still ongoing between foreign
accounting firms and the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) in the hope that some relief can be granted in consideration of
the differences between the legal and operating environments in the U.S.
and the local legal and operating environments of foreign accounting
firms. However, foreign regulatory bodies have threatened to retaliate
against U.S. audit firms by imposing requirements similar to those of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (European Report, 2004).
The next section examines the specific requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that are applicable to foreign accounting firms
followed by a discussion of the impact that these new requirements
impose on foreign accounting firms and the current state of development
of a global co-operative system of accounting/auditing oversight.
SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN ACCOUNTING FIRMS
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements discussed in this section apply
to both domestic (U.S.) and foreign accounting firms. However, complying
with these requirements may prove to be especially problematic for some
foreign accounting firms.
Registration Requirements
Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and gave the PCAOB authority over all
U.S. listed companies, including foreign issuers. The PCAOB is appointed
and overseen by the SEC and it oversees and investigates the audits and
auditors of public companies and has the authority to sanction both
firms and individuals for violations of laws, regulations and rules. The
PCAOB has the right to issue new auditing standards or adopt auditing
standards set by other groups or organizations. And it is empowered to
regularly inspect registered accounting firms for potential violations
of securities laws, standards, competency, and conduct. Sanctions that
the PCAOB can impose include revocation or suspension of an accounting
firm's registration, prohibition from auditing public companies,
and civil penalties.
Section 102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that any public
accounting firm prepares or issues an audit report for any U.S. issuer
of stock must be registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) and Section 106 further requires foreign public accounting
firms who audit US companies to register with the PCAOB. This
requirement covers foreign firms that perform some audit work, such that
for a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company, which is relied on by the
primary auditor. Registration is a key to the PCAOB's oversight
powers in that registration with the PCAOB opens registering firms to
inspections and sanctions by the PCAOB (Illustration 1).
The foreign public accounting firm registered with the PCAOB is
assumed to have consented to 1) producing its working papers for the
PCAOB or the SEC in connection with any investigation, and 2) subjecting
themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for the purpose of
enforcing any request for the production of audit working papers.
Illustration 1 shows the possible relationship between the foreign and
domestic audit firms with an U.S. company under section 106.
Independence Provisions
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is based on three fundamental principles of
auditor independence: (1) auditors cannot function in the role of
management, (2) auditors cannot audit their own work, and (3) auditors
cannot serve in an advocacy role for their client. Section 201 of the
Act also lists nine non-audit services that impair a foreign or domestic
auditor's independence: (1) bookkeeping or other services related
to the accounting records or financial statements of the audit, (2)
financial information systems design and implementation, (3) appraisal
or valuation services, fairness of opinions, or contribution-in-kind
reports, (4) actuarial services, (5) internal audit outsourcing
services, (6) management functions or human resources, (7) broker or
dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services, (8) legal
services, and (9) expert services unrelated to the audit
All bookkeeping services, such as maintaining or preparing the
audit client's accounting records, preparing financial statements
or the information that forms the basis of financial statements, would
impair auditor independence, unless it is reasonable to conclude that
the results of the non-audit services will not be subject to audit
procedures. These rules also prohibit domestic and foreign auditors from
providing any service related to the audit client's information
system, but this will not prevent an auditor from working on hardware or
software systems that are unrelated to the audit client's financial
statements or accounting records as long as those services are
pre-approved by the audit committee.
Appraisal and valuation services include any process of valuing
assets, both tangible and intangible, or liabilities. Fairness opinions
and contribution-in-kind reports are opinions and reports in which the
accounting firm provides its opinion on the adequacy of consideration in
a transaction. A foreign and domestic auditor also cannot provide any
actuarially oriented advisory service involving the determination of
amounts recorded in the financial statements and related accounts for
the audit client. However, they may assist a client in understanding the
methods, models, assumptions, and inputs used in computing the amount.
The Sarbanes-Oxley rules also prohibit the auditor from providing
any internal audit service that has been outsourced by the audit client
that relates to internal accounting controls, but the auditor may make
recommendations to the audit client for improvements to the internal
controls during the conduct of the audit. Further, independence is
impaired when auditors seek out prospective candidates for managerial,
executive or director positions, act as negotiator on the audit
client's behalf, or undertake reference checks of prospective
candidates. Also, acting as a broker-dealer, promoter or underwriter,
making investment decisions on behalf of the audit client or otherwise
having discretionary authority over an audit client's investments,
or executing a transaction to buy or sell investments, or having custody
of assets of the audit client are prohibited.
Finally, the rules prohibit a domestic and foreign auditor from
providing expert opinions or other expert services or legal
representation that could be provided by someone licensed, admitted, or
otherwise qualified to practice law in the jurisdiction in which the
service is provided. However, providing factual accounts or testimony
describing work that they performed will not impair independence, or
explaining the positions taken or conclusions reached during the
performance of any service by the auditor. The Act also provides that
the provision of any non-audit service, including tax services, that is
not described as a prohibited service can be provided by the auditor
without impairing the auditor's independence only if the service
has been pre-approved by the issuer's audit committee.
Section 202 states that a reporting issuer's audit committee
must pre-approve allowable services to be provided by the auditor of the
issuer's financial statements. The new rules will require the audit
committees of U.S.-listed foreign firms to pre-approve all services, and
they may establish policies and procedures for pre-approval provided
they are consistent with the Act and designed to safeguard the continued
independence of the auditor.
Section 203 specifies that the lead and compatible partner, which
is defined as a member of the audit engagement team who has the
responsibility for decision-making on significant auditing, accounting
and reporting matters that effect the financial statements, must be
subject to rotation after five years. The rules specify that these
partners must be subject to a five-year "time out" period
after rotation. Additionally, certain audit partners will be subject to
a seven-year rotation requirement with a two-year time out period. An
auditor will not be independent if an audit partner receives
compensation based on selling services to that client, other than audit,
review and attest services, at any point during the engagement period.
The rules also state that firms with fewer than five audit clients and
fewer than ten partners may be exempt from the partner rotation and
compensation provisions with each of the activities subject to a special
review by the PCAOB at least every three years.
Reporting Responsibility of Auditor to the Audit Committee
Section 204 of the Act directs the Commission to issue rules
requiring timely reporting of specific information by auditors to the
audit committee. These rules require foreign auditors to report prior to
filing the audit report: (1) all critical accounting policies and
practices used by the issuer, (2) all material alternative accounting
treatments of financial information within GAAP that have been discussed
with management, including the ramifications of the use of such
alternative treatments and disclosures and the treatment preferred by
the auditor, and (3) other material written communications between the
auditor and management.
THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT ON FOREIGN ACCOUNTING FIRMS
The initial responses by foreign accounting firms to the
PCAOB's authority over foreign accounting firms were very negative
(illustration 2). As a result, the PCAOB decided to permit foreign
accounting firms an additional 90 days (to April 19, 2004) before
requiring registration with the PCAOB (1) and decided to allow foreign
applicants to withhold information from applications for registration
with the PCAOB where disclosure of the information would cause the
applicant to violate non-U.S. laws; however, no provision has been
granted to foreign public accounting firms exempting them from the
registration requirements under section 106 (c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (Evans, 2003).
Many foreign accounting firms view the registration requirement
under section 106 as creating unfair advantage for U.S. accounting firms
since foreign accounting firms are subject to two layers of professional
oversight, domestic and U.S., while U.S. accounting firms are subject to
only one layer of professional oversight (U.S.). This complaint is
particularly intense from accounting firms within the European Union
member states since each EU member state has established or is planning
to establish an effective system for the approval, registration and
professional oversight of statutory auditors with regard to the single
EU capital market from 2005 onwards. The additional administrative and
financial burden posed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on these foreign
accounting firms can be quite enormous (2).
In addition, although the PCAOB allows a foreign applicant to
withhold information from its application for registration with the
PCAOB where disclosure of the information would cause the applicant to
violate non-U.S. laws (Rule 2105, PCAOB), the application must provide a
legal opinion that the non-U.S. law would in fact prevent disclosure of
required information as well as an explanation of the applicant's
efforts to seek consents or waivers to eliminate the conflict and, if
applicable, a representation that the applicant was unable to obtain
such consents or waivers to eliminate the conflict. The explanation of
the applicant's efforts to seek consents or waivers adds no value
to investor protection and will result in extremely time-consuming and
ineffective attempts to seek consents or waivers, as employees would in
many cases refuse to give their consent. Foreign accounting firms also
contend that they have to bear the burden of this obligation; most U.S.
accounting firms probably will not be affected.
There are also additional concerns over confidentiality and data
protection issues relating to the general "duty to co-operate with
inspectors" and "... comply with any request ... to provide
access to, and the ability to copy, any record in the possession,
custody, or control of such a firm ..." (Rule 4006 of the PCAOB),
as well as the provision regarding "Production of audit work papers and other documents" in investigations (Rule 5103). For audit firms
operating in legal environments where the confidentiality requirements
and data protection legislation may make it difficult to provide all the
information which the PCAOB may request, investor confidence and
perception of the quality of audits may be eroded.
There are also additional concerns over undue administrative and
financial burdens placed on the non-big four accounting firms in their
current and future engagement choices. As smaller foreign accounting
firms withdraw from and avoid audit engagements to minimize the burden
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there will be an increased concentration of
audits of publicly listed clients with the "big four" firms.
This potential concentration of the international audit market with the
big four accounting firms may cause more harm to auditor independence.
INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF OVERSIGHT SYSTEMS
In response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., there has been a
wave of international initiatives both by national governments and by
international accounting professionals to promote accounting and audit
reform. For example, in May 2003 the EU Commission launched a
communication to reinforce the statutory audit required of the EU public
firms and there is a proposal underway to revise the Eighth Directive.
Last December, the U.K. government introduced the Companies (Audit,
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill to the House of Lords with
the intention improve the reliability of financial reporting and the
independence of auditors, and to strengthen the powers of company
investigators. The Japanese Financial Services Agency also has initiated
"new comprehensive program for promoting security markets
reform" in 2002 (FSA, 2003).
One of the main arguments presented by foreign accounting firms to
support their exemption from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements is that
there should be a mutual recognition of professional oversight systems.
In additional to the mutual respect for each jurisdiction's
sovereignty (FSA, 2003), the differences in the national audit oversight
systems due to the historical, cultural and legal differences between
the U.S. and other countries need to be respected. This means that if
the U.S. were to develop the principles and criteria upon which an
equivalence, i.e., mutual recognition of accounting/auditing oversight
systems, can be accepted by the U.S, a foreign national audit oversight
system can deem to be "equivalent" to the U.S. oversight
system even if they are not identical.
In light of the recent global harmonization of the accounting and
financial reporting standards, many have argued that this international
coordination and reciprocal recognition of regulations for global
capital markets would benefit not only the foreign accounting
professions but also the global capital markets in general. However,
this "mutual co-operation with other high quality regulatory
systems that respects the cultural and legal differences of the
regulatory regimes that exist around the world" was not supported
in a recent PCAOB Briefing Paper on "Oversight of Non-U.S. Public
Accounting Firms" (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 013). While
the PCAOB announced a co-operative approach to the oversight of non-U.S.
public accounting firms and included in its release paper certain
criteria intended to be used in its evaluation of the independence and
rigor of a particular home country oversight system, the examples of the
criteria that may be used to assess the adequacy and integrity of the
home country system are still based primarily on the U.S. system for
inspections and investigations of U.S. public accounting firms. The FEE
(Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens--European Federation of
Accountants) explicitly expressed (3) concerns that if the PCAOB largely
ignores the established or developing systems for quality assurance in
the EU, or rates certain systems as weak because of the way in which
they achieve oversight, it is unlikely to contribute to the most
effective global oversight and may undermine the perception of audit
quality for publicly listed companies in the EU (FEE comment letter to
the PCAOB, 2004).
THE SAGA CONTINUES
Since 2002, the number of new foreign listings on U.S. stock
exchanges has sharply decreased (illustration 3). Many foreign companies
either decided to de-list from the U.S. to avoid being subject to the
Act or have decided not to list on the U.S. exchanges citing the
compliance costs associated with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. (4) The SEC
intended for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be the most comprehensive scheme
of revised corporate governance in the history of American business and
it certainly has done so with far-reaching impact on both domestic as
well as foreign companies. In terms of the accounting and audit markets,
the resolve of the U.S. PCAOB to follow a more cooperative approach to
oversight of non-US audit firms is still being tested by foreign
accounting firms. As the April 2004 registration deadline approaches for
foreign accounting firms, the PCAOB will meet again to vote on the
proposal to extend the registration deadline for foreign auditors to
July 19, 2004. The SEC is under increasing pressure from the EU and
other countries to reconsider measures in Sarbanes-Oxley and to explore
if there is the basis and a need for exempting foreign audit firms.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Would there be a harmonization of the quality control standards of
the international accounting and audit profession, the public oversight
systems as well as the corporate governance practices on a global basis?
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act certain has an impact far beyond U.S.
territories. The U.K., Japan, and the EU, among other countries, have
either begun their own legislative processes or have enacted regulatory
changes to promote good corporate governance. As accounting and auditing
standards become increasingly harmonized to facilitate global capital
flows, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act certainly has created a worldwide need for
coordination and reciprocal recognition of the equivalence of quality
control and public oversight systems and corporate governance so that
there can be consistent regulations for global capital markets.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
ENDNOTES
(1.) The registration deadline for U.S. audit firms ended Oct. 22
with 598 firms being approved.
(2.) Comment letter to the SEC from the German Institut der
Wirtschaftsprufer (IDW) which represents the German accountants and
Wirtschaftspruferkammer (WPK) which represents the German auditing
profession. File-No. PCAOB 2003-03 PCAOB; Notice of Filing of Proposed
Rules Relating to Registration System.
(3.) The FEE's comment letter, January 2004. Re: PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 013--"Proposed Rules Relating to the
Oversight of Non-U.S. Public Accounting Firms".
(4.) UK's Benfield Group and Daiwa and Fuji Film of Japan
decided not to list on US capital markets citing Sarbanes-Oxley as the
reason.
REFERENCES
AICPA. (2003). How The Sarbanes-Oxley Act impacts accounting
profession, Summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act published by the AICPA.
Bowne Newsletter. (2003). Sarbanes-Oxley Seems Hostile to Foreign
Listings: Foreigns Forced to Play By U.S. Rules, January.
European Report. (2003). Concern Grows over impact of New Audit
Rules, European Report 16, October.
European Report. (2003). New American Regulator decides EU audit
firms must register. European Report, April.
Evans,C. (2003). US softens Sarbanes-Oxley, Accountancy, Feb,
131(1314), 11, 1/2p; (AN 11938354
Financial Services Agency of Japan (2003). Major Issues on
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002", Reference published by the Financial
Services Agency of Japan, June.
Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board. (2003). Final Auditor
Registration Rules, May.
Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board. (2003). Briefing
Paper, 29 October.
Postelnicu, A. (2003). A little breathing space: Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: The SEC has relaxed some of its rules. Financial Times, July 7, 2.
SEC Final Rules Adopted Pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002--Strengthening Auditor Independence. United States Congress,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 2nd session: January.
Kathy H. Y. Hsu, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Ronald G. Cheek, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Harlan L. Etheridge, University of Louisiana at Lafayette
Illustration 2
Opinions on Foreign Compliance with
Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Foreign Registrants
UnDecided 2%
Not Agree 15%
Agree 83%
Note: Table made from pie chart.
Illustration 3
Decline In Non US New Listing American Depesitery Receipts
because of Sarbanes Oxler Act
Non US Reporting Issuers
Non US Listing In 2001 51
Non US Listing In 2002 33
Non US Listing In 2003 13
Note: Table made from bar graph.