Defined benefit pensions and household income and wealth.
Reinsdorf, Marshall B. ; Lenze, David G.
RETIREMENT programs are becoming increasingly important sources of
household income and wealth as the U.S. population and workforce age. A
good understanding of the economic effects of such retirement programs
requires a complete set of measures of the wealth and income generated
by such plans. To that end, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has
embarked on some initial research on alternative measurements of defined
benefit pensions plans. That research is detailed in this article.
The first section of this article discusses accrual approaches to
accounting for defined benefit pension plans. The second section
provides some preliminary estimates of household income from various
defined benefit programs. The third section provides looks at the effect
of these new measures on aggregate household income, saving, and wealth.
U.S. households usually participate in two kinds of retirement
income programs: social security, and a plan sponsored by their
employer. The employer plan may be organized as either a defined
contribution plan, such as a 401(k) plan, or a defined benefit plan.
Defined contribution plans provide resources during retirement based on
the amount of money that has been accumulated in an account, while
defined benefit plans determine the level of benefits by a formula that
typically depends on length of service and average or final pay. For any
program that set benefit levels according to a formula, the movement of
large numbers of participants into retirement raises questions not only
about how households will fare in retirement but also about how the
finances of the program and its sponsor will be affected.
In the national income and product accounts (NIPAs), households
participating in a pension plan are viewed as the owners of the
plan's assets. Employers' contributions to pension plans are
therefore included in the employee compensation component of personal
income, and interest and dividends earned on pension plan assets are
included in personal interest and dividend income. Furthermore, pension
benefit payments to retirees are excluded from personal in come because
they are financial transactions that merely change the form in which
persons hold their wealth, just like employees' contributions to
pension plans. (1)
This treatment provides a full accounting picture of the operations
of defined contribution plans because in these plans only the balance in
the participant's account matters. However, the accounting picture
for defined benefit pension plans is more complex. A defined benefit
plan has an actuarial liability for future benefits equal to the
expected present value of the benefits to which the plan participants
are entitled under the benefit formula. The value of participants'
benefit entitlement often does not coincide with the value of the assets
that the plan has on hand; indeed, a plan that has a pay-as-you-go
funding scheme might have only enough assets to ensure that it can make
the current period's benefit payments. (2)
To provide a more complete picture of the operations and net
position of defined benefit plans, the 2008 revision of the System of
National Accounts, which provides international guidelines for national
economic accounts, has recommended that information be provided on
defined benefit plans' actuarial liability for future benefits. The
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has therefore begun research on
actuarial measures of accruals of pension benefits.
Actuarial estimates of pension income and pension wealth of
households from the early stages of this research are higher than those
under the approach now used in the NIPAs. These estimates do not imply
any change in estimates of national wealth or national saving, however,
because the additional wealth of the participants in defined benefit
plans that would be recognized under an actuarial approach would
represent an additional liability for the employers that sponsor these
plans.
Accrual Accounting Measures
Accounting basics
A complete measure of the wealth of defined benefit plan
participants is the expected present value of the benefits to which they
are entitled, not the assets of the plan. This follows from the fact
that if the assets of a defined benefit plan are insufficient to pay
promised benefits, the plan sponsor must cover the shortfall. This
obligation represents an additional source of pension wealth for
participants in an underfunded plan.
Accounting for the wealth of plan participants as the value of
their benefit entitlements rather than the value of the plan's
assets changes the measure of their income. Instead of the actual
interest and dividends earned on the plan assets, the participants earn
imputed interest on their actuarial wealth. This imputed interest equals
the increase in the present value of their future benefits caused by the
shortening of the wait before the benefits are received. It would also
equal the actual income earned on the plan assets if the value of the
assets matched the actuarial value of the future benefits and if the
rate of return on the assets matched the discount rate used to calculate
the actuarial value of the future benefits. In addition, under the
accrual approach, the measure of compensation income for the
participants in the plan is no longer the employer's actual
contributions to the plan. Instead, it is the present value of the
benefits to which employees become entitled as a result of their service
to the employer.
Measuring household income from defined benefit plans by actual
contributions from employers plus actual investment income on plan
assets can be considered a cash accounting approach to measuring these
plans' transactions. (3) The alternative approach that measures
this income by the increase in the value of the participants'
benefit entitlements caused by the shortening of the discount period and
by the crediting of additional service to the employer is an accrual
accounting approach. We use the term "accrual accounting" to
mean any approach that adopts the principle that a plan's benefit
obligations ought to be recorded as they are incurred. Widely used
actuarial methods for calculating a pension plan's benefit
liabilities are designed to show smooth growth over an employee's
career, not to track the value of the benefits that have actually been
accrued in each year of the career.
Pros and cons, cash and accrual approaches
The accrual approach to pensions has important advantages for
economic statisticians. Taking the accrued liability for future benefits
into account provides a useful picture of the net position of the plan
sponsor, because a gap between this liability and the plan assets
indicates that increased contributions may be needed in the future. (4)
It also provides a better picture of the pension wealth of plan
participants.
Moreover, the accrual approach avoids the arbitrariness in the
timing of the recording of compensation income that can occur under a
cash accounting approach. In principle, if employers always made
contributions equal to benefit accruals and if the plan assets always
earned a rate of return equal to the constant interest rate used to
calculate the benefit accruals, cash accounting and accrual accounting
measures of pension income would coincide. (5) In practice, however, the
timing of employer contributions can cause large shifts in the cash
accounting measure that do not reflect genuine changes in the growth of
pension entitlements. Employers sometimes skip contributions when the
plans have enjoyed unusually good investment returns or when they lack
the needed funds. If a business defers contributions in unprofitable
years and catches up when profits are good, the cash accounting measure
of households' compensation income may be too volatile, and the
cash accounting measure of the business' gross operating surplus may be too smooth.
Nonetheless, the cash accounting approach has one major advantage
for economic measurement purposes. No assumptions are necessary to
measure events that have actually transpired, such as a plan's
receipt of contributions from the employer. In contrast, estimates of
the present value of future benefits are inherently dependent on
assumptions about the discount rate, participant separation rates,
retirement ages, mortality, and even future pay increases and future
inflation if the method used attempts to take these into account.
The sensitivity of actuarial methods to assumptions means that
estimates of pension benefit accruals are subject to a source of
imprecision that is not normally present in national economic
accounting. Furthermore, variation in assumptions can make it impossible
to identify a single set of assumptions used for the estimates when
actuarial estimates made by different plans are combined. Changes in
assumptions can also complicate comparisons of benefit accruals over
time.
Two accrual accounting approaches
On an employee's retirement date, the value of the
employee's pension benefit entitlement is simply the present value
of the expected future benefits. How to value the benefit entitlement at
earlier dates is less clear. In this section, we discuss two possible
approaches.
Accrued benefit obligation (ABO). This approach relies on the
plan's calculated ABO as of the valuation date. The ABO is the
present value of the future benefits to which the employee has actually
become entitled, meaning the benefits that would be due if the employee
were to separate from the employer or otherwise lose the opportunity to
accrue further benefits under the plan. Some sponsors of private defined
benefit plans have, for example, frozen the plans and replaced them with
a defined contribution plan or converted them from a traditional defined
benefit plan into a cash balance plan. For a typical benefits formula
based on years of service multiplied by a measure of average or final
pay, the ABO measure of benefits accrued during the year would include
both the effects of an extra year of employment and the effects of any
salary increase received during the plan year.
Projected benefit obligation (PBO). This approach attributes some
fraction of the plan's PBO on the retirement date to the portion of
the career completed by the valuation date. Pension actuaries have
several methods of doing this. One that is commonly used measures the
growth of the benefit entitlement over the participant's career by
calculating a level percent of pay that would have to be contributed
throughout the career to end up with assets at retirement that match the
PBO. The level percent-of-pay method has the effect of making the part
of the final pension attributed to service in any year (or
"employer's normal cost") proportional to earnings in
that year.
One distinction between the PBO and ABO approaches is that the
projected future salary increases are reflected in PBO measures of
normal cost (the value of the benefits earned through service to the
employer), while the effects of current-period salary increases are
reflected in the ABO measure of benefits accrued in the current period.
This is one reason why the PBO methods often yield a substantially
higher estimate of the value of benefit entitlements of employees in the
early and middle stages of their careers than the ABO approach.
ABO versus PBO. The choice between the ABO and PBO approaches turns
in part on circumstances and measurement objectives. For example,
employers who want the percent of pay that they must contribute to the
pension plan to remain stable need a method that yields a smooth profile
of pension expenses over employees' careers. The PBO approach is
well suited for this purpose; using the level percent-of-pay method, the
growth rate of the measure of benefits earned during a year is just the
salary growth rate. In contrast, the growth rate over the career of the
annual change in the ABO includes, in addition to current-period salary
growth, (1) the effects of discounting and of allowing for separations
from the employer and preretirement mortality and (2) the effects of any
jump in benefits upon reaching normal retirement age that may be part of
the benefits formula. As a result, the pension expense recognized in the
early or middle years of the career under the ABO approach is generally
low, compared with the pension expense recognized near the end of the
career. Using the ABO approach, the rapid rise in pension expenses near
the end of an individual's career means that for an aging workforce
as a whole, total pension expense will rise as a percent of payroll.
For national accounts purposes, the ABO approach has advantages; it
is more straightforward to interpret and offers better consistency with
the way that accrued income and expenses are measured elsewhere in the
accounts. (6) Benefits to which the employee has legally become entitled
fit the usual definition of a liability well, while the recognition of
liabilities arising from projected future events is inconsistent with
the principles of accrual accounting. This is particularly so when the
future events are determined at the discretion of the employer, as is
the case for defined benefit plans that employers are able to
discontinue. (Indeed, in 2006, about 900,000 employees were participants
in private defined benefit plans that had been frozen.) Benefits that
participants in private defined benefit plans have already earned share
none of the riskiness of the benefits that are contingent on continued
participation in the current plan because they are insured by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
The ABO approach also has a practical advantage for national
accounts purposes if a goal is to eliminate the volatility of the cash
accounting measure of compensation income without changing the average
level of the measure of compensation. ABO approach estimates of
compensation income are likely to be closer on average to the level of
employer contributions. Plans' total returns on assets, including
holding gains, are often short of the imputed interest on the PBO
actuarial liabilities, so employer contributions must be higher than the
PBO measure of normal cost. In effect, the higher estimates of the
actuarial liability under the PBO approach seem to be more a description
of aspirational funding targets than a description of what plan sponsors
actually do.
Nevertheless, the ABO approach is not without disadvantages,
particularly if it is applied to government plans. One drawback of the
ABO approach is that it is not a full measure of an employee's
pension wealth if the option to accrue further benefits under the plan
is viewed as an asset of the employee. (7) To induce an employee covered
by a defined benefit pension plan to take early retirement, an employer
will have to offer a buy-out that compensates both for the loss of
projected future wages net of the opportunity cost of the
employee's time and for the loss of the opportunity to increase the
value of the pension above the ABO. If the employee has reached the
point in the life cycle where the value of leisure starts to be greater
than the wage, compensation for lost future wages will be unnecessary
and the minimum buy-out necessary to induce the employee to retire will
be the value of the employee's option to increase the value of the
pension from the ABO to the PBO by staying on the job.
The lower the probability that an employee will lose the
opportunity to accrue benefits after the valuation date, the greater the
value of the option to accrue the PBO. Most government pension plans
cannot be frozen (or even closed to new participants) without a change
in the law. And these plans are not at risk of a termination due to
bankruptcy of their sponsor. Risks of involuntary separation also tend
to be low for government plan participants. Thus, employees in
government pension plans can generally count on having the opportunity
to earn additional benefits under the plan. Estimating accrued pension
entitlements in a way that grows smoothly over the course of the career
is a reasonable convention when the ABO significantly understates
employees' pension wealth because of the neglect of the value of
the employees' option to earn additional pension benefits. For
government plans, therefore, the PBO approach may give a more realistic
picture of the position of the plan participants and the plan sponsor.
The use of the PBO approach for government pension plans is also
convenient. Most government plans make actuarial estimates of their
benefit liabilities with a level percent-of-pay formula, where the
percent is chosen so that contributions equal to the percent of pay over
the course of the career will fully fund the liability for pension
benefits at the time of retirement. On the other hand, for private
plans, ABO estimates prepared using comparable methods are available
from tax data.
Cash and Accrual Approach Estimates
Private pension plans
Households' income and wealth from private defined benefit
pension plans can be estimated from tax data because these plans report
their assets, income, and expenses together with actuarial information
on their liabilities for future benefits on Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Form 5500. (8) Estimates of totals for the nation of the
cash-accounting measures of plan assets, income and benefit expenses
based on Form 5500 are published by the Department of Labor. (9) Based
on the actuarial information schedule of Form 5500, the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) estimates the current liabilities for vested
benefits of the plans that it insures. (10) This schedule includes ABO
estimates of the plan's current liability for benefits and benefits
accrued during the year that are well-suited for economic statistics
purposes as well because the plans all calculate them using
approximately the same assumptions. In the years analyzed for this
article, the interest-rate assumptions used by the plans are mostly
clustered in a narrow range around 6 percent.
The private plan estimates in this article are based on the data
sets maintained by the PBGC because these data sets have detailed
information on the actuarial schedule of Form 5500. The PBGC classifies
returns by calendar years based on the starting date of the period that
they cover; this article follows this approach. (11)
Comparisons across years reveal that significant numbers of plans
are missing from the PBGC data sets for 2000-2002. Overlapping estimates
of ending and beginning assets adjusted for revisions to previously
reported values imply that about 15 percent of plans (weighted by
assets) are missing for 2000, falling to 8.7 percent in 2001 and 5.6
percent in 2002. The variable totals for these years were increased by
the appropriate percent to take account of missing plans. Furthermore,
values for variables that are missing or that have unusable information
are imputed using regression models.
Estimates using the cash accounting approach provide a baseline for
comparison with the actuarial measures of pension income. The income to
households from employer contributions recorded under this approach is
quite variable, rising from about $33 billion. for 2000 to near $100
billion for both 2002 and 2003 (table 1). Large holding gains during the
bull market that lasted from 1995 to early 2000 left many plans
overfunded, allowing their sponsors to take contribution holidays in
2000 and 2001. Holding losses followed in 2000-2002 with the bursting of
the dot-com bubble. Employers were therefore obliged to increase
contributions to restore funding levels. Yet despite the increase in
contributions, the holding losses left the plans with $400 billion less
in assets at the end of 2002 than the $2 trillion they had at the
beginning of 2000. These losses were then reversed by a 4-year string of
holding gains, leaving the plans with $2.5 trillion in assets at the end
of 2006.
Saving by the plans plays almost no role in the growth of their
assets because it was near zero in 2002-2006. This lack of saving
reflects the aging of plan participants, who are more likely to be
retired than active. The retirement of many participants is also
reflected in the rising totals for benefit payments net of employee
contributions, which reached $150 billion in 2006. (12)
As expected, accruals of entitlements to benefits measured under
the ABO approach are more stable than employer contributions to the
plans. The ABO value of benefits earned rises from $66.6 billion for
2000 to $79.4 billion for 2006 (table 2), with an average level over
those 7 years of $73.5 billion, close to the $79.6 billion average of
the employer contributions. On the other hand, the imputed interest cost
of the actuarial current liability of the plans is, on average, more
than twice as high as the actual investment income shown in table 1. The
actuarial liability of the plans is lower than their assets in 2000 and
2001, and only 10 to 25 percent higher in later years, so the main
reason why the imputed interest on this liability is higher than the
actual investment income from the plan assets is that the assumed
interest rate is higher than the realized rate of return on assets excluding holding gains. The low level of actual investment income
reflects the reliance of the plans on holding gains as a source of
funding for benefits, so including the imputed interest in household
income in effect includes expecting holding gains in income. This makes
the actuarial measures of household income and saving in table 2 higher
than the cash accounting measures in table 1. Table 2 also shows that
estimates of plan actuarial liabilities are sensitive to assumptions
about interest rates and other factors.
Federal programs for private sector retirees
The federal government has two programs--the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and the Railroad Retirement Board--that
provide pension benefits to private sector retirees. Like social
security, these programs are classified as government social insurance
in the NIPAs, which means that household income from these programs is
measured by benefit payments. They are small in comparison with national
totals for private defined benefit plans. Nevertheless, they are close
substitutes for defined benefit plans and are part of the complete
picture of households' accrued pension benefit wealth.
The PBGC. As trustee for underfunded defined benefit plans that are
terminated, the PBGC receives the assets of these plans and assumes
responsibility for paying the benefits due to their participants up to
the insured maximum (currently $4,500 per month for a 65 year old
retiree without survivor's benefits or $4,050 with a survivor
annuity). Between 1986 and 2004, about 2000 plans entered into PBGC
trusteeship. (13)
Participants in plans under PBGC trusteeship effectively receive
annuities purchased with a combination of PBGC insurance and the value
of the surrendered plan assets. The interest on the principle used to
purchase the annuity and the government social insurance provided by the
PBGC would represent household sector income in a cash accounting
framework. Benefits paid by the PBGC also include a component that
represents a return of the principle used to purchase the annuity. For
purposes of measuring household sector wealth in a cash accounting
framework, the assets held by the PBGC can be viewed as a measure of the
value of the portion of the annuity that does not come from government
social insurance. (14)
The assets of plans entering PBGC trusteeship are generally
sufficient to pay much of the promised benefits-plans that were taken
over by the PBGC in 2008 had, for example, an average funding ratio of
59 percent. (15) The remainder of the benefit funding comes from the
insurance provided by the PBGC. In 2007, the PBGC disbursed $4.3 billion
in benefits to retirees and assistance to multiemployer plans (table 3).
Of this amount, $2.6 billion was funded by insurance and hence included
in government social benefits in the NIPAs, and $1.7 billion was funded
from the assets of terminated plans.
Under accrual accounting approaches, the present value of future
benefits payable by the PBGC is included in the benefit entitlement
wealth of the household sector. Thus, when a plan is taken over by the
PBGC, only the loss of benefits that exceed the insured maximum is
recorded as a decline in household sector wealth. Under this approach,
households would also receive imputed interest income on the actuarial
value of their benefit entitlements, which would normally exceed the
interest on plan assets that would be recorded under the cash accounting
approach.
The present value of future benefits from PBGC trusteed plans rose
from under $10 billion in 2000 to $65.1 billion in 2007 (table 3). In
estimating these values, the PBGC adjusts its interest-rate assumption
to reflect currently available rates on annuities, so part of this rapid
rise stems from a decline in the assumed interest rate from 7 percent to
5.31 percent. For 2008, about $7.6 billion of the $8.5 billion decline
to $56.6 billion is due to a change in the interest rate assumption to
6.66 percent (PBGC 2008 Actuarial Report, 27).
The estimate of the interest cost of the PBGC's benefit
liability is less sensitive to the interest-rate assumption; it rose to
$3.4 billion in 2008 from $3.3 billion in 2007. These amounts should be
treated as imputed interest income to households under the accrual
accounting approach. They are about $1.1 billion higher than actual
investment income earned on PBGC assets because these assets are not as
large as the benefit liability and because the rate of return on assets
(excluding holding gains and losses) is lower than the assumed interest
rate.
The Railroad Retirement Board. This program takes the place of both
social security and defined benefit pension plans for employees of the
railroad industry. Payroll taxes levied on employers and on employees
are its main source of funding.
In the NIPAs, the railroad retirement program is treated like
social security. This is the only possible treatment for Tier I of
railroad retirement, which is integrated with social security and has
equivalent taxes and benefits. Tier II, on the other hand, is similar
enough to a defined benefit plan to justify a treatment that includes it
in the defined benefit pension assets of households. Indeed, this is the
approach taken by the Federal Reserve Board in its flow-of-funds
accounts.
Although the long downward trend in railroad employment ended in
2002, Tier II benefit payments continue to grow faster than payroll tax receipts. The level of the benefits is also higher; for example, in 2007
the benefit payments amounted to about $4 billion, and the payroll taxes
were $2.6 billion, of which $2 billion came from employers (table 4).
Normally, however, investment income and holding gains on assets are
sufficient to cover the gap between the program's benefit expenses
and its receipts from payroll taxes. In 2007, which was a good year for
holding gains, investment income was about $0.5 billion, and holding
gains were about $4.2 billion.
A railroad retirement actuarial report for a valuation date of
December 31, 2007, estimates a PBO normal cost rate of 6.26 percent of
payroll, assuming an interest rate of 7.5 percent. After subtracting the
payroll taxes paid by employees of $0.6 billion from the dollar value of
the plan's normal costs (employee's service in 2007), earnings
of benefit entitlements are only about $0.4 billion in 2007. The implied value of participants' imputed interest income from interest on the
actuarial value of their benefit entitlement is, however, much higher,
about $5 billion. The imputed interest income is also large in relation
to the actual investment income earned on plan assets, because assets
are about half as large as the actuarial value of the benefit
entitlement, and much of the return on the assets in the portfolio is
expected to come from holding gains, not interest and dividends.
State and local government plans
Although pension plans in the private sector are increasingly
structured as defined contribution plans, in the state and local
government sector, defined benefit plans continue to predominate. The
importance of the pension plan tends to be greater for state and local
government employees than for private sector employees, in part because
many state or local government employees are not covered by social
security. State and local government plans differ from private defined
benefit plans in several ways. For example, many state and local
government plans escalate benefit payments based on a measure of
inflation. Although this adds to the cost of the plans, the burden of
making the contributions needed to fund the promised benefits is likely
to be shared by the employees of the state or local government. In
contrast, private sector defined benefit plans rarely require
significant employee contributions.
State and local government plans had roughly 14.4 million active
participants in 2006 (table 5). Their employer contributions were $67.8
billion in 2006, compared with $89.0 billion for private plans. Yet even
though they have fewer active participants and lower employer
contributions than the private plans, their total income is about the
same as that of the private defined benefit plans because of their high
investment income from their assets. The total income of the state and
local government plans rose from $141 billion to $161 billion in
2004-2006, compared with a rise from $149 billion to $156 billion.
State and local plans have higher investment income than private
plans because they have more assets, $3.1 trillion at the end of 2006,
compared with $2.5 trillion for private plans. The plans are able to
acquire high levels of assets despite having comparatively low levels of
employer contributions because they receive significant funds from
employee contributions. Moreover, the state and local government plans
suffered smaller holding losses in the bear market of 2000-2002, giving
them a slightly better average investment performance than the private
plans over 2000-2006. The investment income and employee contributions
help the state and local government plans to achieve a higher average
saving level (around $22 billion per year over 2000-2006, compared with
a negative average for the private plans). The higher saving is a
reflection of the younger age profile of the participants in the state
and local government plans: around 55 percent of the participants in
these plans are still in their working years, compared with around 45
percent for private plans. The state and local government plans also
have smaller net benefit disbursements; they average $100.6 billion per
year, compared with $134.2 billion for private plans.
The Census Bureau has long collected cash accounting data on state
and local government pension plans, but until recently, it did not
collect actuarial data on these plans. To obtain actuarial data on state
and local government plans, BEA compiled a data set of the actuarial
information found in the financial reports of the larger state and local
government plans and of a sample of smaller plans. This data set has
observations on 124 large plans or plan families, which collectively
account for most of the plan contributions, assets, and benefits.
Actuarial estimates of household income and wealth from state and
local government pension plans based on the BEA data set are higher than
the corresponding cash accounting estimates, but how the actuarial
estimate of benefits accrued during the plan year compares with employer
contributions depends on whether the ABO or the PBO approach is used.
(16) The PBO measures of benefits earned net of employee contributions,
labeled "employer's normal cost" in table 6, are lower
than the cash-accounting measure of household income from employer
contributions in 2003-2006. In 2006, for example, employer's normal
cost is about $51.7 billion, compared with employer contributions of
$67.8 billion.
On the other hand, the PBO measure of overall income from the plans
is higher than the cash accounting measure, because the imputed interest
income of the plan participants on the actuarial value of their benefit
entitlements is $261.9 billion, which far exceeds the actual investment
income on the plan assets in 2006 of $93.4 billion. Table 6 is based on
measures reported by the plans, which are mostly calculated using a
level percent-of-pay approach and interest rates around 8 percent. The
tendency of the PBO approach to attribute a large share of the total
income accruing to plan participants to interest on the actuarial value
of their benefit entitlements becomes more noticeable at such high rates
of interest.
Defined benefit plans' financial strategies generally rely on
expected holding gains as one of the sources of funds for benefit
payments. Yet even after adding holding gains to investment income,
total returns from the plans' assets fall short of the interest
cost of their actuarial liability at the rates assumed by the plans. The
total returns average $181 billion over 2000-2006, compared with an
average interest cost of the PBO liability of $219 billion. The
plans' total rates of return on their assets are not as high as the
rates of interest that they assume, and their assets are not as large as
their PBO actuarial liabilities. The funded ratios in table 6 range from
97.5 percent in 2000, when a bull market ended, to 83.8 percent at the
end of the bear market 2 years later.
Switching to an ABO approach and adjusting the interest-rate
assumptions to the 6 percent level that many private plans use for the
ABO information on Form 5500 raises the estimate of benefits accrued in
2006 to $76.4 billion (table 7).27 The increase from the PBO estimate of
$51.7 billion reflects both the effect of scaling back the interest-rate
assumption and the tendency of the ABO approach to attribute more of
employee's total income from the plan to service to the employer
than does the PBO approach. The imputed interest income on plan
participants' benefit entitlements under the ABO approach falls to
$189.6 billion, so the total participant income falls from $313.6
billion under the PBO approach to $266.0 billion under the ABO approach.
The ABO approach also yields lower estimates of the value of
participants' benefit entitlements than the PBO approach. These
lower estimates are closer to the plans' asset levels than the PBO
estimates, so the plans' assets remain above 90 percent of their
accrued benefit liability for the entire period covered by table 7 and
end at 98.7 percent in 2006. (18)
Federal employee plans
Defined benefit pension plans for federal government employees have
less than one-third of the number of active participants of state and
local government plans and about a fifth as many as private defined
benefit plans. Nonetheless, their employer contributions are higher than
those of the state and local government plans in every year, and by
2006, they had reached parity with those of the private plans at $91.2
billion (table 8). In other words, under the cash accounting approach,
in 2006, defined benefit pension-related compensation for 4 million
federal employees is as large as it was for a group of almost 20 million
private sector employees.
This striking difference in the average contribution rate per
employee arises because plan freezes and holding gains from investments
reduce required contribution levels for the private plans, while young
retirement ages in military plans and relatively generous benefit levels
(caused in part by the substitution of pension benefits for social
security benefits for participants in military plans and the older
civilian plans) raise required contribution levels in the federal plans.
Moreover, about half of the federal plan contributions are designated as
"catch-up contributions" that are intended to compensate for
past underfunding. (19) Because the federal employee plans historically
operated on a pay-as-you-go basis, their asset levels are only around 40
percent of the value of their actuarial liabilities; despite the rapid
growth of assets since the catch-up contributions began, their value in
2007 of under $1 trillion was far less than their benefit liability of
$2.4 trillion (table 9). (20) These relatively low asset levels mean
that relatively little investment income is available to help fund
benefit payments by federal plans, which places an additional burden on
contributions. Note, however, that the PBO approach and conservative
assumptions used to calculate the actuarial liability of the federal
plans result in lower estimates of the funded ratio than the ABO
approach used for the private plans. (BEA has not developed ABO
estimates for the federal plans, but it plans to do so in the future.)
The cash accounting and accrual accounting approaches give
different pictures of the relative amounts of pension-related
compensation that federal government employees receive. The
employer's normal cost for the federal plans of about $41 billion
in 2007 is less than half of the $98 billion in employer contributions.
As the contributions partly relate to past service, the federal plans
are an example of the potential for distortions in the timing of
measured pension-related compensation under the cash accounting
approach. On the other hand, the actuarial measure of total participant
income is higher than the cash accounting measure ($180.5 billion,
compared with $147.4 billion in 2007) because the participants'
imputed interest income based on the actuarial value of their benefit
entitlement is much higher than the actual interest received on plan
assets. As a result, defined benefit plan saving is higher when measured
on an accrual accounting basis than when measured on a cash accounting
basis.
Effect on Household Income, Saving, and Wealth
Income
Combining all defined benefit plans shows that the income
households received from these plans in 2006 is, on average, about 4.6
percent of disposable personal income (DPI) if measured on a cash
accounting basis and about 6.6 percent of DPI if measured on an accrual
basis (table 10). (The accrual estimate uses the ABO approach with a 6
percent interest-rate assumption for private and state and local
government plans and a PBO approach for federal government plans.)
The actuarial value of benefits earned is actually lower than the
employer contributions, so the gap between the actuarial and cash
accounting measures of pension-related income is entirely due to the
shortfall of the investment income that the plans receive from their
assets from the interest accruing on their actuarial liabilities for
future benefits. About a third of this shortfall can be attributed to
the gap between the value of the plans' assets and value of their
actuarial liability, and about two-thirds of it can be attributed to the
role of expected holding gains in the funding strategy of the private
and state and local government plans. The interest and dividend income
from these plans' assets are low because many of these assets are
securities that are expected to rise in value. If we assume that the
expected holding gains are sufficient to bring the rate of return on
plan assets up to 6 percent, the gap between household cash accounting
income from defined benefit plans and their accrual accounting income
shrinks from about 30 percent of the accrual accounting income to about
10 percent.
Besides a shift in the level of income, the accrual approach also
implies a reduction in income volatility. In particular, the accrual
approach eliminates the volatility seen in the cash accounting measure
of household income from defined benefit plans in 2002. In that year, a
jump in employer contributions added an amount equal to 0.4 percent of
DPI to the cash accounting measure.
Saving
Households accruing entitlements in a defined benefit plan may take
the growth of those entitlements into account in deciding how much of
their overall income to save. The higher measure of household income
from defined benefit plans when these plans are accounted for on an
accrual basis implies a correspondingly higher measure of the personal
saving rate. On a cash accounting basis, defined benefit plans account
for about 0.7 percentage point of the average personal saving rate of
2.8 percent in 2000-2006, but on an accrual accounting basis, household
saving in these plans would average around 3 percent of DPI, implying an
average personal saving rate of 5.1 percent.
Wealth
Household wealth is also higher when measured by the actuarial
value of their pension benefit entitlement, averaging about 81 percent
of DPI, compared with 63 percent of DPI if defined benefit pension
wealth is measured by plan assets. Thus, U.S. households appear
thriftier and wealthier when the saving and wealth of participants in
defined benefit pension plans are measured on an accrual basis.
References
Lazear, Edward P., and Robert L. Moore. 1988. "Pensions and
Turnover" In Pensions in the U.S. Economy, edited by Z. Bodie, J.
Shoven, and D. Wise, 163-188. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lenze, David G. 2009. "Accrual Measures of Pension-Related
Compensation and Wealth of State and Local Government Workers." BEA
Working Paper. Washington, DC: BEA, August.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 2005. An Analysis of Frozen
Defined Benefit Plans. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 2005. Hard-Frozen
Defined Benefit Plans: Findings for 2003-2004 and Preliminary Findings
for 2005. Washington, DC: PBGC.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 2008. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation: 2008 Annual Report. Washington, DC: PBGC;
www.pbgc.gov/ docs/2008_annual_report.pdf.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 2008. Pension
Insurance Data Book 200Z Washington, DC: PBGC;
www.pbgc.gov/docs/2007databook.pdf.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 2008. 2008 Actuarial
Report. Washington, DC: PBGC;
www.pbgc.gov/docs/2008_actuarial_report.pdf.
Railroad Retirement Board. 2009. Twenty-Fourth Actuarial Valuation
Report of the Assets and Liabilities Under the Railroad Retirement Acts
as of December 31, 2007. Chicago: Bureau of the Actuary, June.
Stock, James H., and David A. Wise. 1990. "Pensions, the
Option Value of Work, and Retirement." Econometrica 58 (September):
1,151-1,180.
System of National Accounts 2008: Volume 1. Commission of the
European Communities, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations, and World Bank;
unstats.un.org/unsd/sna1993/draftingphase/WC-SNAvolumel.pdf.
U.S. Department of the Labor. 2008. Private Pension Plan Bulletin:
Abstract of 2005 Form 5500 Annual Reports. Washington, DC: Employee
Benefit Security Administration, February;
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2005pensionplanbulletin.pdf.
U.S. Department of the Labor. 2008. Private Pension Plan Bulletin:
Historical Tables and Graphs. Washington, DC: Employee Benefit Security
Administration, February; www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/
1975-2006historicaltables.pdf.
An Example of ABO and PBO Approaches
A simple hypothetical pension plan can illustrate some of the
differences between the accrued benefit obligation (ABO) and projected
benefit obligation (PBO) actuarial measures. Participants in this
pension plan work for 3 years, retire in the 4th year, and die in the
5th year. Their salary grows 5 percent per period from a starting level
of $25,000. Vesting is immediate, there are no breaks in service, and
there is no early retirement. The accrued retirement benefit equals 10
percent of salary times the number of periods worked times final salary.
The interest rate is 15 percent. The constant-percent version of the
entry age method is used to fund the PBO liability. This method sets the
normal cost in each period equal to a constant percentage of salary
(approximately 7.9 percent in this case). It is standard actuarial
practice to require the normal cost to be paid at the beginning of the
period.
Table A shows that the PBO liability is initially higher than the
ABO liability and that they become equal at retirement. The PBO normal
cost is higher than the ABO normal cost in the first period and lower in
the third.
In table B, the employer who sponsors the plan builds or maintains
a workforce of 30 employees by hiring 10 employees (each at age 1) each
year from year 1 to year 6. Hiring ceases in year 7, and the plan
terminates in year 9. Employees work 3 years, and spend 1 year in
retirement. The average normal cost as a percent of payroll rises from
6.6 to 9.5 percent under the ABO approach but remains constant under the
PBO approach.
Table A, Accrual Measures for a Hypothetical
Employee's Lifespan
[Dollars]
Pensiont Accrued
Salary benefit retirement
Age paid paid benefit
1 125,000 0 0
2 26,250 0 2,500
3 27,568 0 5,250
4 0 8,269 8,269
5 0 0 0
Liability
Age ABO PBO PBO/ABO
1 0 0 ...
2 1,890 2,276 1.2
3 4,565 5,008 1.1
4 8,269 8,269 1.0
5 0 0 ...
Normal cost
Age ABO PBO PBO/ABO
1 1,644 1,979 1.2
2 2,079 2,078 1.0
3 2,625 2,182 0.8
4 0 0 ...
5 0 ...
Imputed interest income
Age ABO PBO PBO/ABO
1 247 297 1.2
2 595 653 1.1
3 1,079 1,079 1.0
4 0 0 ...
5 0 0 ...
Table B: Accrual Measures for a Hypothetical Plan from
Initiation to Termination
[thousands of dollars except numbers of partiapants and ratios]
Pension Accrued
Salaries benefits retirement
Year paid paid benefits
1 250 0 0
2 513 0 25
3 78 0 78
4 788 83 160
5 788 83 160
6 538 83 160
7 276 83 135
8 0 83 83
9 0 0 0
Liability
Year AB0 PBO PBO/ABO
1 0 0 ...
2 19 23 1.2
3 65 73 1.1
4 147 156 1.1
5 147 156 1.1
6 147 156 1.1
7 128 133 1.1
8 83 83 1.0
9 0 0 ...
Normal cost
Year AB0 PBO PBO/ABO
1 16 20 1.2
2 37 41 1.1
3 63 62 1.0
4 63 62 1.0
5 63 62 1.0
6 47 43 0.9
7 26 22 0.8
8 0 0 ...
9 0 0 ...
Normal cost as a
percent of payroll Participants
Year AB0 PBO Active Retired
1 6.6 7.9 10 0
2 7.3 7.9 20 0
3 8.1 7.9 30 0
4 8.1 7.9 30 10
5 8.1 7.9 30 10
6 8.7 7.9 20 10
7 9:5 7.9 10 10
8 0.0 0.0 0 10
9 0.0 0.0 0 0
Organization of the U.S. Pension System
Both defined benefit and defined contribution plans play key roles
in financing retirement for U.S. households. Here's a big picture
look at the system.
Private sector. Newer plans in the private sector are almost
invariably defined contribution plans, and some of the defined benefit
plans that are still in existence are dosed to new hires or even frozen
(meaning that benefit entitlements are no longer being accrued under the
plan). Furthermore, from 1986 to 2004, about 99,000 plans were
terminated by their sponsors, about 2000 plans entered into PBGC
trusteeship, and a significant fraction of defined benefit plans
matured, in the sense of having reached the point where contributions no
longer exceed benefit payouts to retirees. As a result, the number of
employees accruing benefit entitlements in private defined benefit plans
fell from over 22 million in 2002 to under 20 million in 2006.
Nonetheless, the number of private sector defined benefit plans in
existence is declining very slowly: in 2006, it was still above 40,000,
of which nearly 12,000 were plans with 100 or more participants.
Government plans. There are more than 2,500 defined benefit plans
for employees of state and local governments. Defined benefit plans
still predominate in the state and local government sector. Federal
government agencies and federal government enterprises (such as the Post
Office and the Tennessee Valley Authority) sponsor about 40 defined
benefit plans for their employees. The federal government also makes
defined contribution plans available to its employees; these plans are a
key component of the retirement plan for civilian federal employees
hired in 1984 or later. For these employees, employer contributions to
the defined contribution plan are an important component of
compensation, and accruals of benefit entitlements under the defined
benefit plan are lower than they would have been under the older defined
benefit plans.
Other plans and accounts. Besides pension plans, many households
have self-funded retirement accounts, such as individual retirement
accounts [IRAs). These are not considered pension plans in the NIPAs, as
they are not sponsored by an employer. (Some small businesses have
defined contribution plans organized as SEP or SIMPLE IRAs, however.) In
addition, except for some government employees, almost everyone is
covered by social security. Social security is a government social
insurance program rather than a pension plan because entitlements to
benefits do not arise from an explicit or implicit contract with an
employer. The classification of social security as a social insurance
program in the NIPAs means that household income from social security is
measured by benefit payments. Neither social security nor the
self-funded retirement accounts are discussed in this paper, but the
expectation that employees will receive social security benefits when
they retire influences the design of the pension plans that are the
topic of this paper. For example, the defined benefit plan for federal
government employees who are covered by social security provides lower
benefits than the plan for federal employees who are not covered by
social security.
(1.) Information on pension benefits and employee contributions to
pension plans is shown in the addenda of NIPA table 6.11D, not as part
of the underlying detail of the calculation of the pension component of
personal income.
(2.) Federal law requires that private pension plans operate as
funded plans, not as pay-as-you-go plans.
(3.) The contributions, interest, and plan expenses used to measure
income under the cash accounting approach may be recognized before they
are settled in cash, so we do not mean to imply that all transactions
are measured on a cash basis.
(4.) An increased contribution rate may be needed to prevent an
unfunded plan from running out of money after a rise in the proportion
of participants who are retired
(5.) In addition, assumptions about mortality, participant
retirement, separation patterns, and a lack of changes in plan features
would have to hold precisely. The assumptions used to estimate accrued
values of pension entitlements are unlikely to be realized in practice,
so contributions will need to be adjusted to correct past mistakes. It
is thus unrealistic to expect complete agreement between a cash
accounting and an accrual accounting measure of personal pension income
even under the best of circumstances.
(6.) For example, the amount of the fixed monthly payment
attributed to principle repayment is not held constant over the life of
a fixed-rate mortgage as it would be if PBO-like smoothing were applied.
(7.) Models of the option value of pension earnings were developed
and estimated by Lazear and Moore (1988) and Stock and Wise (1990).
(8.) Private defined benefit pension plans whose benefits are fully
provided by contracts with life insurers provide insufficient
information on Form 5500 to be included in the estimates in this
article, but the amounts in question are small.
(9.) Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Historical Tables and Graphs,
U.S. Department of Labor.
(10.) PBGC Pension Insurance Data Book 2007.
(11.) This causes some differences between the estimates in this
article of contributions to private defined benefit plans and those
published in NIPA table 6.11D. The estimates in this table are based on
data from the Department of Labor, which classifies returns by calendar
years based on the ending date of a plan's fiscal year. A few large
plans have fiscal years that span the turn of the new year, so their
returns are classified in an earlier year when the starting date is
used.
(12.) The benefits in table 1 include lump-sum distributions at the
time of retirement that go directly to the retiree or used to purchase
an annuity from a life insurer. Investment income on life insurance
reserves for group annuity contracts purchased by employers or defined
benefit plans are excluded from the investment income shown in table 1.
(13.) PBGC An Analysis of Frozen Defined Benefit Plans, 1.
(14.) A comprehensive measure of retirement wealth would also
include annuities purchased in standard terminations of defined benefit
plans and by existing defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans,
and individuals. The Labor Department's Private Pension Plan
Bulletin: Abstract of 2005 Form 5500 Annual Reports estimates the value
of the group annuity contracts for payment of retirement benefits at 10
to 15 percent of the total for defined benefit and defined contribution
plan assets.
(15.) PBGC 2008 Annual Report, 13.
(16.) For a discussion of these estimates, see Lenze (2009).
(17.) To change the interest-rate assumption, Lenze (2009) uses the
formula that the PBGC uses to find the effects of changing the interest
rate on plans' termination liability.
(18.) Lenze (2009) also considers the effect on the ABO of reducing
the interest-rate assumption to the risk-free rate on a 20-year Treasury
bond. Using a rate of 4.9 percent for 2006 reduces the estimate of the
ratio of assets to the ABO to 91.5 percent.
(19.) To prevent distortion in the measure of current compensation
of federal government employees, most federal catch-up contributions are
treated as capital transfers in the NIPAs.
(20.) These plans invest almost entirely in special Treasury
securities. As these are a liability of the employer, in a strict sense,
the federal plans are unfunded.
Table 1. Household Wealth and Income from Private Defined
Benefit Plans: Cash Accounting Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Opening balance 2,011.7 1,918.4 1,755.0
2 Household income 96.1 110.2 149.3
3 Employer contributions 32.8 52.2 100.2
4 Investment income from plan
assets 63.3 58.0 49.1
5 Plan administrative expenses 7.3 7.2 6.9
6 Net benefits 117.4 123.8 133.7
7 Household saving (2 - 5 - 6) -28.6 -20.8 8.7
8 Holding gains/losses on plan
assets -74.1 -139.4 -130.9
9 Net transfers and other
sources of difference
between reported
beginning-of-year and
end-of-year assets (1) -0.5 -4.4 -7.0
10 Reported end-of-year assets
(1 + 7 + 8 + 9) 1,908.5 1,753.8 1,625.9
11 Other changes in value of
assets (2) 9.9 1.3 31.7
12 Change in wealth
(7 + 8 + 9 + 11) -93.3 -163.4 -97.4
Addenda:
13 Number of active participants
(millions) (3) 22.4 22.4 22.2
14 Total number of participants
(millions) 41.7 42.1 42.9
16 Personal income, NIPAs 8,559.4 8,883.3 9,060.1
Line 2003 2004
1 Opening balance 1,657.6 1,944.7
2 Household income 149.7 149.2
3 Employer contributions 100.8 95.4
4 Investment income from plan
assets 48.9 53.8
5 Plan administrative expenses 7.4 8.3
6 Net benefits 134.8 141.1
7 Household saving (2 - 5 - 6) 7.5 -0.2
8 Holding gains/losses on plan
assets 277.2 167.3
9 Net transfers and other
sources of difference
between reported
beginning-of-year and
end-of-year assets (1) -2.5 10.0
10 Reported end-of-year assets
(1 + 7 + 8 + 9) 1,939.7 2,121.8
11 Other changes in value of
assets (2) 5.0 -16.0
12 Change in wealth
(7 + 8 + 9 + 11) 287.1 161.1
Addenda:
13 Number of active participants
(millions) (3) 21.6 21.0
14 Total number of participants
(millions) 42.8 42.7
16 Personal income, NIPAs 9,378.1 10,485.9
Line 2005 2006
1 Opening balance 2,105.8 2,227.4
2 Household income 149.8 155.7
3 Employer contributions 92.7 89.0
4 Investment income from plan
assets 57.1 66.7
5 Plan administrative expenses 8.6 9.4
6 Net benefits 138.8 149.7
7 Household saving (2 - 5 - 6) 2.5 -3.5
8 Holding gains/losses on plan
assets 126.5 230.9
9 Net transfers and other
sources of difference
between reported
beginning-of-year and
end-of-year assets (1) -7.3 31.2
10 Reported end-of-year assets
(1 + 7 + 8 + 9) 2,227.4 2,485.9
11 Other changes in value of
assets (2) -2.5 n.a.
12 Change in wealth
(7 + 8 + 9 + 11) 119.1 258.6
Addenda:
13 Number of active participants
(millions) (3) 20.4 19.9
14 Total number of participants
(millions) 42.5 42.2
16 Personal income, NIPAs 11,268.1 11,894.1
n.a. Not available
(1.) Consists of data discrepancies as measured by comparing opening
and closing balance sheets reported by the plans to the income and
holding gains reported by the plans.
(2.) Difference between reported assets at year end and the assets
that the tax returns for the following year show as present at the
beginning of that year after adjustments for missing tax returns.
(3.) Includes 0.7 million participants in frozen plans in 2005 and 0.9
million participants in frozen plans in 2006. (Frozen plans cannot be
identified before 2005.)
NOTE. Totals for 2000, 2001, and 2002 include imputations for missing
observations. The reported totals have been adjusted up by 15.7
percent, 9.2 percent, and 5.3 percent in 2000, 2001, and 2002,
respectively.
Table 2. Household Income and Wealth From Private Defined Benefit
Plans: ABO Accrual Accounting Approach
[Billions of dollars]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Opening ABO current liability at
interest rates used by plans 1,761.1 1,852.2 1,932.8
2 Effect of changing to 6 percent
interest rate 12.9 -7.6 21.6
3 Opening ABO current liability at
6 percent interest rate 1,773.9 1,844.6 1,954.4
4 Benefits accrued 66.6 70.5 76.1
5 Employee contributions 0.8 0.7 1.1
6 Benefits accrued net of
employee contributions 65.8 69.8 75.0
7 Interest cost of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 106.4 110.7 117.3
8 Household income, ABO approach
(6 + 7) 172.3 180.5 192.3
9 Net benefits paid 117.4 123.8 133.7
10 Household saving, at 6 percent
rate (8 - 9) 54.8 56.7 58.6
11 Other factors (1) 15.8 53.1 58.3
12 Change in current liability at 6
percent interest rate 70.7 109.8 116.9
13 Effect of change in interest rate
assumption to 6 percent 20.5 -29.2 30.9
14 Change in current liability, at
rates used by plans (12 + 13) 91.2 80.6 147.8
Addenda:
19 Assets as percent of current
liability at rates used by
plans 114.2 103.6 90.8
20 Assets as percent of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 113.4 104.0 89.8
21 Assets as percent of current
liability, excluding plans with
missing values, at rates used
by plans 116.3 103.9 92.8
Line 2003 2004
1 Opening ABO current liability at
interest rates used by plans 2,080.7 2,066.2
2 Effect of changing to 6 percent
interest rate -9.3 64.7
3 Opening ABO current liability at
6 percent interest rate 2,071.3 2,130.9
4 Benefits accrued 75.3 71.3
5 Employee contributions 0.9 0.8
6 Benefits accrued net of
employee contributions 75.4 70.5
7 Interest cost of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 124.3 127.9
8 Household income, ABO approach
(6 + 7) 198.7 198.4
9 Net benefits paid 134.8 141.1
10 Household saving, at 6 percent
rate (8 - 9) 63.9 57.3
11 Other factors (1) -4.3 93.9
12 Change in current liability at 6
percent interest rate 59.5 151.1
13 Effect of change in interest rate
assumption to 6 percent -74.0 61.4
14 Change in current liability, at
rates used by plans (12 + 13) -14.5 212.6
Addenda:
19 Assets as percent of current
liability at rates used by
plans 79.7 94.1
20 Assets as percent of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 80.0 91.3
21 Assets as percent of current
liability, excluding plans with
missing values, at rates used
by plans 81.4 96.3
Line 2005 2006
1 Opening ABO current liability at
interest rates used by plans 2,278.7 2,346.1
2 Effect of changing to 6 percent
interest rate 3.3 -58.9
3 Opening ABO current liability at
6 percent interest rate 2,282.0 2,287.2
4 Benefits accrued 75.3 79.4
5 Employee contributions 1.0 0.9
6 Benefits accrued net of
employee contributions 74.3 78.5
7 Interest cost of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 136.9 137.3
8 Household income, ABO approach
(6 + 7) 211.3 215.6
9 Net benefits paid 138.8 149.8
10 Household saving, at 6 percent
rate (8 - 9) 72.5 66.0
11 Other factors (1) -69.9 n.a.
12 Change in current liability at 6
percent interest rate 2.6 n.a.
13 Effect of change in interest rate
assumption to 6 percent 62.2 n.a.
14 Change in current liability, at
rates used by plans (12 + 13) 64.8 n.a.
Addenda:
19 Assets as percent of current
liability at rates used by
plans 92.4 94.9
20 Assets as percent of current
liability at 6 percent interest
rate 92.3 97.4
21 Assets as percent of current
liability, excluding plans with
missing values, at rates used
by plans 96.4 93.8
n.a. Nat available
ABO Accrued benefit obligation
(1.) Includes effects of experience, changes in assumptions other than
the interest rate, and plan amendments.
NOTE. Totals for 2000, 2001, and 2002 include imputations for missing
observations. The reported totals have been adjusted up by 15.7
percent, 9.2 percent, and 5.3 percent in 2000, 2001, and 2002,
respectively.
Table 3. Benefit Payments and Benefit Obligations of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
Income or expense:
1 Benefits and assistance to plans 1.0 1.2 1.9
2 Government social benefits, NIPAs 0.9 1.1 1.7
3 Investment income from assets 0.9 0.9 1.0
4 Interest cost of liability for future
benefits, single employer plans 0.7 0.8 1.1
5 Administrative expenses 0.2 0.2 0.2
6 Premium income 0.8 0.8 0.8
Assets and benefit liability:
7 Net assets, before benefit liability 20.3 21.2 25.0
8 Present value of future benefits,
trusteed plans 9.4 12.7 21.7
9 Future benefits of trusteed plans plus
projected net cost of probable
terminations 10.6 13.5 28.6
10 PBGC net position (7-9) 9.7 7.7 -3.6
Addenda:
11 Number of participants receiving
benefits (millions) 0.2 0.3 0.3
12 Interest rate assumption
(for first 20 years) 7.0 6.7 5.7
Line 2003 2004 2005
Income or expense:
1 Benefits and assistance to plans 2.5 3.0 3.7
2 Government social benefits, NIPAs 2.3 2.4 2.6
3 Investment income from assets 1.0 1.0 1.4
4 Interest cost of liability for future
benefits, single employer plans 1.8 1.9 2.6
5 Administrative expenses 0.2 0.3 0.3
6 Premium income 1.0 1.5 1.5
Assets and benefit liability:
7 Net assets, before benefit liability 33.4 37.5 47.0
8 Present value of future benefits,
trusteed plans 38.9 43.3 57.3
9 Future benefits of trusteed plans plus
projected net cost of probable
terminations 44.6 60.8 69.7
10 PBGC net position (7-9) -11.2 -23.3 -22.8
Addenda:
11 Number of participants receiving
benefits (millions) 0.5 0.5 0.7
12 Interest rate assumption
(for first 20 years) 4.4 4.8 5.2
Line 2006 2007 2008
Income or expense:
1 Benefits and assistance to plans 4.2 4.3 4.4
2 Government social benefits, NIPAs 2.5 2.6 n.a.
3 Investment income from assets 1.9 2.2 2.3
4 Interest cost of liability for future
benefits, single employer plans 3.2 3.3 3.4
5 Administrative expenses 0.3 0.4 0.4
6 Premium income 1.5 1.6 1.5
Assets and benefit liability:
7 Net assets, before benefit liability 51.0 56.1 49.3
8 Present value of future benefits,
trusteed plans 63.9 65.1 56.6
9 Future benefits of trusteed plans plus
projected net cost of probable
terminations 69.1 69.2 60.0
10 PBGC net position (7-9) -18.1 -13.1 -10.7
Addenda:
11 Number of participants receiving
benefits (millions) 0.6 0.6 0.6
12 Interest rate assumption
(for first 20 years) 4.9 5.3 6.7
n.a. Not available
Table 4. Railroad Retirement Board Tier II Taxes and Benefits
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
2000 2001 2002
Receipts from payroll taxes 2.9 2.8 2.7
Employer portion of payroll taxes 2.3 2.2 2.1
Investment income on assets of Railroad
Retirement Account and National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust 1.3 2.0 1.9
Benefit payments 3.0 3.0 3.2
Net of employee portion of payroll tax 2.3 2.3 2.6
Railroad Retirement Account balance 17.0 18.9 18.6
National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust
balance 0.0 0.0 1.4
Holding gains on assets of National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust n.a. n.a. -0.1
Number of beneficiaries (millions) 0.8 0.7 0.7
2003 2004 2005
Receipts from payroll taxes 2.7 2.6 2.6
Employer portion of payroll taxes 2.0 1.9 1.9
Investment income on assets of Railroad
Retirement Account and National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust 0.6 0.4 0.4
Benefit payments 3.5 3.6 3.7
Net of employee portion of payroll tax 2.8 2.9 3.0
Railroad Retirement Account balance 0.5 0.6 0.6
National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust
balance 23.0 25.0 27.6
Holding gains on assets of National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust 2.7 3.0 3.1
Number of beneficiaries (millions) 0.7 0.7 0.7
2006 2007 2008
Receipts from payroll taxes 2.7 2.6 2.6
Employer portion of payroll taxes 2.0 2.0 2.0
Investment income on assets of Railroad
Retirement Account and National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust 0.6 0.5 0.6
Benefit payments 3.8 4.1 4.1
Net of employee portion of payroll tax 3.1 3.4 3.5
Railroad Retirement Account balance 0.5 0.6 0.6
National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust
balance 29.3 32.6 25.3
Holding gains on assets of National Railroad
Retirement Investment Trust 2.2 4.2 -6.5
Number of beneficiaries (millions) 0.6 0.6 0.6
n.a. Not available
NOTES. In 2007, employer's tax rate tpr nonsocial security portion of
railroad pension was about 12 percent, and the employee's tax rate was
about 4 percent. At an interest rate of 7.5 percent, a projected
benefit obligation estimate of the normal cost rate was 6.26 percent
of payroll.
At an interest rate of 7.5 percent, a projected benefit obligation
estimate of the present value of accrued future benefits as of the end
of 2007 is $66.4 billion, which implies a funded ratio of about 50
percent based on 2007 assets.
Table 5. Household Income and Wealth From State and Local Government
Defined Benefit Plans: Cash Accounting Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Household income 122.6 109.5 110.6
2 Employer contributions 39.5 38.8 42.1
3 Investment income from plan
assets 83.1 70.6 68.5
4 Plan administrative expenses 6.0 7.5 7.6
5 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 74.7 82.6 91.7
6 Benefits and withdrawals 100.4 109.6 119.6
7 Employee contributions 25.7 27.0 27.9
8 Household saving(1 + 4 + 5) 42.0 19.3 11.3
9 Holding gains on plan assets 61.8 -77.9 -69.6
10 Net transfers and other
changes in value of assets 22.0 53.2 47.4
11 Change in assets (8 + 9 + 10) 125.8 -5.3 -10.9
12 Closing assets 2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9
Addenda:
13 Active participants (millions) 13.5 13.8 14.1
14 Total participants (millions) 22.4 23.2 23.9
Line 2003 2004
1 Household income 128.6 141.0
2 Employer contributions 53.1 59.8
3 Investment income from plan
assets 75.5 81.3
4 Plan administrative expenses 7.6 9.0
5 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 101.1 109.3
6 Benefits and withdrawals 130.5 140.1
7 Employee contributions 29.4 30.8
8 Household saving(1 + 4 + 5) 19.8 22.7
9 Holding gains on plan assets 113.6 201.8
10 Net transfers and other
changes in value of assets 24.7 29.2
11 Change in assets (8 + 9 + 10) 158.1 253.8
12 Closing assets 2,305.0 2,558.8
Addenda:
13 Active participants (millions) 14.1 14.1
14 Total participants (millions) 24.3 24.8
Line 2005 2006
1 Household income 147.8 161.2
2 Employer contributions 60.9 67.8
3 Investment income from plan
assets 86.9 93.4
4 Plan administrative expenses 10.0 12.5
5 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 117.4 127.5
6 Benefits and withdrawals 149.0 160.5
7 Employee contributions 31.6 33.0
8 Household saving(1 + 4 + 5) 20.4 21.2
9 Holding gains on plan assets 187.7 288.0
10 Net transfers and other
changes in value of assets -9.9 50.7
11 Change in assets (8 + 9 + 10) 198.2 359.9
12 Closing assets 2,757.0 3,116.9
Addenda:
13 Active participants (millions) 14.2 14.4
14 Total participants (millions) 25.4 26.1
Table 6. Household Income and Wealth From State and Local
Government Defined Benefit Plans: PBO Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Household income 219.3 236.2 251.7
2 Employer's normal cost
excluding administrative
expenses 41.0 43.9 46.1
3 Imputed interest on plans'
benefit liability 178.3 192.3 205.7
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 74.7 82.7 91.6
5 Household saving (1 + 4) 144.6 153.6 160.1
6 Actuarial liability of plans 2,218.1 2,393.3 2,560.7
7 Assets of plans (market value) 2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 55.0 235.5 413.8
9 Funded ratio (percent) 97.5 90.2 83.8
Addenda:
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percent of payroll 11.1 45.2 76.3
11 Employer's normal cost per
active participant (dollars) 3,034.0 3,171.0 3,276.0
12 Employer's normal cost as a
percent of payroll 8.3 8.4 8.5
13 Investment rate of return
assumption (percent) 8.0 8.0 8.0
Line 2003 2004
1 Household income 265.2 278.6
2 Employer's normal cost
excluding administrative
expenses 46.9 47.4
3 Imputed interest on plans'
benefit liability 218.3 231.2
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 101.1 109.3
5 Household saving (1 + 4) 164.1 169.2
6 Actuarial liability of plans 2,730.6 2,902.4
7 Assets of plans (market value) 2,305.0 2,558.8
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 425.6 343.6
9 Funded ratio (percent) 84.4 88.2
Addenda:
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percent of payroll 76.4 59.9
11 Employer's normal cost per
active participant (dollars) 3,334.0 3,362.0
12 Employer's normal cost as a
percent of payroll 8.4 8.3
13 Investment rate of return
assumption (percent) 8.0 8.0
Line 2005 2006
1 Household income 294.7 313.6
2 Employer's normal cost
excluding administrative
expenses 49.0 51.7
3 Imputed interest on plans'
benefit liability 245.7 261.9
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 117.4 127.5
5 Household saving (1 + 4) 177.3 186.2
6 Actuarial liability of plans 3,088.3 3,296.3
7 Assets of plans (market value) 2,757.0 3,116.9
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 331.2 179.3
9 Funded ratio (percent) 89.3 94.6
Addenda:
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percent of payroll 55.6 28.7
11 Employer's normal cost per
active participant (dollars) 3,440.0 3,582.0
12 Employer's normal cost as a
percent of payroll 8.2 8.3
13 Investment rate of return
assumption (percent) 8.0 8.0
PBO Projected benefit obligation
Table 7. Household Income and Wealth From State and Local
Government Defined Benefit Plans: ABO Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Household income 175.3 193.3 207.1
2 Benefits accrued (net of
employee contributions and
administrative expenses) 55.0 60.8 64.2
3 Imputed interest on plans'
accrued liability 120.3 132.5 142.8
4 Benefits net of employee
contributions 74.7 82.7 91.6
5 Equals: accrued saving in
pension plans 100.6 110.6 115.4
6 Accrued liability 2,005.1 2,207.7 2,380.8
7 Assets (market value) 2,163.1 2,157.8 2,146.9
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability -158.0 49.9 233.9
9 Funded ratio (percent) 107.9 97.7 90.2
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percentage of payroll -32.0 9.6 43.1
11 Benefit accruals per active
participant (dollars) 4,068.0 4,395.0 4,569.0
12 Benefit accruals as a percent
of payroll 11.1 11.7 11.8
Line 2003 2004
1 Household income 219.4 232.4
2 Benefits accrued (net of
employee contributions and
administrative expenses) 65.9 67.6
3 Imputed interest on plans'
accrued liability 153.5 164.8
4 Benefits net of employee
contributions 101.1 109.3
5 Equals: accrued saving in
pension plans 118.3 123.1
6 Accrued liability 2,558.1 2,747.2
7 Assets (market value) 2,305.0 2,558.8
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 253.0 188.4
9 Funded ratio (percent) 90.1 93.1
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percentage of payroll 45.4 32.9
11 Benefit accruals per active
participant (dollars) 4,683.0 4,792.0
12 Benefit accruals as a percent
of payroll 11.8 11.8
Line 2005 2006
1 Household income 246.2 266.0
2 Benefits accrued (net of
employee contributions and
administrative expenses) 69.8 76.4
3 Imputed interest on plans'
accrued liability 176.4 189.6
4 Benefits net of employee
contributions 117.4 127.5
5 Equals: accrued saving in
pension plans 128.8 138.5
6 Accrued liability 2,939.3 3,159.7
7 Assets (market value) 2,757.0 3,116.9
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 182.3 42.7
9 Funded ratio (percent) 93.8 98.7
10 Unfunded actuarial liability
as a percentage of payroll 30.6 6.8
11 Benefit accruals per active
participant (dollars) 4,902.0 5,295.0
12 Benefit accruals as a percent
of payroll 11.7 12.2
ABO Accrued benefit obligation
NOTE. Estimates assume an interest rate of 6 percent.
Table 8. Household Income and Wealth From Federal Government
Defined Benefit Plans: Cash Accounting Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Household income 114.6 117.8 121.4
2 Employer contributions 66.6 68.6 72.2
4 Investment income from plan
assets 48.1 49.2 49.1
5 Plan administrative expenses 0.1 0.1 0.1
6 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 75.2 78.9 81.3
7 Benefits and withdrawals 79.9 83.6 85.9
8 Employee contributions 4.8 4.7 4.6
9 Household saving (1 - 5 - 6) 39.3 38.8 40.0
Addenda:
10 Assets, end of calendar year 691.4 751.0 789.0
11 Active participants (millions) 4.1 4.1 4.1
12 Total participants (millions) 8.6 8.6 8.7
Line 2003 2004 2005
1 Household income 118.6 128.3 134.7
2 Employer contributions 70.4 81.3 85.1
4 Investment income from plan
assets 48.2 47.0 49.6
5 Plan administrative expenses 0.1 0.1 0.1
6 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 83.1 87.2 92.4
7 Benefits and withdrawals 87.8 91.8 96.8
8 Employee contributions 4.6 4.6 4.5
9 Household saving (1 - 5 - 6) 35.3 41.0 42.2
Addenda:
10 Assets, end of calendar year 826.2 868.2 895.4
11 Active participants (millions) 4.1 4.2 4.1
12 Total participants (millions) 8.7 8.7 8.7
Line 2006 2007
1 Household income 139.1 147.4
2 Employer contributions 91.2 98.0
4 Investment income from plan
assets 47.9 49.4
5 Plan administrative expenses 0.1 0.1
6 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 98.3 104.1
7 Benefits and withdrawals 102.7 108.3
8 Employee contributions 4.4 4.2
9 Household saving (1 - 5 - 6) 40.9 43.2
Addenda:
10 Assets, end of calendar year 931.9 965.6
11 Active participants (millions) 4.1 4.1
12 Total participants (millions) 8.7 8.7
Table 9. Household Income and Wealth From Federal Government
Defined Benefit Plans: PBO Approach
[Billions of dollars except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Normal cost for benefits, net
of employee contributions 29.3 33.0 37.1
2 Imputed interest on actuarial
liability 113.3 116.7 116.9
3 Actuarial income of households
(1 + 2) 142.6 149.7 154.0
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 75.2 78.9 81.3
5 Actuarial saving of households
(3 - 4) 67.5 70.8 72.7
6 Actuarial liability of plans 1,762.3 1,821.2 1,859.8
7 Assets of plans (end of
calendar year) 691.4 751.0 789.0
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 1,070.9 1,070.2 1,070.8
9 Funded ratio (percent) 39.2 41.2 42.4
10 Average normal cost per active
employee 8,352.0 9,231.0 10,201.0
11 Actuarial saving less cash
accounting saving 28.1 32.0 32.7
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: civilian plans
12 Interest rate 7.0 6.8 6.8
13 Inflation rate 4.0 3.8 3.8
14 Projected salary increase rate 4.3 4.3 4.3
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: military plans
15 Interest rate 6.3 6.3 6.3
16 Inflation rate 3.0 3.5 3.0
17 Projected salary increase rate 3.5 3.5 3.5
Line 2003 2004 2005
1 Normal cost for benefits, net
of employee contributions 33.9 33.7 37.1
2 Imputed interest on actuarial
liability 114.8 118.4 126.9
3 Actuarial income of households
(1 + 2) 148.7 152.1 164.0
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 83.1 87.2 92.4
5 Actuarial saving of households
(3 - 4) 65.5 64.9 71.7
6 Actuarial liability of plans 1,929.4 2,067.9 2,169.2
7 Assets of plans (end of
calendar year) 826.2 868.2 895.4
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 1,103.2 1,199.7 1,273.8
9 Funded ratio (percent) 42.8 42.0 41.3
10 Average normal cost per active
employee 9,322.0 9,229.0 10,100.0
11 Actuarial saving less cash
accounting saving 30.2 23.9 29.4
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: civilian plans
12 Interest rate 6.3 6.3 6.3
13 Inflation rate 3.3 3.3 3.3
14 Projected salary increase rate 4.0 4.0 4.0
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: military plans
15 Interest rate 6.3 6.3 6.3
16 Inflation rate 3.0 3.0 3.0
17 Projected salary increase rate 3.8 3.8 3.8
Line 2006 2007 2008
1 Normal cost for benefits, net
of employee contributions 38.0 40.9 42.0
2 Imputed interest on actuarial
liability 133.0 139.6 145.6
3 Actuarial income of households
(1 + 2) 171.0 180.5 187.6
4 Benefits, net of employee
contributions 98.3 104.1 109.0
5 Actuarial saving of households
(3 - 4) 72.7 76.4 78.6
6 Actuarial liability of plans 2,316.1 2,415.1 2,608.9
7 Assets of plans (end of
calendar year) 931.9 965.6 1,029.7
Addenda:
8 Unfunded actuarial liability 1,384.2 1,449.5 1,579.2
9 Funded ratio (percent) 40.2 40.0 39.5
10 Average normal cost per active
employee 10,324.0 11,043.0 11,074.0
11 Actuarial saving less cash
accounting saving 32.1 33.2 n.a.
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: civilian plans
12 Interest rate 6.3 6.3 6.3
13 Inflation rate 3.5 3.5 3.5
14 Projected salary increase rate 4.3 4.3 4.3
Assumptions for actuarial
estimates: military plans
15 Interest rate 6.0 6.0 5.8
16 Inflation rate 3.0 3.0 3.0
17 Projected salary increase rate 3.8 3.8 3.8
n.a. Not available
PBO Projected benefit obligation
Table 10. Comparison of Cash Accounting and Actuarial Measures of
Defined Benefit Pension Income and Wealth of U.S. Households
[Percent of disposable personal income except as noted]
Line 2000 2001 2002
1 Household income, cash
accounting approach 4.6 4.4 4.8
2 Household income, actuarial
approach 6.7 6.9 6.9
3 Compensation, cash
accounting approach 1.9 2.0 2.7
4 Compensation, actuarial
approach 2.0 2.1 2.2
5 Interest and dividend
income, cash accounting 2.7 2.3 2.1
6 Interest income, actuarial
approach 4.6 4.7 4.7
7 Household saving, cash
accounting approach 0.7 0.4 0.7
8 Household saving, actuarial
approach 3.0 3.1 3.1
9 Household pension wealth,
cash accounting 65.3 61.2 57.3
10 Household pension wealth,
actuarial approach 79.4 80.1 80.6
11 Disposable personal income,
NIPAs (billions of dollars) 7,327.2 7,648.5 8,009.7
Line 2003 2004
1 Household income, cash
accounting approach 4.7 4.7
2 Household income, actuarial
approach 6.8 6.6
3 Compensation, cash
accounting approach 2.7 2.7
4 Compensation, actuarial
approach 2.1 1.9
5 Interest and dividend
income, cash accounting 2.1 2.1
6 Interest income, actuarial
approach 4.7 4.6
7 Household saving, cash
accounting approach 0.7 0.7
8 Household saving, actuarial
approach 3.0 2.8
9 Household pension wealth,
cash accounting 60.9 62.8
10 Household pension wealth,
actuarial approach 81.6 81.0
11 Disposable personal income,
NIPAs (billions of dollars) 8,377.8 8,889.4
Line 2005 2006
1 Household income, cash
accounting approach 4.7 4.6
2 Household income, actuarial
approach 6.7 6.6
3 Compensation, cash
accounting approach 2.6 2.5
4 Compensation, actuarial
approach 2.0 1.9
5 Interest and dividend
income, cash accounting 2.1 2.1
6 Interest income, actuarial
approach 4.8 4.7
7 Household saving, cash
accounting approach 0.7 0.6
8 Household saving, actuarial
approach 2.9 2.8
9 Household pension wealth,
cash accounting 63.9 66.4
10 Household pension wealth,
actuarial approach 82.7 81.0
11 Disposable personal income,
NIPAs (billions of dollars) 9,277.3 9,915.7