文章基本信息

标题：Is Information a Sufficient Basis for Cognition? Part 1: Critique of Dretske’s Approach
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作者：José María Díaz Nafría ; Universidad de León, Spain ; Mario Pérez-Montoro 等
期刊名称：tripleC : Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society
印刷版ISSN：1726-670X
出版年度：2011
卷号：9
期号：2
页码：358-366
语种：English
出版社：University of Salzburg
摘要：Based upon the natural limits of observation, we tackle a critical review of Dretske’s approach to information, knowledge and perception. The physics of the manifestation of an arbitrary object –tackled in Part 2 as a separate article– sets forth an informational boundary stating that information cannot be enough to support our cognitive processes. The problems do not rely –as Dretske supposes- on the lacks of the channel, but on the very nature of observation. Furthermore, Dretske’s approach –handcuffed to his maximalist support on information- presents some lacks concerning processual character of information, fuzziness of perception and knowledge, contents de dicto and conventional regularities. The posed limits and problems intend to settle new foundations for a more refined conjunction of information and knowledge.
关键词：Physics of observation; Waves; Inverse problem; Theory of perception; Biophysics; Dretske; Epistemology; Communication; Cognition; Signal; Information content; Information flow