文章基本信息

标题：REFERIR-SE-ÃO AS CATEGORIAS PSICOLÓGICAS ORDINÁRIAS A CAUSAS INTERNAS DO COMPORTAMENTO?
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作者：Filipe Lazzeri
期刊名称：Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia
电子版ISSN：1982-2928
出版年度：2012
卷号：18
期号：1
页码：41-73
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Goiás
摘要：Armstrong and Lewis' account of ordinary psychological concepts is couched in terms of a synthesis between behaviorism and Cartesianism. Their approach supports fundamentally two theses, viz.: (a) that such concepts explain and predict behavior by referring to inner (i.e., proper of the inside body) entities that occupy the relevant roles of bringing it about; and (b) that the occupiers of these roles are identical with brain entities and, eventually, inner substrata of other physical constitution, in the sense of type-type (rather than token-token) identities (though with qualifications). On the one hand, this approach opposes the idea that such concepts do not refer to inner causes; but, on the other, it proposes a sort of materialistic view, and conceives of them as having logical connections with behavioral relations of the organism as a whole with aspects of the larger environment. The present work aims at suggesting that (1) this approach is not plausible, by presenting it several objections; and also that (2) Armstrong and Lewis' criticisms of behavioral perspectives do not touch at least a particular one, which is here sketched (though briefly) and favored.
关键词：Psychological categories;Causal theory of the mind;Behavior;Behaviorism.;categorias psicológicas;teoria causal da mente;comportamento;behaviorismo.