文章基本信息

标题：Metaphor, skepticism, understanding
本地全文：下载
作者：Helena Martins
期刊名称：Ilha do Desterro
印刷版ISSN：0101-4846
电子版ISSN：2175-8026
出版年度：2007
卷号：0
期号：53
页码：109-122
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
摘要：This paper examines the idea that metaphor is a basic cognitive tool from a Wittgensteinian point of view. One specific aspect of Wittgenstein’s legacy is explored, namely his account of verbal understanding. Two interconnected and notoriously difficult features of this account are highlighted and discussed: the idea that linguistic understanding is not an event or a process, but an “abiding condition” (Philosophical Investigations, §143-84); and the idea that neither the meaning of a linguistic expression nor our understanding of it can ever go beyond our capacity of explaining it (Philosophical Investigations, §75). This perspective is shown to be particularly apt in reflecting upon the virtues of metaphor as a means of understanding, especially because it allows for the avoidance of both essentialist and skeptical accounts.
关键词：metaphor; understanding; explanation; skepticism